In a number of local centers, especially working-class ones, the role of the Soviets turned out to be particularly significant. A monopoly of power emerged; the bourgeoisie was completely disarmed and reduced to complete submission; wages were raised, the working day was shortened without any reduction in production; food supplies were secured; control over production and distribution was begun; all old authorities were removed; the revolutionary initiative of the peasants was encouraged both in the question of power (removal of all old authorities and creation of new ones) and in the question of land.

In the capital and some major centers, the opposite phenomenon is observed: the composition of the Soviets is less proletarian; in the executive committees the influence of petty-bourgeois elements is incomparably broader, and moreover—especially in the commissions—"collaboration with the bourgeoisie," which halts the revolutionary initiative of the masses, bureaucratizes the revolutionary movement of the masses and their revolutionary tasks, obstructs all revolutionary measures capable of "affecting" capitalists.

It is entirely natural and inevitable that after the greatest development of revolutionary energy in the capital, where the people and especially the workers made the maximum sacrifice for the overthrow of tsarism,—in the capital, where the central state power turned out to be overthrown and the most centralized power of capital gave maximum power to capitalists,—the power of the Soviets (and the power of the proletariat) turned out to be weak, the task of the further development of the revolution turned out to be particularly difficult, the transition to the new stage of the revolution particularly painful, the resistance of the bourgeoisie at its strongest.

From this it follows: while in the capitals and largest centers the main efforts must be directed toward preparing forces to complete the second stage of the revolution,—locally one can and must move the revolution further directly and, implementing the monopoly of power of the Soviets of workers' deputies, developing the revolutionary energy of the masses of workers and peasants, transitioning to control over production and distribution of products, etc.

The following course of development of the revolution emerged: (1) removal of the old power in the center; (2) seizure of power by the bourgeoisie by virtue of the unpreparedness of the proletariat for gigantic all-state tasks; (3) transition of the revolution to the localities; (4) in the localities very often, especially in proletarian centers, communes and development of the revolutionary energy of the masses; (5) land—they seize, etc.; (6) factories; control over them; (7) monopoly of power; (8) local, municipal revolution moves forward; (9) bureaucratization, submission to the bourgeoisie in the center.

Conclusions:

(α) 1: preparation in the center (preparation of forces for a new revolution);

(β) 2: move the revolution forward (power? land? factories?) in the localities;

(γ) 3: communes in the localities, i.e. (αα) complete autonomy of the localities; on their own initiative; (ββ) without police, without officials, all-powerful rule of armed workers' and peasants' masses;

(δ) 4: struggle against the bureaucratizing and bourgeois-pacifying influence of petty-bourgeois elements;

(ε) 5: gathering of experience from the localities for pushing the center forward: the "localities" become the model.

(ζ) 6: explanation to the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers that the cause of the success of the revolution in the localities is the monopoly of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

(η) 7: of course, it is more difficult in the center, it requires more time.

+ (г) 8: development of the revolution by communes formed from the suburbs and quarters of large cities…

(κ) 9: transformation (in the capitals, etc.) into "servants of the bourgeoisie."

Written April 25–26 (May 8–9) 1917

First published in 1925 in Leninsky Sbornik IV

Printed from the manuscript