In view of the important significance of the Central Committee's position in the intra-party conflict, I consider it necessary to publish the following documents for general information:

I. Letters of Comrade Glebov to members of the "collegium."

a) September.

"Relations with the Central Organization and the League have still not been settled. After our declaration, I must say, they have become emboldened and their appetites are growing. Our position here is very difficult: foreign affairs are in the hands of the League, private sources are in the hands of the Central Organization, and therefore we are indebted up to our necks. Squeezed by need (burdened with up to 9,000 dollars in debt), I am forced to think of some way out. Therefore I turned to the minority with a proposal to draft for me a project of reforms desirable to them."

b) September 7.

"Yesterday evening, in the presence of S., I had a business meeting with three delegates from the minority: Popov, Blumenfeld, and Martov."

From the questions discussed at this gathering, which, according to Glebov, "turned into a preliminary meeting to prepare for peace," we note the following:

I. Organizational relations abroad.

"The Central Committee, the Central Organization, and the League take upon themselves responsibility for the Russian movement. To eliminate mutual friction, greater interest in work, and complete trust, general directing conduct of affairs is entrusted to a commission of representatives from the Central Committee, the Central Organization, and the League. The Central Committee has two votes and the right of veto…"

II. Transport.

"The Central Organization is subordinated to the control of the Central Committee with a certain autonomy. Namely: there can be only one expedition abroad—the Central Committee's expedition. Direction of its own border remains in the hands of the Central Organization. Distribution of literature in Russia belongs to the Central Committee. To ensure more autonomous existence for the Central Organization, the south is granted to it. Let me clarify. The Central Organization has transport. The Central Organization fears that in case of a change of government they will be deprived of the route. Therefore the Central Organization asks to guarantee them the route through organizational means."

c) September 7.

"Dan and perhaps others are terribly angry about the agreement concluded yesterday on conducting affairs. What a voracious public! They want to set up here a foreign committee of representatives from the Central Organization, the Central Committee, and the League, deciding everything abroad; of course, each has only one vote. Not bad, eh?"

d) September.

"I draw attention to the expressed wish of the Council concerning replenishment (the matter concerns replenishing the representation of the Central Committee in the Council). It will be necessary to choose someone in place of Lenin, which he will of course declare illegal. I would propose choosing either Dan or Deich for the Council, with the precise stipulation that they are authorized only for sitting in the Council. It seems there is no one else to choose."

II. Letter of a Central Committee agent (now officially co-opted into the Central Committee) to comrade Glebov:

September 4.

"Over the declaration there has arisen such a mess that it's hard to make sense of it. One thing is clear: all committees, except Kharkov, Crimea, Mountainous Plant, and Don—are committees of the majority. Don seems to be neutral, but it is not known for certain. Of the "majority" committees—Riga, Moscow, Petersburg, and Northern have expressed to the Central Committee distrust over the declaration, as I reported to you earlier. The Central Committee received complete trust from a very insignificant number of committees. The rest expressed trust in it on condition of reconciliation—with the stipulation that in case of failure an emergency congress be convened immediately. Some of the latter make reconciliation conditional on the minority's refusal to consider itself a "faction" and refusal to demand co-optation as a "faction" (?). There's the picture. In case reconciliation fails, the Central Committee loses the trust of the majority of committees and, consequently, will itself have to agitate for a congress in order to hand over its powers. From the mood of the committees it is clearly evident that at a congress resolutions will pass in the spirit of the Twenty-Two, i.e., removal of the editorial board and its transfer into the hands of the majority, alteration of the Council of the Party, etc. But in order for reconciliation to satisfy the committees, the condition I've already written to you about is necessary—that is, the minority's acceptance of the declaration and its refusal to consider itself a "faction." If they do this, I think Lenin will lose ground in Russia and peace can be restored. Your phrase about how things with Martov are "gradually" being set in order surprised me. The obstinacy of editorial board members is beginning to directly embitter me, and I, despite ideological and other sympathies toward them, am beginning to lose confidence in them as political "leaders." They have fully clarified the organizational question, and their further obstinacy in the absence of support from Russia (here the minority is powerless) will show that they are entering into struggle merely for positions."

Such is the beginning of the commercial transaction, and here is its finale:

The Central Committee sends a letter to the committees informing them that

"Negotiations will be concluded in the very near future (at most within two weeks), and for now we can report that 1) the Central Committee has not co-opted any minority into its composition (there is a rumor about this started by someone); …3) negotiations with the minority are being conducted in the same spirit as Valentin reported to you, i.e., if we speak of concessions, they can be only on the side of the minority and must consist in the renunciation of factional polemic by the Central Organization, in the dissolution of the minority's secret organization, in the refusal of co-optation of members into the Central Committee, in the transfer of all enterprises (technical apparatus, transport, communications) to the Central Committee. Only under these conditions is restoration of peace in the party possible. There are grounds to hope that this will indeed occur. In any case, if the minority now shows a desire to continue its old policy, the Central Committee will immediately cease negotiations and proceed to convene an emergency congress."

Thus the Central Committee reassures the committees expressing distrust toward it, and here are letters from "prominent" figures of the minority. Letters received in mid-December 1904, old style.

"At last we've had dealings with the riffraff. Their answer was this: they agree to autonomy of our technical institutions; as for the agitational commission, they are against it, finding that this is a direct function of the Central Committee (leadership of agitation) and that they prefer to this plan a reform of the Central Committee, but they cannot officially co-opt now and propose actual (unofficial) co-optation of three persons from the minority (Popov, Fomin, Fisher). Naturally, X. and I at once agreed, and henceforth the Menshevik opposition is officially abolished. It's as if a mountain has fallen from our shoulders. There is to be a meeting of the entire Central Committee together with us in a few days, and then we will schedule a conference of the nearest committees.

…We are of course fully confident that we will take over the Central Committee and direct it as we wish. This is all the easier because many of them already acknowledge the correctness of the minority's principled criticism… In all consistently hardline committees (in Baku, Odessa, Nizhny, and Petersburg) workers demand an elective system. This is a clear symptom of the agony of the hardliners."

Simultaneously with this, another letter was received:

"An agreement has been reached between the representatives of the 'minority' and the Central Committee. The representatives have been given a receipt. But given that there was no prior consultation with the 'minority,' naturally the receipt itself is not quite successful, since it expresses 'confidence' in the Central Committee rather than its unifying policy; it speaks of dissolution into the party and of cessation of separate existence, while in fact only the latter is sufficient. Finally, this receipt lacks the 'credo'* of the 'minority.' In view of this, it has been decided to pass through all organizations of the 'minority' a resolution with a 'credo'[21] and the indicated corrections, naturally acknowledging the agreement of our representatives with the Central Committee as concluded."

It is very probable that persons caught red-handed, exposed by these present documents, with the "moral sensitivity" characteristic of them, will make every effort to divert the party's attention from the content of the documents to the moral question of the right to publish them. I am confident that the party will not allow itself to be deceived by this sleight of hand. I declare that I take upon myself completely the moral responsibility for this present exposure and will provide all necessary clarifications before the arbitration court that will examine the entire matter as a whole.