"Semblance is essence itself in the determinateness of being"... (12-13) [464].
Semblance is (1) nothing, non-being (Nichtigkeit), which exists
- (2) being as a moment

"Thus, semblance is essence itself, but essence in a certain determinateness, and moreover in such a way that the latter is only a moment of essence, while essence is the appearing of itself within itself" (14) [466].
[Semblance]* What appears is essence in one of its determinations, in one of its sides, in one of its moments. Essence appears as something. Semblance is the appearing (Scheinen) of essence itself within itself.

... "Essence... contains semblance within itself as infinite movement within itself"...

... "Essence in this self-movement of itself is reflection. Semblance is the same thing as reflection" (14) [466].
Semblance (what appears) is the reflection of essence within itself.

... "Becoming in essence, its reflecting movement, is therefore movement from nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself"... (15) [467].
¯¯¯¯
This is clever and profound. There are indeed movements in nature and in life "toward nothing."
Only "from nothing," perhaps, never happens. Always from something.
____

"Reflection is ordinarily understood in the way that, starting from a given immediate representation, it seeks for it or compares with it universal determinations" (21) [473]. (Cites Kant — "Critique of the Power of Judgment")

Thus, here too Hegel accuses Kant of subjectivism. This is NB. Hegel stands for the "objective validity" (sit venia verbo*) of semblance, of the "immediately given" |¯the term "given" is generally customary in Hegel, and see here page 21 i. f. [473]; page 22 [474]. Smaller philosophers dispute whether to take essence or the immediately given as the foundation (Kant, Hume, all empirio-criticists). Hegel instead of "or" puts "and," explaining the concrete content of this "and."

"Die Reflexion is the appearing of essence within itself" (27) [478] ⊂translation? reflectiveness? reflective determination? reflection does not fit.⊃

... "It" (das Wesen) "is movement through differentiated moments, absolute mediation through itself"... (27) [479].

Identity (- difference -
+ [Gegensatz]**
in particular
opposition
) contradiction
(ground)...

Therefore Hegel clarifies the one-sidedness, the incorrectness of the "law of identity" (A = A), category (all determinations of being are categories - page 27-28 [479-480]).

"If everything is identical with itself, then it is not differentiated, not opposed, does not have a ground" (29) [481].

* - if I may say so. Ed.
** The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the manuscript. Ed.