Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Conspectus of Hegel’s BookLectures On the Historyof Philosophy:

Volume XIV.Volume II Of the History Of Philosophy

Written:1915Source:Lenin’sCollected Works, 4th Edition, Moscow, 1976,Volume 38, pp. 269-300Publisher:Progress PublishersFirst Published:1930 inLenin Miscellany XIITranslated:Clemence DuttEdited:Stewart SmithTranscription & Markup:Kevin GoinsPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive (2008).You may freely copy, distribute, display and 
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Note that this document has undergone special formating to ensure that 
	Lenin’s sidenotes fit on the page, marking as best as possible 
	where they were located in the original manuscript.

VOLUME XIV.

Speaking of the Sophists, Hegel in ex-treme detail chews over the thought thatsophistry contains an element common toall culture (Bildung) in general, our ownincluded, namely, the adducing ofproofs(Gründe) and Gegengründe[2]—“reflectingreasoning”;—the finding of the most di-verse points of viewin everything;((sub-jectivity—lack of objectivity)). In discuss-ing Protagoras and his famous thesis (manis the measure of all things) Hegel placesKantclose to him:

...“Man is the measure of everything,—man, therefore, is the subject in general;the existent, consequently, is not in iso-lation, but is for my knowledge—conscious-ness is essentially the producer of the con-tent in what is objective, and subjectivethinking is thereby essentially active. Andthis view extends even to the most modernPhilosophy, as when, for instance, Kantsays that we only know phenomena, i.e.,that what seems to us to be objective, tobe reality, is only to be considered in itsrelation to consciousness, and does notexist without this relation....” (31)[3]

The second “moment” is objectivity(das Allgemeine[4]),
	  “it is posited byme, but is likewise in itself objec-tively universal, not posited by me....”
	  (32)

Diese “Relativität”[5](32) “Every-thing has a relative truth only” (33),according to Protagoras.

...“Kant’s phenomenon is no more thanan external impulse, anx, an unknown,which first receives these determinationsthrough our feeling, through us. Even ifthere were an objective ground for ourcalling one thing cold and another warm,we could indeed say that they must havediversity in themselves, but warmth andcold first become what they are in ourfeeling. Similarly ... things are, etc. ...thus experience was called a phenome-non....“ (34)

“The world is consequently not onlyphenomenal in that it is for consciousness,and thus that its Being is only one rela-tive to consciousness, but it is likewisephenomenal in itself.” (35)

...“This scepticism reached a much deep-er point in Gorgias....” (35)

...“Hisdialectic” ... that of Gor-gias, the Sophist[many times: p. 36, idemp. 37].

Tiedemann said that Gorgias went fur-ther than the “common sense” of man. AndHegel makes fun of this: every philosophygoesfurtherthan “common sense” forcommon sense is not philosophy. Prior toCopernicus it wascontraryto commonsense to say that the earth goes round thesun. (36)

“It” (der gesunde Menschenverstand[7])“is the mode of thought of its time, con-(36)

...“Gorgias is conscious that they” (Be-ing and not-Being, their mutual sublation)“are vanishing moments; the unconsciousconception has this truth also, but knowsnothing about it....” (40)

“Vanishing moments” = Beingand not-Being. That is a magnifi-cent definition of dialectics!!

...“Gorgias α) justly argues against abso-lute realism, which, because it has a no-tion, thinks it possesses the very thingitself, when actually it possesses only some-thing relative; β) falls into the bad ideal-ism of modern times: ‘what is thoughtis always subjective, and thus not theexistent, since through thought an existentis transformed into what is thought....’” (41)

(and further below (p. 41 i.f.)Kantis again mentioned).

To be added on Gorgias[8]: He puts “either—

or” to the fundamental questions. “Butthat is not true dialectics; it would benecessary to prove that the object mustbe necessarily in one or another determi-nation, not in and for itself. The objectresolves itself only into those determi-nations; but from that nothing followsregarding the nature of the object it-self.” (39)

To be added further on Gorgias[9]:

In the exposition of his view that theexistent cannot be imparted, communi-cated:

“Speech, by which the existent has tobe expressed, is not the existent, what isimparted is thus not the existent, but only

words.” (Sextus Empiricus,AdversusMathematicos. VII. § 83-84)—p.41—Hegel writes: “The existent is also compre-hended as non-existent, but the comprehen-sion of it is to make it universal.” (42)

“Thisindividual cannot be ex-pressed....” (42)

Final words of the section on the Soph-ists: “The Sophists thus also made dia-lectic, universal Philosophy, their object,and they were profound thinkers....” (42)

Socrates is a “world-famed personage”(42), the “most interesting” (ibid.) in thephilosophy of antiquity—“subjectivity ofthought”(42)[“freedom of self-conscious-ness”(44)].

“Herein lies the ambiguity of dia-lectics and sophistry; the objectivedisappears”: is the subjective contin-gent or is there in it (“an ihm selbst”[12])the objective and universal? (43)[13]

“True thought thinks in such a way thatits content is as truly objective as subjec-tive” (44)—and in Socrates and Plato wesee, Hegel says, not only subjectivity (“thereference of any judgment to conscious-ness is held by him”—Socrates—”in commonwith the Sophists”)—but also objectivity.

“Objectivity has here” (in Socrates) “thesense of the universal, existent in and foritself, and not external objectivity” (45)—

idem 46: “not external objectivity but thespiritual universal.”

And two lines further down:

“Kant’s ideal is the phenomenon, notobjective in itself....” (46)Socrates called his methodHebammen-kunst[14]—(p. 64) (derived from his mother,he said) ((Socrates’ mother = midwife))—to help in bringing thoughts to birth.

Hegel’s example: everyone knows, hesays, what Werden is, but it surprises usif we analyse (reflektierend) and find that itis “the identity of Being and not-Being”—“so great a distinction.” (67)

Meno (Plato’s “Meno”)[16]compared Socra-tes to an electric eel (Zitteraal), which makesanyone who touches it “narkotisch”[17](69): and I, too, am “narkotisch” and Icannotanswer you.[18]

...“That which is held by me as truthand right is spirit of my spirit. But whatthe spirit derives thus from itself, whatit so holds, must come from it as the uni-versal, as from the spirit which acts ina universal manner, and not from its pas-sions, interests, likings, whims, aims, in-clinations, etc. These, too, certainly comefrom something inward which is ‘implantedin us by nature,’ but they are only ina natural way our own....” (74-75)

Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent ma-terialism than stupid materialism.Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent;metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude,rigid instead of stupid.

To be elaborated:Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialec-tics) probably about 1,000 pages (Beltov +against Bogdanov + against the Kantians +

fundamental questions, etc., etc.).[20]Amongthem,aboutthe large Logic,in con-nection withit,itsthought (i.e.,dialecticsproper, as philosophical sci-ence) nil!!

Protagoras: “man is the measure of allthings.” Socrates: “man, as thinking, is themeasure of all things.” (75)

Xenophon in hisMemorabiliendescribedSocrates better, more accurately and morefaithfully than Plato. (Pp. 80-81)

In connection with the sophisms aboutthe “heap” and “bald,” Hegel repeats thetransition of quantity into quality and viceversa: dialectics. (Pp. 139-140)143-144: At length about the fact that

“language in essence expresses onlythe universal; what is meant, however,is the special, the particular. Hencewhat is meant cannot be said in speech.”(“It”? The most universal word of all.)

Who isit?I. Every person is an I.DasSinnliche?[21]It is auniver-sa1, etc., etc. “This”?? Everyoneis “this.”

Why can the particular not benamed? One of the objects of a givenkind (tables) is distinguished by some-thing from the rest.

“That the universal should in philosophybe given a place of such importance thatonly the universal can be expressed, andthe ‘it’ which is meant, cannot, indicatesa state of consciousness and thought whichthe philosophical culture of our time hasnot yet reached.”

Hegel includes here “the scepticism ofour times” (143)—[Kant’s?]and those whoassert that “sensuous certainty is the truth.”(143)

For das Sinnliche “is a universal.” (143)

Thereby Hegel hits every materialismexceptdialectical materialism.      
		    NB

To call by name?—but the name is acontingent symbol and does not expressSache selbst[22](how can the partic-ular be expressed?) (144)

Hegel seriously “believed,” thought,that materialism as a philosophy wasimpossible, for philosophy is the scienceof thinking, of theuniversal, but theuniversal is a thought. Here he repeatedthe error of the same subjective ideal-ism that he always called “bad” ideal-ism. Objective (and still more, abso-lute) idealism camevery closeto ma-terialism by a zig-zag (and a somersault),even partiallybecame transformed into it.

The Cyrenaics[23]held sensation for thetruth, “the truth is notwhatis in sensation,the content, but is itself sensation.” (151)

“The main principle of the Cyrenaicschool, therefore, is sensation, whichshould form the real criterion of the trueand the good....” (153)

“Sensation is the indeterminate unit”(154), but if thinking is added, then theuniversal appears and “simple subjectivity”disappears.

(Phenomenologists à la Mach & Co.inevitablybecome idealists on thequestion of theuniversal, “law,” “ne-cessity,” etc.)

Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, “recognised”“this incongruity between sensation anduniversality....” (155)

They confuse sensation as a principleof the theory of knowledge and a prin-ciple of ethics. This NB. But Hegelseparatedthe theory of knowledge.

In regard to Plato’s plan by whichphilosophers ought to rule the state:

...“The territory of history is differentfrom that of philosophy....”

...“We must recognise that action repre-sents at the same time the endeavours ofthe subject as such for particular ends....Allthose particular ends are really only meansfor bringing forth the Idea, becauseitis the absolute power.” (193)

Concerning Plato’s doctrine on ideas:

...“because sensuous perception showsnothing purely, or as it is in itself” (Pha-edo)—p. 213—therefore the body is ahindrance to the soul.

The significance of theuniversaliscontradictory: it is dead, impure, in-complete, etc., etc., but it alone isastagetowards knowledge of theconcrete, for we can never knowthe concrete completely. Theinfinitesum of general conceptions, laws, etc.,gives theconcretein its completeness.

The movement of cognitiontotheobject can always only proceed dia-lectically: to retreat in order to hit

more surely—reculer pour mieux sauter(savoir?).[25]Converging and diverginglines: circles which touch one another.Knotenpunkt[26]= the practice of man-kind and of human history.

(Practice = the criterion of the coin-cidence of one of the infinite aspectsof the real.)

These Knotenpunkte representa unity of contradictions, when Be-ing and not-Being, as vanishingmoments, coincide for a moment,in the given moments of the move-ment (= of technique, of history,etc.)

In analysing Plato’s dialectics, Hegelonce again tries to show the differencebetween subjective, sophistic dialectics andobjective dialectics:“That everything is one, we say of eachthing: ‘it is one and at the same time weshow also that it is many, its many parts

and properties’—but it is thereby said:

‘it is one in quite another respect fromthat in which it is many’—we do notbring these thoughts together. Thus theconception and the words merely go back-

wards and forwards from the one to the

other. If this passing to and fro is performedwith consciousness, it is empty dialectics,which does not unite the opposites anddoes not come to unity.” (232)

P l a t oin the “Sophistes”:

“The point of difficulty, and what weought to aim at, is to show that whatis other is the same, and what is the sameis other, and indeed in the same regardand from the same point of view.” (233)

“But we must be conscious of the factthat the Notion is neither merely the im-mediate in truth, although it is the simple—but it is of spiritual simplicity,essentially the thought which has re-turned into itself (immediately is onlythis red, etc.); nor that it is only thatwhich reflects itself in itself, the thingof consciousness; but is also in itself, i.e.,it is objective essence....” (245)

The concept is not something imme-diate (although the concept is a “simple”thing, but this simplicity is “spiritual,”the simplicity of the Idea)—what is im-mediate is only the sensation of “red”(“this is red”), etc. The concept is not“merely the thing of consciousness”; butis theessence of the object(ge-genständliches Wesen), it is somethingan sich, “in itself.”

...“This conviction of the nature of theNotion, Plato did not ixpress so defi-nitely....” (245)

Hegel dilates at length on Plato’s“Philosophy of Nature,” the ultra-non-sensical mysticism of ideas, such as that“triangles form the essence of sensuousthings” (265), and such mystical non-sense. That is highly characteristic! Themystic-idealist-spiritualist Hegel (likeall official, clerical-idealist philosophyof our day) extols and expatiates onmysticism, idealism in the history ofphilosophy, while ignoring and slight-ing materialism. Cf. Hegel on Democ-ritus—nil!! On Plato a huge massof mystical slush.

Speaking of Plato’s republic and of thecurrent opinion that it is a chimera, Hegelrepeats his favourite saying:

...“What is real is rational. But one mustknow, distinguish, exactly what is real;in common life all is real, but there isa difference between the phenomenal worldand reality....” (274)

Incorrect, says Hegel, is the generallyheld opinion that the philosophy of Aristotleis “realism” (299), (id. p. 311 “empiricism”)in contrast to theidealismof Plato. ((Hereagain, Hegel clearly squeezes in a greatdealunderidealism.))

In presenting Aristotle’s polemic againstPlato’s doctrine on ideas, Hegelsup-pressesits materialistic features. (Cf.322-323and others.)

He has let the cat out of the bag:“Theelevation of Alexander” (Alexander of Mac-

edon, Aristotle’s pupil) “... into ... a godis ... not matter for surprise ... God and

man are not at all so very wide asunder....”(305)

Hegel perceives the idealism of Aris-totle in his idea of god. (326) ((Ofcourse, it is idealism, but more ob-jective andfurther removed, moregeneralthan the idealism of Plato,hence in the philosophy of nature morefrequently = materialism.))

Aristotle’s criticism ofPlato’s “ideas” is a criticismofidealismas ideal-ism in general:forwhence concepts, abstrac-tions, are derived, thencecome also “law” and “ne-cessity,” etc. The idealistHegel in cowardly fashionfought shy of the under-mining of thefoundationsof idealism by Aristotle(in his criticism of Plato’sideas).

Whenoneidealistcriticises the founda-tions of idealism ofanotheridealist,ma-terialismis always thegainer thereby. Cf.Aristotle versus Plato,etc., Hegel versusKant, etc.

“Leucippus and Plato accordingly saythat motion has always existed, but theygive no reason for the assertion.” (Aristot-le,Metaphysik, XII, 6 and 7.) p. 328

Aristotlethuspitifully bringsforward godagainstthe material-ist Leucippus and the idealist Plato.There is eclecticism in Aristotlehere. But Hegelconcealstheweakness for the sake ofmysticism!

Hegel, the supporter of dialectics,could not understand thedialec-ticaltransitionfrommattertomotion,frommattertocon-sciousness—especially the second.Marx corrected the error (or weak-ness?) of the mystic.

Not only isthe transitionfrom matterto conscious-ness dialecti-cal, but alsothat fromsensation tothought, etc.

What distinguishes the dialectical tran-sition from the undialectical transition?The leap. The contradiction. The inter-ruption of gradualness. The unity (iden-tity) of Being and not-Being.

The following passage shows especiallyclearly how Hegel conceals the weaknessof Aristotle’s idealism:“Aristotle makes objects into thoughts;hence, in being thoughts, they exist intruth; that is their ούσία.[27]

“The meaning of this is not, however,that natural objects have themselves thepower of thinking, but as they are subjec-tively thought by me, my thought is thusalso the Notion of the thing, which there-

fore constitutes its substance. But in na-ture the Notion does not exist as thoughtin this freedom, but has flesh and blood;yet it has a soul, and this is its Notion.Aristotle recognises what things in and

for themselves are; and that is their ούσία.The Notion does not exist for itself, but itis stunted by externality. The ordinary definition of truth is: ‘truth is the harmonyof the conception with the object.’ Butthe conception itself is only a conception,I am still not at all in harmony with myconception (with its content); for whenI represent to myself a house, a beam, andso on, I am by no means this content—‘I’ is something other than the conceptionof house. It is only in thought that there ispresent a true harmony between objectiveand subjective;that constitutes me(Hegel’sitalics). Aristotle therefore finds himselfat the most advanced standpoint; nothingmore profound can one desire to know.”(332-333)

“In nature” concepts do not exist “inthis freedom” (in the freedom of thoughtand the fantasy ofman!!). “In nature”they (concepts) have “flesh and blood.”—That is excellent! But it is materialism.Human concepts are thesoulof nature—this is only a mystical way of sayingthat in human concepts nature is reflect-edin a distinctive way(this NB: inadistinctiveanddialecticalway!!).

Pp. 318-337solelyon the Meta-physics of Aristotle!! Everything essen-tial that he has to say against Plato’sidealism issuppressed!! In particu-lar, there is suppressed the question ofexistenceoutsideman and humani-ty!!! = the question of materialism!

Aristotle is an empiricist, but athink-ingone. (340) “The empirical, comprehend-ed in its synthesis, is the speculative No-tion....” (341) (Hegel’s italics.)

The coincidence of concepts with“synthesis,” with the sum, summing upof empiricism, sensations, the senses,isindubitablefor the philosophers ofalltrends.Whencethis coincidence?From God (I, the idea, thought, etc., etc.)or from (out of) nature? Engels was rightin his formulation of the question.[29]

...“The subjective form constitutes theessence of the Kantian philosophy....” (341)

On the teleology of Aristotle....“Nature has its means in itself andthese means are also end. This end innature is its λόγοζ,[30]the truly rational.”(349)

“end” andcause, law,connection,reason

...“Understanding is not only thinkingwith consciousness. There is contained init also the whole, true, profound Notionof nature, of life....” (348)

Reason (understanding), thought,consciousness,without nature, notin correspondence with nature isfalsity = materialism!

It is repulsive to read how Hegel extolsAristotle for his “true speculative notions”(373 of the “soul,” and much more besides),clearly spinning a tale of idealistic (= mys-tical) nonsense.

Suppressed areallthe points on whichAristotlewaversbetween idealism and ma-terialism!!!

Regarding Aristotle’s views on the “soul,”Hegel writes:

“All that is universal is in fact real,as particular, individual, existing for anoth-er” (375)—in other words, the soul.

Aristotle.De anima, II, 5:

“The difference” (between Empfinden andErkennen[31]) “is: that which causes thesensation is external. The cause of this isthat perceptive activity is directed on theparticular, while knowledge has as itsobject the universal; but the universal is,to a certain extent, in the soul itself assubstance. Everyone can therefore thinkif he wishes but sense-perception does notdepend on him, since the necessary con-dition is that the object perceived be pres-ent.” (377)

The crux here—“außen ist”[32]—outsideman, independent of him.That is materialism. And this founda-tion, basis, kernel of materialism,Hegel begins wegschwatzen[33]:

“This is an entirely correct view of sense-perception,” writes Hegel, and he goes onto explain that there is undoubtedly “pas-

sivity” in sense—perception: “it is a matterof indifference whether subjectively orobjectively; in both there is containedthe moment of passivity.... With this mo-ment of passivity, Aristotle does not fall

short of idealism, sense-perception is al-

ways in one aspect passive. That is, how-ever, a bad idealism which thinks thatthe passivity and spontaneity of the minddepend on whether the determination givenis from within or from without, as if there

were freedom in sense-perception; the lat-ter is a sphere of limitation”!!... (377-378)

((The idealist stops up the gap leadingto materialism. No, it is not gleich-
	  gültig[34]whetherfrom withoutorfrom within. This is precisely thepoint! “From without”—that is mat-terialism. “From within” = idealism.And with the word “passivity,” whilekeeping silent about the term (“fromwithout”) in Aristotle, Hegel descri-bed in a different way the samefrom without.Passivity meansprecisely from without!! Hegel re-places the idealism ofsense-percep-tionby the idealism ofthought, butequally by idealism.))

...“Subjective idealism declares that thereare no external things, they are a determi-nation of our Self. This must be admittedin respect to sense-perception. I am passive

in sense-perception, sense-perception issubjective; it is existence, a state, a deter-mination in me, not freedom. Whetherthe sense-perception is external or in me,is a matter of indifference, itexists....”(378)

Then follows the famous analogy of thesoul with wax, causing Hegel to twist andturn like the devil confronted with holywater, and to cry out about it having “sooften occasioned misapprehension.” (378-379)

Aristotle says (De anima, II, 12):

"Sense-perception is the receiving of sen-sible forms without matter” ... “as waxreceives only the impress of the goldensignet ring, not the gold itself, but merelyits form.”

Hegelwrites: ...“In sense-perception

only the form reaches us, without matter.It is otherwise in practical life—in eatingand drinking. In the practical sphere ingeneral we behave as single individuals,

and as single individuals in a determinateBeing, even a material determinate Being,we behave towards matter in a materialway. Only insofar as we are of a material

nature, are we able to behave in such a

way; the point is that our material exist-ence comes into play:” (379)

((A close approach to materialism—andequivocation.))

Hegel gets angry and scolds on accountof the “wax,” saying: “everyone can under-stand it” (380), “we do not get beyond thecrude aspect of the analogy,” (379) etc.

“The soul should by no means be pas-sive wax or receive determinations fromwithout....” (380)

...“It” (die Seele[35]) “changes the form ofthe external body into its own....” (381)

Aristotle, De anima, III, 2:

...“The effect of being perceived and ofsense-perception is exactly one and thesame; but their existence is not the same....”(381)

And Hegel comments:

...“There is a body which sounds and asubject which hears: their existence istwofold....” (382)

But he leaves aside the question ofBeingoutsideman!!! A sophistical dodgefrommaterialism!

Speaking about thinking, and about rea-son (νουζ), Aristotle (De anima, III, 4) says:...“There is no sense-perception inde-

pendent of the body, but νουζ is separablefrom it....” (385) “νουζ is like a book uponwhose pages nothing is actually written”

(386)—and Hegel again becomes irate:

“another much-decried illustration” (386),the very opposite of what he means isascribed to Aristotle, etc., etc.((and the

question of Beingindependentof

mind and of man is suppressed!!))—all thatfor the sake of proving “Aristotle is there-fore not a realist.” (389)

“In this way he who perceives nothing

by his senses learns nothing and under-stands nothing when he discerns anything(ΰεωρή[36]) he must necessarily discern itas a pictorial conception, for such con-ceptions are like sense-perceptions, only

without matter....” (389)

...“Whether the understandingthinks actual objects when it is abs-tracted from all matter requires spe-cial investigation....” (389) And Hegel

scrapesout of Aristotle that ostens-ibly “νουζ[37]and νοητόν[38]are oneand the same” (390), etc. A model

example of the idealistic misrepresen-tations of an idealist!! Distorting Aris-totleintoan idealist of the eighteenth-nineteenth century!!

In regard to the “criterion of truth” oftheStoics—“the conception that is laidhold of” (444-446)—Hegel says that con-sciousness only compares conception withconception (notwith the object—(446):“truth ... is the harmony of object andconsciousness” = “the celebrated definitionof the truth”) and, consequently, the wholequestion is one of the “objective logos, therationality of the world.” (446)

“Thought yields nothing but the formof universality and identity with itself;...hence everything may harmonise withmy thought.” (449)

“Reasons, however, prove to be a hum-

bug; for there are good reasons for every-thing....” (469) “Which reasons should beesteemed as good thereby depends on theend and interest....” (ibidem)

Speaking of Epicurus (342-271 B. C.),Hegelimmediately(before describ-ing his views) adopts a hostile attitudeto materialism and declares:

“It is already (!!) self-evident (!!) thatif sense-perceived Being is regarded asthe truth, the necessity for the Notion isaltogether abrogated, in the absence of

speculative interest everything falls apart,

and, on the contrary, the vulgar viewof things prevails; in point of fact it doesnot go beyond the view of ordinary humanunderstanding, or rather, everything islowered to the level of ordinary humanunderstanding”!! (473-474)

Slanderagainst materialism!! “Ne-cessity for the Notion” is not in theslightest “abrogated” by the theoryof thesourceof cognition andthe concept!! Disagreement with“common sense” is the foul quirkof an idealist.

Epicurus gave the name ofCanonic[40]to the theory of knowledge and the crite-rion of truth. After a brief exposition ofit, Hegel writes:

“It is so simple that nothing can wellbe simpler—it is abstract, but also verytrivial; more or less on the level of ordi-nary consciousness that begins to reflect.It consists of ordinary psychological con-ceptions; they are quite correct. Out of

sense-perceptions we make conceptions asthe universal; thanks to which it becomeslasting. The conceptions themselves (bei

der δόξα, Meinung[41]) are tested by means

of sensations, as to whether they are last-ing, whether they repeat themselves. Thatis quite correct on the whole, but quitesuperficial; it is the first beginning, the

mechanics of conception with respect tothe first sense-perceptions....” (483)

The “first beginning” is forgottenand distorted by idealism.Dia-lecticalmaterialism alonelinkedthe “beginning” with thecontinuation and the end.

NB: p.481—on the significance ofwordsaccording to Epicurus:

“Everything has its evidence, energy,distinctness, in the name first conferredon it” (Epicurus:Diogenes Laertius, X,

§ 33). And Hegel: “The name is somethinguniversal, belongs to thinking, makes themanifold simple.” (481)

“On the objective manner in general

in which the images of external thingsenter into us, and on our relation to exter-nal things, by which conceptions arise—

Epicurus has evolved the following met-aphysical explanation:

“From the surfaces of things there passesoff a constant stream, which cannot bedetected by our senses ... and this be-cause, by reason of the counteracting re-plenishment, the thing itself in its solid-ity long preserves the same arrangementand disposition of the atoms; and the mo-tion through the air of these surfaces whichdetach themselves is of the utmost rapidity,because it is not necessary that what isdetached should have any thickness.” “Thesensation does not contradict such an idea,when we consider” (zusehe) “how imagesproduce their effects; they bring us a cor-respondence, a sympathetic link with ex-ternal things. Therefore something passesout from them which within us is likesomething external.” “And since the ema-nation passes into us, we know of the def-initeness of a sensation; the definite liesin the object and thus flows into us”(pp. 484-485,Diogenes Laertius, X,§ 48-49).

The genius of Epicurus’ conjecture (300B.C., i.e., more than 2,000 years beforeHegel), e.g., on light and its velocity.

Hegel completelyconcealed(NB)themain thing: (NB) the existenceof thingsoutsidethe consciousnessof man andindependentof it

—all that Hegelsuppressesand merelysays:

...“This is a very trivial way of repre-senting sense-perception. Epicurus electedto take the easiest criterion of the truth—acriterion still in use—inasmuch as it is notapprehended by sight, namely: that it doesnot contradict what we see or hear. For intruth such matters of thought as atoms, thedetachment of surfaces, and so forth, arebeyond our powers of sight and hearing;[cer-tainly we manage to see and to hear some-thing different][42]but there is abundance ofroom for what is seen and what is conceivedor imagined to exist alongside of one anoth-er. If the two are allowed to fall apart, theydo not contradict each other; for it is notuntil we relate them that the contradic-tion becomes apparent....” (485-486)

Hegel hasavoidedEpicurus’ theoryof cognition and begun to speak ofsome-thing else, which Epicurus does nottouch onhereandwhich is com-patiblewith materialism!!

P. (486):Error, according to Epicurus, proceedsfrom aninterruptionin movement (inthe movement from the object to us, tosense-perception or to conception?).

“It is impossible,” Hegel writes, “to have amore meagre (theory of knowledge).” (486)

Everything becomesdürftig,[43]if it is distorted and despoiled.

The soul, according to Epicurus, is a“certain” arrangement of atoms. “This iswhat Locke also (!!!) said.... These areempty words ...“ (489) ((no, they are theguess-work of genius andsignposts forscience, but not for clericalism)).

NB.NB.(489), id. (490):

Epicurus ascribes to the atoms a“krummlinigte”Bewegung,[46]this according to Hegel is “most arbitrary

and wearisome” (489) in Epicurus.—((and the “God” of the idealists???)).

“Or else Epicurus altogether denies No-tion and the Universal as the essential...”(490) although his atoms “themselves havethis very nature of thought”... “the incon-sistency ... which all empiricists are guil-ty of....” (491)

Thisavoidsthe essence ofmaterialismand material-ist dialectics.

“In Epicurus there is no ... final end inthe world, wisdom of a Creator; everythingconsists of events, which are determinedby the chance (??) external (??) comingtogether of configurations of atoms....” (491)

And Hegel simplyhurls abuseatEpicurus: “His thoughts on particular as-pects of Nature are, however, in them-selves feeble....” (492)

And immediately afterwards is apolemicagainst the “Naturwissenschaft” heute,[47]which, like Epicurus, allegedly judges “byanalogy,” and “explains” (492)—e.g., lightas “vibrations of the ether....” “This is ananalogy quite in the manner of Epicu-rus....” (493)

((Modernnatural sciencever-sus Epicurus,—against (NB) Hegel.))

In Epicurus, “the kernel of the matter,the principle, is nothing else than theprinciple of our usual natural science....”(495) ... “it is still the manner which liesat the basis of our natural science....” (496)

Correct is only the reference tothe ignorance of dialectics in gen-eral and of the dialectics of con-cepts. But the criticism ofma-terialismis schwach.[48]

“Of this method (of Epicurean philosophy)we may say in general that it likewisehas a side on which it possesses value.

Aristotle and the more ancient philosopherstook their start in natural philosophy fromuniversal thought a priori, and from this

developed the Notion. This is the one side.The other side is the necessary one thatexperience should be worked up into uni-versality, that laws should be determined;that is to say, that the result which fol-lows from the abstract Idea should coin-cide with the general conception to whichexperience and observation have led. The

a priori is with Aristotle, for instance,most excellent, but not sufficient, becauseit lacks connection with and relation toexperience and observation. This develop-

ment of the particular to the general isthe discovery of laws, natural forces and

so on. It may be said that Epicurus is theinventor of empirical natural science, ofempirical psychology. In contrast to the

Stoic ends, conceptions of the understand-ing, is experience, the sensuous present.There we have abstract, limited understand-

ing, without truth in itself, and thereforewithout the presence and reality of nature;here we have this sense of nature, whichis more true than these other hypotheses.”(496-497)

(THIS ALMOST COMPLETELY AP-PROACHES DIALECTICAL MAT-ERIALISM.)

The importance of Epicurus—the strug-gle againstAberglauben[49]of theGreeks and Romans (498)—andmodern priests??all this nonsense about whether a hare ranacross the path, etc. (and the good Lord?).

“And from it” (the philosophy of Epi-curus), “more than anything, those con-ceptions which have altogether denied thesupersensuous have proceeded.” (498)

||But this is good only for “end-lichen”[50]....“With superstition therealso passed away self-dependent Con-nection and the world of the Ideal.”(499)

This NOTA BENE.

P.499:Epicurus on thesoul: thefiner(NB) atoms, their morerapid(NB)motion, theirconnection(NB)etc., etc., with the body (DiogenesLaertius, X, § 66; 63-64)—very naïveand good!—but Hegel becomes irate, hehurls abuse:“meaningless talk,” “emptywords,” “no thoughts.” (500)

The Gods, according to Epicurus, are“das Allgemeine”[51](506) in general—“theyconsist partly in number” as number,i.e., abstraction from the sensuous....

“In part, they” (the gods) “arethe perfect-ed type of man,which, owing to the simi-larity of the images, arises from the con-tinuous confluence of like images on oneand the same subject.” (507)

Speaking ofScepticism, Hegel pointsto its apparent “invincibility” (Unbezwing-lichkeit) (538):

“If anyone actually desires to be a Scep-tic, he cannot be convinced, or be broughtto a positive philosophy, any more than hewho is paralysed can be made to stand.” (539)

“Positive philosophy in relation to it”(den denkenden Skeptizismus[54]) “mayhave this consciousness: it contains in itselfthe negative of Scepticism; Scepticism isnot opposed to it, nor outside it, but isa moment of it; but it contains the negativein its truth, as it is not present in Scepti-cism.” (539)

(The relation of philosophy to Scepti-cism:)“Philosophy is dialectical, this dialecticis change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, isthe inert and existent, but it is only trueinsofar as it grasps itself as living; thisis that it is dialectical in itself, in orderto transcend that quiescence and inertness.Hence the philosophic idea is dialecticalin itself and not contingent; Scepticism,

on the contrary, exercises its dialecticcontingently—for just as the material, thecontent comes before it, it shows that itis negative in itself....” (540)

The old (ancient) Sciepticism has to bedistinguished from thenew(only Schulzeof Göttingen is named). (540)

Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the idealof the Sceptics:

“Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow-passengers on board a ship, who were fright-ened during a storm, a pig, which remainedquite indifferent and peaceably ate on,saying to them: in such imperturbahilitythe wise man must also abide” (DiogenesLaertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.

“Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is justthe opposite of the tranquillity that isthe result of scepticism.” (552)

...“Scepticism, on the contrary, is indif-ferent to the one as well as to the other....”(553)

Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scep-ticism the statement that everything sen-suous is truth (557), but the Sceptics didnot say so: one must sich danach richten,

orientate oneself by the sensuous, but thatis not the truth. The new Scepticism doesnotdoubt the reality of things. The oldScepticism does doubt the reality of things.

Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.)of the Sceptics:

everything inSextusEmpiricus(second cen-tury A. D.)

the earth going roundthe sun or vice versa, etc.

“These sceptical tropes, in fact,concernthat which is called a dogmatic philosophy(and in accordance with its nature sucha philosophy must display itself in allthese forms) not in the sense of its havinga positive content, but as asserting some-thing determinate as the absolute.” (575)

Hegelagainst the absolute!Here we have the germ of dialectical mat-erialism.

“To the criticism which knows nothingin itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!)[56]ab-solute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself,as such, is held to be dogmatism, whileit is the worst dogmatism of all, becauseit maintains that the ‘I,’ the unity of self-consciousness, opposed to Being, is in andfor itself, and that what is ‘in itself’ inthe outside world is likewise so, and there-fore that the two absolutely cannot cometogether.” (576)

“These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy,which has this manner of representing oneprinciple in a determinate proposition asdeterminateness. Such a principle is alwaysconditioned; and consequently contains dia-lectics, the destruction within it of itself.”(577) “These tropes are a powerful weaponagainst the philosophy of reason.” (ib.)

Sextus, for example, reveals the dialec-tics of the concept of apoint(der Punkt).A point has no dimensions? That meansthat it isoutsidespace! It is the limitof space in space, a negation of space, and

at the same time “it touches space”—“butat the same time it is also in itself some-thing dialectical.” (579)

“These tropes ... are powerless againstspeculativeideas, because the latter containwithin themselves adialecticalmomentand theabrogationof the finite.” (580)

End of Volume XIV (p. 586).

[1]Sophists(from the Greeksophos—a
	  wise man)—the designation (since the second half of the 5th century B.C.)
	  for professional philosophers, teachers of philosophy and rhetoric. The Sophists
	  did not constitute a single school. The most characteristic feature common
	  to Sophists was their belief in the relativity of all human ideas, ethical
	  standards and values, expressed by Protagoras in the following famous statement:
	  “Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what
	  is not, that it is not.” In the first half of the 4th century B.C.,
	  sophism disintegrated and degenerated into a barren play with logical conceptions.

[2]counterproofs—Ed.

[3]Hegel,Werke, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

[4]theuniversal—Ed.

[5]this “relativity”—Ed.

[6]Phenomenologism—a branch of subjective
	  idealism that considers phenomena to be only the totality of man’s sensations.
	  The Machists were phenomenalists. An important role in the Marxist criticism
	  of phenomenologism was played by Lenin’s bookMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism(Collected Works, Vol. 14).

[7]common sense—Ed.

[8]This excerpt was made by Lenin somewhat later in
	  outlining the philosophy ofSocrates(pp. 43-44 of Hegel;see
	  p. 273of this volume).—Ed.

[9]This excerpt was made by Lenin in outlining the
	  philosophy of Socrates (p. 69 of Hegel; seep. 274of this volume).—Ed.

[10]See § 27 ofFeuerbach’sPrinciples
	  of the Philosophy of the Futurefor his views on being and essence.

[11]The reference is to the following statement of
	  Feuerbach: “At the beginning of phenomenology we immediately come across
	  a contradiction between the word which represents the universal, and the thing,
	  which is always a particular.” (See § 28 of Feuerbach’sPrinciples
	  of the Philosophy of the Future.)

[12]“in it itself”—Ed.

[13]Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt
	  on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added 
	  on Gorgias....” (Seep. 271of this volume.)—Ed.

[14]the art of midwifery—Ed.

[15]Becoming = not-Being and Being.—Ed.

[16]Meno—Plato’s dialogue directed
	  against the Sophists. It is considered to be one of Plato’s early works.

[17]“drugged”—Ed.

[18]Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt
	  on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added
	  further on Gorgias....” (Seep. 272of this 
	  volume.)—Ed.

[19]very well put—Ed.

[20]Lenin is referring to the following philosophical
	  works byPlekhanov:
	  N. Beltov,The Development
	  of the Monist View of History,
	  published as a separate volume in 1895 in St. Petersburg (seeSelected
	  Philosophical Works, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, pp. 542-782); articles against
	  Bogdanov appearing in Social-Democratic periodicals and published in the collection
	  entitled “From Defence to Attack” (1910); articles against the Kantians E.
	  Bernstein, C. Schmidt and others appearing in the journalDie Neue Zeitand published in the collection: N. Beltov, “Criticism of Our Critics,” St.
	  Petersburg, 1906; and “Fundamental Questions of Marxism,” published as 
	  a separate volume in 1908 in St. Petersburg.

[21]the sensuous—Ed.

[22]the very essence of the
	  thing—Ed.

[23]Cyrenaics-adherents, of an ancient Greek
	  school of philosophy, founded in the 5th century B.C. by Aristippus of Cyrene
	  (North Africa). In the theory of knowledge, the Cyrenaics adhered to sensualism.
	  They asserted that objective truth does not exist and that, with certainty,
	  one can only speak of subjective sensations. In Cyrenaicism, the sensualist
	  theory of knowledge is supplemented by sensualist ethics—the doctrine
	  of sensual satisfaction as the basis of morality. The Cyrenaic school produced
	  a number of representatives of ancient atheism.

[24]Cf. Überweg-Heinze, § 88, p. 122 (10th edition)—
	  and also about them in Plato’sTheaetetus.[24a]Their (the Cyrenaics’) scepticism
	  and subjectivism.—Ed.

[24a]The reference is to § 38 “The Aristippian
	  and Cyrenaic or Hedonistic School” in Überweg’s book:Grundriss
	  der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1909.
	  (F. Überweg,Outline of the History of Ancient Philosophy, 10th
	  edition, Berlin, 1909). In the dialogueTheaetetus, Plato expounds
	  his mystical theory of knowledge, calling cognition the rise of reason into
	  the realm of ideas; this rise is like recollection since, according to Plato,
	  reason, the soul, by their origin, belong to this supersensual world of ideas.

[25]to fall back, the better to leap (to know?)—Ed.

[26]nodal point—Ed.

[27]substance—Ed.

[28]See L. Feuerbach,Against Dualism of Body
	  and Soul, Flesh and Spirit.

[29]SeeF. Engels,Anti-Dühring, 
	  Moscow, 1959, p. 54.

[30]logos—Ed.

[31]sense-perception (sensation) and cognition—Ed.

[32]“is external”—Ed.

[33]to talk out of existence—Ed.

[34]A matter of indifference—Ed.

[35]the soul—Ed.

[36]perceives—Ed.

[37]reason—Ed.

[38]what is apprehended by reason—Ed.

[39]Stoics—adherents 
	  of an ancient Greek school of philosophy arising about the 3rd century B.C. and existing
	  until the 6th century A.D. The Stoics recognised two elements in the universe:
	  an enduring element—matter without quality; and an active one—reason,
	  logos, god. In logic, the Stoics proceeded from the assumption that the source
	  of all cognition is sensuous perception and that a conception can be true only
	  if it is a faithful and full impression of the object. The Stoics taught,
	  however, that perceptual judgment arises only as a result of agreement between
	  the mind and a true conception. This the Stoics called “catalepsy”
	  (or “seizure”) and viewed it as a criterion for truth.

[40]In the manuscript the word “Canonic”
	  is linked by an arrow with the word “It” at the beginning of the
	  following paragraph.—Ed.

[41]in opinion—Ed.

[42]The words in brackets are missing in Lenin’s
	  manuscript.—Ed.

[43]meager—Ed.

[44]also—Ed.

[45]difference—Ed.

[46]“curvilinear”
	  motion—Ed.

[47]“natural science” today—Ed.

[48]feeble—Ed.

[49]superstitions—Ed.

[50]“finite” things—Ed.

[51]“the universal”—Ed.

[52]See L. Feuerbach,Lectures 
	  on the Essence of Religion: “the God of man is nothing but the deified being of
	  man.” (L. Feuerbach,Werke, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840, S. 21.)

[53]Sceptics—in this case,
	  adherents of the ancient Greek philosophical school founded by Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B.C.).
	  The best known of the ancient Sceptics were Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus
	  (2nd century A.D.). [See also:“Scepticism and Dogmatism”]Tropes—the designation for the reasons
	  for doubt advanced by the ancient Sceptics (ten tropes) and later supplemented
	  (five tropes) by Agrippa. By means of these reasons the Sceptics tried to
	  prove the impossibility of cognising things and the absolute relativity of
	  all perceptions.

[54]thinking scepticism—Ed.

[55]raised—Ed.

[56]Lenin’s remark in parentheses was evoked
	  by a misprint in the German text, which had nicht (not) instead of nichts
	  (nothing) before the word “absolute.”—Ed.