First Exposure of Cadet Negotiations with the Cabinet

Published:Prosveshcheniye, No. 1, December 1911.

      Signed:P..

      Published according to theProsveshcheniyetext.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      Progress Publishers,[1974],

      Moscow,Volume 17,

      pages424-432.Translated:Dora CoxTranscription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2004).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

Thosewho, six or five and a half years ago, sounded the
alarm about the negotiations which the Constitutional-Democrats were, in
general, conducting with Cabinet ministers, especially on the subject of
ministerial portfolios, cannot help entertaining a feeling of profound
satisfaction today. Historical truth is bound to out—it is sometimes
divulged in quarters from which truth is least expected. The first
revelations have now been made, and, despite all the efforts of
“interested” persons (and parties) to hush them up, they will not end
here. It may be said with absolute certainty that these exposures will
fully corroborate the accusations we levelled against the Cadets at that
time.

Wittestarted them in his controversy with Guchkov. Witte’s object and
the nature of his revelations are of the basest; it is an intrigue of the
worst kind, a desire to trip somebody up, a bid for a portfolio. But it is
a well-known fact that when two thieves fall out honest men always come
into their own; and when three thieves have fallen out, the gain is likely
to be the greater.

Whatmatters most in Witte’s letter is that willy-nilly he had to
establish certainfacts—thus providing an opportunity (and
making it indispensable) to verify these facts by questioning all those
involved in the affair. The basic facts to be gleaned from Witte’s letter
are the following:

(1)Theconference called by Witte was attended by Shipov, Guchkov,
Urusov, Y. Trubetskoi, and M. Stakhovich, that is to say, leading figures
of the Cadet, Peaceful Renovation, and Octobrist parties.

(2) “Atthe first session of the conference between Count Witte [we
are quoting his letter I and the above-mentioned prominent persons,
agreement in principle was reached on all the main questions, except the
question of the appointment of the Minister of the Interior.”

(3) “CountWitte insisted on Durnovo’s appointment, while the
prominent persons, with the exception of Prince Urusov, were opposed to
it. As for Prince Urusov, he tried to persuade his colleagues at the
conference to agree to Durnovo’s appointment in view of the gravity of the
situation and the impossibility of delaying the matter, and, for his own
part, he declared that, in order to set an example, he was prepared to
accept the post of Vice-Minister under Durnovo.... At the next session
Shipov, Guchkov, and Prince Trubetskoi declared that they could not join a
Cabinet that would include Durnovo....”

(4)Stolypin’scandidature was mentioned, but it failed to receive
unanimous approval. Some were in favour, others were opposed to it.

Whatamendments has Guchkov introduced to this statement of the facts?
He has confirmed that “Durnovo’s candidature had the warm Support of
Prince Urusov, subsequently a member of the First Duma.” Witte, according
to Guchkov, hesitated, and there was a moment when he was prepared to give
up Durnovo because it was known that the press was about to come out with
revelations and bitter articles against him. “The whole incident,” adds
Guchkov, “took place immediately after the Manifesto of October 17, when
there reigned the fullest, the most unbridled, I should say, freedom of the
press.”

Thenegotiations were prolonged. Guchkov writes of “wearisome days of
protracted negotiations”. In respect of Stolypin, he says that “nobody
expressed the unfavourable opinion mentioned byCoundWitte. In describing the general situation
obtaining at that time, Guchkov says: “Many ‘saviours’ of the country have
now appeared on the scene.... But where were they in those days? ... At
that time many of them had not yet made up their minds on which side of the
barricades they were going to stand”.

Thoseare the essential points in Witte’s and Guchkov’s
revelations. The minor details we naturally leave out ofconsideration. The historical truth is now quite definitely established:

(1)At that extremely grave moment in the history of Russia there were
no serious differences of opinion between the Cadets and the
Octobrists;

(2) “At that time many [of the bourgeois leaders and, as Guchkov
“subtly” hints, perhaps even of the ministers] had not yet made up their
minds on which side of the barricades they were going to stand”. But the
fact is that those who attended the conference, and did so more than once,
were men who all stoodon one definite “side of the
barricades”. During those conferences the ministers, and the
Octobrists, and the Cadets all stood on the same side of the
barricade. Historical truth permits of no doubt or misinterpretation: these
were conferences at which the government conducted negotiations with the
counter-revolutionary, liberal bourgeoisie.

Nowlook at the behaviour of the Cadets. Ever since the publication of
Witte’s and Guchkov’s revelations (their letters were printed in
St. Petersburg on September 26, and in Moscow on September 27, Old Style),
the Cadetshave been maintaining complete silence about theirpart
in the affair, confining themselves to attempts to “twit” Guchkov. That
is exactly whatRechdid in its issue of September 28, andRusskiye Vedomostiin its issue of the same date, where they
“twitted” Guchkov with having subsequently joined Durnovo’s colleagues,
butthey have never printed any corrections or denials that affect the
historical facts. The third thief hopes that, thanks to the
controversy between Witte and Guchkov, he will go unnoticed!

Thenthe Octobrists begin to “revenge” themselves on both Witte and
the Cadets. OnOctober 14(after two weeks of reconnoitring by the
Octobrists and of cowardly and mean silence on the part of the Cadets)Golos Moskvycarried a “statement of facts” headed “Count Witte
and P. N. Durnovo in Alliance with the Cadets”. The new revelations bring
out the following points:

(1) Prince Trubetskoi was a member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party
at the time.

(2) “Since he did not want to create any misconceptions in Count Witte’s
mind, Prince Trubetskoi considered it his duty to warn him that he, Prince
Trubetskoi, would inform the bureau of his party, which met every day in
Professor Petrazhitsky’s apartment to discuss current affairs,about all of Witte’s negotiations with men prominent in public life” (it
is obvious that neither the Octobrists nor the Cadets regard the worker and
peasant democrats as “prominent in public life”; apparently, in
October 1905 the workers and peasants wereoutside“public
life”!).

(3) Mr. Petrunkevich was particularly vehement in his objections to
Stolypin’s candidature. He said that, “if the worst came to the worst
[sic!], it was necessary to advise Count Witte to appoint Durnovo,
rather than Stolypin, to the post of Minister of the Interior. The other
leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic Party fully shared Petrunkevich’s
opinion, and Prince Trubetskoi was instructed to convey to Count Witte the
opinion of the prominent public men who met in Petrazhitsky’s
apartment”. The next morning Trubetskoi visited Count Witte and conveyed
to him the exact opinion of the bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic
Party about both candidates.

HasTrubetskoi corroborated the reference to his part in the affair? He
fully corroborated it when he told both the correspondent ofNovoye
Vremya(see issue of October 15) and thecorrespondentofRech(see issue of October 19) that the information printed inGolos Moskvywas “quite exact”. “The word ‘bureau’,”
said Trubetskoi, “isperhaps out of place, it would have been
more correct to say ‘leaders of the Party’” (meaning the
Cadets). Trubetskoi made another, just as immaterial, “correction”,
stating that he had visit ed Witte “not the next morning, perhaps, but two
or three days later”. Finally, in the interview he gave to theRechcorrespondent, Trubetskoi said:

“Exceptionmust be taken to one statement made by Guchkov. He says
that the prominent people refused to join the Cabinet only because of
Durnovo. That is not quite so [not quite so! I as far as I am concerned
and, if I am not mistaken, the same applies to Shipov and I expressed our
willingness to join the Cabinet, but on condition that its programme was
drafted beforehand. Witte, however, tried to persuade us to join the
Cabinet without insisting on that condition. That was the difference
between us and Guchkov, who, as far as I can remember, stipulated no such
condition.” Trubetskoi is very cautious in his choice of expressions on
this point: “not quite so”, “as far as I can remember”!

Mr.Petrunkevichdeals with the subject inRechof October
19—three weeksafter the first revelations were published! Now,
seehowhe does it.

Hebegins with a long-winded argument (27 lines) about the
inadvisability of relying on people’s memories, and points out that Shipov
was the only one who kept a diary.

Whatis the purport of this argument? Do you want to have the truth
published, at once and in full? Then nothing could be easier than toname allthose who took part in the conferences and to question
them about it. If, however, you do not want to have the truth aboutyour ownparty published, then do not play at hide-and-seek and do
not refer to Shipov.

Thenfollow27 linesof argument about the propensity of the
Octobrists for “canards”. But what is the point of this argument, onceGolos Moskvymentionedthe personwho corroborated its
information? Mr. Petrunkevich is obviously at pains to obscure a plain and
clear question by heaping up literary and diplomatic rubbish around
it. That is adishonestmethod.

Furtherfollow20 linesof jibes at Trubetskoi: that he
indulges in “personal reminiscences”—as though reminiscences could be
anything but personal!—and that the Prince “never mentioned the
matter to anyone”—the emphasis being Petrunkevich’s, who obviously
intends this as a rebuke for Trubetskoi’s indiscretion. Instead of giving a
plain answer to the question, the Cadets have begun to rebuke one another
for being indiscreet. Whatcanthis kind of method mean, except
that the Cadets arechagrinedby the revelations? It betrays their
effortsto husk upthe matter (what they say, in effect, is: don’t
be indiscreet in the future, Prince).

The74 lines of introduction are followed, at last, by the denial
proper on the following points:

(1) The bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic Party was in Moscow and,
therefore, could not meet in Petrazhitsky’s apartment.

(2) “At that time” Petrazhitsky “was not one of the group of persons who
directed the affairs of the Party”.

(3) “The few members I of the bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic
Party I who were living in St. Petersburg were not authorised to enter into
any negotiations, and still less alliances, with Count Witte, Mr. Durnovo,
or any other persons.”(4) “Personally, I [Petrunkevich] visited Petrazhitskyonce[Mr. Petrunkevich’s emphasis], and it is true that on that one occasion
there was some talk about the possibility of Prince Trubetskoi being
offered the post of Minister of Education, and all those present expressed
their conviction that the Prince could accept the offer only on condition
that the entire Cabinet adopted a clear and definite programme fully
conforming to the conditions of the political situation. Moreover, the
Cabinet was to be one that could command the confidence of ‘society’ [bear
in mindwhat allthe disputants mean by the word “society”: the
workers and peasants arenot“society”]. It is quite possible
that at the same time the personal and political qualities of the various
candidates, among them Durnovo and Stolypin, were discussed. But neither my
memory, nor the memory of others whom I consulted on the subject, has
retained any recollection of a warm speech which, presumably, convinced all
those present.”

Thatis all there is to the relevant part of Mr. Petrunkevich’s
“denial”, to which he adds a further 48 lines of jibes at Trubetskoi, to
the effect that the latter’s memory has failed him, that the
Constitutional-Democratic Party concluded no alliance with Durnovo and that
it “prevented one of its members, Prince Trubetskoi, from joining a
Cabinet Which the Party could not support”.

Trubetskoi’sand Petrunkevich’s letters in theRechof October
27 add nothing new. The former insists that it was no other than
Petrunkevich who “advised that Durnovo be preferred to
Stolypin”. Petrunkevich denies this.

Now,what does this all boil down to?

Mr.Petrunkevichdeclares that the few members of the bureau who were
living in St. Petersburgwere not authorised to enter into any
negotiations, but he cannot help confirming thefactthat
negotiations were conducted! He himself states (Rech, October 27):
“At the conference in Petrazhitsky’s apartment we discussed Prince
Trubetskoi’s candidature”.

Thisthen means thatnegotiations were conducted. If, as
Mr. Petrunkevich says, the Party “prevented” Prince Trubetskoi,this
meansthat the negotiationswere conducted on behalf of the
Party!

Mr.Petrunkevichhas an amazing knack of contradicting himself. There
were no negotiations, but ... but there was“a conference on the candidature”. The bureau of the Party held no
meetings, but ... but the Party took a decision. Such pitiful evasions are
characteristic of people who are trying in vainto concealsomething. What, indeed, could be simpler than to nameallthose
who took part in the conference, or to cite the exact decision of the
“bureau”, or of the Party, or of the leaders, or to set forth the
allegedly clear and allegedly definite programme which (allegedly) the
Cadets demanded of Witte’s Cabinet? But the trouble with our liberals is
that theycannot affordto tell the truth, they areafraidof it, the truth is theirruin.

Andso they resort to petty and shabby subterfuges, equivocations and
evasions, the purpose of which is to prevent the reader (at least the
inattentive one) from getting a clear idea of a historical question of
great importance, namely, the question of the attitude of the liberals to
the government in October 1905.

Whyis the truth the ruin of the Cadets? Because the fact that
negotiations were conducted, and the circumstances and conditions under
which they were conducted, explode the fable that the Cadets are democrats
and prove the counter-revolutionary nature of their liberalism.

Coulda really democratic party even think of entering into
negotiations with a man like Witte at a time like October 1905? Certainly
not; for such negotiations necessarily implied that both parties stood, to
a certain extent, on common ground, namely the common ground of
counter-revolutionary aspirations, sentiments, and

			    proclivities.[1]There was nothing to negotiate with Witte, except ways and means of putting
an end to the democratic mass movement.

Further,assuming for a moment that the Cadets, in entering into
negotiations, did havesomedemocratic purposes inmind, could a democratic party have failed to inform the people of those
negotiations when they were broken off? It could not. This is exactly where
we see the difference between counter-revolutionary liberalism and
democracy, undeserving of the epithet counter-revolutionary. The liberaldesiresan extension of liberty, butin such a wayas not
to lend strength to democracy; he wants the negotiations and the
rapprochement with the old government to continue, to gain in force, to be
put on a firm basis. That is why the liberalcould not affordto
inform the public of the negotiations after they had been broken off, for
that would have made it difficult to resume the negotiations, he would
there by “have shown his hand” to democracy and broken with the
authorities—but that is precisely something a liberal cannot bring
himself to do. A democrat, on the other hand, who happened to be in the
position of someone conducting negotiations with Witte and who saw the
hopelessness of the negotiations, would immediately make them public, and
thereby put the Wittes to shame, expose their game, and bring about a
further advance of the democratic movement.

Consideralso the question of the programme of the Cabinet and of its
composition. All those involved in the affair speak of the latter and say
quite clearly and explicitly, such and such portfolios were offered to such
and such individuals. Butnot a singleclear and explicit word is
said about theformer, i.e., about the programme! Both Trubetskoi
and Petrunkevich remember the candidates for portfolios perfectly well, and
name them. Butnoneof themsays anythingabout what the
“programme” was! Is it just an accident? Of course not. It results from
(and is also positive proof of) the “programmes” having been the last
thing the liberal gentlemen thought of, simply meaningless window-dressing,
hollow “literature”—actually, Witte could have had no other programme
than that of strengthening the government and weakening the democratic
movement, and no matter what assurances he gave, and what promises and
statements he made, that would be the only policy he would havepursued. The “vital” business that they were primarily concerned
with was that of the distribution of portfolios. For this reason only,
Witte, for instance, could forgetallabout the programme
(according to Witte,there was even complete agreement on principles!), but the controversy over the
question as to who was better (or worse?), Durnovo or Stolypin, that is
something they all re member, of which they all talk, and in connection with
which they all refer to the speeches and arguments made by one person or
another.

Murderwill out. Even in the deliberately touched up stories of three or four
persons the historical truth stands out in fairly bold relief.

Immediatelyafter October 17, the entire liberal bourgeoisie of
Russia—from Guchkov to Milyukov, who is undoubtedly politically
responsible for Trubetskoi—turned awayfromdemocracy and drew
closer to Witte. Nor was this an accident or the treachery of
individuals—it was theclassthat went over to the
counter-revolutionary position that corresponds to its economic interests. Only
when they had assumed that position could the Cadets conduct negotiations with
Witte through Trubetskoi in 1905, with Trepov through Muromtsev in 1906,
etc. Unless we understand the distinction between counter-revolutionary
liberalism and democracy, we cannot understand anything either about the history
of the latter or about its tasks.

[1]Seethe excellent explanation ofthiscommon ground, on the
basis of articles written by Mr. Milyukovhimself(A Year of
Struggle), in Y. K.’s article, “From the History of Russian
Liberalism”, in the almanacSummer Lightnings, St. Petersburg,
1907. “Count Witte’s resignation means the loss of the last opportunity to
come to terms,” wrote Mr. Milyukov on April 18, 1906, thus admitting quite
clearly and definitely that there had beennegotiationsfordealsand that there had beenopportunities, that there
was some sense inrepeatingthe attempts to negotiate a deal.
—Lenin