*Date of the note not established. Written in response to A. Martynovʼs pamphlet "Two Dictatorships," published in Geneva at the beginning of 1905.*

**PERSPECTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION**
**(OF THE TYPE OF 1789 OR 1848)**
**[Beginning of 1905]**

The important question concerning the Russian revolution consists in this:

I Will it reach the complete overthrow of the tsarist government, [lead] to a republic,

II or will it limit itself to a curtailment, a restriction of tsarist power, to a monarchical constitution?

Or in other words: Are we destined for a revolution of the type of 1789 or of the type of 1848?*) (we say: "of the type" in order to eliminate the absurd idea of the possibility of a repetition of the irretrievably past social, political and international situation of 1789 and 1848).

That a social-democrat should wish for and strive toward the first—there can scarcely be any doubts about this.

Meanwhile, Martynovʼs formulation of the question falls completely toward a tail-ist desire for a more modest revolution. In the II-nd type the "danger" of the seizure of power by the proletariat and peasantry, which frightens the Martynovs, disappears altogether. It is inevitable for [social]-democracy to remain "oppositional" even in relation to the revolution in the second case—Martyanov precisely wants to remain in opposition even in relation to the revolution.

The question arises: which type is more probable?

In favor of I speaks: (1) An incomparably greater reserve of hatred and revolutionariness in the Russian lower classes than in Germany in 1848. We have a sharper break; between us and autocracy and political freedom there were and are no intermediate steps whatsoever (the zemstvo does not count), our despotism is Asiatic in its virginity. (2) In our case the unfortunate war makes a sharp collapse even more probable, for it entangles the tsarist government completely. (3) In our case the international situation is more favorable, for a proletarian Europe will make aid to Russian monarchy by European monarchs impossible. (4) In our case the development of consciously revolutionary parties, literature, and their organization is many times higher than in 1789, 1848 and 1871. (5) In our case there is a whole series of peoples oppressed by tsarism—Poles, Finns, etc.—which make the thrust against autocracy especially energetic. (6) In our case the peasantry is especially impoverished, pauperized incredibly, and has absolutely nothing left to lose.

All these considerations, of course, are far from absolute. One can oppose them with others: (1) There are very few remnants of feudalism among us. (2) The government is more experienced and disposes of greater means of recognizing revolutionary danger. (3) War complicates the immediacy of the revolutionary explosion with tasks extraneous to revolution. War proves the weakness of Russian revolutionary classes, which without the war were unable to rise (cf. Karl Kautsky in "The Social Revolution"¹). (4) From other countries there is no impetus for upheaval for us. (5) National movements toward the fragmentation of Russia are capable of tearing away from our revolution a mass of major and petty Russian bourgeoisie. (6) The antagonism of the proletariat and bourgeoisie in our case is much deeper than in 1789, 1848, 1871, and therefore the bourgeoisie will fear proletarian revolution more and will sooner throw itself into the arms of reaction.

To account for all these [considerations]—history alone, of course, will be able to do. Our task, [of social]-democracy, is to push the bourgeois revolution as far as possible, never forgetting our main task: the independent organization of the proletariat.

And here is where Martyanov becomes confused. A complete revolution is the seizure of power by the proletariat and the poor peasantry. And these classes, being in power, cannot but strive toward a socialist revolution. Ergo, the seizure of power, being at first a step in the democratic overturn, by the force of things, against the will (and sometimes even against the consciousness of) the participants, will **pass over** into a socialist one. And here a crash is inevitable. And once a crash of attempts at social-

*) NB: Here one might add—"or 1871?"? This question must be examined as a likely objection to us from many non-social-democrats.

¹) [Translator's note: References to Kautsky's works omitted in original]