# Date: 1904-01-02

The letter from L. B. Krasin of January 2, 1904 (December 20, 1903) printed below, which is a reply to the letter of N. K. Krupskaya of December 17, 1903 (above, document 134, pp. 65—68), is of particular interest as a detailed exposition of the viewpoint of one of the most authoritative Russian members of the Central Committee on the question of convening an emergency congress, put forward by Lenin. L. B. Krasin decisively speaks out against convening the congress. At this very time in Baku, L. B. Krasin had another member of the Central Committee, V. A. Noskov, and a conversation with him on this question further strengthened the author of the letter's negative attitude toward the idea of the congress.

# 156.
# L. B. KRASIN — TO THE FOREIGN BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[January 2, 1904 (December 20, 1903)*. Baku.]

Dear Comrades! The contents of your letter of 17/XII has considerably lowered our mood here, which had been raised after the news from Kiev about the agreement that took place.¹ We thought that, if complete oblivion of the past were impossible, at least a basis had been found for harmonious work and such gross manifestations of internal friction as obstruction by the minority had been eliminated. It turns out that is not the case at all. All of this is sad and repugnant to the last degree. It still seems to me that the present Central Committee must in no way capitulate; more than enough concessions have already been made. The main task of the near future is to develop activity as intensively as possible. The Central Committee must inundate the local committees with literature, issue leaflets of general party content as frequently as possible, constantly visit the committees to maintain personal ties, perpetually remind everyone of its existence, ring the bell in all corners, and not be disturbed if even at first some committees meet its people with a cold reception. If it fulfills its main functions, the ice of distrust will soon break; it is only necessary that the local committees tangibly feel themselves the benefit and support in their work that the Central Committee can and must give them. The main task of the latter at the present moment is the supply of literature to the committees, the organization of transport, and publishing work within the country. Decidedly from everywhere, from every corner comes one general cry: literature, literature, literature! The success and productivity of local work, at least in "peaceful" times, is conditioned above all by the ability of the committees to satisfy the incredibly great demand for illegal publications. In wartime, during demonstrations and such movements as the summer ones, leaflets are needed not in 1,000 but in hundreds of thousands of copies. The distribution of literature has no limits whatsoever, and the best way for local organizations to discredit themselves in the eyes of the masses is to demonstrate an inability to supply literature. If the Central Committee succeeds in resolving this task, then it is beyond question that its relations with the local committees will become the most intimate. If, moreover, it succeeds in organizing the delivery of *Iskra*, which, to tell the truth, has been almost entirely absent in Russia up to now, then no obstruction by the minority will be fearsome. To convene a congress now, in my opinion, is worse than useless. First of all, it will cost enormous sums of money, and there is none, and it is desperately needed to meet the most pressing needs. Take Baku, for instance. Two full and completely separate printing establishments, one with a new stereotyping machine, could produce from 60 to 80;² an announcement about the congress was issued in the amount of barely 30—40 due to lack of funds.³ Furthermore, if one spends 400—500 a month, one can organize transport through Batumi.⁴ Dozens of other equally important matters are being held up due to lack of money. Meanwhile, any such expenditure not only raises the moral significance of the Central Committee but also brings in new funds. The convening of a congress at the present moment is possible only at the cost of an almost complete cessation of the Central Committee's activity, and this is equivalent to the loss of the position already won and, on the whole, still strengthening. But let us suppose even that it succeeded in being carried out. The first question is: what will the delegates be like? If their composition is a true reflection of the sloppiness reigning in the heads of very many Russians, then I do not congratulate the party in advance on this new congress. As a result of its work, the same quarrels, if not worse ones, will occur. Such tangles as the present one are untangled (or destroyed) by life itself, that is, by the further development and maturation of the movement itself. From all that is now taking place, one begins to doubt whether the convening of a congress was not a political mistake. Would not the opposite path have been more correct, that is, the creation first of the Central Committee? But let us suppose even that the delegates prove equal to the situation. Under present conditions, very much will not come of it. After all, the main cause of disorder is not at all in the leaders of the minority, whom one may be able to overcome at the congress; it lies in the spinelessness of the Russian public, in its lack of understanding of the enormous importance of work for the common good, or, what is even worse, in its unwillingness or inability to observe discipline, even if theoretically it has come to an understanding of it. One must learn this too. What is the benefit in even the most authoritative decisions of the collegium if the local public does not understand or does not carry out such elementary rules as active subordination of the minority to the decisions of the majority? It is enough for a couple of loudmouths like Popov to discredit in the eyes of at least some committees any decisions whatsoever. There has never been a lack of wise men who sleep and dream of how to save the motherland from usurpers, violators of freedom of opinion, and other villains, and that there will be those who wish to exploit such holy simplicity, with this you will not dispute. Finally, the congress will now discredit the very idea of a congress and to a certain degree will undermine the significance of the results already achieved, which are by no means small. There will be an impression of something extremely unstable, frivolous. It seems to me that the matter should begin from the other end, breaking through the indifference and distrust of the general public.

20/XII. I interrupted the letter due to the arrival of Nil. We spoke a great deal with him about your plan for a new congress and came to a unanimous conclusion as to its infeasibility and uselessness under the present conditions. Nil does not doubt and asks me to convey that the other comrades (Nikolay)⁵ will share this opinion on this question. The Kiev committee has recently taken a completely loyal position. The others even more so. In a word, there is every hope here of putting matters in order. By tearing away the most active people from work for the sake of endless discussions, we will lose everything that has been done up to now. The Caucasus regards the Central Committee quite well. All committees are providing material support. Resolutions were not formally sent only because, in the main respects, after No. 53,⁶ we considered the matter settled.⁷ To publish them now, when an agreement has been officially announced⁸ and when the obstruction by the minority here is gradually dying down, would mean only pouring oil on the fire and fanning the dying flame. If you saw the enormous, scarcely remediable damage that has already now been done to the cause by these quarrels, you would understand why we all speak so categorically against new discussions.

Why are matrices not being sent?⁹ Is there not some premeditated intention on the part of the editorial board here? In my opinion, the representative of the Central Committee should have demanded in writing (with a copy to the Party Council) that they be handed over within 2—3 days, declaring that in case of non-compliance with this fully lawful and feasible requirement, the Central Committee disavows responsibility for the fact that Russia will be left without *Iskra*. Nina and Nadya are well and send greetings.

Nikitich.

¹ "News from Kiev about the agreement that took place"—this refers to information from G. M. Krzhizhanovsky about the results of negotiations between the Central Committee and the opposition abroad.

² The reference is to two party illegal printing establishments existing at that time in Baku and known in the correspondence of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee with Russia under the nicknames "Nina" and "Nadya." One was organized in late 1901 by Lado (Vladimir) Ketskhoveli, initially equipped with an old machine purchased from one of the local legal printing establishments, and soon became the central party printing establishment where *Iskra* was printed until the end of 1903. Ketskhoveli, who managed the printing establishment, was arrested in September 1902 and was killed by a guard in August 1903 in the Metekhi fortress where he was held in confinement. His successor Trifon Enukidze ("Semyon") organized a second printing establishment in November 1903, equipping it with a new advanced machine ordered from Leipzig through the mediation of the owner of one of the local legal printing establishments. This second printing establishment from the moment of its organization became the central party printing establishment (served the Central Committee and printed *Iskra*), and as such existed until the 1905 revolution, when in autumn 1905 it was moved to Petersburg and set up here for printing the legal Bolshevik organ "New Life." The former printing establishment continued to exist for some time alongside the second as its branch, which was subsequently liquidated, and the printing establishment itself was transferred to the Tiflis organization, where it existed until its collapse in autumn 1906. A more detailed history of the Baku underground "apparatus" is recounted in the collection "Technique of the Bolshevik Underground," in an article by L. B. Krasin (collection, vol. 1, 1924, pp. 11—12) and in an article by A. S. Enukidze (collection, vol. II, 1924, pp. 5—50). The figures cited here by L. B. Krasin designate the number of impressions in thousands that both printing establishments could and in fact did produce within a definite period.

³ Transport of literature by sea from Marseille to Batumi was first organized in the 1902 navigation season by A. S. Enukidze (see his article in the collection "Technique of the Bolshevik Underground," 1924 ed., vol. II, p. 18), who recounts the following: "We organized such transport of foreign literature in Batumi through the French steamship company 'Paquets.' In Baku we received notices of the departure of a steamship from Marseille with the name of the vessel on which illegal cargo was being sent to us, and a password was sent to a certain person on the ship.... By such means, we more than once received literature from abroad, and there was never a single failure in Batumi." Here L. B. Krasin is speaking of organizing again transport by this route for the coming 1904 navigation season.

⁴ Since the question of convening an emergency congress at that moment had been raised by Lenin for discussion only within the Central Committee, the "other comrades" who, according to V. A. Noskov's opinion presented here, "will share this opinion on this question," that is, against convening the congress, were the remaining Russian members of the Central Committee. It has not been established which member of the Central Committee personally L. B. Krasin meant by the nickname "Nikolay" in this case.

⁵ The reference is to resolutions of the Caucasus committees on internal party disagreements and on their attitude toward the central institutions of the party elected by the congress.

⁶ By "official announcement of the agreement" here is meant the letter of the Central Committee about the results of negotiations with the opposition, distributed to the committees upon the return of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky from abroad. This letter is cited above in the text of the introductory remarks to document 139, pp. 79—80.

⁷ From abroad, matrices were regularly sent to Baku, taken from the setting of successive issues of *Iskra*. In the Baku party printing establishment, a stereotype was cast from them, by which *Iskra* was printed here for distribution in Russia.