Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Prefaces and Introduction to theConspectus of Hegel’s bookThe Science of Logic

Bern: Log. I. 175

Hegel’s WerkeBd. I.Philosophische Abhandlungen"     II.The Phenomenology of Mind"     III-V.The Science of Logic"     VI-VII. (1 and 2)The Encyclopaedia"     VIII.The Philosophy of Law"     IX.The Philosophy of History"     X. (3 parts)Aesthetics"     XI-XII.The History of Religion"     XIII-XV.The History of Philosophy"     XVI-XVII.Miscellaneous Writings"     XVIII.Philosophical Propaedeutic"     XIX. (1 and 2)Hegel’s Correspondence

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Vol. III,[3]p. 5 — ashrewd statementabout
        logic: it is a “prejudice” that it ”teach-es how to think”
        (just as physiology ”teaches... to digest”??)

... “logical science, which is the true con-tent of genuine metaphysics or pure spec-ulative philosophy.... ” (6)

...“Philosophy cannot borrow its methodfroma subordinate science, such as mathe-matics....” (6-7)

...“But it can be only the nature of thecontent which stirs in scientific cognition,while at the same time it is this veryreflection of the content which itself ini-tially posits and produces its determina-tion.” (7)

(Themovementof
	  scientificcognition — that is the essential thing.)“Understanding (Verstand) makes deter-minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver-nunft) is negative and dialectical becauseit dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”)the determinations of Understanding. (7)The combination of these two—“Reasonwhich understands or Understanding whichreasons”(7)=
	  the positive.

Negation of “the simple” ... “movementof Mind ...”(7)

(The “path of self-construction” = thepath(this is the crux, in my  opinion) ofreal cognition, of the process of cognising,of movement from ignorance to knowledge.[4]

The movement of consciousness,“likethe development of all natural and
	  spiri-tual life,”rests on “the nature of the pure

essentialities which make up the contentof Logic” (Natur der reinen Wessenheiten[5]).

Turn it round: Logic and the theoryof knowledge must be derived from“the development of all natural andspiritual life”.

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

“To present the realm of thought in itsphilosophical aspect—that is, in its own

(NB) immanent activity, or (which comes

to the same thing) in its necessary (NB)development....”(10)

“The familiar forms of thought”—an im-portant beginning, “die leblosen Knocheneines Skeletts.”[6](11)

What is necessary is notleblose Knochen, but living life.

The connection between thoughtand language (the Chinese language, inciden-tally, and its lack of development:(11),

the formation of nouns and verbs. (11)In the German language words sometimeshave “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”[7](12)(not simply “different” butopposedmean-ings)—“a joy to thought....”

the historyof thought =the history oflanguage??

The concept offorcein Physics—andofpolarity(“the things distinguishedinsep-arably(Hegel’s italics) bound up to-gether”). (12) The transition from forceto polarity—a transition to “higher Denk-verhältnisse.”[8](12)

[NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature ingeneral is opposed, as physical, to what ismental, then it must be said that Logicis rather something supernatural....”]

Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,[10]but... “wasbekanntist, darum noch nichterkannt.[11](13)

“Infinite progress”—“liberation” 
	  of “formsof thought” from the matter (von demStoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration ofthe general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginningof Knowledge....

“It was only after nearly everything thatwas necessary ... was available, that peoplebegan to trouble themselves about philo-sophic knowledge,” saysAristotle(13-14);and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp-tian priests, the beginning of the mathe-matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with“pure thought” presupposes “a long stretchof road already traversed by the mind

of man.” In this kind of thought“those interests are hushed which movethe lives of peoples and individuals.”(14)

The categories of Logic areAbbrevi-aturen[12](“epitomiert”[13]in another pas-age) for the “endless multitude” of “par-ticulars of external existence and of ac-tion....” (15) In turn, these categoriesdie-nen[14]people in 
	  practice (“in theintellectual exercise of living content, inproduction and interchange”).(15)

“We do not say of our feelings, impulsesand interests that they serve us—rather,they are regarded as independent facultiesand powers...all this is just what we are.”(15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denk-formen) it cannot be said that they serveus, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16),they are “the Universal as such.”

Objectivism: the categories ofthought are not an auxiliary toolof man, but an expression of lawsboth of nature and of man—com-pare further the antithesis—

of “subjective thinking” and “the objec-tive concept of the very essence of things”.We cannot“get beyond the nature of things”.

“Also the remark against the "CriticalPhilosophy.”(17)It conceives the relationbetween “three terms” (We, Thought,Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid-dle” between things and us, and so thatthis middle term “separates” (abschließt)“rather than... connects” (zusammenschli-eBen) us. This view may be met, saysHegel, by the “simple observation” that“these very things which are supposedto stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ...are themselves thought entities (Gedanken-dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it-self is only ein Gedankendingder leerenAbstraktion.[15]”

In my opinion, the essence of the argu-ment is: (1) InKant,
      cognition demar-cates (divides) nature and man; actuallyit unites them; (2) In Kant, the “emptyabstraction” of theThing-in-it-selfinstead of living Gang, Bewegung,[16]deeper and deeper, of our knowledgeabout things.

In Kant, Ding an sich[17]is anemptyabstraction, but Hegel demands abstrac-tions which correspond toder Sache[18]:“der objective Begriff der Dinge dieSache selbst ausmacht,”[19]which cor-respond—speaking materialistically—tothe real deepening of our knowledge ofthe world.

It is incorrect to say that Denkformenare only a “Mittel”, “zum Gebrauch.”[20](17)

It is also incorrect to say that they are“äußere Formen,”[21]“Formen die nur

an demGehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbstseien,” (forms which are merely forms at-tached to the content, and not the contentitself). (17)...

What Hegel demands is a Logic,the forms of which would be ge-haltvolle Formen,[22]forms ofliving, real content, inseparablyconnected with the content.

And Hegel draws attention to “thoughtsof all natural and spiritual things”, to the“substantial content....” (18)

—“To bring into clear consciousness thislogical character, which gives soul to mindand drives and operates in it, this is ourproblem.”(18)

Logic is the science not of ex-ternal forms of thought, but ofthe laws of development “of allmaterial, natural and spiritualthings”,i.e., of the developmentof the entire concrete content ofthe world and of its cognition, i.e.,the sum-total, the conclusion of theHistoryof knowledge of the world.

“Instinctive 
	  action”(instinktartigesTun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely di-verse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligentand conscious action” brings out “the con-tent of that which motivates” (den Inhaltdes Treibenden) “out of its immediate unitywith the subject” and makes it “an objectfor it” (for the subject).

“In this webstrong knots are formednow and then, which are foci of the arrestand direction of its”[the spirit’s, or thesubject’s]“life and consciousness ....” (18)

How is this to be understood?Man is confronted by awebof natural phenomena. Instinctiveman, the savage, does not distin-guish himself from nature. Con-scious man does distinguish, cate-gories are stages of distinguishing,i.e. of cognising the world, focalpoints in the web, which assistin cognising and mastering it.

“Truth is infinite” (19) —its finitenessis its denial, “its end”. The forms (Denk-formen[23]),
	  if one regards them as forms,“distinct from the substance and merely at-tached to it” are incapable of embrac-ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of[formal logic]makes them deserving of“contempt” (19) and “derision.”  (20)TheLaw of identity,A = A,—vacuousness,“unerträglich.”[24]. (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories“have their place and validity in cognition.”(20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be“instruments of error and sophistry” (20),not of truth.

“Contemplative thought” should include“der Inhalt”[25]as well as the “external form.”(20)

“With this introduction of Content intological consideration,” the subject becomesnot Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff derDinge.[26]

not things, but the laws[27]of theirmovement, materialistically

...”the logos, the reason of that whichis." (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning,thesubject of logicis expressed in thewords:

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seinerNotwendigkeit.”

“develop-ment” ofthinking inaccordancewith itsnecessity

The categories have to bederived(andnot taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (notby “exposition”, not by “assurances,” butwithproofs) proceeding from thesimplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth-ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (withouttaking others)—here, in them, “in thisgerm, the whole development.”  (23)

INTRODUCTION:GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Logic is usually understood as being the“science of thinking,” the “bare form ofcognition.”(27) Hegel refutes this view.He is against Ding an sich[28]as “somethingbeyond thought.” (29)

Forms of thinking apparently “have noapplicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31)Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,[29]which doesnot cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is notVerstand[30]also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

“Transcendental idealism, carriedmore consistently to its logical conclusion, hasperceived the nullity of the spectre of theThing-in-itselfleft over from the criticalphilosophy—that abstract shadow detachedfrom all content—and has had the aimof demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi-losophy (Ficthe?) made a beginning of mak-inf reason develop its own determinationsout of itself.  But the subjective attitudeof this attempt did not admit of its beingcarried to completion.”(32)

Logical forms are tote Formen[31]—for they are not regarded as an “organicunity,” (33) as“their living concrete unity”(ibidem).

In thePhenomenology of MindI have examined “the movement of con-sciousness, from the first direct contradiction(Gegensatz) between itself and the object, upto absolute knowledge.(34)This path goesthrough all the forms of the relation of con-sciousness to the object....”

“The negative is to an equal extent pos-itive”(41)—negation is something defi-nite, has a definite content, the inner con-tradictions lead to the replacement of theold content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, de-velopment (of concept and thought), there

is not “eines inneren, notwen-digen Zusammenhangs”[35](43)of all the parts and “Übergang”[36]of someparts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic require-ments:1)“The necessity of connection”and2)  “the immanent emergence of distinctions”.

Very important!! This is what it means,in my opinion:1.Necessaryconnection, the ob-jective connection of all the aspects,forces, tendencies, etc., of the givensphere of phenomena;2. The “immanentemergenceof dis-tinctions” - the inner objective logic ofevolution and of the struggle of thedifferences, polarity.

Shortcomings of the Platonic dialecticsin Parmenides.[37]

“Dialectic is generally regarded as anexternal and negative procedure, that doesnot belong to the subject-matter itself,that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec-tive craving to shake and break down whatis fixed and true,—or that at best leadsto nothing but the inaneness of the dialec-tically treated matter.”(43)

NB: unclear,return to it!!

selbstbewegende Seele[41]... (“inher-ent negativity”) ...“the principle of all phys-ical and spiritual life”(44)

#Is not the thought here that semblancealso is objective, for it containsoneof the aspectsof theobjectiveworld? Not only Wesen,[42]butSchein, too, is objective. There is adifference between the subjectiveand the objective,BUT IT, TOO,HAS ITS LIMITS.

45Logic resembles grammar, being onething for the beginner and another thingfor one who knows the language (and lan-guages) and the spirit of language. “It isone thing for him who approaches Logicand the Sciences in general for the firsttime and another thing for him who comesback from the sciences to Logic.”

Then logic gives “the essential characterof this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt-vorstellung[43]),
	  “the inner nature of spir-it and of the world....” (46)

“Not merely an abstract universal, buta universal which comprises in itself thewealth of the particular” (47)

A beautiful formula: “Not mere-ly an abstract universal, but a uni-versal which comprises in itselfthe wealth of the particular, theindividual, the single” (all the(all the wealth of the particularand single!)!! Très bien!

“—Just
	  as one and the same moralmaxim in the mouth of a youth whounderstands it quite accurately doesnot have the significance and scopewhich it has in the mind of a manof years and experience, for whom itexpresses the full force of its con-tent.

Thus, the value of logic only receives dueappreciation when it is the result of ex-perience of the sciences; then it presentsitself to the mind as universal truth, notas aparticulardepartment of knowledgealongsideother departments and realities,but as the essence of all this other con-tent....”(47)

“The system of logic is the realm ofshades"(47), free from "all sensuous con-creteness....”

Kant: to res-trict “reason”and strength-enfaith[44]

(53) Once again, that Ding ansich = an abstraction, the productof thinking that abstracts.

[1]The first edition of Hegel’s works in German
	consists of 18 volumes (1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887).

[2]Wissenschaft der Logik (The Science of Logic)consists of two parts (three books).

[3]Hegel,Werke,Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

[4]In the manuscript the words “from ignorance to knowledge” 
	are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of being underlined.—Ed.

[5]In the nature of pure essentialities—Ed.

[6]“the lifeless bones of a skeleton”—Ed.

[7]“opposed meanings”—Ed.

[8]“relations of thought”—Ed.

[9]“the mental”—Ed.

[10]“are familiar to all”—Ed.

[11]“what isfamiliaris not on that 
	account necessarilyknown”—Ed.

[12]abbreviations—Ed.

[13]optimised—Ed.

[14]serve—Ed.

[15]a thought entity of empty abstraction—Ed.

[16]progress, the movement—Ed.

[17]theThing-in-itself—Ed.

[18]theessence—Ed.

[19]“the objective concept of things constitutes
	their very essence”—Ed.

[20]a “means,” “for 
	use”—Ed.

[21]“external forms”—Ed.

[22]forms with content—Ed.

[23]forms of thought—Ed.

[24]“insufferable"—Ed.

[25]“content”—Ed.

[26]things, but the essence, the concept of things—Ed.

[28]Thing-in-itself—Ed.

[29]True cognition is absurd—Ed.

[30]understanding—Ed.

[31]dead forms—Ed.

[32]disrepute—Ed.

[33]It has fallen into disrepute.—Ed.

[34]and others—Ed.

[35]“an inner,necessary connection”—Ed.

[36]“transition”—Ed.

[37]Parmenides—the name of one ofPlato’sdialogues, in which the philosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient GreekEleatic
	philosopher, are discussed.

[38]“the semblance of arbitrariness”—Ed.

[39]the objectivity of semblance—Ed.

[40]the necessity of contradiction—Ed.

[41]self-moving soul—Ed.

[42]essence—Ed.

[43]the wealth of the world view—Ed.

[44]Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known 
	statement byKantin the preface 
	to the second edition ofCritique of Pure Reason:
	“I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to make place for faith.”