V. I. Lenin

Tenth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)[1]

May 26-28, 1921

Written:26 May,
    1921First Published:1921, Published inByulleten
    Vserossiiskoi Konferentsii R.K.P.(Bolshevikov) (Bullitin of the All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.[B.]
    ) Nos. 1 and 2, May 27 and 28, 1921; Published according to theByulletentextSource:Lenin’sCollected Works, 1st English
    Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965,Volume 32, pages 399-437Translated:Yuri SdobnikovTranscription\HTML Markup:David
    Walters&R.
    CymbalaCopyleft:V. I. Lenin Internet Archive
    (www.marx.org) 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this
    document under the terms of theGNU Free Documentation
    License

1. Speech In Opening The Conference May 26

Comrades, permit me to declare the All-Russia Conference of
    the R.C.P. open.

You are aware, comrades, that this conference has been convened earlier
    than is prescribed by the Rules. Consequently, it is not an ordinary, or at
    least, not quite an ordinary conference. You are also aware that the main
    item on the agenda—the main question—that has compelled us to
    convene the conference before the planned date is that of economic
    policy—the tax in kind. It is central at the present time.

I propose that we proceed to elect the presidium of the conference.

2. Report On The Tax In Kind May 26

Comrades, I had occasion to discuss, for the benefit of the
    Party, the question of the tax in kind in a pamphlet with which, I suppose,
    the majority of you are familiar. That this question has been brought up
    for discussion at a Party conference came as a surprise to me, for I had
    not seen anything to indicate that this was called for. But very many of
    the comrades who have visited the localities, notably Comrade Osinsky upon
    his return from a tour of a number ofgubernias, informed the
    Central Committee—and this was corroborated by several other
    comrades—that locally the policy which had taken shape in connection
    with the tax in kind remained largely unexplained and partly even
    misunderstood. In view of its exceptional importance, additional discussion
    at a Party conference seemed so necessary that it was decided to convene
    the conference earlier than scheduled. You are aware that we in the Central
    Committee have decided to divide the report on this point into four parts,
    to be given by fourrapporteurs: Kamenev, on the work of the
    co-operatives; Milyutin, on small-scale industry; Comrade Svidersky, on the
    precise calculations and proposals of the People’s Commissariat for
    Food, and the related organisational measures; the instructions and
    regulations on the tax system, partly approved, and partly to be approved
    shortly, by the Council of People’s Commissars, are of especial
    importance in this connection. Finally, Comrade Khinchuk is to be the
    fourthrapporteur; he has been relieved of all his duties in the
    People’s Commissariat for Food to allow him to concentrate entirely
    on the co-operatives, as Chairman of Tsentrosoyuz.[Central Council of Co-operative
    Societies.—Translator.]

It has been decided, as the chief principle, that the commodity exchange
    in this case is to be handled by the People’s Commissariat for Food,
    mostly and even chiefly, through Tsentrosoyuz and the co-operatives. These
    relations between the People’s Commissariat for Food and Tsentrosoyuz
    should be formalised in an agreement, stating that all the goods available
    for exchange shall be handed over by the People’s Commissariat for
    Food to Tsentrosoyuz. This makes the latter’s role quite clear, and
    there is no need to go into it in detail. Thus, it has fallen to me to
    introduce the question of the general significance of this policy, and I
    should merely like to supplement what I have already said in the pamphlet.
    I have no direct information as to how this question is being presented in
    the localities or to the flaws, defects and unclarity that there prevail. I
    may have to elaborate certain points later on, when it becomes clearer from
    the questions that are raised at the conference, or from the subsequent
    debate, how the local officials and the Party are to be oriented.

As far as I can see, the misunderstandings and lack of clarity on the
    political tasks connected with the tax in kind and the New Economic Policy
    are perhaps due to the exaggeration of this or that aspect of the matter.
    But until we have organised this work on practical lines, these
    exaggerations are absolutely inevitable; and until we have carried out at
    least one food campaign on the new lines, it will hardly be possible at all
    to give any precise definition to the real limits for the application of
    this or that specific feature of this policy. I shall deal only in general
    outline with some of the contradictions which, as far as I could judge from
    several notes sent up at the meeting, have given rise to most
    misunderstanding. The tax in Knd and the attendant changes in our policy
    are often interpreted as a sign of a drastic reversal of policy. It is not
    surprising that this interpretation is taken up and made most of by the
    whiteguard, particularly the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik, press
    abroad. I do not know whether it is due to the operation of similar
    influences which have made themselves felt on the territory of the
    R.S.F.S.R., or to the acute discontent which was, and perhaps still is,
    evident in certain circles, owing to the extreme aggravation of the food
    situation, but this sort of perplexity may have spread to some extent even
    in this country and created what is largely a wrong conception of the
    significance of the change that has been brought about and of the character
    of the new policy.

Naturally, in view of the fact that the peasantry preponderates
    enormously among the population, the principal task—of our policy in
    general, and of our economic policy in particular—is to establish
    definite relations between the working class and the peasantry. For the
    first time in modern history we have a social system from which the
    exploiting class has been eliminated but in which there are two different
    classes—the working class and the peasantry. The enormous
    preponderance of the peasantry could not but have an effect on our economic
    policy, and our policy in general. The principal problem that still
    confronts us—and will inevitably confront us for many years to
    come—is that of establishing proper relations between these two
    classes, proper from the standpoint of abolishing classes. The enemies of
    the Soviet power discuss the formula of agreement between the working class
    and the peasantry with such frequency, and so very often use it against us,
    because it is so vague. Agreement between the working class and the
    peasantry may be taken to mean anything. Unless we assume that, from the
    working-class standpoint, an agreement is possible in principle,
    permissible, and correct only if it supports the dictatorship of the
    working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes,
    then, of course, it remains a formula on which all the enemies of the
    Soviet-power, all the enemies of the dictatorship, operate. How is this
    agreement to be realised in the first period of our revolution, i.e., the
    period which we can now approximately consider as coming to a close? How
    was the dictatorship of the proletariat maintained and consolidated amidst
    the enormous preponderance of the peasant population? It is the Civil War
    that was the principal reason, the principal motive force, and the
    principal determinant of our agreement. Although, in many cases, the Civil
    War was started with the whiteguards, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and
    the Mensheviks jointly participating in the alliance against us, it
    invariably led to all the Socialist-Revolutionary Constituent Assembly and
    Menshevik elements finding themselves—either through acoup
    d’etator otherwise—driven into the background, which left
    the capitalist and landowner elements to head the whiteguard movement. That
    was the case under Kolchak and Denikin, and all the numerous smaller
    regimes and during campaigns against us. It was the principal factor that
    determined the form of the alliance between the proletariat and the
    peasantry. This circumstance multiplied our incredible difficulties, but
    upon the other hand, it spared us the necessity of racking our brains over
    how to apply the alliance formula, for it and the conditions of its
    realisation were both dictated by the circumstances of war, leaving us no
    choice whatsoever.

Only the working class could exercise the dictatorship in the form
    demanded by the Civil War and its conditions. The participation of the
    landowners in this war united the working class and the peasantry
    absolutely, unreservedly and irrevocably. In that respect there was no
    internal political wavering whatsoever. Amidst the gigantic difficulties
    that confronted us because Russia was cut off from her principal grain
    areas and food hardships had been aggravated to the extreme, we could not
    have carried out our food policy in practice without the appropriation of
    surplus grain. This meant taking not only the surplus stocks of grain,
    which would hardly have sufficed even if they had been properly
    distributed. I cannot here deal in detail with the irregularities which the
    system brought in its train. At all events, it served its main
    purpose—keeping industry going even when we were almost completely
    cut off from the grain districts. But this could have been at all
    satisfactory only in conditions of war. As soon as we had finally done away
    with the external enemy—and this became a fact only in
    1921—another task confronted us, the task of establishing aneconomicalliance between the working class and the peasantry. It
    was only in the spring of 1921 that we actually got down to this task, and
    that was when the 1920 crop failure had worsened the condition of the
    peasantry to an incredible degree, and when we first witnessed some
    internal political wavering, which did not result from external enemy
    pressure, but from the relations between the working class and the
    peasantry. If wehad had a very good, or at least a good, harvest in 1920,
    if the surplus appropriations had yielded 400 million out of the planned
    420 millionpoodsof grain, we would have been able to fulfil the
    greater part of our industrial programme and would have had a stock of
    manufactured urban goods to exchange for agricultural produce. But the
    opposite happened. A fuel crisis, even more acute than the food crisis,
    developed in some places and it was utterly impossible to satisfy the needs
    of the peasant farms in urban manufactures. Peasant farming was gripped by
    an incredibly acute crisis. Those were the circumstances that suggested
    that we could not possibly continue with the old food policy. We had to
    bring up the question of what economic basis we required immediately for
    the alliance between the working class and the peasantry as a stepping
    stone to further measures.

The stepping stone is to prepare the exchange of industrial goods for
    agricultural produce; to create a system under which the peasant would not
    have to surrender his produce otherwise than in exchange for urban and
    factory-made goods, but which would not subordinate him to any of the forms
    existing under the capitalist system. In view of the prevailing economic
    conditions, however, we could not even think about that. That is why we
    have adopted the transitional form I have spoken about, namely, to take
    produce in the form of a tax without giving any equivalent, and to obtain
    additional produce through the medium of exchange. But this requires an
    appropriate fund; ours is extremely small, and the possibility of
    augmenting it through foreign trade has arisen only this year, as a result
    of a number of agreements with capitalist countries. It is true that these
    are as yet a mere introduction, a foreword; no real trade has yet begun.
    There is continued sabotage and all sorts of attempts to disrupt these
    agreements by most or the greater part of the capitalist circles, and the
    most characteristic thing is that the Russian whiteguard press, including
    the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press, is hammering away at these
    agreements with more venom than at anything else. It is absolutely clear
    that the bourgeoisie is better prepared for the fight, that it is more
    developed than the proletariat, that its class-consciousness has been given
    a keener edge by all the “trouble” it has had to put up with,
    and that it is betraying an abnormal sensitiveness. A close look at the
    whiteguard press will show that it is hitting out at the very point that is
    the centre, the pivot, of our policy.

After the failure of the military invasion, which has quite obviously
    collapsed, although the struggle is still on, the whole of the whiteguard
    Russian press has set itself an unattainable aim: to tear up the trade
    agreements. The campaign which was started this spring on an extremely
    extensive scale, with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the
    forefront of the counter-revolutionary forces, had a definite aim—to
    tear up the economic agreements between Russia and the capitalist world by
    this spring; and to a considerable extent they succeeded in achieving their
    aim. It is true that we have concluded the principal agreements—their
    number is increasing—and we are overcoming the growing resistance to
    them. But there has been a very dangerous delay; for, without some
    assistance from abroad, rehabilitation of large-scale industry and
    restoration of regular exchange of commodities will either be impossible or
    will mean very dangerous delay. These are the conditions in which we are
    obliged to act, and these are the conditions which for the peasants have
    brought the question of restoring trade to the forefront. I shall not deal
    with the question of concessions, because it has been debated most at Party
    meetings, and has not lately given rise to any perplexity. The position is
    that we are continuing our assiduous offers of concessions, but the foreign
    capitalists have not yet received a single sizable concession, and we have
    not yet concluded any really serious concessions agreement. The whole
    difficulty lies in finding a way of enlisting West-European capital that
    has been tested in practice.

Theoretically, it is absolutely indisputable—and it seems to me
    that everyone ‘s doubts on this score have been
    dispelled—theoretically, I say, it is absolutely clear that it would
    be to our advantage to pay off European capital with a few score or
    hundreds of millions, which we could give it in order to augment, in the
    shortest possible time, our stocks of equipment, materials, raw materials
    and machinery for the purpose of restoring our large-scale industry.

Large-scale industry is the one and only real basis upon which we can
    multiply our resources and build a socialist society. Without large
    factories, such as capitalism has created, without highly developed
    large-scale industry, socialism is impossible anywhere; still less is it
    possible in a peasant country, and we in Russia have a far more concrete
    knowledge of this than before; so that instead of speaking about restoring
    large-scale industry in some indefinite and abstract way, we now speak of
    the definite, precisely calculated and concrete plan of electrification. We
    have a precise plan projected by the best Russian specialists and
    scientists, a plan which gives us a definite picture of the resources,
    considering Russia’s natural features, with which we can, must and
    will lay the basis of large-scale industry for our economy. Without it, no
    real socialist foundation for our economic life is possible. This remains
    absolutely indisputable, and if, in connection with the tax in kind, we
    have lately spoken about it in abstract terms, we must now say definitely
    that we must first of all restore large-scale industry. I myself have heard
    statements of this kind from several comrades, and all I could do in reply
    was, of course, to shrug my shoulders. It is absolutely ridiculous and
    absurd to assume that we could ever lose sight of this fundamental aim. The
    only question that arises here is: how could such doubts and perplexity
    arise in the minds of comrades, and how could they think that this key
    task, without which the material production basis of socialism is
    impossible, has been pushed into the background? These comrades must have
    misunderstood the relation between our state and small industry. Our main
    task is to restore large-scale industry, but in order to approach this task
    at all seriously and systematically we must restore small industry. Both
    this year, 1921, and last year, we had great gaps in our efforts to restore
    large-scale industry.

In the autumn and winter of 1920 we started several important branches
    of our large-scale industry, but we had to suspend them again. Why? Many
    factories were able to obtain enough manpower and sufficient supplies of
    raw materials; why then was work at these factories suspended? Because we
    were short of food and fuel. Without a state reserve of 400 millionpoodsof grain (I take an approximate figure) backed up by regular
    monthly allotments, it is difficult to talk about any sort of regular
    economic development or of restoring large-scale industry. Without it we
    find that after having started work on restoring large-scale industry and
    continuing it for several months we have had to suspend it again. Most of
    the few factories that were started are now idle. Without fully assured and
    adequate food stocks the state cannot concentrate on systematically
    organising the rehabilitation of large-scale industry, organising it on a
    modest scale, perhaps, but in such a way as to keep it going
    continuously.

As regards fuel, until the Donbas is restored, and until we obtain a
    regular supply of oil, we shall have to continue to rely on timber, on
    firewood, which again means dependence on small-scale production.

That explains the mistake of those comrades who failed to understand why
    it is the peasant who must now be placed in the centre of things. Some
    workers say: the peasants are being favoured, but we get nothing. I have
    heard such talk, but I must say I think it is not very widespread, for such
    talk is dangerous, because it echoes the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It is
    an obvious political provocation; and is, besides, a survival of
    craft—not class—but craft-union prejudices of workers, when the
    working class regards itself a part of equitable capitalist society and
    fails to realise that it still stands on the old capitalist basis. These
    workers say, in fact: the peasant is being favoured, he has been relieved
    of surplus-grain appropriation, he is allowed to retain his grain surplus
    for the purpose of exchange; we workers at the bench want to have the same
    thing.

What is at the bottom of this point of view? It is, in essence, the old
    petty-bourgeois ideology: since the peasants are a component part of
    capitalist society, the working class also remains a component part of this
    society; hence, if the peasant trades, we too must trade. Here we
    undoubtedly see a revival of the old prejudices which grapple the worker to
    the old world. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are the most
    ardent and, in fact, the only sincere, champions of the old capitalist
    world. You will find none among the hundreds, the thousands, and even the
    hundreds of thousands in all the other camps. But these rare specimens
    remain among the so-called pure democrats, whom the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks represent. And the more
    persistently they advocate their views, the more dangerous is their
    influence over the working class. They are doubly dangerous when the
    working class has to go through periods of suspended production. The
    principal material basis for the development of proletarian
    class-consciousness is large-scale industry, where the worker sees the
    factories running, and daily feels the power that can really abolish
    classes.

When the workers lose their footing in this material production basis,
    some of them are beset by a sense of instability, uncertainty, despair and
    skepticism, and this has a definite effect when combined with outright
    provocations by our bourgeois democrats, i.e., the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. This produces a mentality which
    makes people, even in the ranks of the Communist Party, reason in this way:
    the peasants were given a handout; for the same reasons, and by the same
    methods, a handout should be given to the workers. We have had to yield to
    this mentality to some extent. The decree on bonuses to workers in the form
    of a part of the goods they produce is, of course, a concession to these
    sentiments, which have their roots in the past and are engendered by
    skepticism and despair. Within certain small limits, this concession was
    necessary. It has been made. But we must not for a moment forget that we
    have been making a concession that is necessary from no other standpoint
    but the economic one: the interests of the proletariat. Its basic and most
    vital interests are bound up with the rehabilitation of large-scale
    industry as a solid economic foundation. When that is done, it will
    consolidate its dictatorship, it will be sure to carry its dictatorship to
    success, in the teeth of all the political and military difficulties. Why,
    then, were we obliged to make a concession, and why would it be extremely
    dangerous to give it a wider interpretation than it deserves? It is only
    because temporary food and fuel difficulties compelled us to take this
    path.

What is the principal economic determinant of the policy when we say,
    “We must not base our relations with the peasants on surplus-grain
    appropriation but on a tax"? It is that under the surplus-grain
    appropriation system the small peasant farms have no proper economic basis
    and are doomed to remain dead for many years. Small farming cannot exist
    and develop, because the petty farmer loses interest in consolidating and
    developing his activity and in increasing his output, all of which leaves
    us without an economic basis. We have no other basis or source, and unless
    the state is able to accumulate large stocks of food it is no use thinking
    about the rehabilitation of large-scale industry. That is why we are first
    of all applying this policy which is changing our food relations.

We are conducting this policy so as to have a fund for the
    rehabilitation of large-scale industry; to relieve the working class from
    all interruption of work, which should not be experienced even by our
    large-scale industry, miserable though it is when compared with that of the
    advanced colmtries; to relieve the proletarian of the need to find the
    means of subsistence by resorting to the petty-bourgeois method of
    profiteering, which is not a proletarian method and threatens us with the
    gravest economic dangers. Owing to our present deplorable conditions,
    proletarians are obliged to earn a living by methods which are not
    proletarian and are not connected with large-scale industry. They are
    obliged to procure goods by petty-bourgeois profiteering methods, either by
    stealing, or by making them for themselves in a publicly-owned factory, in
    order to barter them for agricultural produce—and that is the main
    economic danger, jeopardising the existence of the Soviet system. The
    proletariat must now exercise its dictatorship in such a way as to have a
    sense of security as a class, with a firm footing. But the ground is
    slipping from under its feet. Instead of large, continuously running
    factories, the proletarian sees something quite different, and is compelled
    to enter the economic sphere as a profiteer, or as a small producer.

We must spare no sacrifice in this transitional period to save the
    proletariat from this. To ensure the continuous, if slow, rehabilitation of
    large-scale industry we must not hesitate to throw sops to the greedy
    foreign capitalists, because, from the standpoint of building socialism, it
    is at present to our advantage to overpay the foreign capitalists some
    hundreds of millions in order to obtain the machines and materials for the
    rehabilitation of large-scale industry, which will restore the economic
    basis of the proletariat, and will transform it into a steadfast
    proletariat, instead of one engaged in profiteering. The Mensheviks and
    Socialist-Revolutionaries have deafened us with their shouts that since the
    proletariat has been declassed, we ought to abandon the tasks of the
    dictatorship of the proletariat. They have been shouting that since 1917,
    and the surprising thing is that they have not grown tired of shouting it
    up to 1921. But when we hear these attacks we do not say that there has
    been no declassing, and that there are no flaws. What we say is that
    Russian and international realities are such that even though the
    proletariat has to go through a period when it is declassed, and has to
    suffer from these handicaps, it can nevertheless fulfil its task of winning
    and holding political power.

It would be absurd and ridiculous to deny that the fact that the
    proletariat is declassed is a handicap. By 1921, we realised that after the
    struggle against the external enemy, the main danger and the greatest evil
    confronting us was our inability to ensure the continuous operation of the
    few remaining large enterprises. This is the main thing. Without such an
    economic basis, the working class cannot firmly hold political power. In
    order to ensure the continued rehabilitation of large-scale industry we
    must organise the food supply in such a way as to collect and properly
    distribute a fund of, say, 400 millionpoods. It would be utterly
    impossible for us to collect it through the old surplus-grain appropriation
    system: 1920 and 1921 are proof of this. Now we see that we can nonetheless
    fulfil this extremely difficult task by means of the tax in kind. We cannot
    fulfil it with the old methods, and so we must try some new ones. It can be
    done by means of the tax in kind and by establishing proper relations with
    the peasant as a small producer. We have devoted considerable effort to
    prove this theoretically.

I think, judging by the Party press and by what is being said at
    meetings, that it has been fully proved theoretically that this task can be
    fulfilled if the proletariat retains possession of the transport system,
    the big factories, the economic basis as well as political power. We must
    give the peasant a fair amount of leeway as a small producer. Unless we
    revive peasant farming we shall not solve the food problem.

It is within this framework that we must deal with the question of
    developing small industry on the basis oI unrestricted trade and free
    turnover. This free turnover is a means to establish economically stable
    relations between the working class and the peasantry. We now have more and
    more precise data on agricultural output. A pamphlet on grain output was
    distributed at the Party Congress; it was still in proofs when it was
    distributed to the delegates. Since then the material contained in it has
    been supplemented and circulated. The pamphlet in its final form has now
    been sent to the press, but it is not yet ready for the conference, and I
    am unable to say whether it will be ready before the conference comes to a
    close and the delegates disperse. We shall do all we can to get it out in
    time, but we cannot promise to do so.

This is a small part of our effort to determine, as precisely as
    possible, the position in regard to agricultural output, and the resources
    at our disposal.

Still, we can say that there is evidence that we are quite able to solve
    this economic problem, particularly this year, when the harvest prospects
    are not too bad, or not as bad as we anticipated in spring. This assures us
    of the possibility of accumulating an agricultural reserve that will enable
    us to devote ourselves entirely to the task of steadily, even if slowly,
    restoring our large-scale industry.

In order to solve the problem of accumulating food stocks for industry
    we must devise a form of relations with the peasant, the small proprietor,
    and there is no other form except that of the tax in kind; no one has come
    up with another form, and one can be imagined. But we must have a practical
    solution of this problem: we must arrange to have the tax collected in a
    proper manner, and not in the old way, when grain was taken two or three
    times, leaving the peasant in a worse plight than ever, inflicting the most
    suffering on the more industrious and destroying every possibility of
    establishing economically stable relations. The tax in kind, while also a
    levy on every peasant, must be collected in a different way. On the basis
    of the collected and published data we can say that the tax in kind will
    now bring about a crucial change, but whether it will cover everything is
    still, to some extent, an open question. Of one thing we can be quite
    certain, however, and it is that we must bring about an immediate
    improvement in the condition of the peasant.

The task that confronts the local workers is to collect the tax in kind
    in full, and do so in the shortest possible time. The difficulties are
    increased by the fact that the harvest promises to be an unusually early
    one this year, and if our preparations are based on the customary dates, we
    run the risk of being too late. That is why the early convocation of the
    Party conference was important and opportune. We must work more quickly
    than before to prepare the apparatus for collecting the tax in kind. The
    accumulation of a minimum state fund of 240 millionpoodsof grain
    and the possibility of making the position of the peasant secure depend on
    the speed with which the tax in kind is collected. Delay in collecting it
    will cause a certain amount of inconvenience to the peasant. The tax will
    not be paid voluntarily, we shall not be able to dispense with coercion,
    for the levy imposes some restrictions on the peasant farm. If we drag out
    the process of collecting the tax, the peasant will be discontent and will
    say that he is not free to dispose of his surplus. If the freedom is to be
    such in practice, the tax must be collected quickly; the tax-collector must
    not hover over the peasant for long, and so the period between the
    harvesting and the collection of the tax in full must be reduced to a
    minimum.

That is one task. The other is to maximise the peasant’s freedom
    of trade and the revival of small-scale industry, so as to allow some
    leeway to the capitalism that grows up on the basis of small private
    property and petty trade. We should not be afraid of it, for it is not
    dangerous to us in the least.

We need not fear it at all in view of the general economic and political
    situation that has now arisen, with the proletariat controlling all the
    sources of large-scale production, and denationalisation in any shape or
    form entirely out of the question. At a time when we are suffering most of
    all from a severe shortage of goods and utter impoverishment, it is
    ridiculous to fear the threat of capitalism based on small commercial
    agriculture. To fear it is to fail altogether to take account of the
    relation of forces in our economy. It means to fail to understand that the
    peasant economy, as a small-scale peasant economy, cannot be stable at all
    without some free exchange and the attendant capitalist relations.

This is what you must firmly impress on your minds, comrades. And our
    main task is to give a push to the comrades in all the localities, to give
    them the utmost scope for initiative, to stimulate them to display the
    utmost self-reliance and boldness. In this respect we are still suffering
    from the fear of doing things on a really wide scale. We have no more or
    less definitely tabulated local data showing from practical experience what
    the situation is in regard to local goods exchange and trade, what success
    has been achieved in restoring and developing small industry—which
    can alleviate the condition of the peasant right away, without the great
    effort of transporting large stocks of food and fuel to the industrial
    centres that large-scale industry entails. From the general economic
    standpoint, not enough is being done locally in this respect. We have no
    information on this from the localities, we do not know what the position
    is all over the Republic, we have no examples of really well-organised
    work; and my impression is that the Trade Union Congress and the Congress
    of the Supreme Economic Council[2]have none either.

Here again, the principal defect of these congresses is that we devote
    ourselves mainly to such threadbare things as theses, general programmes
    and arguments, instead of giving the participants a chance to swap local
    experience and say, on returning home: “Out of a thousand examples we
    heard one good one, and we shall follow it.” Actually, we have not
    only one good example in a thousand, we have many more; but least of all do
    we see congress work arranged in this way.

I have no wish to forestall events, but I must say a word or two about
    collective supplies for the workers, i.e., about the proposal to substitute
    for the ration system a system under which certain factories that are
    actually in operation will be assured of a certain quantity of food in
    proportion to their output. The idea is an excellent one, but we have
    turned it into something semi-fantastic, without however doing any real
    preparatory work for it. We have no example as yet of any particular
    factory, even one employing a small number of workers, in a particularuyzed, having tried out this system and having secured
    such-and-such results. That is something we do not as yet have, and it is
    one of the greatest drawbacks in our work. We must keep repeating that
    instead of discussing general problems, which was all very well in 1918,
    i.e., in the long distant past, we must, in this 1921, discuss practical
    problems. By telling congresses first of all about the examples of
    well-organised work—there are quite enough of them—we would
    make it an obligation for the rest to strive to imitate the best that has
    been achieved in a few rare and exceptional localities. I have in mind the
    work of the Trade Union Congress, but it also applies to all work connected
    with the food problem.

Quite a lot has been done in some cases, in a few localities, to prepare
    for the collection of the tax in kind, the organisation of trade, etc., but
    we have not managed to study this experience; and the great task that
    confronts us now is to induce the vast majority of the localities to follow
    the example of the best. Our task now is to study practical experience and
    raise the backward and mediumuyzedsandvolosts, the
    standard of which is absolutely unsatisfactory, to the level of the
    insignificant number of highly satisfactory ones. At our congresses we must
    shift our main attention from the study of general theses and programmes of
    meetings to the study of practical experience, to the study of the examples
    set by the satisfactory and highly satisfactory districts, and to raising
    the backward and medium ones, which predominate, to the level of these good
    ones, which may be few but are still there.

Those are the remarks to which I must confine myself.
    (Applause.)

3. Summing-Up Speech On The Tax In Kind May 27

Comrades, although many comrades from the provinces have expressed
    dissatisfaction with the reports and the debate, it seems to me that we
    have, at any rate, achieved one object—we have ascertained how the
    new policy is understood and applied locally. The conference could hardly
    have set itself any other aim than that of securing an exchange of opinion
    for the purpose of thoroughly assimilating this new policy and of
    unanimously proceeding to its proper application. This we have achieved.
    True, there has been some perplexity and even wavering, which,
    unfortunately, in some cases, went far beyond perplexity over practical
    questions and conjectures about whether the new policy was meant
    “seriously” or “notseriously", and for how long. What
    Comrade Vareikis said, for example, was really not communist at all, and in
    content smacked of Menshevism. I must say this quite bluntly. How could he
    keep asking: “Tell us, is the peasantry a class, or not a
    class?” Of course, it is a class. In that case, he says, it must have
    political concessions, or, if not that, then certain measures should be
    taken in that direction, which will resemble Zubatovism[3]just the
    same.

Reference was made here to the fact that Martov had put the case
    squarely, whereas Vareikis was adding: “To a certain extent",
    “to some degree", “partly". This caused incredible, monstrous
    confusion. It is the same sort of confusion that was displayed when we were
    being accused of employing force. Again we have to explain that when we
    speak of dictatorship we mean the employment of coercion. Every-state
    implies employment of coercion; but the whole difference lies in whether it
    is employed against the exploited or against the exploiters. Is it employed
    against the toiling and exploited class? The same applies to the reference
    to Zubatovism. What was Zubatovism? It was support for the oppressor class
    by means of small economic concessions to the oppressed classes. That is
    why the response at that time was: economic concessions will not help you
    to induce the proletariat, the class that is fighting for the emancipation
    of all the oppressed, to abandon the idea of capturing political power and
    of destroying the system of oppression. At present the proletariat holds
    power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does that mean?
    It means, first, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and
    not towards the small producer. If we strayed from this bedrock course we
    should cease to be socialists and would find ourselves in the camp of the
    petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are
    now the proletariat’s most bitter enemies. Not long ago Comrade
    Bukharin quoted inPravdasome utterances of such a serious
    political thinker as Milyukov (Chernov and Martov come nowhere near him),
    who argued that only a socialist party could occupy the arena of political
    struggle in Russia today. And since the “socialist” parties,
    the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, desire to take the
    trouble of fighting the Bolsheviks, they “are welcome to try". That
    is literally what Milyukov said, and it proves that he is cleverer than
    Martov and Chernov, simply because he is a representative of the big
    bourgeoisie (even if he personally had less brains than Chernov and
    Martov). Milyukov is right. He takes a very sober account of the stages of
    political development and says that Socialist-Revolutionism and Menshevism
    are the necessary stepping stones leading to a reversion to capitalism. The
    bourgeoisie needs such stepping stones, and whoever does not understand
    this is stupid.

From the standpoint of the interests of the bourgeoisie, Milyukov is
    absolutely right. Since we, being the party of the proletariat, are leading
    the peasantry, we must pursue a course towards strengthening large-scale
    industry, and must therefore be prepared to make economic concessions. The
    proletariat led the peasantry, and did it in such a way that during the
    Civil War the peasantry obtained more economic benefits than the
    proletariat. In Martov’s terms, this is Zubatovism. Economic
    concessions have been made to the peasantry. These concessions were made to
    a section of the working people constituting the majority of the
    population. Is this policy wrong? No, it is the only correct one! And no
    matter what you say about Martov’s catchwords, about it heing
    impossible to deceive a class, I ask you nevertheless: where is our
    deception? We say that there are two paths to choose: one following Martov
    and Chernov—and through them to Milyukov—and the other
    following the Communists. As for us, we are fighting for the abolition of
    capitalism and the establishment of communism. Ours is a very hard road,
    and many are weary and lack faith. The peasants lack faith. But are we
    deceiving them? It is ridiculous to say that we are deceiving a class, and
    have lost our way amidst three pines, or even two, for the working class
    and the peasantry are only two classes. The proletariat leads the
    peasantry, which is a class that cannot be driven out as the landowners and
    capitalists were driven out and destroyed. We must remould it by prolonged
    and persistent effort, entailing great privation. It depends on us, the
    ruling party, how much of the suffering will fall to the lot of the
    proletariat and how much to that of the peasantry. How is this suffering to
    be shared? Is it to be on a basis of equality? Let Chernov and Martov say
    that. We say that we must be guided by the interests of the proletariat,
    that is, we must obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism
    and ensure the road to communism. Since the peasantry is now wearier and
    more exhausted, or rather it thinks that it is so, we make more concessions
    to it in order to obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism
    and to ensure the road to communism. That is the correct policy, and we are
    guided exclusively by class considerations. We tell the peasants frankly
    and honestly, without any deception: in order to hold the road to
    socialism, we are making a number of concessions to you, comrade peasants,
    but only within the stated limits and to the stated extent; and, of course,
    we ourselves shall be the judge of the limits and the extent. The
    concession itself is being made with an eye to distributing the burdens
    which, up to now, the proletariat has borne to a larger extent than the
    peasantry. During the three and a half years of the dictatorship of the
    proletariat, it has voluntarily borne more hardships than the peasantry.
    This is an absolutely obvious and incontrovertible truth. This is how the
    question stands in regard to the relations between the proletariat, and the
    peasantry: either the peasantry comes to an agreement with us and we make
    economic concessions to it—or we fight. That is why all other
    arguments are but evidence of a terrible confusion. As a matter of fact,
    any other road leads to Milyukov, and the restoration of the landowners and
    capitalists. We say that we shall agree to make any concession within the
    limits of what will sustain and strengthen the power of the proletariat,
    which, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, is unswervingly
    advancing towards the abolition of classes and towards communism.

The next point is that much of the criticism of Comrade
    Svidersky’s speech was wrong. All the members of the opposition at
    once hurled themselves upon him with what might be called brilliant
    parliamentary speeches, Comrade Larin proving to be the most brilliant
    representative of the “parliamentary opposition". The Soviet system
    does not provide many opportunities for making parliamentary speeches; but
    nature asserts herself, and although we have no parliamentary institutions,
    the parliamentary manner survives. Concerning Comrade Svidersky they
    complained that he had proposed the introduction of a food supply
    inspectorate, and had even gone to the length of talking about a food
    dictatorship. Comrade Svidersky may have overstated his case, but he is
    right in substance. We distributed the reporters’ roles in such a way
    that each played on a different instrument, as it were. The report on the
    question of exchange was made by the representative of Tsentrosoyuz,
    Comrade Khinchuk—the co-operator. As you are well aware, Tsentrosoyuz
    has concluded an agreement with the state. If some of the comrades have not
    read it, this only goes to show that they have not treated the material of
    the conference in a business-like way. Our state concludes an agreement
    with the representative of Tsentrosoyuz: the representative of the
    People’s Commissariat for Food concludes an agreement with the
    representative of the co-operative societies, and co-operators abroad must
    reckon with our agreement. Under the agreement all goods are delivered to
    the co-operative societies, so that the co-operators may trade on our
    behalf—on behalf of the centralised state, the big factories, and the
    proletariat—but not on their own behalf. This is a major and most
    important condition, because there can be no other arrangement. Petrograd
    and Moscow are starving, while the well-fedgubernias, as Comrade
    Bryukhanov’s figures show, have eaten twice as much, and sent us half
    as much as they should have. What do you say: in the circumstances, do we
    or do we not need a food dictatorship? I think we do; we need it very much,
    indeed, because there is any amount of this laxity all over the country.
    You must realise that we cannot do without coercion, and Tsentrosoyuz must
    do the distributing under our control.

We say to Tsentrosoyuz: you have traded well and we will give you a
    bonus in the form of a definite percentage. This is stipulated in the
    agreement, and we will encourage this commission-basis trading by every
    sort of bonus system. We will give a bonus for profitable trade; but we
    will demand that this trade is carried on for our benefit, for the benefit
    of the state, which has centralised large-scale industry, and which is
    governed by the proletariat. Does large-scale industry stand to gain? Who
    stands to gain?

How can you ensure food supplies without a tax? You cannot. We do not
    know whether the tax or the exchange will yield most, but we do
    know—and it is a fact—that we lack an adequate fund for
    exchange. At the present time, you cannot get what you need without an
    instrument of coercion. Never! This is obvious. And in this, Svidersky, as
    a representative of his line, is absolutely right. We have approved of the
    establishment of a food supply inspectorate, and the Presidium of the
    All-Russia Central Executive Committee will bring more pressure to bear on
    you because you know who ought to be appointed; that is your business; but
    once you make the appointment, see that the man does his job. Things being
    what they are, unless the state is assured of approximately 400 millionpoodsof grain, it is no use talking about large-scale industry
    and socialist construction. Those who have not learned this in the course
    of the past three years are not worth arguing with. But in spite of our
    numerous mistakes, we have increased this fund. True, while increasing the
    fund in 1920, we blundered over distribution, but enormous progress was
    made nonetheless. We must approach the subject soberly and say that to
    collect the tax in kind we need an expeditious apparatus, and it is no use
    making liberal speeches and hinting that a food supply inspectorate is such
    a nasty thing.

I am not aware of the existence of a “communist” system
    under which you could expect to collect—without coercion—a tax
    from the peasantry constituting a majority of the population in the period
    of transition from capitalism to communism. If you want to sustain
    large-scale industry—the basis of the proletarian
    dictatorship—then you must want this apparatus to function. And this,
    naturally, demands centralism. Look at the figures. Unfortunately, few of
    you are sufficiently familiar with them. See how much the localities have
    kept for themselves, in spite of the orders from the centre. The comrades
    from Moscow and Petrograd have quoted figures here showing that the orders
    from the centre are not being fully carried out. It turns out that three
    reminders were given, and an equal number of censures. What else is there
    to do? There remains nothing but dismissal, arrest and so forth. (A
    voice: “How many such cases were there?") There were many cases
    of infringements, but few dismissals. That is what I wanted to say in
    defence of this line of policy.

The harvest this year will evidently be a fair one in many parts, and
    will set in earlier than we expected. Hence, we must make preparations
    beforehand, the situation now being such that we must swiftly collect the
    main fund. Consequently, it is absolutely wrong to take the approach that
    many did here.

As for Comrade Larin, his talents lie more in the sphere of
    parliamentary opposition and journalism than business efficiency. He is
    tireless in the drawing-up of projects. He mentioned that he had proposed a
    good plan as early as January 1920, but if we were to collect all of his
    projects and pick out the good ones, we would probably find that they add
    up to one in ten thousand.

On May 10, he submitted a scheme to the Central Committee’s
    Political Bureau for a general introduction of a collective supply system.
    Its main principle is alluring, but when was it proposed? On May 10, 1921,
    when there was an absolute shortage of food in centres like Moscow and
    Petrograd, when these important centres of the Russian Republic were
    temporarily doomed to semi-starvation and even worse. It is ridiculous to
    propose a reshuffle of the food supply organisations at a time when men are
    on their last legs, and are overworking the trunk-lines to Siberia, the
    Caucasus and the Ukraine, in an effort to track down every trainload, every
    car almost. What the devil is the use of introducing a collective supply
    system at a time like that? The Political Bureau adopted the following
    resolution: “That the scheme proposed by Larin and the All-Russia
    Central Council of Trade Unions [the A.C.C.T.U., of course, hastened to put
    its signature to it] be rejected; that the author of the scheme be
    instructed to re-examine the question with greater care, in the light of
    the actual possibilities of obtaining supplies. . . .” This principle
    was reiterated (in Chubar’s and Holtzmann’s theses, if you have
    read them) at the Trade Union Congress; Chubar had formulated the main
    parts of his theses in harmony with the policy of circumspection laid down
    by the Party’s Central Committee. Holtzmann and Larin behaved
    according to the rule which Larin, half in jest, whispered in my ear at the
    end of the meeting of the Political Bureau. (I don’t think I shall be
    committing an indiscretion if I relate this conversation.) When Larin saw
    that the resolution had been adopted he said to me: “You have given
    us your little finger, but we will take your hand.” Then I said to
    myself—although I had known it before—now we know how to
    bargain with Larin. If he asks for a million rubles, offer him fifty
    kopeks. (Laughter.) During the debate, when Larin was asked for
    the facts, he quoted the example (which he said was “brilliant") of
    the construction of the Kizlyar-Staro-Terek railway. Although it has
    already been shown that there is nothing new in this example, that similar
    experiments have been made before, it is a sign of progress to hear
    definite examples and results of experience, instead of general arguments
    and countless theses, It would be disastrous if everyone began reading and
    discussing these theses, nine-tenths of which you cannot read to the end
    without a splitting headache.

It is not theses, but a record of local experience, that we need. Let us
    study this experience, instead of piling system upon system and drawing up
    laws on collective supplies when we lack even the minimum of real supplies.
    Practical work is going on in the localities. We were told: it is not right
    to reproach the localities for not sharing their experiences. The Central
    Committee was reproached here for not giving publicity to local experience.
    But we have none of it: our time is taken up entirely with decrees. The
    majority of us are immersed in this unpleasant work, and that is why we
    cannot see local experience. It is your business to bring it to us. Larin
    was right in quoting the fine example of the Kizlyar-Terek railway, for it
    was a piece of local experience. But even here he allowed his imagination
    to run away with him, and Chubar and Osinsky had to put him right. This is
    not the only example. He said that a worker received 28 pounds under the
    old system and fourpoodsunder the new system. I was doubtful
    about the figures and so I asked him: Where did you get that from? He
    replied that they had been certified by the Workers’ and
    Peasants’ Inspection. But we know that Larin is not only a
    parliamentary man, but also a cartoonist. First, he drew a cartoon
    satirising the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection. And now he
    says: fourpoodsinstead of 28 pounds—certified by the
    Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection. First, he undermines
    confidence in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection by relating
    anecdotes of that kind, and then presents the certificate of the
    Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection as sole proof. Chubar and
    Osinsky say that this system has been repeatedly employed in the timber
    industry. The whole point is to compare the experience of one locality with
    that of another. The best part of Larin’s statement was his
    description of the work on the Kizlyar-Terek railway. But what we need to
    know is whether things have not been done better in Tula or Tambov. The
    centre cannot tell you that, because we do not know. You should bring us
    this information from the localities, show us the facts, teach us, and we
    will all learn, and try to follow the best example.

The number of local centres, on theuyedor district level,
    with such experience is two or three per thousand, possibly more, but
    surely two or three can be found. This experience must be thoroughly
    studied in a business-like fashion. We must carefully sift the evidence and
    verify the figures, and not rely merely on speeches by the opposition. If
    we do this, the centre will be able to learn.

I think the most important outcome of the debate has been the
    information we got on how the exchange of commodities was begun; the only
    thing lacking was the precise facts. Donbas comrades cabled to say: We have
    obtained 3,000poodsof wheat through exchange. This referred to a
    small district, but there were no details. I expected the comrades to come
    forward here and tell us what they gave in return, and through what
    organisation the exchange was made: the Commissariat for Food, a lessee,
    concessionaire or private entrepreneur? This we do not know; and yet it is
    far more important than our decrees. Decrees can be read, and it is hardly
    worth getting together to discuss them; but it is certainly worth while to
    come together to discuss how they obtained 3,000poodsof wheat in
    the Donbas, and whether the comrades in Volhynia or Tambov have not done
    better. Quite a good deal has been done locally. The comrades should come
    here and tell us the results of their practical experience over there. One
    will say: “I started doing so and so, but was hindered by the central
    organisation.” Another will say: “I managed to bring the
    central organisation to heel.” As for Tambov Gubernia, the comrade
    who delivered a parliamentary speech and thundered against the Commissariat
    for Food vaguely hinted that they had set up co-operative shops and
    agencies. The comrades had accepted this. Over there they have to put up
    with a number of additional difficulties; part of the area has not been
    sown, severe conditions generally, handicap upon handicap. Nevertheless,
    from what he said it is evident that exchange has begun and the
    co-operatives are functioning. Even pomade was mentioned. How much pomade
    did you take? And on what terms was it distributed? You must even trade in
    pomade; when you are trading you must reckon with the demand. If there is a
    demand for pomade, we must supply it. If we run things properly we can
    restore large-scale industry even with the aid of pomade. What we must
    calculate, though, is how much of it we need to buy, or obtain, to be able
    to purchase 1,000poodsof grain. (Voice: What about
    icons; there’s a demand for icons.) As for icons, someone has just
    given a reminder that the peasants are asking for icons. I think that we
    should not follow the example of the capitalist countries and put vodka and
    other intoxicants on the market, because, profitable though they are, they
    will lead us back to capitalism and not forward to communism; but there is
    no such danger in pomade. (Laughter.) As for church bells, we
    differ on that, and some comrades think that in some places the bells will
    soon be voluntarily recast into copper wire for electrification. Besides,
    there are so many of them in Russia at the moment that they can hardly be
    used by religious people for their original purpose, because the need is no
    longer there. As regards Volhynia, it was stated that there are places
    there where they give apoodof grain for ten pounds of salt. But
    how was this transacted? Did you have any agents? How did you trade? Who
    looked after the goods? Who locked up the warehouses? How much was stolen?
    That is the main thing but nothing was said about it at all. Instead, we
    were told that the Poles had given apoodof salt for apoodof grain. In conversation with the comrade I said that if the
    Poles offered apoodof salt for apoodof grain and the
    peasants offered you apoodof grain for ten pounds of salt, then
    you could have traded something for yourselves. What prevented you from
    doing that? The centre, it was said. I’m sorry but I simply cannot
    believe that the centre prevented you from obtaining fourpoodsof
    grain for apoodof Polish salt. We could not have opposed a thing
    like that; I refuse to believe it. The comrades complained that before,
    when the army was there, everything had to be done through the military
    authorities; but now that the army is no longer there and there is no war,
    permission must be obtained from the centre. A comrade said that now they
    had the Southern Paper Trust and that they were fighting this Trust. But
    when I asked to whom they had complained about this organisation he
    answered that he did not know. But this is very important.

They were unable to name the body to whom they had sent their complaint
    about the Southern Paper Trust. I do not know what this Paper Trust is. In
    all probability it is a body that suffers from the same bureaucratic
    distortion that all our Soviet organisations are afflicted with. The
    capitalists are still fighting us. We have compelled many of them to seek
    protection under Milyukov’s wing abroad; but many thousands are still
    here, waging war against us according to all the rules of the art of
    bureaucracy. But how are you combating this, comrades? Do you think you can
    take this Paper Trust and all the rest of them with your bare hands? We did
    not fight Denikin with bare hands, but armed ourselves strongly, and
    organised an army. But here we have excellent officials, who consider that
    it is in the interests of their class to play dirty tricks on us, to hamper
    our work; they think that they are saving civilisation by helping to bring
    about the downfall of the Bolsheviks, and they know how to run an office a
    hundred times better than we do. There was nowhere for us to learn this
    business. We must fight them according to all the rules of the art and take
    proceedings against Party comrades who go about lodging complaints, or
    telling anecdotes about the dirty tricks that are being played in some
    office or other. They go about Moscow telling anecdotes about the
    bureaucratic tricks that are being played. But you, comrades, who are
    intelligent Communists, what have you done to combat this?—"I lodged
    a complaint."—Where did you file your complaint? It turns out that no
    complaint had been filed, whereas it should have been sent to the Council
    of People’s Commissars and to the All-Russia Central Executive
    Committee; in other words, they should have exercised all their rights
    provided for by our Constitution. Of course, we may suffer a reverse here
    and there in this war. But has there ever been a war, even the most
    victorious, without any reverses? In this one reverses are also possible,
    but the fight must go on. Many of us, however, are not taking it seriously.
    Have you taken legal proceedings against those who are responsible for red
    tape? Has any people’s court convicted anyone for making a worker or
    a peasant call at an office four or five times and finally sending him off
    with an answer which is formally correct, but is essentially sheer mockery?
    You are Communists, aren’t you? Then why don’t you set a trap
    for these bureaucratic gentlemen and then haul them before a people’s
    court, and into prison, for this red tape? How many people have you put
    into prison for red tape? Everyone will say, of course, that it is a
    troublesome business: Someone may be offended. Many take this view, but do
    not find it too much trouble to complain and tell anecdotes. Very often one
    cannot tell the difference between these anecdotes and the slander
    published by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in foreign
    journals. The Mensheviks write: “We have our own correspondents in
    all the Soviet offices in Moscow.” (Laughter.) Quite often
    the anecdotes that are told here, and those with which the speeches of the
    parliamentary opposition are replete, appear in the Menshevik journals a
    few days later. But you should know where to draw the line; you must see
    the difference between a serious struggle and the telling of anecdotes. Of
    course, when people are tired, an anecdote told by a capable speaker may
    help to let off steam. Judging from my own observations this is so, and I
    have no objections from this point of view. But we need something more: we
    must study the methods used to catch the culprits, count up how many were
    caught and brought to trial, and sum up the results obtained. If we proceed
    on these lines we will win this war, although it takes far more skill than
    the Civil War.

I should like to say a word or two about Nikolayev Gubernia. The comrade
    from Nikolayev Gubernia gave us a number of valuable facts, but in most
    cases he gave no details. He said: “There is a demand for textiles
    and iron, but not for pomade.” Others said, however, that there was
    no demand for textiles. The comrade came up against the profiteers, and
    being obliged to pursue the free market policy, he wants to know how to
    combat them. We cannot fight them in the old way; and to fight them in the
    new way we have mounted guards in the transport system, and a number of new
    decrees have been passed; but, of course, no quick results can be expected.
    But where is your local experience in this matter? A number of decrees have
    now been passed for the protection of the transport system, not against the
    profiteers, but against its “improper use". Special commissions,
    Extraordinary Three-Man Commissions have been set up by the Cheka and the
    Transport Cheka; the War Department and the People’s Commissariat for
    Railways are also taking a hand. But what are the bodies functioning in
    your districts? How do they co-ordinate their work? What is being done
    about the complaints that the profiteers are getting the upper hand? How do
    they operate? This is what we ought to discuss. But comrades come here and
    complain: “The profiteers have got the upper hand.” We have
    adopted the decrees. Perhaps they are no good, they must be put to the
    test, but how is this to be done? We test our decrees by publishing them.
    You know them; you come here to discuss them and tell us how they are
    applied. You must tell us: in such and such a place, such and such a
    Transport Three-Man Commission has done the following. In one place it was
    successful, in another it was not. Perhaps the speeches will not be as
    brilliant as those we heard about the food dictatorship; but unless we do
    this we shall never learn to make fewer mistakes in drafting decrees, and
    that is the main thing.

Let me deal in conclusion with the deductions which, I think, Comrade
    Osinsky has quite rightly drawn, and which sum up our activities. His
    deductions were three. First: “Seriously and for a long time". I
    think he is quite right. The policy is a long-term one and is being adopted
    in earnest. We must get this well into our heads and remember it, because,
    owing to the gossip habit, rumours are being spread that we are indulging
    in a policy of expedients, that is to say, political trickery, and that
    what is being done is only for the present day. That is not true. We are
    taking class relationships into account and have our eyes on what the
    proletariat must do to lead the peasantry in the direction of communism in
    spite of everything. Of course, we have to retreat; but we must take it
    very seriously and look at it from the standpoint of class forces. To
    regard it as a trick is to imitate the philistines, the petty bourgeoisie,
    who are alive and kicking not only outside the Communist Party. But I would
    not go along with Comrade Osinsky in his estimate of the period. He said
    “seriously and for a longtime” meant 25 years. I am not that
    pessimistic; I shall refrain from estimating the period, but I think his
    figure is a bit too pessimistic. We shall be lucky to project our policy
    for some 5 or 10 years, because we usually fail to do so even for 5
    weeks.

We must promote enterprising non-Party workers. We must reiterate over
    and over again that, after all is said and done, meetings, congresses and
    conferences held by the Communist Party and other organisations in Soviet
    Russia must not be what they have been in the past, and still are, that is
    to say, assemblies with speeches in the spirit of parliamentary oppositions
    and the drawing up of resolutions. We have so many resolutions that nobody
    even takes the trouble to file them, let alone read them. We must devote
    our attention to business and not to resolutions. Under the bourgeois
    system, business matters were managed by private owners and not by state
    agencies; but now, business matters are our common concern. These are the
    politics that interest us most. Of course, we can denounce the Mensheviks
    for the 999th time, they deserve it; but after all is said and done, this
    is mere repetition, and many of us have now been doing it these thirty
    years. Most of us have had enough of it.

What is much more interesting is how, in this socialist state, we are to
    exchange textiles, pomade and other things for grain, and obtain an extrapoodof flour in exchange for Polish salt. Although it is not our
    custom, Party meetings must take up the question of enterprise and
    initiative. The whole capitalist world is starving. They have an abundance
    of salt, pomades, and other things of that sort, and if we apply the slogan
    of local exchange properly and show initiative, we shall obtain extrapoodsof grain.

Comrade Gusev has handed me a draft of the rules and regulations for a
    Communist Producers’ Co-operative Society. Its substance is contained
    in Point 5, in which the members of the society ask to be assured a
    “healthy, hygienic ration". (Laughter.) A “healthy,
    hygienic ration” is the goal of our whole food policy. We must
    collect 240 millionpoodsof grain by means of the tax, and 160
    million through commodity exchange, making a total of 400 millionpoods, so that the peasants may feel that this system is
    economically stable.

The surplus-grain appropriation system could not be continued any
    longer. The policy had to be changed. In this respect, we are facing what
    is, perhaps, the most difficult period of our construction effort. If we
    were to compare the whole work of the Communist Party to a four-year course
    in the higher sciences, we could say that our present position is as
    follows: we are taking our examination to pass from the third course to the
    fourth; we have not yet passed the examination, but there is every sign
    that we shall. We can say that the first course lasted from the 1870s to
    1903; it was the initial introductory period, ranging from Narodnaya Volya,
    Social-Democracy and the Second International to Bolshevism. That was the
    first course.

The second course lasted from 1903 to 1917, with a serious preparatory
    course for revolution, and the first essay in revolution in 1905. The third
    course lasted from 1917 to 1921, a period of four years, which in content
    was more important than the first forty years. This was a very practical
    test, when the proletariat came to power, but it was not yet the crucial
    test. Although in our anthem we sing: “The last fight let us face", I
    must say that, unfortunately, it was not the last fight, but one of the
    fights just before the last, to be absolutely exact. At present we are
    taking our examination to pass from the third course to the fourth. Taking
    Osinsky’s example of years, I think we should allow ten, because we
    shall have to take an exam to pass from the third course to the fourth.
    After that we must do well in the fourth course and then we shall really be
    invincible. We can win on the economic front. If we are victorious in
    relation to the peasantry and collect a “healthy, hygienic
    ration” this year, we shall pass to the fourth course. After that,
    all the work of construction that we are planning will be more serious.

This is the task confronting us. That is why I take the liberty, once
    again, in conclusion to express the hope that, in spite of the
    difficulties, and all the old traditions which frown on the idea of
    discussing local questions of minor economics at congresses, conferences
    and fine parliamentary assemblies, we shall, nevertheless, say to
    ourselves: being Communists, we shall have to devote ourselves to these
    tasks. We must study the practical experience gained in economic work in
    the localities, where the decrees are being applied, where they are tested,
    where their defects should be rectified, where we must begin to do the
    things that are later summed up at our meetings. If we do that, our work of
    construction will make real and durable progress. (Stormy
    applause.)

4. Draft Resolution On Questions Of The New Economic
    Policy

1. The fundamental political task of the moment is for all Party and
    Soviet workers to gain a complete understanding of the New Economic Policy
    and to implement it to the letter.

The Party regards this policy as being established for a long period of
    years, and demands that everyone should carry it out unconditionally with
    thoroughness and diligence.

2. Commodity exchange is brought to the fore as the principal lever of
    the New Economic Policy. It is impossible to establish a correct
    relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry, or an altogether
    stable form of economic alliance between these two classes in the period of
    transition from capitalism to socialism, without regular commodity exchange
    or the exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

The exchange of commodities, in particular, is required to stimulate the
    extension of the peasants’ area under crop and improvement of peasant
    farming.

Local initiative and enterprise must be given all-round support and
    development at all costs.

guberniaswith the greatest grain surpluses must be placed on
    the priority list for commodity exchange.

3. Considering co-operatives to be the main apparatus for commodity
    exchange, the conference recognises as correct the policy of contracts
    between the agencies of the People’s Commissariat for Food and the
    co-operative societies, and the transfer, under government control, by the
    former to the latter of commodity-exchange stocks to fulfil the assignments
    of the government;

the co-operatives to be given broad opportunities for procurement and
    all-round development of local industry and revival of economic life in
    general;

support for credit operations by the co-operatives;

anarchic commodity exchange (that is, exchange which eludes all control
    and state supervision) to be combated by concentration of exchange chiefly
    in the hands of the co-operatives, without, however, any restrictions on
    regular free market operations;

market analysis.

4. Support for small and medium (private and co operative) enterprises,
    chiefly those not requiring supplies from state raw material, fuel and food
    reserves.

Permission to lease government enterprises to private persons,
    co-operatives, artels and associations. The right of local economic
    agencies to conclude such contracts without authorisation from superior
    agencies. Obligatory notification of the Council of Labour and Defence in
    each such case.

5. Review of (certain sections of) production programmes for large-scale
    industry towards increasing the manufacture of consumer goods and peasant
    household articles.

Extension of enterprise and initiative by each large establishment in
    the disposal of financial and material resources. Submission of a precise
    decree to that effect for approval by the Council of People’s
    Commissars.

6. Development of the system of bonuses in kind and the establishment by
    way of experiment of a collective supply system.

Establishment of a more correct distribution of foodstuffs with the aim
    of increasing labour productivity.

7. The need to maintain and enlarge the apparatus for the full and
    expeditious collection of the tax in kind everywhere. Investment of food
    agencies with the necessary Party authority for that purpose. Maintenance
    and enhancement of the centralisation of the food apparatus.

8. To concentrate all the enumerated measures on the current
    year’s practical and urgent task: collection of at least 400 millionpoodsof grain stocks as a basis for the rehabilitation of
    large-scale industry and the implementation of the electriccation plan.

9. To adopt in principle the draft Instructions of the C.L.D.,
    authorising the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to enact them
    into law.

To recognise the strict fulfilment of the Instructions in general and
    the recruitment and promotion of non-Party people for work, in particular,
    as the Party’s unconditional and primary task.

10. To establish special responsibility on the part of central agencies
    for any hampering of local initiative and insufficient support of it. To
    authorise the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to work out a
    corresponding decision and have it adopted at the very next session.

11. The conference authorises the Central Committee and all Party
    organisations to carry out a system of measures to intensify agitation and
    propaganda and effect the necessary transfer of Party cadres to ensure
    complete understanding and steady implementation of the enumerated
    tasks.

12. To set as the Party’s most important task the careful and
    all-round publicising and study in the press and at trade union, Soviet,
    and Party meetings, conferences, congresses, etc., of the practical
    experience gained in economic development locally and at the centre.

First published in full according to page proofs with
    Lenin’s corrections.

5. Speech In Closing The Conference May 28

Comrades, I think that I can confine myself to a very short speech. As
    you are aware, we convened this special conference mainly for the purpose
    of achieving complete understanding on economic policy between the centre
    and the localities, among Party and all Soviet workers. I think that the
    conference has fully achieved its object. Some speakers noted that Comrade
    Osinsky gave the correct expression to the feelings of very many, probably,
    the majority of local Party workers when he said that we must remove all
    doubt about the fact that the policy adopted by the Tenth Party Congress
    and subsequently reinforced by decrees and orders has unquestionably been
    accepted by the Party in earnest and for a long time. This is what the
    conference most emphatically expressed and amplified by a number of points.
    When the comrades return to their localities, not the slightest possibility
    of wrong interpretation will remain. Of course, in adopting a policy to be
    pursued over a number of years we do not for a moment forget that
    everything may be altered by the international revolution, its rate of
    development and the circumstances accompanying it. The current
    international situation is such that some sort of a temporary, unstable
    equilibrium, but equilibrium for all that, has been established; it is the
    kind of equilibrium under which the imperialist powers have been compelled
    to abandon their desire to hurl themselves at Soviet Russia, despite their
    hatred for her, because the disintegration of the capitalist world is
    steadily progressing, unity is steadily diminishing, while the onslaught of
    the forces of the oppressed colonies, which have a population of over a
    thousand million, is increasing from year to year, month to month, and even
    week to week. But we can make no conjectures on this score. We are now
    exercising our main influence on the international revolution through our
    economic policy. The working people of all countries without exception and
    without exaggeration are looking to the Soviet Russian Republic. This much
    has been achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up or conceal anything. That
    is why they so eagerly catch at our every economic mistake and weakness.
    The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this
    problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale.
    That is why for us questions of economic development become of absolutely
    exceptional importance. On this front, we must achieve victory by a steady
    rise and progress which must be gradual and necessarily slow. I think that
    as a result of the work of our conference we shall certainly achieve this
    goal. (Applause.)

Published inPravdaNo. 19, June 2, 1921; Published
    according to thePravdatext .

[1]An
    extraordinary conference, held in Moscow from May 26 to 28, 1921, was
    attended by 239 delegates from Party and Soviet organisations. On its
    agenda were the following questions: 1) Economic policy: a) tax in kind; b)
    co-operatives; c) financial reform; d) small industry; 2) The current role
    of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, 3) The Third Congress of
    the Comintern; 4) Information on the Fourth Trade Union Congress; 5)
    Organisational question.

The Conference centred on the question of the New
    Economic Policy (NEP) because it was not yet clear enough to the people in
    the localities.

Lenin guided the work of the Conference: he delivered
    the opening speech, spoke on the agenda, was elected to the Presidium, gave
    a report and a summing-up speech on the tax in kind, and the closing speech
    of the Conference. Substantiating the New Economic Policy, he exposed the
    false rumours about NEP and distortions of this policy, and stressed that
    it was a policy whose aim was the construction of a socialist society, that
    it was to be carried out “in earnest and for a long time". The
    Conference adopted Lenin’s draft resolution, “On Economic
    Policy", which confirmed NEP’s basic principles and gave concrete
    instructions for their implementation. It said: “The basic political
    task of the moment is for all Party and Soviet workers to master and
    implement to the letter the New Economic Policy. SeeK.P.S.S. v
    rezolutsiakh. . . (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions
    of Congresses,Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1,
    1954, p. 574).

After the Conference had heard information on the work
    of the Fourth Trade Union Congress, Lenin sharply criticised the factional
    activity of the trade union leadership, first and foremost M. P. Tomsky,
    Chairman of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.

Another question of great importance was the
    organisational work of the Party, the report on which was given by V. M.
    Molotov. The Conference adopted a “Plan for the Work of the Central
    Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)” which demanded the training and
    promotion of new Party workers and activisation of all Party and Soviet
    work. Lenin stressed that Party organisations had to establish closer ties
    with the non-Party masses and that it was necessary to collect and study
    the experience of local Party organisations. His remarks were taken into
    account in the resolution.

Representatives of the Communist Parties of Germany and
    the United States conveyed greetings to the Conference, and, on the motion
    of the Presidium, the Conference cabled a message of greetings to workers
    detained in prison.

[2]The
    reference is to the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions, held in
    Moscow from May 17 to 25, 1921, and the Fourth All-Russia Congress of
    Economic Councils, held there from May 18 to 24, 1921.

The Fourth Congress of Trade Unions had the following
    items on its agenda: report of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade
    Unions; report of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council the role
    and tasks of the trade unions and economic development organisational
    question; wage-rate policy and workers’ supply; trade unions and
    co-operatives; labour protection, etc.

The Fourth Congress of Economic Councils had on its
    agenda: report of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, economic
    policy of the S.E.C. in connection with the decree on the tax in kind and
    the co-operatives, S.E.C. organisation, report of the State Planning
    Commission; report on foreign trade; electrification of Russia; material
    resources of the Republic and organisation of supply in industry.

The most important questions were discussed at joint
    sittings of the two congresses with the participation of specialists and
    public figures.

[3]Colonel of
    the gendarmerie Zubatov, Chief of the Secret Political Police, proposed the
    setting up of legal workers’ organisations in 1901-03 to divert the
    workers from political struggle against the tsarist autocracy, and to
    switch their attention to narrow economic demands which the government, he
    asserted, was ready to meet. The Minister for the Interior, V. K. Plehve,
    approved Zubatov’s activity and the first organisation, called
    “Workers’ mutual aid in mechanical industries society", was set
    up in Moscow in May 1901, and later such societies made their appearance in
    Minsk, Odessa, Vilno, Kiev, and other towns.

The Second Coneress of the R.S.D.L.P., in its resolution
    “On the Trade Union Struggle", defined Zubatovism as a policy of
    “systematic betrayal of working class interests for the benefit of
    the capitalists", and in order to fight it, called on Party organisations
    to support and lead any strikes started by legal workers’
    organisations.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats made use of such
    organisations to draw the masses of working people into the struggle
    against the tsarist government, exposing the reactionary nature of
    Zubatov’s policy. Lenin wrote in 1905: “And now the Zubatov
    movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests
    of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and
    demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is
    turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the
    proletarian class struggle.”

The tsarist government had to close down the Zubatov
    organisations in 1903 because of the mounting revolutionary movement.

Lenin believed it was highly important to give the
    working people a thorough explanation of these Instructions and put them
    into practice as soon as possible.