"But what do you mean by populism?" the reader will probably ask. "A definition of what content is invested in the concept of 'heritage' was given above, but no definition has been given to the concept of 'populism.'"

"By populism we mean a system of views containing the following three features: 1) Recognition of capitalism in Russia as decline, regression. Hence the strivings and desires to 'restrain,' 'stop,' 'halt the destruction' of age-old foundations by capitalism, and similar reactionary outcries. 2) Recognition of the originality of the Russian economic system in general and of the peasant with his commune, artel, and so forth in particular. To Russian economic relations one does not consider it necessary to apply the concepts about various social classes and their conflicts that have been developed by contemporary science. The peasant commune is regarded as something higher, better in comparison with capitalism; there is an idealization of 'foundations.' Amid the peasantry, the very contradictions that are inherent in any commodity and capitalist economy are denied and obscured; the connection between these contradictions and their more developed form in capitalist industry and capitalist agriculture is denied. 3) Ignoring the connection between the 'intelligentsia' and the juridico-political institutions of the country with the material interests of specific social classes. Denial of this connection and the absence of a materialist explanation of these social factors leads them to see in them a force capable of 'dragging history along a different line' (Mr. V. V.), 'turning aside from the path' (Mr. N—ov, Mr. Yuzhakov, and so forth), and so on."

"This is what we mean by 'populism.' The reader sees, therefore, that we use this term in the broad sense of the word, as all 'Russian disciples' use it who are fighting against an entire system of views rather than against individual representatives of it. Among these individual representatives, of course, there are differences, sometimes quite significant. No one ignores these differences. But the features of world-outlook cited above are common to all the most diverse representatives of populism, starting from... well, let us say, Mr. Yuzov and ending with Mr. Mikhailovsky. Messrs. Yuzov, Sazonov, V. V., and the like, in addition to the negative features of their views indicated above, attach yet other negative features which are present, for example, neither in Mr. Mikhailovsky nor in other contributors to the present 'Russian Wealth.' To deny these differences of the populists in the narrow sense from populists in general would, of course, be incorrect, but it would be even more incorrect to ignore the fact that the basic socioeconomic views of all and any populists coincide on the principal points cited above. And since the 'Russian disciples' reject precisely these basic views rather than only 'sorrowful deviations' from them for the worse, they obviously have every right to use the concept of 'populism' in the broad meaning of the word. Not only do they have the right, but they cannot act otherwise.

Turning to the basic views of populism outlined above, we must first of all establish that the 'heritage' has nothing whatsoever to do with these views. There is a whole series of undoubted representatives and keepers of the 'heritage' who have nothing in common with populism, who do not raise the question of capitalism at all, who do not believe at all in the originality of Russia, the peasant commune, and so forth, who see in the intelligentsia and juridico-political institutions no factor capable of 'turning aside from the path.' We named above, for example, the publisher-editor of the 'Messenger of Europe' {133}, who may be accused of many things, but not of violating the traditions of the heritage. On the contrary, there are people whose views correspond to the basic principles of populism indicated above and who directly and openly 'renounce the heritage'—let us name, for instance, Mr. Ya. Abramov, whom Mr. Mikhailovsky himself points to, or Mr. Yuzov. The very populism against which the 'Russian disciples' fight did not exist at all at the time when (speaking in legal language) the 'heritage' was 'opened,' that is, in the 1860s. Germs and embryos of populism existed, of course, not only in the 1860s but also in the 1840s and even earlier [282]—but the history of populism is not our concern now. What is important to us, we repeat once more, is to establish that the 'heritage' of the 1860s, in the sense as we outlined it above, has nothing in common with populism—that is, in terms of substantive views they have nothing in common; they pose different questions. There are keepers of the 'heritage' who are not populists, and there are populists who have 'renounced the heritage.' Of course, there are also populists who keep the 'heritage' or claim to keep it. Therefore we speak of the connection between the heritage and populism. Let us see what this connection has produced.

First, populism took a major step forward against the heritage by posing to public thought questions for resolution which the keepers of the heritage were partly unable to pose (in their time), and partly did not pose and do not pose because of the narrowness of outlook characteristic of them. The posing of these questions is a major historical service of populism, and it is completely natural and understandable that populism, having provided (whatever it may be) a solution to these questions, thereby occupied the foremost place among progressive currents of Russian public thought.

But the solution given by populism to these questions turned out to be utterly worthless, based on antiquated theories long since discarded by Western Europe, based on romantic and petty-bourgeois criticism of capitalism, on ignoring the most important facts of Russian history and reality. While the development of capitalism in Russia and the contradictions inherent in it was still very weak, this primitive criticism of capitalism could hold its ground. But to contemporary development of capitalism in Russia, to the contemporary state of our knowledge of Russian economic history and reality, to contemporary demands upon sociological theory, populism absolutely does not satisfy. Having been in its time a progressive phenomenon as the first posing of the question about capitalism, populism is now a reactionary and harmful theory, confusing public thought, playing into the hands of stagnation and all manner of Asiatic backwardness. The reactionary character of populist criticism of capitalism has given populism at present even such features as place it below the world-outlook that limits itself to faithful preservation of the heritage [283]. That this is so we shall endeavor to show presently in examining each of the three basic features of the populist world-outlook noted above.

The first feature—recognition of capitalism in Russia as decline, regression. As soon as the question about capitalism in Russia was posed, it very quickly became clear that our economic development is capitalist, and the populists declared this development to be regression, an error, a turning aside from the path supposedly prescribed by the entire historical life of the nation, from a path supposedly sanctified by age-old foundations, and so forth and so on. In place of the enlighteners' fervent faith in the given social development came distrust of it; instead of historical optimism and cheerfulness of spirit—pessimism and despair, based on the notion that the further things proceed as they do, the worse they become, the more difficult it will be to resolve the tasks posed by the new development; there arise invitations to 'restrain' and 'stop' this development; there appears a theory that backwardness is Russia's blessing, and so forth. With the 'heritage' all these features of the populist world-outlook not only have nothing in common but directly contradict it. Recognition of Russian capitalism as a 'turning aside from the path,' as decline, and so forth leads to a distortion of all the economic evolution of Russia, to a distortion of the 'change' that is taking place before our eyes. Carried away by the desire to restrain and halt the destruction of age-old foundations by capitalism, the populist falls into astonishing historical tactlessness, forgets that behind this capitalism there is nothing but the same exploitation combined with endless forms of bondage and personal dependence, which weighed upon the condition of the laborer, nothing but routine and stagnation in social production, and consequently in all spheres of social life. Fighting capitalism from his romantic, petty-bourgeois point of view, the populist throws overboard all historical realism, always comparing the reality of capitalism with the fiction of precapitalist order. The 'heritage' of the 1860s, with their fervent faith in the progressiveness of the given social development, with their ruthless hostility directed wholly and exclusively against the remnants of the old order, with their conviction that one needs only to sweep clean these remnants and affairs will go as well as possible—this 'heritage' not only has nothing whatsoever to do with the views of populism indicated above but directly contradicts them.

The second feature of populism—faith in the originality of Russia, idealization of the peasant, the commune, and so forth. The doctrine of Russia's originality forced the populists to clutch at antiquated West European theories, prompted them to treat with astonishing frivolity many acquisitions of West European culture: the populists comforted themselves with the thought that if we do not have certain features of civilized humanity, then 'we are destined' to show the world new methods of economic management, and so forth. The analysis of capitalism and all its manifestations that advanced West European thought had provided was not only not accepted with regard to Holy Russia but, on the contrary, all efforts were directed at devising excuses that would permit them not to draw the same conclusions about Russian capitalism that have been drawn regarding European. The populists bowed and scraped before the authors of this analysis and... and continued to be perfectly comfortable remaining such romantics against whom these authors had fought their entire lives. This teaching about Russia's originality, common to all populists, once again not only has nothing in common with the 'heritage' but even directly contradicts it. The '1860s,' on the contrary, strove to Europeanize Russia, believed in bringing it into common European culture, cared about transferring the institutions of this culture to our soil, which is in no way original. Any teaching about Russia's originality is in complete discord with the spirit of the 1860s and their tradition. Even more does it contradict this tradition the populist idealization, the whitewashing of the village. This false idealization, wishing at all costs to see in our village something special, utterly unlike the structure of any other village in any other country in the period of precapitalist relations—stands in the most glaring contradiction to the traditions of sober and realistic heritage. The further and deeper capitalism developed, the more strongly there manifested themselves in the village those contradictions common to any commodity-capitalist society, the more sharply and sharply there stood out the opposition between the sweet tales of the populists about the 'communal spirit,' 'artel character' of the peasant, and so forth on the one hand—and the actual split of the peasantry into village bourgeoisie and rural proletariat on the other; the more rapidly did the populists, continuing to view things through the eyes of the peasant, transform themselves from sentimental romantics into ideologues of the petty bourgeoisie, for the petty producer in contemporary society becomes a commodity-producer. The false idealization of the village and romantic fantasies about 'communal spirit' led to the fact that the populists treated with extreme frivolity the actual needs of the peasantry flowing from the given economic development. In theory one could speak as much as one likes about the strength of the foundations, but in practice every populist felt perfectly well that the elimination of the remnants of the old order, of the remnants of the pre-reform system that swathes our peasantry from head to foot even now, would open the door precisely to capitalist and no other development. Better stagnation than capitalist progress—such is, in essence, the point of view of every populist toward the village, although, of course, not every populist with the naive directness of Mr. V. V. will risk expressing this openly and frankly. "Peasants, riveted to their allotments and village communes, deprived of the possibility of employing their labor where it is more productive and more advantageous for them, have, as it were, become frozen in that crowded, herd-like, unproductive form of life in which they emerged from the hands of serfdom." Thus viewed one of the representatives of the 'heritage' from his characteristic point of view as an 'enlightener' {134}. "Let peasants rather continue to be frozen in their routine, patriarchal form of life than have the path cleared for capitalism in the village"—thus views, in essence, every populist. Indeed, one will probably not find a single populist who would dare to deny that the estate-based closure of the peasant commune with its collective liability and with the prohibition of selling land and renouncing allotments stands in the sharpest contradiction with contemporary economic reality, with contemporary commodity-capitalist relations and their development. To deny this contradiction is impossible, but the whole point is that the populists fear such a posing of the question as they would fire, such a confrontation of the juridical situation of the peasantry with economic reality, with the given economic development. The populist stubbornly wishes to believe in the nonexistent and romantically fantasized development without capitalism, and therefore... therefore he is ready to restrain the given development proceeding along the capitalist path. With regard to questions about the estate-based closure of the peasant commune, about collective liability, about the right of peasants to sell land and renounce allotments, the populist relates not only with the utmost caution and anxiety for the fate of the 'foundations' (foundations of routine and stagnation); not only that, the populist sinks so low that he welcomes police prohibition of peasants selling land. "The muzhik is stupid," one can say to such a populist in the words of Engelhardt, "he cannot manage by himself. If no one looks after him, he will burn all the forests, kill all the birds, catch all the fish, spoil the land and die himself." The populist here directly 'renounces the heritage,' becoming reactionary. And note moreover that this destruction of the estate-based closure of the peasant commune, in the course of economic development, becomes ever more and more an urgent necessity for the rural proletariat, whereas the inconveniences flowing from it for the peasant bourgeoisie are by no means so significant. A 'business-minded peasant' can easily rent land elsewhere, open an establishment in another village, travel anywhere at any time on commercial business. But for the 'peasant' living mainly by the sale of his labor-power, attachment to an allotment and to the commune means tremendous restriction of his economic activity, means the impossibility of finding a more profitable employer, means the necessity of selling his labor-power precisely to the local buyers of it, who always give less and look for every possible way to bind him in debt-bondage. Having once fallen under the power of romantic fantasies, having set for himself the goal of supporting and protecting foundations contrary to economic development, the populist imperceptibly to himself has slid down this slope until he found himself alongside the agrarian who with all his soul yearns to preserve and strengthen the 'tie of the peasant to the land.' It suffices to recall how this estate-based closure of the peasant commune engendered special methods of hiring laborers: the dispatch by factory and estate owners of their agents to villages, especially those in arrears with taxes, for the most profitable hiring of laborers. Fortunately, the development of agricultural capitalism, by destroying the 'sedentariness' of the proletariat (such is the effect of the so-called seasonal agricultural occupations), gradually displaces this debt-bondage with free hiring.

Another confirmation, perhaps no less striking, of our position regarding the harm of contemporary populist theories is given by the fact that among the populists idealization of labor-service rent is a common phenomenon. We above cited an example of how Engelhardt, having committed his populist transgression, went so far as to write that it would be 'good' to develop labor-service rent in the village! We found the same thing in the famous project of Mr. Yuzhakov on agricultural gymnasia ('Russian Wealth,' 1895, No. 5) [284]. The same idealization was indulged in in serious economic articles by a colleague of Engelhardt's in the journal, Mr. V. V., who asserted that the peasant had won a victory over the landlord who supposedly wished to introduce capitalism; but the misfortune was that the peasant undertook to work the landlord's land, receiving from him land 'in rent' for this—that is, restored precisely the same method of economy that had existed under serfdom. These are the most striking examples of the reactionary attitude of the populists toward questions of our agriculture. In less striking form you will encounter this idea among every populist. Every populist speaks of the harm and danger of capitalism in our agriculture, for capitalism, you see, replaces the independent peasant with a farm laborer. The reality of capitalism ('the farm laborer') is counterposed to the fiction about the 'independent' peasant: this fiction is based on the fact that the peasant of the precapitalist epoch possesses the means of production, and modestly glosses over the fact that for these means of production one must pay double their value; that these means of production serve for labor-service rent; that the living standard of this 'independent' peasant is so low that in any capitalist country he would be classed as a pauper; that to the hopeless poverty and mental inertia of this 'independent' peasant is added personal dependence, inevitably accompanying precapitalist forms of economy. The third characteristic feature of populism—ignoring the connection of the 'intelligentsia' and the juridico-political institutions of the country with the material interests of specific social classes—stands in the most inseparable connection with the previous ones: only this absence of realism in sociological questions could have produced the doctrine of the 'erroneousness' of Russian capitalism and the possibility of 'turning aside from the path.' This view of populism once again stands in no connection with the 'heritage' and the traditions of the 1860s, but, on the contrary, directly contradicts these traditions. From this view naturally flows such an attitude of the populists toward the numerous remnants of pre-reform regulation in Russian life as the representatives of the 'heritage' could in no case share. For the characterization of this attitude we permit ourselves to use the excellent observations of Mr. V. Ivanov in the article 'A Bad Invention' ('New Word,' September 1897). The author speaks of the well-known novel by Mr. Boborykyn 'Differently' and exposes his misunderstanding of the dispute between populists and 'disciples.' Mr. Boborykyn puts in the mouth of his novel's hero, a populist, such a reproach directed at the 'disciples' to the effect that they supposedly dream 'of a barracks with intolerable despotism of regulation.' Mr. V. Ivanov remarks on this occasion: "Concerning the intolerable despotism of 'regulation' as a 'dream' of their opponents, they (the populists) not only did not speak but, remaining populists, cannot and will not speak. The essence of their dispute with the 'economic materialists' in this area consists precisely in this, that the surviving remnants of the old regulation in our country can, according to the opinion of the populists, serve as a foundation for further development of regulation. The intolerability of this old regulation is obscured from their eyes, on the one hand, by the representation that the very 'peasant soul (single and indivisible) evolves' in the direction of regulation—on the other hand, by the conviction in the existing or impending moral beauty of the 'intelligentsia,' 'society,' or generally 'ruling classes.' The economic materialists they accuse not of partiality to 'regulation' but, on the contrary, to West European order based on the absence of regulation. And the economic materialists indeed assert that the remnants of old regulation, which grew on the basis of natural economy, become with each day more and more 'intolerable' in a country that has passed over to monetary economy, evoking countless changes both in the actual position and in the mental and moral physiognomy of the various strata of its population. They are convinced therefore that the conditions necessary for the emergence of a new beneficent 'regulation' of the economic life of the country can develop not from the remnants of regulation adapted to natural economy and serfdom, but only in the atmosphere of such broad and all-sided absence of this old regulation as exists in the advanced countries of Western Europe and America. In such a position stands the question of 'regulation' in the dispute between populists and their opponents" (pp. 11–12, 1. c. [285]). This attitude of the populists toward the 'remnants of the old regulation' represents, perhaps, the most striking departure of populism from the traditions of the 'heritage.' The representatives of this heritage, as we saw, were distinguished by an irrevocable and fervent condemnation of all and every remnant of the old regulation. Consequently, from this side the 'disciples' stand incomparably closer to the 'traditions' and 'heritage' of the 1860s than do the populists. The absence of sociological realism, besides the extremely important error of the populists indicated above, also leads in them to that particular manner of thinking and reasoning about social affairs and questions which can be called narrow-minded intelligentsia self-conceit or perhaps bureaucratic thinking. The populist always reasons about what path for the fatherland 'we' should choose, what calamities will be encountered if 'we' direct the fatherland along such and such a path, what outlets 'we' could secure for ourselves if we were to avoid the dangers of the path that old Europe followed, if we were to 'take what is good' from both Europe and our time-honored communality, and so forth and so on. Hence complete distrust and contempt of the populist for the independent tendencies of individual social classes that create history in accordance with their interests. Hence the astonishing frivolity with which the populist (having forgotten about the circumstances surrounding him) engages in all manner of social scheming, ranging from some kind of 'organization of agricultural labor' to the 'secularization of production' through the efforts of our 'society.' "Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Action wird der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Action sie ist [286]"—in these words [287] is expressed one of the most profound and most important propositions of the historical-philosophical theory which our populists in no way wish to and cannot understand. As the scope and depth of mankind's historical creativity expand, so must increase the size of that mass of population which is a conscious historical agent. The populist, on the other hand, always reasoned about the population in general and about the laboring population in particular as about an object of those or other more or less sensible measures, as about material subject to direction along one path or another, and never looked at the various classes of the population as independent historical agents within the given path, never posed the question concerning those conditions of the given path which could develop (or, conversely, paralyze) the independent and conscious activity of these creators of history.

Thus, although populism took a major step forward against the 'heritage' of the enlighteners by posing the question about capitalism in Russia, the solution given by it to this question turned out to be so unsatisfactory, owing to the petty-bourgeois point of view and sentimental criticism of capitalism, that populism on a whole series of the most important questions of social life turned out to be behind in comparison with the 'enlighteners.' The joining of populism to the heritage and traditions of our enlighteners turned out in the final analysis to be a minus: the new questions that post-reform economic development of Russia posed to Russian public thought were not resolved by populism, which limited itself to sentimental and reactionary lamentations concerning them, while the old questions that had been posed by the enlighteners themselves were cluttered up by populism's romanticism and their complete resolution was delayed.