Date: 7 September 1903
Pages: 204-208

LENIN'S COLLECTION
absolutely incorrect color.
There is "nothing" terrible whatsoever, and the restraining of the Zickzackkurs was necessary, and the majority of Iskrovites (both at the congress and within the organization of *Iskra*) understood this perfectly well.

No, I repeat, the Final is not an "unforeseen calamity," the Final is not a "fragmentation of the whole." This is incorrect. It is incorrect that one could curse the day of "promotion in rank"—or else all our old work would have remained forever the torment of Tantalus. And in the party, on its formal basis, with the subordination of *everything* to the statute *) (over which we fought desperately, fought over everything down to the smallest details with Martov, whom we lost on this point), in such a party the old family editorial board (which in 3 years—a fact—never once met in its full membership of 6) was impossible, all the more so because into the party there immediately entered, by right, on a formal basis, a whole crowd of non-Iskrovites. And this demanded precisely a firm line and consistent, not a zigzag policy. There is no return to the old, and only disturbed imagination can paint a picture that M[artov] is being led to the slaughter, rather than for joint work with comrades, each of whom has his own shade of political line. De facto, I will say further, the politically decisive (and not literary) center was always this troika, all these 3 years, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.

I now find amusing "their" complaints about the staff, about the praetorians, lamentations about the "crystal" of *Iskra*'s editorial board,—after Martov beat the majority of Iskrovites through alliance with the Bund, and prepared everything for beating them with this same alliance on the question of centers. Through alliance, I say, and not through a deal, and I do not think of accusing them of a deal with the swamp and with the Bund, nothing of the sort. When "they" claim that against them there was spread "shameful gossip" (allies, they say, of Bundists), "they" repeat their usual mistake of confusing the personal and the political. A deal would have been personally ugly. The alliance depended not on their will, the alliance was determined by their error; it was not they who went with the Bund and the swamp, but the Bund and the swamp—the South Worker etc.—went after *them*, immediately grasping whom among the Iskrovites should be supported from the standpoint of anti-Iskrovism. The Bund and the swamp etc. revealed politically only an organizational and tactical error of Martov.

*) This is why "constitutions among themselves" are now impossible, absolutely impossible either juridically or morally.

V. I. LENIN
To A. M. KALMYKOVA

Whoever knows all the facts of the congress and especially the distribution of Iskrovite votes (both at the congress and in the secret organization of *Iskra*), for that person there cannot be doubt that there is no return backward. The Iskrovites have split, and *Iskra* could not exist without the Iskrovites. And, I repeat, among the Iskrovites Mart[ov] was in an absolute minority, and the split in the party (toward which Martov is moving fatally, ever more with each day) will prove to be a revolt of the minority, both juridically and *especially in the substance of the matter* wrong.

We do not "stain" Martov for his error, nor anyone else, but we call all of them to work.

As for the "material means" which You mention, our affairs are not important now, it is true, and the California sources have dried up. But, if necessary, we shall endure even extreme need, only so as not to allow breaking up, out of discontent with the composition of the centers (for objectively it all boils down only to "their" discontent), the entire years-long work.

"Divide even a bucket, perhaps?" You ask. I could hardly answer this question, for I make no claim to impartiality in "dividing," and you have no need of a partial answer. I am convinced that there are no "fractional parts" whatsoever, but rather a mad attempt to break up, scatter, and shatter the whole (to disassemble the new hearth, as You put it) because of defeat on one question on which the defeated Iskrovites were arch-wrong.

I shake your hand.

*) The discussion concerns disputes and votes concerning the addition by the Program Commission regarding "equal rights of language" to § 6 of the general political part of the program, according to the draft of the editorial boards of *Iskra* and *Zaria* (see this draft in "Leninskiye Sborniki" II, p. 156), which corresponds to § 7 of the adopted program (see "Protocols" of the II Congress, ed. 1924, p. 3). Debates and votes on this question took place at sessions 16 and 17 of the congress ("Protocols," p. 159-162). The final decision on this point was adopted at session 21 of the congress ("Protocols," p. 215-216). Vladimir Ilyich provided a detailed exposition and analysis of this moment in his "Account of the II Congress of the R.S.D.R.P." (see below this document, p. 226-227) and in his report on the party congress at the 2nd Congress of the Foreign League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy (see "Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," Geneva, p. 47).

2) The "Assembly of 16 members of the organization of *Iskra*"—this was the 4th (and last) private meeting of members of the *Iskra* organization of both tendencies, held after the completion of debates and voting on § 1 of the statute and devoted to the question of lists for membership in the C.C. Vladimir Ilyich speaks more fully about all four sessions of the *Iskra* organization in his "Account of the II Congress of the R.S.D.R.P." (see below, p. 222 and 226) and especially about this 4th session (there, p. 228-229).

3) "The person who was the apple of discord"—O.K.E.M. member Aleksandrova. The Martovites advanced her candidacy for the C.C., the firm faction was against. (See more detail on this: 1) "Protocols," p. 373, footnote 12; 2) "Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League," p. 45-46 and 49; 3) "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Collected Works, vol. V, p. 367; 4) "Account of the II Congress," below, p. 228-229.)

4) "The question of lists," debated at the 4th session of the *Iskra* organization, was a question of lists of candidates for the C.C. The majority of Iskrovites (the "firm" faction) proposed a conciliatory list of 5 persons; three of the firm line: Noskov, Lengnik, and Kzhizhanovsky, and two: the "South Worker (agreeable to the minority)" Rozanov and the "militant member of the minority" Trotsky (see more detail on this below in Lenin's "Account of the II Congress," p. 228-229).

5) The Bund delegation left the congress at session 27 after § 2 of the Bund's statute was rejected by congress vote ("Protocols," p. 90, footnote, and p. 267-268). "*Rabochee Delo*" (Worker's Cause)—this is Martyanov and Akimov, prominent representatives of the opportunist s.-d. group "*Rabochee Delo*," who were at the congress as delegates from the Foreign Union of Russian Social-Democrats. (For a political assessment of the "*Rabochee Delo*" group see Lenin's "What Is to Be Done?" Collected Works, vol. V, p. 152-179. Martyanov and Akimov left the congress at session 28, in view of the congress's adoption of § 13 of the statute recognizing the League as the sole foreign s.-d. organization, in which they saw an indirect congress decision to close the Union of Russian s.-d. (Their statement of departure is in the "Protocols," p. 267; debates of the congress on their statement and on the departure itself there, p. 269-274.)

6) Here Vladimir Ilyich has in mind the accusation from the opposition against the majority of the II Congress and personally against Lenin that the latter were creating ultra-centralism in the party.

7) The question of the editorial "troika" is the question of Lenin's proposal, which the congress adopted, to elect the editorial board of the C.O. to consist of three members (see the speeches of Martov and Lenin at session 31 of the congress "Protocols," 304-307).

8) Lenin had conducted a definite conversation about this long before the congress with Potresov and Martov, which he describes in detail in his "Account of the II Congress" (see below, p. 231). All other members of the editorial board also knew about this project of his, to which Vladimir Ilyich pointed in his speech in response to Martov at session 31 of the congress ("Protocols," p. 306-307).

9) "Everything"—i.e., the entire former *Iskra* organization, its entire leading group, the entire party.

10) "California sources"—by this Vladimir Ilyich means some permanent, solid sources of material means for the party, but which exactly has not been precisely established.

At the end of August n.s. the entire elected "troika" of the C.C. was already in Russia, but in fact had not yet formed a collegium and had not yet managed to take a definite line in the atmosphere of the unexpectedly impending internal party turmoil and split. Two members of the C.C., Lengnik and Kzhizhanovsky, elected by the congress in absentia, were conducting practical work in different parts of Russia and were, as we saw above (p. 483-485), to a considerable degree discouraged by the first reports of events at the congress.

V. A. Noskov, the third member of the C.C., who participated in the struggle at the congress, had just left for Russia and had not yet managed to meet with the others. Meanwhile the opposition abroad was trumpeting about the "incapacity" of the C.C., was organizing and carrying out a boycott of the central institutions, was mobilizing its forces to capture the local committees in Russia. In such circumstances the congress majority needed to "strike while the iron is hot." The C.C. in Russia had to meet the wave of opposition in the localities fully armed, oppose it with decisive resistance through its influence and authority, and through organizing the forces of the majority in the localities. But all this still had to be created. Lenin clearly saw the entire danger and acuteness of the situation, was accurately oriented in it, and hastened to "charge" his closest comrades and like-minded colleagues in the C.C. with the will to victory. The following (unsent) letter to Kzhizhanovsky represents a sample of Vladimir Ilyich's directives at the moment of impending danger of a party split.

20.
V. I. LENIN — TO G. M. KZHIZHANOVSKY *)

[Between 10 and 14 September 1903. Geneva.] 2)

Thank you, Smith [G. M. Kzhizhanovsky],3) for the long letter.4) Let him write to Yegor [Yu. O. Martov],5) appealing to him one last time to reason. Let Zarin [F. V. Lengnik]6) go immediately to Yegor,7) having received all (absolutely all) powers for conducting affairs in Yegor's territories.8) Draw up all this more fully, more strictly, and more precisely. You must act formally, and regarding the Yegorovites8) you must prepare for decisive war; you must at all costs ensure that their attempt to thrust themselves into the committees9) immediately provokes decisive resistance. You must keep a sharp eye on these people and prepare all the committees. The Yegorovites are waging and expanding the boycott, they are devilishly embittered, they have fantasized for themselves a whole heap of injuries and insults, imagine that they are saving the party from tyrants, cry about it far and wide, are stirring up people. Their turmoil has already taken from us (I do not know for how long, but it might be forever) two of our largest sources of money.10) Direct all desperate efforts to obtaining money—that is the main thing.

So, let Smith not regard Yegor in the old way. Friendship is at an end here. Down with all softness! Prepare the most decisive resistance, send Zarin at once, designate candidates (in case of Smith's death),11) for that same contingency prepare for him, for Smith, a journey "to Yegor,"12) designate members to the Soviet,13) make everything more formal and operate to the fullest. On the literary side we shall manage. We have firm hopes in V[a]d[i]m [V. A. Noskov].14)

*) It is unknown why this letter of Lenin's was not sent.

2) The date of the letter has been established, firstly, on the basis of N. K. Krupskaya's notation on the copy of the aforementioned (on p. 184) letter from G. M. Kzhizhanovsky of 7/IX: "received 10/IX," and secondly, on the basis that certain positions of this letter from Vladimir Ilyich are set forth in N. K. Krupskaya's letter to G. M. Kzhizhanovsky of 14 September, which apparently was sent in place of this letter. The following passages in N. K. Krupskaya's letter partially convey the content of this present letter of Lenin: "We have not a kopeck of money, the Yegorovites influenced the money sources, and they are not giving money." "The Yegorovites are waging a boycott of the C.C. and C.O., a number of people refuse to work, the situation is very serious. One must hold firm and be prepared for the worst. Discuss everything with Vadim [V. A. Noskov]." "Hurry Wolf [F. V. Lengnik]. Every day is precious." "Formalize everything you are doing."

3) G. M. Kzhizhanovsky (b. 1872) (Brut, Claire, Smith)—social-democrat Iskrovite, from the II Congress of the R.S.D.R.P. a Bolshevik; prominent practical organizer; participated in the revolutionary movement from 1893, initially as a propagandist in s.-d. workers' circles; together with Lenin participated in organizing the Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class; in December 1895 he was arrested and exiled to Eastern Siberia; upon his return from exile in 1901, K. settled in Samara, where with his closest and active participation an Iskrovite center was organized, and from which relations were established with all the Volga region; at the Pskov conference in autumn 1902 he was elected to the composition of the O.K. for convening the II Congress of the party; at the second congress he was elected in absentia to the C.C.: