Date: End of August — first half of September 1903
Pages: 219-244

ACCOUNT OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSS. S.-D. R. P.

...with the [South] [Worker]), 6 irresolute, wavering ones (a "swamp," as all Iskrists called them — in jest, of course),⁴ then approximately 33 Iskrists, more or less firm and consistent in their Iskra-ism. These 33 Iskrists, who, being united, always decided the fate of every question at the Congress, split, in turn, into 2 sub-groups, splitting finally only at the end of the Congress: one sub-group, approximately 9 votes of Iskrists of a "soft," or rather, zigzag — line [(or women's line, as some jokers, not without reason, quipped)], Iskrists who stood (as will be seen below) for justice, for resultants etc., and approximately 24 votes of Iskrists of a firm line, defending consistent Iskra-ism both in tactics and in the personal composition of the party's central bodies. I repeat, such a grouping crystallized definitively and became fully clear only post factum *), at the end of the Congress (which had up to 40 sessions!),⁵ and I am jumping ahead in outlining this grouping at the outset. I should also note that this grouping gives only an approximate number of votes, for on individual minor questions (and once, on the question of "equal rights of languages," about which below, and on an important matter),⁶ votes were frequently divided, some abstained, groupings mixed, etc.

The composition of the Congress was determined in advance by the Organizational Committee, which had the right, according to the Congress statute, to invite whomever it saw fit to the Congress with a consultative vote. At the Congress, a commission for verifying mandates was elected from the beginning, into which (commission) everything relating to the composition of the Congress was transferred. (By the way, into this commission entered ... **) a Bundist, who wore down all members of the commission, keeping them until 3 a.m., and yet remained "with a dissenting opinion" on every question.)¹

The Congress began amid peaceful and friendly work of all Iskrists, among whom there were, of course, always nuances of opinion, but outwardly these nuances, as political disagreements, did not surface. Incidentally, let us note in advance that the split among Iskrists was one of the main political results of the Congress, and anyone wishing to familiarize themselves with the matter should therefore pay special attention to all episodes connected, however remotely, with this split.

A rather important act at the very beginning of the Congress was the election of a bureau or presidium. Martov stood for the election of 9 persons, who would elect 3 each session to the bureau,⁸ and in the composition of these 9 he even included a Bundist. I stood for the election of only three for the entire Congress, and moreover three for "maintaining strict order."⁹ Elected were: Plekhanov, myself, and comrade T¹⁰ (about whom there will be much discussion below — an Iskrist of the firm line, member of O.K.). The latter passed, however, by a small majority of votes against one South Worker (also an O.K. member).¹¹ The disagreement between myself and Martov on the question of the bureau (a disagreement characteristic from the point of view of all that followed) led, however, to no split or conflict: the matter was settled somehow peacefully, of itself, "in a family way,"¹² as matters were generally settled in the Iskra organization and in the Iskra editorial board.

Relating to the beginning of the Congress was (a secret and informal, of course) session of the Iskra organization on the question of its mandates at the Congress. The session likewise came to a peaceful, "amicable" resolution of the question.¹³ I note this session only because I consider it characteristic, firstly, of the friendly work of Iskrists at the beginning of the Congress, and secondly, of their decision to resort, in questionable and disputed cases, to the authority of the Iskra organization (more precisely, members of the Iskra organization present at the Congress), whereas, of course, such voting had no binding force, since the rule: "imperative mandates are abolished," everyone can and must vote at the Congress according to their personal, free conviction, without any submission to any organization — this rule, I say, was recognized by all Iskrists, and [hardly] at the beginning [hardly] of each Iskra session was loudly proclaimed by the chairman.

Further. The first incident at the Congress, which revealed that not everything was well among the Iskrists, and which served as the "thread" of the final drama (or tragicomedy?), was the notorious "O.K. incident." One must dwell on this incident in detail. It took place while the Congress was still occupied with its own constitution, while the Congress regulations were still being discussed (regulations which, incidentally, consumed an immense amount of time due to obstruction by Bundists, who did not miss the opportunity, intentionally and unintentionally ... *) to hinder things where they could and however they could). The essence of the O.K. incident consisted in the fact that the O.K., on the one hand, had rejected before the Congress a protest from "Struggle" (the Struggle group), demanding admission to the Congress, and supported this rejection in the mandate verification commission, and, on the other hand, that same O.K. suddenly announced at the Congress that it was inviting Ryazanov with a consultative vote. This incident played out as follows.

Even before the beginning of Congress sessions, Martov informed me confidentially that a member of the Iskra organization and a member of the O.K. (let us call this person the letter N)¹⁴) had decided to insist in the O.K. on inviting with a consultative vote to the Congress a certain person, whom Martov himself could characterize only by the term "turncoat."¹⁵) (This person indeed once leaned toward Iskra, with the intention subsequently, and indeed just a few weeks later, to go over to the side of Workers' Cause, although it was already in the fullest state of decline by then.) We discussed this with Martov, both outraged that a member of the Iskra organization would take such a step, understanding, of course* (since Martov had warned comrade N), that this step was a direct blow to Iskra's face, and yet not deeming it necessary to consult with the organization. N indeed submitted his proposal to the O.K., but this proposal was rejected, thanks to the heated protest of comrade T, who described the entire changeable political figure of the "turncoat." It is characteristic that Martov could not by that time, by his account, even speak with N, despite their previous good personal relations: he was so struck by this step. N's striving to throw sticks in Iskra's wheels [was] also expressed in a reprimand of the Iskra editorial board by the O.K., which was adopted with his support — a reprimand which concerned, it is true, a very trivial matter, but nonetheless aroused Martov's grave indignation.¹⁶) Reports from Russia, also conveyed to me by Martov, pointed moreover to N's tendency to spread rumors of discord between Iskrists abroad and in Russia. All this inclined Iskrists to view N with the utmost distrust, and then such a fact came to light. The O.K. rejected the protest of "Struggle," members of the O.K. (T and Zh), invited to the mandate verification commission, likewise declared themselves both (and N included!!!) against "Struggle" most decisively. Nevertheless the O.K. suddenly arranged, during the break of one *) morning session of the Congress, its own session by the "little window"¹⁷) and decided at this session to invite Ryazanov with a consultative vote! N was for the invitation. T, of course, was unconditionally against, moreover declaring such a decision by the O.K. to be unlawful after the question of the Congress composition had already been transferred to a special commission for verifying mandates, elected by the Congress. Of course, the South Worker members of the O.K.¹⁸) + Bundist¹⁹) + N voted down comrade T, and the O.K. decision was made.

T informed the Iskra editorial board of this decision, which (not in full composition, but with the participation of Martov and Zasulich), of course, decided unanimously to take up the struggle against the O.K. at the Congress, since many Iskrists had already declared themselves publicly at the Congress against "Struggle," and it was impossible to retreat on this question.

When the O.K. (in the afternoon session) announced its decision to the Congress,²⁰) T declared his protest in turn. The South Worker member of the O.K.²¹) then attacked T, accusing him of violation of discipline (!), since the O.K. had decided not to reveal this at the Congress (sic!)**). It is understandable that we (Plekhanov, Martov and myself) then attacked the O.K. with all our energy, accusing it of restoring imperative mandates, of violating the Congress's sovereignty, etc. The Congress took our side, the O.K. was defeated, a resolution was adopted removing from the O.K., as a collegium, the right to influence the composition of the Congress.²²)

Such was the "O.K. incident." Firstly, it finally undermined many Iskrists' political confidence in N (and strengthened confidence in T), secondly, it not only proved but also showed before everyone's eyes how shaky the Iskra direction still was even in such a central, arch — supposedly — Iskra institution as the O.K. It became clear that besides the Bundist, in the O.K. there were still 1) South Workers with their special politics;²³) 2) "Iskrists ashamed to be Iskrists,"²⁴) and only partly (3) Iskrists unashamed of this.²⁵) When the South Workers wished to explain themselves to the Iskra editorial board (privately, of course) concerning this sad incident — comrade N, it is very important to note this, expressed not the slightest desire to explain himself — the editorial board explained themselves with them,²⁶) and I directly told the South Workers that the Congress had finally revealed this major political fact: the presence in the party of many Iskrists ashamed to be Iskrists, and capable, simply out of spite toward Iskra, of pulling such a stunt as inviting Ryazanov. The stunt N pulled so enraged me, after N's speech in the commission against Struggle, that I said publicly at the Congress: "comrades who have attended foreign congresses know what a storm of indignation such people always arouse there — those who speak one thing in commissions and another at the Congress."²⁷) Such "Iskrists," who feared Bundist "reproaches" that they were "Iskra's puppets" and for this reason alone pulled political stunts against Iskra, could, of course, not inspire confidence.

The general distrust of Iskrists toward N [was expressed sometimes in that these N Iskrists (even Zagorsky [V. N. Krokhmahl]... *) This distrust] grew to an enormous degree when Martov's attempt to explain himself with N led to N's declaration of his exit from the Iskra organization!! From this moment the "matter" of N passes into the Iskra organization, whose members were outraged by such an exit, and the organization had 4 sessions on this question.²⁸) These sessions, especially the last, are extraordinarily important, for in them the split among Iskrists was finally formed, chiefly on the question of the composition of the Central Committee.

But before proceeding to an account of these (private and informal, I repeat once more) sessions of the Iskra organization, I shall speak of the Congress's work. This work proceeded harmoniously in the meantime, in the sense of a united appearance by all Iskrists, both on the 1st point of the agenda (the place of the Bund in the party) and on the 2nd (program) and on the 3rd (confirmation of the Central Organ of the party). The agreement of Iskrists ensured a large cohesive majority at the Congress (a compact majority, as the Bundists expressed it with regret!) ²⁹), whereas the "irresolute" ones (or "swamp") and South Workers more than once showed themselves in trifles to be unstable. The political grouping of not entirely Iskrist elements of the Congress became clearer and clearer.

I return to the sessions of the Iskra organization. At the first session it was decided to request explanations from N, providing this N the opportunity to indicate in what composition of the Iskra organization he, N, wished to explain himself. I decisively protested against such a formulation of the question, demanding the separation of the political question (regarding Iskrists' distrust of N at this Congress in the political respect) and the personal question (to appoint a commission to investigate the causes of N's strange behavior). At the 2nd session it was reported that N wished to explain himself without T, although N intended, it seems, to say nothing personally about T. I protested a second time, refusing to participate in such an explanation when [a member] of the organization³⁰) removes, even for a second, a member while speaking, however, not about him; I saw in this an unworthy game and an insult dealt by N to the organization: N does not trust the organization even enough to let it determine the conditions of explanation! At the 3rd session took place N's "explanation," an explanation which did not satisfy the majority of those participating. The 4th session occurred with the full composition of all Iskrists, but this session was preceded by a series of important Congress episodes.

First, it is worth noting the episode of "equal rights of languages."³¹) The matter concerned the adoption of the program, the formulation of the demand for equality and equal rights concerning languages. (Each point of the program was discussed and adopted separately, Bundists raised unexpected obstruction here and nearly 2/3 of the Congress's time was spent on the program!). The Bundists succeeded here in shaking the ranks of Iskrists, instilling in part of them the idea that Iskra did not want "equal rights of languages," — whereas in fact the editorial board of Iskra wanted only not to use this, in their opinion illiterate, absurd and unnecessary formulation. The struggle was desperate, the Congress divided in half into two equal halves (some abstained): on Iskra's side (and the editorial board of Iskra) were approximately 23 votes (might be 23—25, I don't remember exactly), and as many against.³²) The question had to be postponed, referred to a commission, which found a formula adopted by the entire Congress unanimously. The incident with equal rights of languages is important in that it revealed once again and again the shakiness of Iskra-ism, revealed finally the shakiness of both the irresolute (whom precisely then, if I'm not mistaken, and precisely Iskrists of Martov's type themselves called swamp!) and South Workers, all of whom were against Iskra. Passions flared desperately and sharp words were hurled without number against the South Workers by Iskrists, especially Martovist ones. One "leader" of the Martovist section³³) nearly came to a scandal with South Workers during the break, and I hastened then to resume the session (at Plekhanov's insistence, who feared a fight). It is important to note that even among these, the most steadfast, 23 Iskrists, Martovist ones (i.e., those who subsequently went behind Martov)* were in the m i n o r i t y.³⁴)

Another episode — the struggle over § 1 of the "party statute." This was already point 5 of the Tagesordnung, near the end of the Congress. (A resolution against Federalism was adopted on point 1;³⁵ on point 2 — the program; on point 3 — recognition of Iskra as the central organ of the party;** on point 4 — "delegate reports" were heard, part of them, while the rest were referred to a commission,³⁶ for it became clear that the Congress had no more time left (financial resources and personal forces were exhausted).

Point 1 of the statute defined the concept of a party member. In my draft this definition was as follows: "A member of the Russ. S.-D. R. P. is considered ***) a n y o n e who recognizes its program and supports the party both through material means and through personal participation in one of the party organizations." Martov, instead of the underlined words, proposed to say: work under the control and guidance of one of the party organizations. Plekhanov argued for my formulation,⁴⁰ for Martov's — the other members of the editorial board (Axelrod spoke for them at the Congress).⁴¹) We argued that it was necessary to narrow the concept of a party member to distinguish workers from chatterers, to eliminate organizational chaos, to eliminate such abomination and such nonsense so that there could be organizations consisting of party members but not being party organizations, etc.⁴²) Martov stood for broadening the party and spoke of a broad class movement, requiring a broad — diffuse organization, etc.⁴³) It is curious that almost all Martov's supporters referred, in defense of their views, to "What Is To Be Done"!⁴⁴) Plekhanov hotly objected to Martov, pointing out that his Jauressian formulation opens the doors to opportunists, who want nothing more than this position in the party and not in the organization.⁴⁵) "Under control and guidance" — I said — mean in reality nothing more and nothing less than: without any control and without any guidance.⁴⁶) Martov won here: his formulation was adopted (by a majority of approximately 28 votes against 23 or thereabouts, I don't remember exactly)⁴⁷) thanks to the Bund, which, of course, immediately figured out where the loophole was, and with all its [six] five votes pushed through "what's worse" (a delegate from Workers' Cause expressed his vote for Martov precisely this way!).⁴⁸) The heated debates over § 1 of the statute and the ballot once more clarified the political grouping at the Congress and showed plainly that the Bund + Workers' Cause could decide the fate of any decision, supporting a minority of Iskrists against the majority.

After the debates and ballot on § 1 of the statute took place the last (4th) session of the Iskra organization.⁴⁹) The disagreement among Iskrists on the question of the personal composition of the Central Committee had by now become fully clear and caused a split in their ranks: some stood for an Iskra Central Committee (in view of the dissolution of the Iskra Organization and the Emancipation of Labor group and the necessity to complete the Iskra work), others — for admitting South Workers and for the predominance of Iskrists of the "zigzag line." Some were unconditionally against N's candidacy, others for. To make a last attempt to reach agreement, a gathering of the 46 (members of the Iskra organization was called, though I repeat, consultative votes were counted). The voting gave the following results: against N — 9 votes, for — 4, the rest abstained.⁵⁰) Then the majority, not wishing all the same war with the minority, proposed a compromise list of 5 persons, including 1 South Worker (agreeable to the minority) and one militant member of the minority, the other Iskrists were consistent (of whom — this is important — one participated in the Congress struggle only at the end of it, and was properly impartial, two moreover did not participate in struggles at all and were absolutely impartial on the personal question.⁵¹) For this list 10 hands went up (later another was added and it became 11), against — 1 (only Martov!), the rest abstained! The compromise list was thus torpedoed by Martov. After this two more "militant" lists of each side were voted on, but both gathered only a minority of votes.⁶²)

Thus, at the last session of the Iskra organization, the Martovist faction remained in the minority on both questions, and yet they declared war when one member of the majority (an impartial one or the chairman)⁵³) went to them after the session to make a final attempt at agreement.

The calculation of the Martovist faction was clear and correct: the Bundists and Workers' Cause advocates would undoubtedly have supported the zigzag line list, since over a month of Congress sessions all questions had become so clear, all personalities so outlined, that not a single Congress member would have been in doubt as to what was better or which evil was lesser. And for the Bund + Workers' Cause, naturally, the zigzag Iskrists were the lesser evil and always would be.

After the session of the 16th, when Iskrists finally broke apart and war between them was declared, began the sessions of the two parties into which the Congress split, i.e., private unofficial gatherings of all like-minded persons. The Iskrists of the consistent line first gathered in the number of 9 (9 of the 16), then 15, finally [22] 24,*³) counting deciding votes, not persons. Such a rapid growth was explained by the fact that lists (of the Central Committee) began to circulate and the lists of the Martovist faction repelled the vast majority of Iskrists immediately and irrevocably, as flaccid lists: the candidates promoted by Martov had shown themselves at the Congress from a decidedly negative side (wavering, lack of fortitude, tactlessness, etc.).⁵⁵) This, in the first place; in the second place, explanation to Iskrists of what was occurring in the Iskra organization attracted them in the vast majority of cases to the side of the majority, and Martov's inability to maintain a definite political line became clear to all and sundry. Therefore 21 votes consolidated easily and quickly on the consistent Iskra tactic, on the Central Committee list,⁵⁶) on the choice of a troika for the editorial board⁵⁷) (instead of confirming the old, inoperative and diffuse sextet).

The Congress at this time finished discussing the statute, whereby Martov and Co. won once again (and even not once, but several times) the majority of Iskrists with the noble assistance of the Bund + Workers' Cause — for instance, on the question of cooptation to the centers (this question was decided by the Congress in Martov's spirit).**

Despite this corruption of the statute, the entire statute as a whole was adopted by all Iskrists and by the entire Congress. But after the general statute they moved to the Bund's statute, and the Congress rejected by an overwhelming majority the Bund's proposal (to recognize the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in the party*). It seems the Bund alone stood here almost against the entire Congress.⁵⁹) Then the Bundists left the Congress, announcing their withdrawal from the party.⁶⁰) The Martovist faction lost five of its loyal allies! Then the Workers' Cause members left, when the foreign League of Russian revolutionary social-democrats was recognized as the sole party organization abroad. The Martovist faction lost two more of its loyal allies! There resulted altogether at the Congress 44 (51 — 7) deciding votes, and of them the majority were consistent Iskrists (24); whereas the coalition of Martovist faction with South Workers and the "swamp" together gave only 20 votes.⁶¹)

The zigzag line Iskrists were destined to submit — as consistent line Iskrists submitted without a word when Martov beat and defeated them with his coalition with the Bund. But the Martovist faction had so overreached that instead of submitting they went to scandal and split.

A scandal was the raising of the question of confirming the old editorial board, for it suffices for even one editor to make a statement for the Congress to be obliged to consider the entire question of the composition of the Central Organ, not limiting itself to simple confirmation. A step toward split was the refusal to elect the Central Organ and Central Committee.

First of all about the election of the editorial board. In the Tagesordnung it stood, as was indicated above, at point 24: election of the party's central bodies. And in my commentary to the Tagesordnung (this commentary was known to a l l Iskrists long before the Congress and to all Congress members) it stood in the margins: election of 5 persons to the Central Organ and 3 to the Central Committee.⁶²) Consequently it is beyond any doubt that from the depths of the editorial board came the demand to elect a troika, and no one from the editorial board protested against it.⁶³) Even Martov and another leader of the Martovist faction⁶⁴) defended these "two troikas" before a whole series of delegates before the Congress.

I personally, a few weeks before the Congress, declared to Starover and Martov that I would demand the election of the editorial board at the Congress; I agreed to the election of 2 troikas, with the understanding that the editorial troika would either coopt 7 (or even more) persons, or remain alone (this last possibility was specially stipulated by me). Starover even said directly that a troika means: Plekhanov + Martov + Lenin, and I agreed with him, — so clear it was for everyone and always that only such persons in leadership could be elected. One would have to become embittered, feel offended and lose one's head after the struggle at the Congress to begin afterward to attack the expediency and efficiency of the troika. The old sextet had been so inoperative that it never once in three years assembled in full composition — this is incredible, but it is a fact. Not one of the 45 issues of Iskra was put together (in the editorial-technical sense of the word) by anyone other than Martov or Lenin. And never was a major theoretical question raised by anyone other than Plekhanov. Axelrod worked not at all (zero articles in Zarya and 3—4 in all 45 issues of Iskra). Zasulich and Starover limited themselves to contributions and advice, never doing purely editorial work. Who should be elected as political leaders, to the center — this was as clear as day to every Congress member, after a month of its work.

The raising at the Congress of the question of confirming the old editorial board was an absurd provocation to scandal.

Absurd, — because it was purposeless. If they had even confirmed the sextet, — one member of the editorial board (myself, for instance) would have demanded a reshuffling of the collegium, a review of its internal relations, and the Congress would have been obliged to start the matter over.

A provocation to scandal, — because non-confirmation was bound to be understood as an o f f e n s e, — whereas a fresh election would in no way have included anything offensive. They are electing the Central Committee, — let them elect the Central Organ. There is no talk of confirming the O.K., — let there be no talk of confirming the old... *) editorial board either.

But it is understandable that, by demanding confirmation, the Martovist faction provoked protest at the Congress, the protest was perceived as an insult, offense, removal, exclusion.... [(and thus began the invention of all horrors which now feed the fantasy of idle slanderers!)]**

The editorial board left the Congress for a time during the discussion of the question of election or confirmation. After desperately passionate debates the Congress decided: t h e o l d e d i t o r i a l b o a r d i s n o t c o n f i r m e d.***

Only after this decision did the former editorial board members enter the hall. Martov then stands and refuses election for himself and his colleagues, uttering all sorts of terrible and pitiful words about "siege conditions in the party" (for non-elected ministers?), about "exceptional laws against individual persons and groups" (such as persons who, in Iskra's name, tender it Ryazanov and speak one thing in a commission, another at the Congress?).⁶⁵)

I answered him, pointing out the incredible confusion of political concepts, which leads to protest against election, against the Congress's review of its officials' collegium.

The election gave: Plekhanov, Martov, Lenin. Martov refused again. Koltsov (who had 3 votes) likewise refused. The Congress then adopted a resolution, instructing two members of the Central Organ to coopt a 3rd when they find a suitable person.

After this three members of the Central Committee were elected and only one of them was named to the Congress⁶⁶) as a ballot counter, — and also elected (secretly, by ballot) a fifth member of the Party Council.⁶⁷)

The Martovist faction and all the "swamp" behind them did not submit ballots and submitted a written statement about this to the bureau.

This was a clear step toward split, toward wrecking the Congress, toward non-recognition of the party. But when one South Worker directly declared that he doubted (sic!) the legality of the Congress's decisions, Martov was ashamed and refuted him, declaring publicly that he did not doubt the legality of the decisions.⁶⁸)

Unfortunately, these good and loyal words of Martov did not correspond to his (and the Martovist faction's) deeds and actions...

The Congress then referred to the "protocol commission" the question of publishing the protocols and adopted 11 tactical resolutions:

1) on demonstrations.
2) on the trade union movement.
3) on work among sectarians.
4) on work among students.
5) on behavior during interrogation.
6) on factory elders.
7) on the international Congress of 1904 in Amsterdam.
8) on liberals (Starover).
9) on liberals (Plekhanov).
10) on socialist-revolutionaries.
11) on party literature.

Then the Congress was closed by the chairman after a brief speech, reminding everyone of the binding nature of the Congress's decisions.⁶⁹)

Examining the behavior of the Martovist faction after the Congress, their refusal to collaborate (which the Central Organ's editorial board formally asked of them), their refusal to work in the Central Committee,⁷⁰) their propaganda of boycott, — I can only say that this is a mad, unworthy [of honest] members of the party attempt to tear the party apart... for what? Only out of dissatisfaction with the composition of the centers, for objectively o n l y on this did we part, while subjective evaluations (such as offense, insult, removal, exclusion, stigmatization, etc. etc.) are the fruit of wounded vanity and sick fantasy.

This sick fantasy and wounded vanity lead directly to the most shameful calumnies, when, n o t k n o w i n g a n d n o t y e t s e e i n g t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e n e w c e n t e r s, they spread rumors of their "inefficiency," of "iron fists" of Ivan Ivanovich, of the "fist" of Ivan Nikipherovich, etc.

Proving the "inefficiency" of the centers through boycott is an unprecedented and unheard-of violation of party duty, and no s o p h i s t r y can conceal this: boycott is tantamount to splitting the party.

Russian social-democracy is undergoing its final difficult transition to party organization from cliquishness, to awareness of revolutionary duty from philistinism, to discipline from action through intrigue and group pressure.

Whoever values party work and work in service of the s.-d. workers' movement will not permit such p i t i f u l sophistries as a "lawful" and "loyal" boycott of the centers, will not permit the work to suffer and activity to stop because of the dissatisfaction of a dozen persons that they and their friends did not get into the centers,*) will not permit official party members to be influenced privately and secretly through threats of non-cooperation, through boycott, through cutting off financial resources, through intrigue and false rumors.

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1) The figures in brackets, showing the number of delegates at the Congress with 1 vote and the number of delegates with 2 deciding votes, somewhat diverge from the precise personal data of this type that Vladimir Ilyich himself had in his post-Congress summary on the composition of the II Congress (see above "Congress composition," pp. 190—192) and from the Congress protocol data ("Protocols," pp. 365—366). The data from both sources completely coincide and show that at the Congress there were delegates with 1 deciding vote not 33, but 35, — delegates with 2 votes — not 9, but 8 and, finally, the total number of delegates with deciding votes — not 42, but 43. The reason for this divergence has not been clarified.

2) Persons with consultative votes at the Congress, judging from the data from the sources indicated in note 1, were not 10, but more: according to the above-mentioned summary by Vladimir Ilyich on the composition of the II Congress they were 12 (see above p. 191), and according to the Congress protocols — even 14 ("Protocols," p. 366).

3) According to the information indicated in notes 1 and 2, the total number of Congress participants was not 52 persons, as indicated in this document, but 55 (according to Vladimir Ilyich's above-mentioned summary) or 57 (according to the "Protocols" of the Congress).

4) The personal composition of the indicated groups is fully provided in the above-mentioned summary by Vladimir Ilyich "Congress composition" (above, pp. 191—192).

5) The II Congress of the R.S.-D.R.P. had 37 sessions.

6) For more on this incident see below note 31.

7) The mandate commission was elected at the 1st Congress session after hearing the report of the O.K. in the following composition: L. G. Deich, Sablina (N. K. Krupskaya), V. I. Lenin, Yudin (N. L. Aizenshtat) and Koltsov (V. A. Ginzburg) ("Protocols" of the Congress, p. 24). The Bundist in the commission was N. L. Aizenshtat. The mandate commission had one session from evening into the night of July 30-31 (between the 1st and 2nd Congress sessions).

8) On this proposal of Martov see also in Lenin's report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva, 1904, p. 44).

9) On this proposal of Lenin see there as well.

10) Comrade T — this is Pavlovich (N. A. Krasikov).

11) N. A. Krasikov received 18 votes against 12 cast for "South Worker" V. N. Rozanov (see above "Diary of Congress sessions," p. 87).

12) On the "family" ways of settling matters and disagreements that arose in the "Iskra" editorial board before the Congress, Vladimir Ilyich speaks much in the above-cited letters to A. M. Kalmykova and A. I. Potresov (see above, pp. 205 and 216).

13) Vladimir Ilyich spoke about this assembly of Iskra organization members before the Congress more fully in his report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva, 1904, p. 44).

14) The member of the Iskra organization and member of the O.K., designated here by Vladimir Ilyich as the letter N, is — E. M. Aleksandrova (according to Congress protocols — Stein).

15) There is reason to believe that here the reference is to a member of the "Struggle" group Yu. M. Steklov.

Yu. M. Steklov (b. 1873) (Nevzorov) — a social democrat, initially aligned with the Emancipation of Labor group and contributing to Iskra, after the split of foreign s.-d. at the second Congress of the "Union of Russian S.-D. Abroad" in April 1900, together with Ryazanov and the "Struggle" group he founded, took a conciliationist position toward Workers' Cause advocates; he participated in revolutionary workers' movement from the early 1890s; in 1893—94 he worked on creating a workers' s.-d. organization in Odessa; at the end of January 1894 he was arrested and received 10 years exile in Eastern Siberia; in 1899 he escaped exile and in the beginning of 1900 emigrated abroad, where he joined the Emancipation of Labor group and initially contributed to Iskra; in April 1900 he participated as a delegate from the Emancipation of Labor group at the second Congress of the "Union of Russian S.-D." in Geneva; after the split at the "Union" Congress, together with Ryazanov he undertook to organize a special s.-d. group "Struggle," claiming to "unite all s.-d. forces agreeing to stand on the ground of revolutionary Marxism," starting from supporters of the Emancipation of Labor group and the revolutionary s.-d. organization it organized "Social-Democrat" and ending with Workers' Cause advocates — "economists"; after consultation with the Iskra editorial board in the summer of 1900, not satisfied with the editorial board's proposals about the character of his work in Iskra, he completely withdrew from Iskra; during the 1905 revolution he stood on a position close to Bolshevism and worked practically together with Bolsheviks; subsequently he contributed to Bolshevik organs — the "Social-Democrat," "Prosveshchenie," "Mysl," "Pravda"; in 1917 he contributed to "Novaya Zhizn," during the Kornilov days he joined the Communist party; after the October Revolution he was appointed editor of "Izvestia," in which position he served until the end of June 1925.

16) Before the Congress began, in the O.K. on the initiative of a Bund representative (K. Portney) and with the support of E. M. Aleksandrova, the question was raised about one action by the Iskra editorial board, in which O.K. members saw improper use of the O.K.'s name without its knowledge and consent. This action consisted in that the Iskra editorial board transmitted a sum of money to German social-democrats for elections in its name and in the O.K.'s name, without first obtaining permission from it. On this matter, the O.K. adopted a decision, according to Vladimir Ilyich's words, to reprimand the editorial board, or according to Martov's words, to express regret. See more on this in Lenin's report (Collected Works vol. IV, p. 908) and in Martov's counter-report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols" of the League, Geneva, 1904, pp. 45 and 55).

17) An emergency session of the O.K. on the question of inviting the "Struggle" group to the Congress took place at the 2nd (morning) Congress session (above, pp. 89 and 110. "Diary of Congress sessions" and note 23 to it, as well as "Protocols," p. 34). About this O.K. session by the "little window" Lenin and Martov speak in their reports at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva, 1904, pp. 45, 46 and 56). Most fully this incident is recounted by Pavlovich (P. A. Krasikov) in his "Letter to comrades on the second Congress of the R.S.-D.R.P." (Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, vol. V, pp. 526—527).

18) The South Worker members of the O.K. participating in this session by the "little window" were V. N. Rozanov (according to Congress protocols — Popov) and E. Ya. Levin (according to protocols — Egorov).

19) The O.K. member Bundist — this is K. Portney (according to Congress protocols — Abramson).

20) This announcement on behalf of the O.K. at the 3rd Congress session was made by O.K. member V. N. Rozanov ("Protocols," p. 38).

21) The South Worker O.K. member who spoke on this question against P. A. Krasikov was E. Ya. Levin (according to Congress protocols — Egorov) ("Protocols," p. 39).

22) See the debate on the O.K. announcement at the 3rd Congress session and the adoption of the resolution ("Protocols," pp. 38—44).

23) South Workers in the O.K. — V. N. Rozanov and E. Ya. Levin. Their "special politics" was, among other things, formulated by E. Ya. Levin in his speech against N. A. Krasikov at the 3rd Congress session as follows: "The O.K. adopted this decision [on inviting Ryazanov. Ed.] not because it changed its attitude toward the 'Struggle' group, but because it wants to eliminate unnecessary obstacles in the path of the future central organization of the Party in its first steps of activity." ("Protocols," p. 39.)

24) "An Iskrist ashamed to be an Iskrist" — E. M. Aleksandrova.

25) "An Iskrist not ashamed" — P. A. Krasikov.

26) More detailed information on this explanation of the South Workers, O.K. members with the Iskra editorial board is not available.

27) This quote from Lenin's speech at the Congress is not found in the "Protocols" of the Congress, though a similar expression does appear in his report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva, 1904, p. 47).

28) The four sessions of the Iskra organization took place on July 31, August 5, 7 and 10, 1903. ("Protokoly," pp. 366-367 and the "Diary of Congress sessions," pp. 123, 127, 138.)

29) The Bundists' expression of this concept appears in the report of a Bund delegate at the 2nd Congress of the League. ("Protokoly," p. 302.)

30) Here some words remain unclear in Lenin's manuscript.

31) The episode concerning the formulation in the program of the demand for the "equal rights of all nationalities" took place at the 11th Congress session (August 7, 1903), when the Congress was discussing point 9 of the program — the national question. ("Protokoly," pp. 140-176). The Bundists advanced the particular demand about equal rights of languages. The vote on this question resulted as Lenin describes it here (the vote was divided almost exactly in half). A special sub-commission had to be created on this question. Its formula was adopted unanimously by the Congress.

32) The result of the ballot at the 11th Congress session is described in the "Diary of Congress sessions" (p. 127) as follows: "The vote showed: 23 in favor, 24 against, 3 abstained."

33) This "leader of the Martovist faction" was apparently Ya. M. Steklov. (See the "Diary," p. 127.)

34) The data in the text about the minority position of Martovist Iskrists among the 23 voting for Iskra finds no clear confirmation in the "Diary of Congress sessions." However, it is confirmed by other sources, in particular by the comparison of the voting at the Congress (where the Martovist faction was in the minority on the question of equal rights of languages) with their later declarations of unity and their break from the consistent Iskrists, which occurred only after the question of the composition of the party's central organs.

35) The resolution on federalism was adopted at the 2nd Congress session.

36) The Congress did not discuss point 4 (delegate reports) at this Congress, as was stated. (See the "Diary of Congress sessions," pp. 85, 115 and "Protokoly," pp. 17, 225.)

**) This footnote is not in the Russian text and has been added by the translator for clarity; in the original, Martov's explanation regarding points 3 and 24 is given as a separate footnote in the text.

37) Martov's explanation on point 3 is given in the "Protokoly" on p. 65. The second sentence of Lenin's footnote is actually a paraphrase of Martov's explanation.

38) See instances of Martov's use of the expression "former members of the editorial board" in the "Protokoly," e.g., pp. 112, 141, 142, etc.

39) In the margin of the Tagesordnung commentary, there was written "election of 5-3" with the explanation that this meant selection of 5 for the Central Organ and 3 for the Central Committee.

40) Plekhanov's speech in defense of Lenin's formula on point 1 of the statute is in the "Protokoly," pp. 230-232.

41) Axelrod's speech on point 1 is in the "Protokoly," pp. 232-237.

42) Lenin's speech on point 1 of the statute is in the "Protokoly," pp. 228-230.

43) Martov's speeches on point 1 are in the "Protokoly," pp. 221-228, 237-241.

44) This is confirmed by the "Protokoly." (See, for example, speeches by Krupskaya on p. 237, Liakhovskaya on p. 238, Gusev on p. 241.)

45) This is a reference to the fact that, in Plekhanov's view, Jaurès adopted a very broad formulation of party membership.

46) This phrase is taken from Lenin's speech in "Protokoly," p. 230.

47) The vote on point 1 of the statute resulted, according to the "Protokoly" (p. 241) as follows: for Martov's formula — 28 votes, for Lenin's — 23 votes. (But at another place in the "Protokoly," p. 366, it says that the decision was made by 28 to 22.)

48) The speech of the Workers' Cause (Rabochee Delo) delegate is in the "Protokoly," p. 241. He said: "The formula of comrade Martov is worse, consequently, it is better."

49) Four sessions of the Iskra organization after the Congress began took place on July 31, August 5, 7, and 10, 1903.

50) At the last, fourth, session of the Iskra organization, the voting on N (Aleksandrova) was: against — 9, for — 4, abstained — 33 (see the "Diary of Congress sessions," p. 138 and note 28 there).

51) The compromise list of 5 candidates for the Central Committee proposed by the majority of the Iskra organization consisted of: P. B. Axelrod (South Worker), N. A. Krasikov, V. I. Lenin, Yu. O. Martov and G. V. Plekhanov. Two of them (Krasikov and Plekhanov) were considered impartial, according to Lenin.

52) See the "Diary of Congress sessions," p. 138.

53) Here reference is probably being made to Plekhanov as chairman of the last, fourth session of the Iskra organization.

54) The expression "22 votes" appears in the manuscript as an insertion above the line; earlier there was written "15." This shows the growth of the consistent Iskrists' faction which finally reached 24 votes (counting P. B. Axelrod).

55) The negative characterization of the candidates on the Martovist list is confirmed by the "Diary of Congress sessions" (see, e.g., pp. 131, 138).

56) The full text of the consistent Iskrists' list for the Central Committee is in the "Diary of Congress sessions," p. 138.

57) On the selection of a "troika" for the editorial board instead of the old sextet, see the "Protokoly," pp. 242-257.

58) The question on cooptation to the central organs is discussed in the "Protokoly," pp. 163-175. The Congress decision on this question was made in Martov's spirit.

59) The discussion and voting on the Bund's statute (point 6 of the Tagesordnung) took place at the 30th-31st Congress sessions (August 29-30, 1903). ("Protokoly," pp. 303-332, "Diary of Congress sessions," pp. 132-134.)

60) The Bund's withdrawal from the Congress and from the Party is described in the "Protokoly" on pp. 331-332.

61) The composition of delegates remaining at the Congress after the withdrawal of the Bundists and Workers' Cause advocates is described in the "Diary of Congress sessions," p. 134: "After the departure of the Bund and Rabochee Delo there remained 44 delegates with the right to a deciding voice."

62) See above the commentary to the Tagesordnung, note 39.

63) This assertion by Lenin requires clarification. In the draft regulations of the Congress, point 24 (which was finally point 5 of the Tagesordnung as adopted) did provide for elections of central organs. However, the specific number of persons to be elected to each organ was not definitely established in advance. The decision on "5-3" (5 for the Central Organ, 3 for the Central Committee) was made only at the Congress itself.

64) This "other leader of the Martovist faction" was probably I. O. Gusev.

65) Martov's speech on the question of confirming the old editorial board is in the "Protokoly," pp. 242-244.

66) For details on the election of the Central Committee and the Central Organ, see "Protokoly," pp. 244-257.

67) The reference is to the election of the fifth member of the Party Council, which at the Congress was called the "Council of the Party." (See "Protokoly," p. 254-256.)

68) This episode is described in the "Protokoly," pp. 256-257.

69) The closing of the Congress is described in the "Protokoly," pp. 257-258.

70) Martov's refusal to work in the Central Committee is mentioned in several places in the "Protokoly" and "Diary of Congress sessions."

# ACCOUNT OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSS. S.-D. R. P.

27) This was said by Lenin in his speech after Egorov's (E. Ya. Levin) second statement at the 3rd session of the congress in the debate regarding the O.K. declaration ("Protocols," pp. 40–41).

28) Vladimir Ilyich discusses these four sessions of the members of the "Iskra" organization more thoroughly below, stopping separately on each session. Also in his report at the 2nd congress of the League, Vladimir Ilyich notes that "throughout all four sessions of the "Iskra" organization, debates were held around comrade NN, to whom some of the Iskra members wanted to express political distrust..." ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva 1904, p. 49.)

29) The expression "compact majority" directed at the Iskra majority of the congress belonged to the delegate of the Foreign Committee Bund Kosovskii (according to the protocols — Hofmann, at the congress — Shvartsman). This expression was used by him in a speech at the 6th session of the congress on the question of Bund's place in the Party, in which he declared: "From the very first day of the congress, a compact majority formed that acted toward us as an opposing side." ("Protocols," p. 80.) Lenin in his subsequent statement at the same congress session responding to these words replied: "...we should not be ashamed, but proud of the fact that the congress has a compact majority." And further in his speech, this theme is devoted to almost the entire first paragraph ("Protocols," p. 83).

30) E. M. Aleksandrova by this time had left the "Iskra" organization.

31) The episode with "equal rights of languages" took place at the 10th and 17th sessions of the congress and was finally resolved at the 21st session. During the discussion of the program point by point at the 16th session, a dispute arose around § 7 (§ 6 according to the draft of "Iskra" and "Zarya") of the political part of the program, which in the editing of the program commission read: "The abolition of estates and complete equal rights of all citizens, regardless of sex, religion, race, nationality and language." The commission's version of this paragraph differed from the original draft of the "Iskra" and "Zarya" editing (see "Lenin Miscellany" II, p. 156) by the addition of the last two words: "nationality and language." In connection with this point, a dispute flared up: the opposition on this question, headed by delegates of the Bund, demanded the inclusion in the program of a special point on the equal rights of languages. This demand introduced great confusion even among the supporters of the "Iskra" organization, and a significant part of them spoke and voted for the necessity of specially emphasizing the demand for equal rights of languages. At the 16th session, after a series of votes on other amendments, an amendment by Kostrov (N. Zhordania) to § 7 was adopted in the form of a special addition of a separate paragraph on equal rights of languages ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 160). At the 17th session, when voting on the entire point as a whole, together with Zhordania's amendment, it was rejected, and heated debates arose again on the question of what to do with this paragraph. It was unanimously decided to send it to a commission. But on the question of the purpose of sending it to the commission and on the question of which commission to send it to (to the former program commission or to a special one), the votes were sharply divided into two parts. By a majority of 1 vote (26 against 25), Martynov's proposal was adopted: "send for editing and agreement of separate parts"—against Lenin's proposal: "send the paragraph to the commission without special instruction." For Martynov's proposal, among others, 3 supporters of the "Iskra" organization voted, delegates from the Caucasus (6 votes). By a majority of 27 votes against 24, it was decided to send § 7 to the old program commission. This last vote, after all the struggle, was an expression of confidence in the commission, which by the majority of its composition (Plekhanov, Lenin, Axelrod, Potresov) represented the editing of "Iskra" and "Zarya,"—thereby this was a vote of confidence in the ideological center of the Iskra organization. (Details of the struggle at the 17th session around § 7—see "Protocols" of the congress, pp. 161–162.)

32) In three votes on the point about equal rights of languages at the 16th and 17th sessions, the votes divided as follows: 1) on Liber's (Goldman's) proposal: "create a special paragraph on equal rights of languages"—voted (both simply and by name) 23 for and 23 against; among those who voted for Liber's proposal were 4 Iskra members (3 delegates from the Caucasus and a delegate from the Petersburg Committee Gorskii (A. Shotman), —in total 7 votes) and 1—L. G. Deich abstained; 2) for Zhordania's amendment at the 16th session see above, footnote 31) in a roll-call vote: 24—for and 23—against (from among the Iskra members, again 3 Caucasian delegates and L. G. Deich voted for the amendment—in total 7 votes); when voting on § 7 as a whole (together with Zhordania's amendment) at the 17th session of the congress, the votes divided: 24—for and 24—against.

33) It is not clarified who exactly is being discussed here.

34) Of the 23 votes of Iskra members who consistently voted throughout the episode with "equal rights of languages" (see "Protocols" of the congress, pp. 160 and 161), 7 votes belonged to the "soft line" Iskra members (the Martovtsy)—S. Zborovskii—from Odessa, M. S. Makadzjub from the Crimean Union, V. N. Krokhmаl'—from Ufa, L. D. Trotskii—from the Siberian Union and Yu. O. Martov—in total 5 people.

35) Martov's resolution on Bund's place in the Party ("Protocols," p. 11).

36) Tagesordnung (order of business) of the congress, compiled by V. P. Lenin, see in his "Program of the II Scheduled Congress of the R.S.-D.R. P." cited above (pp. 56–60).

37) The Rabochedelets about whom Vladimir Ilyich mentions here was Akimov (V. P. Makhnovets). He contested the formulation of the question about the C.O. of the party by point 3 during the discussion of the order of business of the congress at the 2nd session. He also spoke six times with objections at the 10th session of the congress against the recognition of "Iskra" as the C.O. of the party, and the following question belongs to him, mentioned by Vladimir Ilyich: "What are we confirming? The title, or what? We don't even know the editing!" ("Protocols," pp. 127–129 and 134.) As for the indicated answer of Martov to Akimov, there are no traces of this statement by Martov in the "Protocols." During the discussion of the order of business of the congress at the 2nd session, Martov, answering Akimov, says the following: "Point three of the list speaks only of the appointment of an organ, and the organizational relations between the c.o. and the c.c. should be considered separately during the discussion of the question of the organization of the Party in general." In the protocol of the 10th session, when the very question of the C.O. was being discussed, only one statement by Martov is noted with a proposal to rescind the decision of the 1st congress on recognizing the "Workers' Newspaper" as the C.O. of the Party. As for objections to Akimov at the 10th session, a whole series of delegates spoke with such objections, including—L. D. Trotskii, whose answer to Akimov in content to a considerable degree corresponds to the tone of the speech which Vladimir Ilyich attributed to Martov ("Protocols," pp. 131–132).

38) In the protocol records of Martov's speeches at the II congress, after the discussion of the question about the C.O., the expression "former members of the ed[ition] of 'Iskra'" does not appear at all. Apparently, during the editing of the protocols, Martov omitted those places where he used this expression.

39) The hearing of part of the delegates' reports was devoted to the 11th, 12th, and 13th sessions of the congress, during which the congress heard reports from the following 11 organizations: the Bund, the Baku and Saratov committees, the Union of Mining Workers, the Russian organization of "Iskra," the "Southern Worker" group, the Don, Ekaterinoslav, Tula, Tver, and Moscow committees. The reports of the remaining organizations were considered only in the commission for reviewing reports according to the congress resolution at the 10th session ("Protocols," p. 136). This commission was elected in the composition of V. N. Krokhmаl', V. I. Zasulich, and V. N. Rozanov ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 10).

40) Plekhanov's speech at the 23rd session of the congress for the Leninist formulation of § 1 of the charter see in "Protocols," pp. 226–227.

41) Axelrod in the debates over § 1 of the charter spoke twice at the 22nd session of the congress ("Protocols," pp. 220 and 224).

42) All the positions briefly indicated here by Lenin were developed by him in two of his speeches on § 1 of the charter at the 22nd and 23rd sessions of the congress ("Protocols," pp. 222 and 230–232).

43) Martov on § 1 of the charter also spoke twice: at the 22nd and 23rd sessions of the congress ("Protocols," pp. 220 and 226).

44) In the protocol records of the speeches of Martov's supporters on § 1 of the charter, direct references to "What Is to Be Done?" have not been preserved. Apparently, these references were eliminated by the speakers during the editing of the protocols. According to Vladimir Ilyich's account, it is completely confirmed by Martynov in his speech at the 22nd session of the congress, which begins with the following words: "We observe a strange picture. Comrades defending Martov's resolution, which expands the framework of our party, cite in their argumentation Lenin's pamphlet 'What Is to Be Done?'" ("Protocols," p. 224).

45) This part of Plekhanov's speech in the protocol record is formulated as follows: "Workers wishing to join the Party will not fear entering an organization. Discipline does not frighten them. But many intellectuals, thoroughly permeated with bourgeois individualism, will fear entering it. But that is good. These bourgeois individualists are usually also representatives of all sorts of opportunism. We must keep them away from ourselves. Lenin's project can serve as a bulwark against their invasion of the Party, and for this reason alone all opponents of opportunism should vote for it." ("Protocols," p. 227.)

46) In the protocol record of Lenin's speech at the 23rd session of the congress, this place is formulated as follows: "In fact... the words 'under the control and guidance' will lead to the result that there will be neither control nor guidance. The C.C. will never be able to extend real control to all those working but not entering organizations." ("Protocols," p. 232.)

47) Lenin's formulation was rejected (in a roll-call vote) by 28 votes against 23. Voted for: 19 votes of Iskra members—Bekov (A. G. Zurabov from Batumi, 2 votes), Gusev (from Rostov n/D), Osipov (R. S. Zemlachka—from Odessa), Pavlovich (P. A. Krasikov—from Kiev), Stepanov (Andrei—from Kiev), Sorokin (N. E. Bauman—from Moscow), Lyadov (from Saratov), Gorin (from Saratov), Murav'ev (Petoukhov—from Ufa), Lange (A. M. Stopani) and Dedov (L. M. Knipovich—both from the Northern Union), Orlov (Malkin—from Ekaterinoslav), Gorskii (A. Shotman—from Petersburg), Plekhanov, Lenin (2 votes), Gerts (D. I. Ulyanov) and Braun (Stepanov—both from Tula); 2 votes of "South Workers"—Egorov (E. Ya. Levin) and Medvedev (L. V. Nikolaev—from Kharkov); 1 vote of "bog"—Tsarev (A. S. Lokerman—from Rostov n/D); 1 vote of Rabochedelets—Bruker (L. P. Makhnovets—from Petersburg).

Martov's formulation was adopted by 28 votes against 22. Of the 23 who voted for Lenin's formulation, at the vote on Martov's formulation Orlov (Malkin) abstained. Against Lenin's formulation and for Martov's formulation voted: 14 votes of Iskra members—Rusov (B. M. Knunyants) and Karskii (Topuridze—both from the Caucasus—2 votes each), Kostich (S. Zborovskii—from Odessa), Panin (M. S. Makadzjub—from Crimea, 2 votes), Fomin (V. N. Krokhmаl'—from Ufa), Trotskii and Posadovskii (Mandelberg—both from the Siberian Union), Lenskii (Vilenskii—from Ekaterinoslav), Deich, Martov (2 votes); 5 votes of "bog"—Makhov (D. P. Kalafati from Nikolaev—2 votes), L'vov (I. N. Moshinskii—from the Mining Workers' Union—2 votes), Belov (L. S. Tseitlin—from Moscow); 2 votes of "South Workers"—Ivanov (E. S. Levina—from Kharkov), Popov (V. N. Rozanov); 2 votes of "Rabochedelets"—Akimov (V. P. Makhnovets) and Martynov; 5 votes of Bund (the entire delegation in full) ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 234).

48) Rabochedelets Akimov (Makhnovets) in both of his speeches on § 1 of the charter at the 22nd and 23rd sessions of the congress repeats this motivation for his vote for Martov's formulation. In his first speech, he says: "I join the formulation given by Martov, not because it precisely defines the desired relationship between the Party and the organization for me, but only in view of the fact that it takes a step forward on the path to the correct solution of the question." ("Protocols," p. 225.) In his second speech, Akimov twice motivates his support for Martov's formulation. At the beginning of the speech, he says: "Comrades Martov and Lenin are disputing which formulation better achieves their common goal; Bruker and I want to choose the one that achieves the goal the least. In this respect, I choose Martov's formulation." At the end of the speech, he repeats the same in different words: "If Comrade Lenin finds that Martov's text is not such a significant worsening of his plan, then I recognize it as, though not a very large, but still an improvement." ("Protocols," pp. 233–234.)

49) Below Vladimir Ilyich indicates that at the 4th session of the "Iskra" organization, there were 16 people from among the congress participants (including persons with advisory vote). P. A. Krasikov in his "Letter to Comrades on the II Congress of the R.S.-D.R. P." personally lists these members of the "Iskra" organization who attended the congress: 9 Iskra members of the "hard line"—Plekhanov, Lenin, Krupskaya (advisory vote), D. I. Ulyanov (Tula Committee), Zemlachka (Odessa Committee), Knipovich (Northern Union), Bauman (Moscow Committee), Noskov (advisory vote), Krasikov (Kiev Committee) and 7 Iskra members of the "soft line"—Martov, Axelrod (advisory vote), Zasulich (advisory), Potresov (advisory), Deich, Trotskii (Siberian Union), Krokhmаl' (Ufa Committee) (Collected Works of Lenin, vol. V, p. 529). The remark with which Lenin accompanies the mention of the 4th session of the "Iskra" organization (above, p. 226) and this remark allow us to establish the time of this session: it took place after the debates and voting on § 1 of the charter, i.e., after the 23rd session of the congress, i.e., either in the evening of August 15 or in the morning of August 16 n.s. Furthermore, the first of these remarks (p. 226) testifies that the first three sessions of members of the "Iskra" organization as a whole took place before the episode with "equal rights of languages," before its beginning at the 16th session of the congress, i.e., before August 12 n.s.

50) Against the candidacy of N (E. M. Aleksandrova) were Plekhanov, Lenin, Krupskaya, D. I. Ulyanov, Zemlachka, Knipovich, Bauman, Noskov, Krasikov. As for the remaining votes, among the 4 who voted for was Martov, while regarding the other Martovtsy, it was not possible to establish precisely who voted for and who abstained.

51) The personal composition of the reconciliation list put forward by Lenin and the "hard" majority of the assembly of 16 was as follows: "South Worker (acceptable to the minority)"—V. N. Rozanov, "fighting member of the minority"—L. D. Trotskii, the rest—"consistent Iskra members," "who participated in the congress struggle only at its end"—V. A. Noskov, "two who did not participate in the fights"—F. V. Lengnik and G. M. Krzhizhanivskii. Both of the latter did not attend the congress (see also about this Collected Works, vol. V, pp. 485 and 528–529).

52) The "fighting" lists of both sides were: 1) the list of "hard" Iskra members—Krzhizhanivskii, Popov (Rozanov), Noskov, 2) the list of "soft" ones (or Martovtsy)—Rozanov, Trotskii, Noskov (Collected Works, vol. V, p. 402, and also p. 374).

53) "A member of the majority (impartial or chairman)" was V. A. Noskov.

54) The personal composition of the group of 20 "hard" Iskra members with 24 deciding votes is given in Lenin's post-congress summary on the composition of the congress (see above, pp. 191–192).

55) The following lists of Martovtsy circulated at the congress: 1) a "fighting" list of three, given in footnote 52; 2) a list opposed to the "reconciliation" list of the majority of the "Iskra" organization (footnote 51) of five—V. N. Rozanov, L. D. Trotskii, V. N. Krokhmаl', V. A. Noskov, G. M. Krzhizhanivskii; 3) a list that later served as the occasion for Martov to accuse Gusev of spreading false information (see "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," appendix "Incident of Comrade Gusev with Comrade Deich," Collected Works, vol. V, p. 484)—this list also of five—V. N. Rozanov, L. D. Trotskii, V. N. Krokhmаl', E. M. Aleksandrova, and E. Ya. Levin. Vladimir Ilyich's words: "The candidates promoted by Martov have shown themselves at the congress from an absolutely negative side (wavering, lack of restraint, tactlessness, etc.)"—refer mainly to the last two candidates of this third list.

56) The "fighting" list in the C.C. on the part of the "hard" ones, see above in footnote 52. After V. N. Rozanov refused to go on the list of the "hard" ones, he was replaced by F. V. Lengnik.

57) The "trio" for the C.O. editing, promoted by the majority of Iskra members, was: Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov. In such a composition, the C.O. editing was elected at the 31st session of the congress ("Protocols," 1924 ed., p. 308).

58) The question of co-optation into the centers during the discussion of § 12 of the Charter consisted in the fact that Lenin put forward a proposal so that co-optation into the C.C. and into the C.O. editing would be carried out by each center with the consent of the other center (mutual co-optation), while Martov and his supporters stood for the independence of each center from the other and objected to mutual co-optation. At the 27th session of the congress, Martov's proposal: "Delete the point on mutual co-optation"—was adopted by 26 votes against 24. A further amendment by Lenin to the point on co-optation—about the admissibility of co-optation into the centers "only with the consent of all members of the Party Council"—by roll-call vote was rejected by 27 votes against 22, but the list of those voting is not preserved in the congress protocols. Finally, Martov's amendment about transferring the question of co-optation, in case of lack of unanimity, to the Party Council and, in case of cassation in the Council, about the subsequent decision of the question by simple majority, was adopted by 24 votes against 23 (see this moment in "Protocols," pp. 258–259).

59) The Bund's proposal discussed here was formulated in § 2 of the amended charter of the Bund, submitted by the Bund delegation at the 7th session of the congress as a result of debates on the question of the Bund's place in the party. This paragraph stated: "The Bund is a social-democratic organization, unlimited in its activity by any territorial boundaries, of the Jewish proletariat and enters the Party as its sole representative" ("Protocols," p. 90). At the 27th session of the congress, when discussing the question about the Bund on the point about national organizations, this Bund proposal was rejected by 41 votes against 5 with 5 abstaining. For the proposal (§ 2 of the Bund charter) voted only the Bund delegation (5 votes), abstained—D. P. Kalafati (2 votes) and the Rabochedelets—A. S. Martynov, V. P. and L. P. Makhnovets ("Protocols," p. 267, footnote).

60) The Bund delegation made their declaration of leaving the congress and of the Bund's withdrawal from the party immediately after the aforementioned vote on § 2 of the Bund charter ("Protocols," pp. 267–268).

61) The coalition of Martovtsy (9 votes) with other opportunistic groups at the congress after the withdrawal of Bundists (5 votes) and Rabochedelets (2 votes) encompassed the "South Workers" (4 votes), "bog" (6 votes), and Rabochedelets L. P. Makhnovets (1 vote). The personal composition of the entire coalition, see in Lenin's post-congress summary on the composition of the congress (above, pp. 191–192).

62) See above, Part II, section entitled "Program of the II Scheduled Congress of the R.S.-D.R. P." (p. 60).

63) Vladimir Ilyich stops more thoroughly on this in his speech at the 31st session of the congress in response to Martov ("Protocols," pp. 306–307).

64) Who exactly was this "other leader of the Martovtsy" has not been established precisely. Perhaps A. N. Potresov, about whom Vladimir Ilyich in his present "Account" speaks as a participant in the discussion of the project for the selection of "two trios" into the centers. But more likely, it was L. D. Trotskii, which is indicated in the speech of Rusov (B. M. Knunyants) at the 30th session of the congress, where he says: "I am surprised precisely at Comrade Trotskii attacking the selection of trios. Is it not he who at the preliminary meetings defended with foam at the mouth the adopted order of business? And not a word about such heresy in it as the selection of trios" ("Protocols," p. 301); this speech in the protocols is erroneously (a typo) attributed to Gusev, whereas it belongs to Rusov (B. M. Knunyants), and further in Gusev's speech: "If the suggestion about the editorial trio so upset Comrade Trotskii today, then one is forced to wonder why earlier not only did it not upset him, but on the contrary, made him deliver passionate speeches in its defense."

65) The remark about "tears" apparently refers to L. D. Trotskii's speech, as it is precisely after his very passionate statement that Lange (A. M. Stopani) speaks of "pathos," of "just shed tears" ("Protocols," pp. 301 and 302).

66) Here Vladimir Ilyich again has in mind E. M. Aleksandrova and her statements in connection with the invitation to the congress of the "Struggle" group and D. B. Ryazanov.

67) Of the three members of the C.C. elected by the congress, the congress was told Glebov (V. A. Noskov) ("Protocols," p. 314).

68) The fifth member of the Party Council was G. V. Plekhanov.

69) This question about the legality of the congress decisions was raised by Popov (V. N. Rozanov) ("Protocols," p. 315).

70) The concluding part of the "Account" that follows, concerning the behavior of the Martovtsy after the congress, judging by the facts noted in it and by the external form of its record (in the manuscript it is separated from the main part by an ending), represents a later addition. The main part of the "Account," apparently, was written by Lenin immediately after the congress, under the fresh impression of it, no later than the end of August n.s. The concluding part, judging by the mention in it of the fact of the Martovtsy's refusal to collaborate in "Iskra," in response to an official invitation from the C.O. editing, could only have been written after this fact. And it took place shortly after the congress twice: first, in London, immediately after the congress ended through the mediation of V. A. Noskov, second, already in Geneva, at Lenin's personal meeting with Martov (see about this above the introductory remark to Lenin's letter—Potresov, p. 213). In both cases, the C.O. editing's proposal to Martov about collaboration was, according to the testimony of both Lenin and Martov, fully official in character. Vladimir Ilyich could have written the concluding part of his "Account" only after the second formal attempt to attract Martov into the C.O. editing. It is very likely that the concluding part was written by Lenin even after his letter to Potresov of September 13 n.s. (above, pp. 215–217).

71) The refusal to work on the C.C. and on the C.O., which Martov initiated still at the congress by refusing to enter, as elected by the congress, into the composition of the C.O. editing, after the congress expressed itself in the factual refusal of a number of Martovtsy to occupy any positions at the C.C. In his letter to Axelrod of August 31 n.s. ("Letters of P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov," 1924 ed., p. 87), Martov writes: "Dimka [I. G. Smidovich-Loman], Dement'ev [I. B. Basovskii], Lyub[ov] Nikolaevna [Radchenko], [M. G.] Turskii and one more emigrant-worker from Petersburg ('Eremа' [A. A. Shneerson]) have joined our 'boycott.' Blüm[enfeld I. S.] is in the middle: he is deeply indignant, but considers it necessary 'not to irritate' the 'victors' and to avoid a final rupture." In his letter to Axelrod of September 13 (see there, p. 91), Martov already writes: "Those of the peacemakers who acted with pure intentions have now decisively joined the 'boycott': so, Blüm yesterday abandoned the printing house."

The foreign group of the "minority" headed by Martov immediately after the conclusion of the congress laid as the basis of its intra-party conduct a tactic of boycott of the central institutions of the party. Soon the leaders of the "minority" recognized it necessary for the purposes of the factional unification of their supporters and the systematic intra-party struggle for the seizure of the centers collectively to work out a definite program of action, binding for the supporters of the "minority." In his letter to Axelrod of September 13, 1903, Martov wrote: "...struggling resolutely, we will achieve our goal. Now with Starover's arrival, we will together (there are 46 of us) discuss practical steps for the time being..." ("Letters of P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov," Berlin ed., p. 92). A corresponding resolution-platform was soon worked out at a three-day conference in Geneva. The conference was attended by 47 supporters of the minority.

We are publishing this "platform of 47," reprinting it from the collection "Letters of P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov 1904–1946" (pp. 94–96), in view of the importance of this document for comprehensively illuminating the course of the party split.

The conference of 47 Geneva mensheviks who worked on developing this platform took place later than the 13th (the date of the letter of Martov to Axelrod cited above) and earlier than the 20th of September (the date of L. G. Deich's letter to P. B. Axelrod, written after this conference). By these two limiting dates is approximately determined the time of writing of this document.

As a footnote, we are also reprinting the commentary of the editors of "Letters," establishing the authors of the resolution and giving a detailed external description of the manuscript of the document.

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## [ACCOUNT OF L. D. TROTSKII AND YU. O. MARTOV]

### RESOLUTION ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLE, ADOPTED AT A FIVE-DAY MEETING OF 47 SUPPORTERS OF THE MINORITY OF THE II CONGRESS.*)

*[Between September 13 and 20, 1903. Geneva.]*

Considering that at the II congress of our party there manifestly appeared—and in a number of questions—victorious—the tendency to sharply change the former tactics of "Iskra" and over the ideologically-educative and ideologically-organizing influence of the newspaper—to place a juridically-secured power of a new editing;

considering that this tendency was embodied in the establishment of a Council composed in a definite manner, which

*) Editorial note from the "Letters" of P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov. We are publishing this resolution from the original; the first part of it, to the words: "ideological and organizational education of the party," is written in the hand of L. D. Trotskii; the rest—in Martov's handwriting. From the manuscript, one can judge that initially Trotskii's draft represented a completed resolution, but, evidently, in the course of discussion, the practical part of his resolution proved insufficient, and therefore the concluding paragraph of the resolution was cut short (we have preserved only its beginning, which does not represent independent interest), and instead of it, Martov composed a special resolution on the means which the opposition thinks to apply in its struggle.

In both parts of the resolution—both Trotskii's and Martov's—there is a whole series of corrections; as a rule, we do not restore the original text, since the overwhelming majority of these changes are purely stylistic and made by the authors themselves, evidently in the course of composing the texts of the resolutions. The only substantial correction in Trotskii's resolution—correction of its concluding paragraph, and even here we do not restore the original text, since, as we have already noted, the original version has been preserved without its conclusion and does not represent a finished whole.

As for the amendments to Martov's resolution, besides the stylistic amendments made in the course of composing the resolution, a number of amendments (written in pencil) of interest have been made to it, having necessarily resulted from the discussion of the resolution at the meeting; such amendments we deemed necessary to note by placing them in simple brackets.