(2) determinate ground (as ground |¯for¯| determinate content).
Its transition into
(3) thing-in-itself (transition into

The usual [formulation]: "Everything has its sufficient ground."
"The meaning of this proposition consists in nothing other than this: that everything which is, must be considered not as immediate being, but as posited; it must not stop at immediate determinate being or at determinateness in general, but must return from them to its ground"... It is superfluous to add:
Leibniz, who made the law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy, understood this more profoundly. "Leibniz opposed the sufficiency of ground primarily to causality in the strict sense of the word, as the mechanical mode of action" (76) [528]. He sought the "Beziehung" der Ursachen* (77) [528-529], — the whole as essential unity.
He sought ends, but teleology
... "One cannot ask how form comes to essence, for the former is merely the shining [reflection] of the latter within itself, its own proper reflection inherent (sic!) in it"... (81) [532-533].
Form is essential. Essence is formed. One way or another depending on essence...
Essence as formless identity (with itself) becomes matter.
* — "relation" of causes. Ed.

130
V. I. LENIN

"... It" (die Materie) "is its own ground or substratum of form"... (82) [533].
"If one abstracts from all determinations, from every form of something or other, there remains indeterminate matter. Matter is something simply abstract.
(— Matter cannot be seen, touched, etc.; what is seen, touched, is already determinate matter, i.e., the unity of matter and form)" (82) [534].
Matter is not the ground of form, but the unity of ground and grounded. Matter is passive, form is active (tätiges) (83). "Matter must be formed, and form must become material"... (84) [535].

NB

... "Both, the action of form and the movement of matter, are one and the same... Matter as such is determined or necessarily has some form, while form is simply material, stable form" (86) [538].

Remark: "The formal mode of explanation from tautologous grounds."
Very often indeed, especially in the physical sciences, "grounds" explain things tautologically: the movement of the earth is explained by the "attractive force" of the sun. But what is attractive force? Also movement!! (92) [544]. Empty tautology: why does this man travel to the city? Because of the attractive force of the city! (93) [544]. It also happens that in science one puts forward first as "ground" — molecules, ether, "electric matter" (95-96) [547], etc., and then it turns out that "they" (these concepts) "are actually determinations derived from that which they are supposed to ground, are hypotheses and fabrications derived from uncritical reflection"... Or one says that we "do not know the inner essence of these very forces and matters themselves"... (96) [547], in which case there is supposedly nothing to "explain," but simply to confine oneself to facts...

The real ground* ... is not tautology, but already "another determination of the content" (97) [548-549].

* — real ground. Ed.

131