V. I. Lenin

The Crisis Has Matured

Written:October,
    1917First Published:Sections I-III and V published
    on October 20(7), 1917 in the newspaperRabochy PutNo 20; section
    VI first published in 1924 according to the manuscript.[1]Source:Lenin’sCollected Works,
    Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 26, 1972, pp. 74-85Translated:Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna,
    Edited by George HannaTranscription & HTML Markup:Charles Farrell
    and David WaltersOnline Version:Lenin Internet ArchiveNovember, 2000

The end of September undoubtedly marked a great
    turning-point in the history of the Russian revolution and, to all
    appearances, of the world revolution as well.

The world working-class revolution began with the action of individuals,
    whose boundless courage represented everything honest that remained of that
    decayed official "socialism" which is in realitysocial-chauvinism.Liebknechtin Germany,Adlerin
    Austria,MacLeanin
    Britain—these are the best-known names of the isolated heroes who have
    taken upon themselves the arduous role of forerunners of the world
    revolution.

The second stage in the historical preparation for this revolution was a
    widespread mass discontent, expressing itself in the split of the official
    parties, in illegal publications and in street demonstrations. The protest
    against the war became stronger, and the number of victims of government
    persecution increased. The prisons of countries famed for their observance
    of law and even for their freedom—Germany, France, Italy and
    Britain—became filled with tens and hundreds of internationalists,
    opponents of the war and advocates of a working-class revolution.

The third stage has now begun. This stage may be called the eve of
    revolution. Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and particularly
    the beginning of mutinies in the German army,[2]are indisputable symptoms that a great
    turning-point is at hand, that we are on the eve of a world wide
    revolution.

Even before this there were, no doubt, individual cases of mutiny among
    the troops in Germany, but they were so small, so weak and isolated that it
    was possible to hush them up—and that was the chief way of checking
    themass contagionof seditious action. Finally, there developed
    such a movement in the navy that it wasimpossibleto hush it up,
    despite all the severity of the German regime of military servitude,
    severity elaborated with amazing minuteness of detail and observed with
    incredible pedantry.

Doubt is out of the question. We are on the threshold of a world
    proletarian revolution. And since of all the proletarian internationalists
    in all countries only we Russian Bolsheviks enjoy a measure of
    freedom—we have a legal party and a score or so of papers, we have the
    Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals on our side,
    and we have the support of amajorityof the people in a time of
    revolution—to us the saying, "To whom much has been given, of him much
    shall be required" in all justice can and must be applied.

The crucial point of the revolution in Russia has undoubtedly
    arrived.

In a peasant country, and under a revolutionary, republican government
    which enjoys the support of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik
    parties that only yesterday dominated petty-bourgeois democracy, apeasant revoltis developing.

Incredible as this is, it is a fact.

We Bolsheviks are not surprised by this fact. We have always said that
    the government of the notorious "coalition" with the bourgeoisie is a
    government thatbetraysdemocracy and the revolution, that it is a
    government ofimperialistslaughter, a government thatprotectsthe capitalists and landownersfromthe
    people.

Owing to the deception practised by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and
    the Mensheviks, there still exists in Russia, under a republic and in a
    time of revolution, a government of capitalists and landowners side by side
    with the Soviets. This is the bitter and sinister reality. Is it then
    surprising, in view of the incredible hardship inflicted on the people by
    prolonging the imperialist war and by its consequences, that a peasant
    revolt has begun and is spreading in Russia?

Is it then surprising that the enemies of the Bolsheviks, the leaders of
    theofficialSocialist-Revolutionary Party, the very party that
    supported the "coalition" all along, the party that until the last few days
    or weeks had the majority of the people on its side, the party that
    continues to harry and abuse the "new" Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have
    realised that the policy of coalition is a betrayal of the interests of the
    peasants—is it surprising that these leaders of the official
    Socialist-Revolutionary Party wrote the following in an editorial in their
    official organ,Dyelo Narodaof September 29:

"So far practically nothing has been done to put an end to
    the relations of bondage that still prevail in the villages of central
    Russia. . . . The bill for the regulation of land relations in the
    countryside, which was introduced in the Provisional Government long ago,
    and which has even passed through such a purgatory as the Judicial
    Conference, has got hopelessly stuck in some office. . . . Are we not right
    in asserting that our republican government is still a long way from having
    rid itself of the old habits of the tsarist administration, and that the
    dead hand of Stolypin is still making itself strongly felt in the methods
    of the revolutionary ministers?"

This is written by the official Socialist-Revolutionaries! Just think:
    the supporters of the coalition areforcedto admit that in a
    peasant country, after seven months of revolution, "practically nothing has
    been done to put an end to the bondage" of the peasants, to their
    enslavement by the land owners! These Socialist-Revolutionaries areforcedto give the name ofStolypinsto their colleague,
    Kerensky, and his gang of ministers.

Could we get more eloquent testimony than this from the camp of our
    opponents, not only to the effect that the coalition has collapsed and that
    the official Socialist-Revolutionaries who tolerate Kerensky have become ananti-popular,anti-peasantandcounter-revolutionaryparty, but also that the whole Russian
    revolution has reached a turning-point?

A peasant revolt in a peasant country against the government of the
    Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, the Mensheviks Nikitin and Gvozdyov, and
    other ministers who represent capital and the interests of the landowners!
    The crushing of this revolt bymilitary measuresby a republican
    government!

In the face of such facts, can one remain a conscientious champion of
    the proletariat and yet deny that a crisis has matured, that the revolution
    is passing through an extremely critical moment, that the government's
    victory over the peasant revolt would now sound the death knell of the
    revolution, would be the final triumph of the Kornilov revolt ?

It is obvious that if in a peasant country, after seven months of a
    democratic republic, matters could come to a peasant revolt, it irrefutably
    proves that the revolution is suffering nation-wide collapse, that it is
    experiencing a crisis of unprecedented severity, and that the forces of
    counter-revolution have gone thelimit.

That is obvious. In the face of such a fact as a peasant revolt all
    other political symptoms, even were they to contradict the fact that a
    nation-wide crisis is maturing, would have no significance whatsoever.

But on the contrary, all the symptoms do indicate that a nation-wide
    crisis has matured.

Next to the agrarian question, the most important question in Russia's
    state affairs is the national question, particularly for the
    petty-bourgeois masses of the population. And at the "Democratic"
    Conference, which was fixed by Mr. Tsereteli and Co., we find that the
    "national" curia takes second place for radicalism, yielding only to the
    trade unions, andexceedingthe curia of the Soviets of Workers'
    and Soldiers' Deputies in the percentage of votes castagainstthe
    coalition (40 out of 55). The Kerensky government—a government
    suppressing the peasant revolt—is withdrawing the revolutionary troops
    from Finland in order to strengthen the reactionary Finnish bourgeoisie. In
    the Ukraine, the conflicts of the Ukrainians in general, and of the
    Ukrainian troops in particular, with the government are becoming more and
    more frequent.

Furthermore, let us take the army, which in war-time plays an
    exceptionally big role in all state affairs. We find that the army in
    Finland and the fleet in the Baltic have completelyparted wayswith the government. We have the testimony of the officer Dubasov, a
    non-Bolshevik, who speaks in the name of the whole front and declares in a
    manner more revolutionary than that of any Bolsheviks that the soldiers
    will not fight any longer.[3]We have governmental reports stating that the
    soldiers are in a state of "agitation" and that it is impossible to
    guarantee the maintenance of "order" (i.e., participation of these troops
    in the suppression of the peasant revolt). We have, finally, the voting in
    Moscow, where fourteen thousand out of seventeen thousand soldiers voted
    for the Bolsheviks.

This vote in the elections to the district councils in Moscow is in
    general one of the most striking symptoms of the profound change which has
    taken place in the mood of the whole nation. It is generally known that
    Moscow is more petty-bourgeois than Petrograd. It is a fact frequently
    corroborated and indisputable that the Moscow proletariat has an
    incomparably greater number of connections with the countryside, that it
    has greater sympathy for the peasant and is closer to the sentiments of the
    peasant.

In Moscow the vote cast for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the
    Mensheviks nevertheless dropped from 70 per cent in June to 18 per cent.
    There can be no doubt that the petty bourgeoisie and the people have turned
    away from the coalition. The Cadets have increased their strength from 17
    to 30 per cent, but they remain a minority, a hopeless minority, despite
    the fact that they haveobviously been joined
    by the "Right" Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the "Right" Mensheviks.Russkiye
    Vedomostistates that theabsolutenumber of votes cast
    for the Cadets fell from67,000to62,000.Only the votes
    cast for the Bolsheviks increased—from 34,000 to 82,000. They received
    47 per cent of the total vote. There can be no shadow of doubt that we,
    together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, now have a majority in
    the Soviets, in the army, andin the country.

Among the symptoms that have not only a symptomatic, but also a very
    real significance is the fact that the armies of railway and postal
    employees, who are of immense importance from the general economic,
    political and military point of view, continue to be in sharp conflict with
    the government,[4]even the Menshevik defencists are dissatisfied with
    "their" Minister, Nikitin, and the official Socialist-Revolutionaries call
    Kerensky and Co. "Stolypins". Is it not clear that if such "support" of the
    government by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries has any value at
    all it can be only a negative value?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Yes, the leaders of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing the
    correct tactics of defending the bourgeoisie and the landowners. And there
    is not the slightest doubt that if the Bolsheviks allowed themselves to be
    caught in the trap of constitutional illusions, "faith" in the Congress of
    Soviets and in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, "waiting" for
    the Congress of Soviets, and so forth—these Bolsheviks would most
    certainly bemiserable traitorsto the proletarian cause.

They would be traitors to the cause, for by their conduct they would be
    betraying the German revolutionary workers who have started a revolt in the
    navy. To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets and so forth under such
    circumstances would be abetrayal of internationalism, a betrayal
    of the cause of the world socialist revolution.

For internationalism consists ofdeedsand not phrases, not
    expressions of solidarity, not resolutions.

The Bolsheviks would be traitors to thepeasants, for to
    tolerate the suppression of the peasant revolt by a government whicheven Dyelo Narodacompares with the Stolypin government would beto ruinthe whole revolution, to ruin it for good. An outcry is
    raised about anarchy and about the increasing indifference of the people,
    but what else can the people be but indifferent to the elections, when the
    peasants have beendriven to revoltwhile the so-called
    "revolutionary democrats" are patiently tolerating its suppression by
    military force!

The Bolsheviks would be traitors to democracy and to freedom, for to
    tolerate the suppression of the peasant revolt at such a moment wouldmeanallowing the elections to the Constituent Assembly to be
    fixedin exactly the sameway as the Democratic Conference and the
    "Pre-parliament" were fixed, only even worse and more crudely.

The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Russian revolution is at
    stake. The honour of the Bolshevik Party is in question. The whole future
    of the international workers' revolution for socialism is at stake.

The crisis has matured....

September 29, 1917.

Everything to this point may be published, but what follows isto be
    distributedamong the members of theCentral Committee,the Petrograd Committee,the Moscow Committee,and
    the Soviets.

What, then, is to be done? We mustaussprechen was ist, "state
    the facts", admit the truth that there is a tendency, or an opinion, in our
    Central Committee and among the leaders of our Party which favourswaitingfor the Congress of Soviets, and isopposedto
    taking power immediately, isopposedto an immediate insurrection.
    That tendency, or opinion, must beovercome.[5]

Otherwise, the Bolsheviks will cover themselves with eternalshameanddestroy themselvesas a party.

For to miss such a moment and to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets
    would beutter idiocy, orsheer treachery.

It would be sheer treachery to the German workers. Surely we should not
    wait until their revolution begins. In that case even the Lieberdans would
    be in favour of "supporting" it. But itcannotbegin as long as
    Kerensky, Kishkin and Co. are in power.

It would be sheer treachery to the peasants. To allow the peasant revolt
    to be suppressed when we control the Soviets of bothcapitalswould be tolose, andjustly lose, every ounce of the
    peasants' confidence. In the eyes of the peasants we would be putting
    ourselves on a level with the Lieberdans and other scoundrels.

To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets would be utter idiocy, for it
    would mean losingweeksat a time when weeks and even days decideeverything.It would mean faint-heartedlyrenouncingpower, for on November 1-2 it will have become impossible to take power
    (both politically and technically, since the Cossacks would be mobilised
    for the day of the insurrection so foolishly "appointed"[6]).

To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets is idiocy, for the Congress willgive nothing,and can give nothing!

"Moral" importance? Strange indeed, to talk of the "importance" of
    resolutions and conversations with the Lieberdans when we know that the
    Sovietssupportthe peasants and that the peasant revolt isbeing suppressed! We would be reducing theSovietsto
    the status of wretched debating parlours. First defeat Kerensky, then call
    the Congress.

The Bolsheviks are nowguaranteedthe success of the
    insurrection: (1) we can[7](if we do not "wait" for the Soviet Congress)
    launch asurpriseattack from three points—from Petrograd,
    from Moscow and from the Baltic fleet; (2) we have slogans that guarantee
    us support—down with the government that is suppressing the revolt of
    the peasants against the landowners! (3) we have a majorityin the
    country; (4) the disorganisation among the Mensheviks and the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries is complete; (5) we are technically in a position
    to take power in Moscow (where the start might even be made, so as to catch
    the enemy unawares); (6) we havethousandsof armed workers and
    soldiers in Petrograd who couldat onceseize the Winter Palace,
    the General Staff building, the telephone exchange and the large printing
    presses. Nothing will be able to drive us out, while agitational work in
    thearmywill be such as to make itimpossibleto combat
    this government of peace, of land for the peasants, and so forth.

If we were to attack at once, suddenly, from three points, Petrograd,
    Moscow and the Baltic fleet, the chances are a hundred to one that we would
    succeed with smaller sacrifices than on July 3-5, becausethe troops
    will not advanceagainst a government of peace. Even though Kerenskyalreadyhas "loyal" cavalry, etc., in Petrograd, if we were to
    attack from two sides, he would be compelled tosurrendersinceweenjoy the sympathy of the army. If with such chances as we have
    at present we do not take power, then all talk of transferring the power to
    the Soviets becomesa lie.

To refrain from taking power now, to "wait", to indulge in talk in the
    Central Executive Committee, to confine ourselves to "fighting for the
    organ" (of the Soviet), "fighting for the Congress", isto doom the
    revolution to failure.

In view of the fact that the Central Committee haseven left
    unansweredthe persistent demands I have been making for such a policy
    ever since the beginning of the Democratic Conference, in view of the fact
    that the Central Organ isdeletingfrom my articles all references
    to such glaring errors on the part of the Bolsheviks as the shameful
    decision to participate in the Pre-parliament, the admission of Mensheviks
    to the Presidium of the Soviet, etc., etc.—I am compelled to regard
    this as a "subtle" hint at the unwillingness of the Central Committee even
    to consider this question, a subtle hint that I should keep my mouth shut,
    and as a proposal for me to retire.

I am compelled totender my resignation from the Central
    Committee, which I hereby do, reserving for myself freedom to campaign
    among therank and fileof the Party and at the Party
    Congress.

For it is my profound conviction that if we "wait" for the Congress of
    Soviets and let the present moment pass, we shallruinthe
    revolution.

September 29.

P.S. There are a number of facts which serve to prove that even the
    Cossack troops will not go against a government of peace! And how many are
    there? Where are they? And will not the entire army dispatch unitsfor
    our support?

[1]Written in Vyborg. It consisted of six chapters,
    the last not being intended for publication but for circulation among
    members of the Central Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow Committees and
    the Soviets. Only the manuscript of the last two chapters has come down to
    us. The article was first published in four chapters inRabochy
    PutNo. 30 of October 20 (7), 1917; a comparison of the newspaper text
    and the manuscript shows that one of the chapters was omitted and Chapter V
    was headed as Chapter IV. The article was widely carried by Bolshevik
    periodicals.

[2]The reference is to the revolutionary action by
    German sailors in August 1917, who were led by a revolutionary sailors'
    organisation numbering 4,000 members (late July 1917). It was led by sea
    men Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis of theFriedrich der
    Grosse.The organisation decided to fight for a democratic peace and
    prepare for an uprising. Manifestations broke out in the navy in early
    August. Sailors of the warshipPrinzeregent Luitpold, which was at
    Wilhelmshaven, took absence without leave to fight for the release of their
    comrades who had earlier been arrested for staging a strike; on August 16,
    the firemen of theWestphaliarefused to work; at the same time
    the crew of the cruiserNürnberg, which was out at sea,
    staged an uprising. The sailors' movement spread to the ships of several
    squadrons at Wilhelmshaven . These manifestations were put down with great
    savagery. Reichpietsch and Köbis were shot and other active
    participants were sentenced to long terms of hard labour.

[3]The reference is to what an officer, Dubasov, said
    at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on September 21 (October 4), 1917. He
    had just returned from the front and declared: "Whatever you may say over
    here, the soldiers will not fight".  [p. 80]

[4]The reference is to the nation-wide strike of
    railwaymen for higher wages. It started on the night of September 23
    (October 6), 1917, and threw the Provisional Government into a panic. The
    bourgeois press attacked the striking railwaymen.The strike was discussed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on
    September 24 (October 7), 1917. In an appeal, "Let's Help the Railwaymen",
    which was published inRabochy Put(The Workers' Path),
    the Central Committee exposed the counter-revolutionary policy of the
    Provisional Government and called on the proletariat to express full
    sympathy for the railwaymen, protect them from the provocative attacks of
    the counter-revolutionaries and do everything to prevent their strike from
    being isolated and defeated. The strike ended on the night of September 26
    (October 9), 1917, when the Provisional Government satisfied some of the
    railwaymen's demands.

[5]The reference is to the attitude of Kamenev,
    Zinoviev, and Stalin and their followers. Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed
    Lenin's plan for an armed uprising, declaring that the working class of
    Russia was incapable of carrying out a socialist revolution. They slid down
    to the Menshevik position of demanding a bourgeois republic.

[6]To "convene" the Congress of Soviets for October 20
    in order to decide upon "taking power"—how does that differ from
    foolishly "appointing" an insurrection? It is possible to take power now,
    whereas on October 20-29 you will not be given a chance to.

[7]What has the Party done tostudythe
    disposition of the troops, etc? What has it done to conduct the
    insurrection as an art? Mere talk in the Central Executive Committee, and
    so on!