V. I. Lenin

Letter on Oil Concessions

Delivered:12 February , 1921First Published:1945 inLenin Miscellany XXXV;Published according to the manuscriptSource:Lenin’sCollected Works, 1st English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965,Volume 32, pages 134-136Translated:Yuri SdobnikovTranscription\HTML Markup:David Walters&R. CymbalaCopyleft:V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marx.org) 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of theGNU Free Documentation License

To Members of the Political Bureauand Comrade Rykov,Stalin,Bukharin,Kamenev,Krestinsky,Rykov

We are in receipt of replies to the Political Bureau’s
      query concerning oil concessions both from Krasin (and
      Bogdatyan) and Chairman of Glavneft[Chief
      Oil Industry Administration.—Translator]Dosser and his four experts.

In connection with the report,The State of the Oil Industry
      by the End of 1920(Baku, 1920), I am sending these replies
      on to Comrade Stalin, and request all members of the Political
      Bureau to ring him up to obtain all this materia] and read it in
      good time. (All you have to do with regard to the printed report
      is to read through what I have marked off with a blue pencil on
      the pages listed on the cover, that is, on the page before the
      text.)

This material needs to be read urgently, because it is desirable
      to have a Political Bureau decision (8.00 p.m . Monday, February
      14).

The material gives ample proof that:

(a) disaster isimminent;

(b) everything must be done to lease out the concessions in Baku
      (that is, find the concessionaires);

(c) the Glavneft Chairman is extremely stupid. Stupidity in such
      high quarters is a menace.

These three points summed up:

(a) Disaster is looming. This point is driven homeby the
      Glavneft experts.The fool Dosser tries tominimisethe danger in his “memo”. That is
      the height of stupidity. The opinions of all the Glavneftexpertsshould be read and compared with Dosser’s
      toned-down conclusion.

(b) Dosser formulates his conclusion as follows: “There is
      doubtful benefit in inviting a concessionaire.” It looks
      as though he has, like the truly well-intentioned fool that he
      is, scared his experts into believing that an anti-concession
      stand is the only decent one to take for a “Soviet”
      citizen. That’s a really “good turn” he has
      done us!

In the practical plane, the reports of the Glavneft experts
      (which are business-like and are strictly borne out by the
      “end of 1920” printed report) clarifythe kind
      of termswe should lay down for the concessionaire.

It is, of course, “doubtful” whether a
      concessionaire can be found on these terms. But no politician in
      his right mind would consult Dosser or the experts on that.

It is up to us to make every effort to find such
      concessionaires.

If we don’t, so much the worse for us.

If we fail to make an all-out effort to find a concessionaire,
      we shall find ourselves bankrupt.

The working out of the terms must be speeded up.

An immediate start must be made in fighting a highly dangerous
      prejudice which could easily carry a section of the workers and
      which must be debunked at any cost. It is this
      “idea”: “We don’t want to work for the
      capitalists”, or its variant, “We don’t want
      to work for the capitalists when workers nearby are not doing
      it”.

The harm of it (refuted by the R.C.P. Programme and Marxism in
      general) is evident from this rough calculation, which
      epitomises the conclusion given in the experts’
      reports.

We are extracting 100aof oil.

Output is dropping.

Flooding threatens disaster.

If we get a concessionaire, who will help to extract
      100a+ 100bof oil, and if we have to pay him
      98bfor this, our output will rise, instead of
      dropping, even if ever so slowly (100a+ 2b).

Here is the question: are the workers who give the
      concessionaire 98bout of the 100bworking for
      “the capitalists” or for the Soviet power?

There is no difficulty about the answer.

Please go over the enclosed material and reports urgently, to
      allow us to take a decision as soon as possible. There is
      extreme danger in any delay.

February 12, 1921