This phrase on the last, 353rd [319] page of the Logic is archremarkable. The transition of the logical idea to nature. A short step to materialism. Engels was right that Hegel's system is inverted materialism.
End of the "Logic." 17. XII. 1914.

It is remarkable that the entire chapter on "absolute idea" scarcely utters a word about God (hardly once does "divine" "concept" slip out by accident)*, and moreover—this NB—it contains almost nothing specifically idealist; rather, its principal subject is the dialectical method. The conclusion and résumé, the final word and essence of Hegel's logic is the dialectical method—this is extremely remarkable. And one more thing: in this very idealist work of Hegel there is the least idealism of all, the most materialism of all. "Contradictory," but a fact!

Vol. VI, p. 399 [I, 332-333]:
Encyclopedia § 227—excellent on the analytical method ("decompose" the "given concrete" phenomenon—"give the form of abstraction" to its separate sides and "bring out" the "genus or force and law"), p. 398—and on its application:

It is by no means a "matter of our arbitrary choice" (398) [332] whether to apply the analytical or synthetic method (as one customarily says)—this depends "on the form of the very objects subject to cognition."

Locke and the empiricists stand at the point of view of analysis. And it is often said that "cognition cannot accomplish anything greater than this" (399) [332].

"But immediately it becomes clear that this is a perversion of things and that cognition, wishing to take things as they are, falls thereby into contradiction with itself." For example, the chemist "tortures" a piece of meat and discovers nitrogen, carbon, etc. "But these abstract substances no longer appear as meat."

There may be many definitions, for there are many sides in objects:

"The richer the object being defined, that is, the more diverse sides it presents for consideration, the more diverse can be the definitions put forward on the basis of them" (400 [334] § 229)—for example, the definition of life, of the state, etc.

Spinoza and Schelling give in their definitions a mass of "speculative" content (evidently Hegel uses this word here in the good sense), but "in the form of bare assertion."

Philosophy, however, must prove and derive everything, and not confine itself to definitions.

NB:
"genus or force and law"
(genus = law!)
Very true!
Cf. Marx's remark in "Capital"
I, 5.2

*—addition. Editor
**—as one customarily says. Editor
***—"tortures." Editor
****—"but this existing idea is nature." Editor