**Introductory Note by the Editor**

In mid-September, during the Democratic Conference, the Regional Committee refused any submission to the Provisional Government. Kerensky's attempt to send a punitive detachment to Finland failed. It was clear that such a situation could not continue for long. Either insurrection or the disintegration of our ranks.

From the letter, the reader will see what significance Vladimir Ilyich attached to the Finnish forces. Petrograd was the undisputed political base of October. The technical preparation of October in Finland represents one of the most important pages in the history of the proletarian revolution.

The letter was sent to me from Vyborg in the final days of September.

8/VII-25

I. Smilga.

**Editorial Note**

Comrade Smilga wrote this letter in Vyborg. The letter is undated. The exact date—27 September/10 October—is established on the basis of the facts mentioned in the letter (see note 6). The circumstances of the letter's composition are evident from Comrade Smilga's account above.

Vladimir Ilyich advised Comrade Smilga to burn this letter. Comrade Smilga, fortunately, did not comply with this suggestion, but, for reasons of security, tore out the surname of the addressee; as a result, the word "comprehensively" on the reverse of the page was damaged. The entire letter consists of 4 pages.

V. I. Lenin.

# LETTER TO I. T. SMILGA.

**[27 September (10 October) 1917. Vyborg.]**

Comrade [Smilga],

I am taking advantage of a good opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

**I.**

The general political situation fills me with great anxiety. The Petro[grad] Soviet and the Bolsheviks have declared war on the government*). But the government has troops and is systematically preparing itself (Kerensky is at Headquarters2; clearly, he is in contact with the Kornilovists about troops for suppressing the Bolsheviks and is in contact in a businesslike manner).

And what are we doing? Only passing resolutions? Wasting time, setting "deadlines" (20.X Congress of Soviets—is it not ridiculous to postpone things like this? Is it not ridiculous to rely on this?). The Bolsheviks are not conducting systematic work to prepare their own military forces for the overthrow of Kerensky.

Events have fully confirmed the correctness of my proposal made during the Democratic] Conference], namely, that the party must put armed insurrection on the agenda3). Events compel us to do this. History has made the military question a fundamental political question at this moment. I fear that the Bolsheviks are forgetting this, absorbed in the "passions of the day," petty current questions, and "hoping" that "a wave will sweep away Kerensky." Such hope is naive; it is the same as relying on "chance." On the part of the party of the revolutionary proletariat this could prove to be a crime.

In my opinion, we must agitate within the party for a serious approach to armed insurrection—for this purpose, retype this letter on a machine and deliver it to the Petersburgers and Muscovites.

**II.**

Further, about your role. It seems that the only thing we can fully have in our hands and which plays a serious military role is the Finni[sh] troops and the Balti[c] fleet. I think you ought to use your high position, offload all petty, routine work onto your assistants and secretaries, not waste time on "resolutions," but devote all attention to the military preparation of the Finni[sh] troops and Fleet for the forthcoming overthrow of Kerensky. Create a secret committee of the most reliable military men, discuss with it comprehensively, gather (and verify yourself) the most precise information about the composition and disposition of troops near Petrograd and in Petrograd, about the transport of Finnish troops to Petrograd, about the movement of the Fleet, etc.

We could end up looking like utter fools, without doing this—with fine resolutions and Soviets, but without power!! I think you have the possibility of finding truly reliable and knowledgeable military men, traveling to Ino4) and other crucial points, weighing and studying the matter seriously, not relying on the too usual boastful general phrases that are characteristic of us.

That we in no case can allow the withdrawal of troops from Finl[and] is clear.5) Better to go for everything, for insurrection, for the seizure of power—in order to hand it over to the Congress of Soviets. I read in the newspapers today that already in 2 weeks the danger of a landing is equal to zero.6) This means you have very little time for preparation.

**III.**

Furthermore. The "power" in Finland must be used for systematic propaganda among the Cossacks who are here in Finl[and]. Part of them Kerensky and [General] Kornilov deliberately withdrew from Vyborg, for example, fearing "Bolshevization," and placed them in Uski-Kirko and Perkjärvi, between Vyborg and Terijoki, in safe (from Bolsheviks) isolation.7) You must study all information about the disposition of the Cossacks and organize the dispatch of agitator detachments composed of the best forces of sailors and soldiers of Finland. This is necessary. The same applies to literature.

**IV.**

Furthermore. Of course, leaves are granted both to sailors and soldiers. From those being given leave to the countryside for a visit, you must form detachments of agitators for systematic traveling through all provinces and agitation in the villages, both in general and for the Constituent Assembly. Your position is exceptionally favorable, for you can immediately begin to implement that bloc with the left Socialist-Revolutionaries, which alone can give us durable power in Russia and a majority in the Constituent Assembly. While things are dragging on there, conclude such a bloc immediately with you, organize the publication of leaflets (clarify what you can technically do for this and for their transport to Russia), and then it is necessary that in each agitator group for the village there be no fewer than 2 people: 1 from Bolsheviks, 1 from left Socialist-Revolutionaries. In the village, "the firm" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries for now reigns, and you must use your good fortune (you have left Socialist-Revolutionaries) in the name of THIS firm to introduce in the village a bloc of Bolsheviks with left Socialist-Revolutionaries, peasants with workers, and not with capitalists.

**V.**

In my opinion, for the proper preparation of minds, we must now immediately put into circulation such a slogan: power must immediately pass into the hands of the Petro[grad] Soviet, which will hand it over to the Congress of Soviets. For why endure another 3 weeks of war and Kerensky's "Kornilov preparations."

From the propaganda of this slogan by the Bolsheviks and left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Finland nothing but benefit can result.

**VI.**

Since you are at the head of "power" in Finl[and], there falls upon you one more very important, though modest in scope, task: to arrange the transport of literature from Sweden illegally. Without this all talk about the "International" is mere phrase. This can be arranged entirely: firstly, by creating your own organization of soldiers on the frontier; secondly, if that is impossible, by organizing proper trips of at least 1 reliable man to one locality, where I began to arrange transport with the help of that person, with whom I lived 1 day before arriving in Helsingfors (Rovio knows about it8)). It may be necessary to provide some monetary help. Be sure to arrange this!

**VII.**

I think we ought to see each other to talk about these matters. You could come, losing less than a day, but if you go only for a meeting with me, have Rovio ask by telephone Huttunen9), whether it is possible to see "sister-in-law" of Rovio ("sister-in-law" = You) and "sister" of Huttunen ("sister" = I). For otherwise I might leave suddenly.

Answer me without fail about receipt of this letter (burn it) through the same comrade who will deliver this letter to Rovio and who is soon going back.

In case I remain here for a long time, we must arrange a mail system for us: You could help with this by passing envelopes to railway employees to the Vyborg Soviet (and inside: to Huttunen).

**VIII.**

Send me through the same comrade a certificate (as formal as possible if you can: on the letterhead of the Regional Committee, signed by the chairman, with a seal, either typewritten or very clearly written): in the name of Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov, to the effect that the Chairman of the Regional Committee vouches for this comrade, and requests all Soviets, both the Vyborg Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, and others, to accord him complete confidence, assistance and support.

This is necessary for me in any case, for both a "conflict" and an "encounter" are possible.

**IX.**

Do you have a Moscow pamphlet "On the Revision of the Program"10)? Search for it with someone in Helsing[fors] and send it to me with the same comrade.

**X.**

Bear in mind that Rovio is a fine fellow, but lazy. You must watch over him and remind him 2 times a day. Otherwise he won't do it.

Greetings! K. Iva[nov].