Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Conspectus of the BookThe Holy Familyby Marx and Engels

Written:Not earlier than April 25 (May 7), but not later than September 1895Source:Lenin’sCollected Works, 4th Edition, Moscow, 1976,Volume 38, pp. 19 - 51Publisher:Progress PublishersFirst Published:1930 inLenin Miscellany XIITranslated:Clemence DuttEdited:Stewart SmithOriginal Transcription & Markup:R. Cymbala&Marc SzewczykRe-Marked up & Proofread by:Kevin Goins(2007)Public Domain:Lenin Internet Archive (2003).You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works.
	 Please credit “Marxists Internet Archive” as your source.

Conspectus of the book“The
	 Holy Family”by Marx and Engelswas written by Lenin in 1895 during his first
	 stay abroad when he left Russia to establish contact with the Emancipation 
	 of Labour group.Note that this document has undergone special formating to ensure that Lenin’s
	 sidenotes fit on the page, marking as best as possible where they were 
	 located in the original manuscript.

THE HOLY FAMILY, OR CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL CRITICISM

AGAINST BRUNO BAUER & CO.

BY FREDERICK ENGELS AND KARL MARX

This little book, printed in octavo, consists of
     a foreword (pp. III-IV)[2](datedParis, September 1844), a table of
     contents (pp. V-VIII) and text proper (pp. 1-335),
     divided into nine chapters (Kapitel). Chapters
     I, II and III were written by Engels, Chapters
     V, VIII and IX by Marx, Chapters IV, VI and VII
     by both, in which case, however, each has signed
     the particular chapter section or subsection,
     supplied with its own heading, that was written
     by him. All these headings are satirical up to
     and including the “Critical Transformation
     of a Butcher into a Dog” (the heading of
     Section 1 of Chapter VIII). Engels is
     responsible for pages1-17Chapters I, II, III and sections 1 and 2 of
     Chapter IV, pages138-142(Section
     2a of Chapter VI) and pages240-245(Section 2b of Chapter
     VII):

i.e., 26 pages out of 335.

The first chapters are entirely criticism of thestyle(t h e  w h o l e 
				  ( ! )first chapter, pp. 1-5) of theLiterary
				  Gazette[[Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitungof Bruno Bauer[3]—in their 
				  foreword Marx and Engels say that their criticism is directed 
				  against its first eight numbers]], criticism of its
                  distortion of history (Chapter II, pp. 5-12,
                  especially of English history), criticism of its
                  themes (Chapter III, pp. 13-14, ridiculing the
                  Gründlichkeit[4]of the account of some
                  dispute of Herr Nauwerk with the Berlin Faculty
                  of Philosophy), criticism of views on love
                  (Chapter IV, 3 by Marx), criticism of theaccountof Proudhon in theLiterary
                  Gazette((IV,4) Proudhon, p. 22 u. 
				  ff. bis[5]74. At the beginning there
                  is a mass ofcorrections of the
                  translation: they have confused formule et
                  signification,[6]they have translated la
                  justice as Gerechtigkeit[7]instead of
                  Rechtpraxis,[8]etc.). This criticism
                  of the translation (Marx entitles it—Characterisierende
				  Übersetzung No. I, II u.s.w.[9]) 
				  is followed by Kritische Randglosse 
				  No. I u.s.w.,[10]where MarxdefendsProudhon against the critics of theLiterary Gazette, counterposing his clearly socialist ideas 
				  to speculation.

Marx’s tone in relation to Proudhon is very
                  laudatory (although there are minor reservations, for example 
				  reference to Engels’Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie[11]in theDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher[12]).

Marx here advances from Hegelian philosophy to socialism: 
				  the transition is clearly observable—it is evident what Marx 
				  has already mastered and how he goes over to the new sphere of ideas.

(36) “Accepting the relations of private
                  property as human and rational, political
                  economy comes into continual contradiction
                  with its basic premise, private property, a
                  contradiction analogous to that of the theologian,
                  who constantly gives a human interpretation to
                  religious conceptions and by that very fact
                  comes into constant conflict with his basic
                  premise, the superhuman character of religion. Thus, 
				  in political economy wages appear at
                  the beginning as the proportionate share of
                  the product due to labour. Wages and profit on
                  capital stand in the most friendly and
                  apparently the most human relationship, reciprocally 
				  promoting one another. Subsequently it turns
                  out that they stand in the most hostile
                  relationship, ininverseproportion
                  to each other. Value is determined at the
                  beginning in an apparently rational way by the
                  cost of production of an object and its social
                  usefulness. Later it turns out that value is
                  determined quite fortuitously, not bearing any 
				  relation to cost of production or social
                  usefulness. The magnitude of wages is
                  determined at the beginning byfreeagreement between the free worker and the free
                  capitalist. Later it turns out that the worker
                  is compelled to agree to the determination of
                  wages by the capitalist, just as the capitalist
                  is compelled to fix it as low as possible.Freedomof the contracting Parthei[13]” [this is the way
                  the word is spelled in the book] “has been
                  supplanted bycompulsion. The same
                  thing holds good of trade and all other economic
                  relations. The economists themselves
                  occasionally sense these contradictions, and the
                  disclosure of these contradictions constitutes
                  the main content of the conflicts between
                  them. When, however, the economists in one way
                  or another become conscious of these contradictions,they themselvesattackprivate
                  propertyin any one of itsprivateforms as the falsifier of what is in itself (i.e.,
                  in their imagination) rational wages, in
                  itself rational value, in itself rational
                  trade. Adam Smith, for instance, occassionally
                  polemises against the capitalists, Destutt de
                  Tracy against the bankers, Simonde de Sismondi
                  against the factory system, Ricardo against
                  landed property, and nearly all modern
                  economists against thenon-industrialcapitalists, in whom private property appears as
                  a mereconsumer.

“Thus, as an exception—and all the more so
                  when they attack some special abuse—the
                  economists sometimes stress the semblance of the
                  humane in economic relations, while, more often
                  than not, they take these relations precisely in
                  their markeddifferencefrom the humane, in
                  their strictly economic sense. They stagger
                  about within that contradiction without going
                  beyond its limits.

“Proudhonput an end to this
                  unconsciousness once for all. He took thehumane semblanceof the economic
                  relations seriously and sharply opposed it to
                  theirinhumane reality. He forced them
                  to be in reality what they imagine themselves to
                  be, or, more accurately, to give up their own idea
                  of themselves and confess their real
                  inhumanity. He therefore quite consistently
                  represented as the falsifier of economic
                  relations not one or another particular type of
                  private property, as other economists have done,
                  but private property as such, in its
                  entirety. He has done all that can be done by
                  criticism of political economy from the stand-point of 
				  political economy.” (39)

Herr Edgar’s reproach (Edgar of theLiterary
                  Gazette) that Proudhon makes a
                  “god” out of “justice,” Marx
                  brushes aside by saying that Proudhon’s treatise
                  of 1840[14]does not adopt “the
                  standpoint of German development of 1844”
                  (39), that this is a general failing of the French,
                  and that one must also bear in mind Proudhon’s
                  reference to the implementation of justice by
                  its negation—a reference making it possible to
                  have done with this Absolute in history as
                  well (um auch dieses Absoluten in der Geschichte
                  überhoben zu sein)—at the end of p. 39. “If
                  Proudhon does not arrive at this consistent
                  conclusion, it is owing to his misfortune in
                  being born a Frenchman and not a German.”
                  (39-40)

Then follows Critical Gloss No. II (40-46),
                  setting out in very clear relief Marx’s
                  view—already almost fully developed—concerning
                  the revolutionary role of the proletariat.

...“Hitherto political economy proceeded
                  from thewealththat the movement of
                  private property supposedly creates for thenationsto an apology of private
                  property. Proudhon proceeds from the opposite
                  side, which political economy sophistically
                  conceals, from the poverty bred by the movement of 
				  private property, to his conclusions
                  negating private property. The first criticism
                  of private property proceeds, of course, from
                  the fact in which its contradictory essence
                  appears in the form that is most perceptible and
                  most glaring and most directly arouses man’s
                  indignation—from the fact of poverty, of
                  misery.” (41)

“Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they 
				  form a single whole. They are both begotten by the world
                  of private property. The question is what particular place
                  each occupies within the antithesis. It is not sufficient to
                  declare them two sides of a single whole.

“Private property as private property, as
                  wealth, is compelled to maintainitself, and thereby its opposite, the
                  proletariat,in existence. That is
                  thepositiveside of the contradiction, 
				  self-satisfied private property.

“The proletariat, on the other hand, is
                  compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and
                  thereby its opposite, the condition for its
                  existence, that which makes it the proletariat,
                  i.e. private property. That is thenegativeside of the contradiction, its
                  restlessness within its very self, dissolved and
                  self-dissolving private property.

“The propertied class and the class of the
                  proletariat present the same human
                  self-alienation. But the former class feels
                  happy and confirmed in this self-alientation, it
                  recognises alienationas its own power, and
                  has in it thesemblanceof human
                  existence. The class of the proletariat feels
                  annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it
                  its own powerlessness and the reality of an
                  inhuman existnece. To use an expression of
                  Hegel’s, the class of the proletariat is in
                  abasementindignationat this abasement, an
                  indignation to which it is necessarily driven
                  by the contradiction between its humannatureand its conditions of life,
                  which are the outright, decisive and
                  comprehensive negation of that nature.

“Within this antithesis the private
                  property-owner is therefore theconservativeside, the proletarian, thedestructiveside. From the former
                  arises the action of preserving the antithesis,
                  from the latter, that of annihilating it.

“In any case, in its economic movement
                  private property drives towards its own
                  dissolution, but only through a development
                  which does not depend on it, of which it is
                  unconscious and which takes place against its will,
                  through the very nature of things, only inasmuch
                  as it produces the proletariatasproletariat, misery conscious of its spiritual
                  and physical misery, dehumnaisation conscious of its
                  dehumanisation and therefore
                  self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the
                  sentence that private property pronounced on
                  itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it
                  executes the sentence that wage-labour
                  pronounced on itself by begetting wealth for
                  others and misery for itself. When the
                  proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes
                  the absolute side of society, for it is
                  victorious only by abolishing itself and its
                  opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as
                  well as the opposite which determines it, private
                  property.

“When socialist writers ascribe this
                  historic role to the proletariat, it is not, as
                  Critical Criticism would have one think, because
                  they consider the proletarians asgods.
                  Rather the contrary. Since the abstraction of all
                  humanity, even of thesemblanceof
                  humanity, is practically complete in the
                  fully-formed proletariat; since the conditions of
                  life of the proletariat sum up all the
                  conditions of life of society today in their
                  most inhuman and acute form; since man has lost
                  himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time
                  has not only gained theoretical consciousness of
                  that loss, but through the no longer removable,
                  no longer disguisable, absolutely imperativeneed—the practical expression ofnecessity—is driven directly to revolt
                  against that inhumanity; it follows that the
                  proletariat can and must free itelf. But it
                  cannot free itself without abolishing the
                  conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the
                  conditions of its own life without abolishingallthe inhuman conditions of life of
                  society today which are summed up in its own
                  situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern
                  but steeling school oflabour. It is
                  not a question of what this or that proletarian,
                  or even the whole proletariat, at the momentconsidersas its aim. It is a question ofwhatthe proletariat is, and what, in
                  accordance with thisbeing, it will
                  historically be compelled to do. Its aim and
                  historical action is irrevocably and clearly
                  foreshadowed in its own life situation as well
                  as in the whole organisation of bourgeois
                  society today. There is no need here to show that a
                  large part of the English and French proletariat
                  is alreadyconsciousof its historic
                  task and is constantly working to develop that
                  consciousness into complete clarity.”
                  (42-45)

CRITICAL GLOSS NO. 3

“Herr Edgar cannot be unaware that Herr Bruno Bauerbased all his arguments on ‘infiniteself-consciousness’and that he also saw in this principle the creative principleof the gospels, which, by their infinite unconsciousness,appear to be in direct contradiction to infinite self-con-sciousness. In the same way Proudhon considers equalityas the creative principle of private property, which is indirect contradiction to equality. If Herr Edgar compares

Frenchequalitywith German
                  self-consciousness for an in-stant, he will see
                  that the latter principle expressesin Ger-man, 
				  i.e., in abstract thought, what the former
                  saysinFrench, that is, in the
                  language of politics and of thoughtful

observation. Self-consciousness is man’s equality withhimself in pure thought. Equality is man’s consciousnessof himself in the element of practice, i.e., therefore, man’sconsciousness of other men as his equals and man’s attitudeto other men as his equals. Equality is the French expressionfor the unity of human essence, for man’s consciousnessof his species and his attitude towards his species, for thepractical identity of man with man, i.e., for the socialor human relation of man to man. As therefore destructivecriticism in Germany, before it had progressed inFeuerbachto the consideration ofreal man, tried to solve everythingdefinite and existing by the principle ofself-consciousness,destructive criticism in France tried to do the same bythe principle ofequality.” (48-49)

“The opinion that philosophy is the abstract
                  expressionof existing conditions does not
                  belong orginally to HerrEdgar. It belongs toFeuerbach, who was the first to
                  de-scribe philosophy as speculative and mystical
                  empiricism,and proved it.” (49-50)

“‘We always come back to the same thing... Proudhonwrites in the interests of the proletarians.’[15]He does not

write in the interests of self-sufficient criticism or out ofany abstract, self-made interest, but out of a massive,real, historical interest, an interest that goes beyondcrit-

icism,that will go as far as acrisis. Not only does Proud-hon write in the interests of the proletarians, he is himselfa proletarian, un ouvrier. His work is a scientific manifestoof the French proletariat and therefore has quite a differenthistorical significance from that of the literary botchworkof a Critical Critic.” (52-53)

“Proudhon’s desire to abolish non-owning and the oldform of owning is exactly identical to his desire to abol-ish the practically alienated relation of man to hisob-jective essence, to abolish thepolitical-economicex-pression of human self-alienation. Since, however, hiscriticism of political economy is still bound by the pre-mises of political economy, the reappropriation of the ob-jective world is still conceived in the political-economicform ofpossession.

“Proudhon indeed does not oppose owning to non-owning,as Critical Criticism makes him do, butpossessionto theold form of owning, toprivate property. He declares posses-sion to be a ‘social function.’ In a function, ‘interest’ is notdirected however toward the ‘exclusion’ of another, buttoward setting into operation and realising my own powers,the powers of my being.

“Proudhon did not succeed in giving this
                  thought appro-

priate development. 
				  The concept of ‘equalpossession’ is apolitical-economic one and therefore itself still an alienatedexpression for the principle that theobjectasbeing forman, as theobjective being of man, is at the same time theexistence of man for other men, hishuman relation toother men, the social behaviour of man in relationto man. Proudhon abolishes political-economic estrangementwithinpolitical-economic estrangement.” (54-55)

[[This passage is highly characteristic, for it shows howMarx approached the basic idea of his entire “system,” sitvenia verbo,[16]namely the concept of the social relations ofproduction.]]

As a trifle, it may be pointed out that on p. 64 Marxdevotes five lines to the fact that “Critical Criticism” trans-lates maréchal as “Marschall” instead of “Hufschmied.”[17]

Very interesting are: pp.65-67(Marxapproachesthelabour theory of value); pp. 70-71 (Marx answers Edgar’scharge that Proudhon is muddled in saying that the workercannot buy back his product), 71-72 and72-73(spec-ulative, idealistic, “ethereal” (ätherisch) socialism—and“mass” socialism and communism).

(Section 1, first paragraph:Feuerbachdisclosedreal mysteries,
                  Szeliga—vice versa.)

(Last paragraph:anachronismof then a ï v erelationof rich and poor: “si le riche le
                  savait!”[18])

(All these seven pages areextremelyinteresting.This is Section 2, “The Mystery of Speculative Con-struction”—a criticism of speculative philosophy usingthe well-known example of “fruit”—derFrucht—a crit-icismaimed directly a g a i n s t  H e g e l as well.Here too is the extremely interesting remark that Hegel “veryoften” gives a real presentation, embracing the thingitself—dieS a c h eselbst—within the speculative pre-sentation.)

pp. 92, 93—

f r a g m e n t a r yremarks against Degradierung der Sinnlichkeit.[19]

“He” (Szeliga) “is unable ... 
				  to see thatindustry

and tradefound universal
                  kingdoms that are quitedifferent from Christianity and morality, family hap-piness and civic welfare.”

(End of the first paragraph—barbed
                  remarks on thesignificance ofnotariesin modern society.... “The notaryis the temporal confessor. He is apuritanby profes-sion, and ‘honesty,’ Shakespeare says, is ‘no puritan.’He is at the same time the go-between for all possiblepurposes, the manager of civil intrigues and plots.”)

Another example of ridiculing abstract specula-tion: the “construction” of how man becomes masterover beast; “beast” (dasTier) as an abstraction is changedfrom a lion into a pug, etc.

A characteristic passage regarding Eugène Sue[20]:owing to his hypocrisy towards the bourgeoisie, he ideal-ises the grisette morally, evading her attitude to mar-riage, her “naïve” liaison with un étudiant[21]or ouv-

rier.[22]“It is precisely in that
                  relation that she” (gri-sette) “constitutes a really human contrast to the sanc-timonious, narrow-hearted, self-seeking wife of thebourgeois, to the whole circle of the bourgeoisie, thatis, to the official circle.”

The “mass” of the sixteenth
                  and the nineteenthcenturies was different “von vorn herein.”[23]

pp.118-121.

This passage (in Chapter VI: “Absolute Cri-tical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person ofHerr Bruno.” 1) Absolute Criticism’s First Campaign.a) “Spirit” and “Mass”) ise x t r e m e l yimportant:a criticism of the view that history was unsuccessfulowing to the interest in it by the mass and its relianceon the mass, which was satisfied with a “superficial” com-prehension of the “idea.”

“If, therefore, Absolute Criticism condemns some-thing as ‘superficial,’ it is simply previous history, theactions and ideas of which were those of the ‘masses.’It rejectsmasshistory to replace it bycriticalhistory(see Herr Jules Faucher on Topical Questions in Eng-land[24]).” (119)

“The ‘idea’ always exposed itself to ridicule inso-far as it differed from ‘interest.’ On the other hand,it is easy to understand that every mass ‘interest’ that

asserts itself historically goes far beyond its real limitsin the ‘idea’ or ‘imagination’ when it first comes onthe scene, and is confused withhumaninterest ingeneral. Thisillusionconstitutes whatFouriercallsthetoneof each historical epoch” (119)—as an illus-tration of this the example of the French Revolution(119-120) and the well-known words (1 2 0infine[25]):

“With the thoroughness of the historical action, thesize of the mass who perform it will therefore increase.”

How far the sharpness of Bauer’s division into
                  Geist[26]and Masse[27]goes is evident from this
                  phrase thatMarx attacks: “In the mass, not
                  somewhere else, is the trueenemy of the spirit
                  to be sought.” (121)

Marx answers this by saying that the enemies of prog-ress are the products endowed with independent being(verselbständigten) of the self-abasement of the mass, althoughthey are not ideal but material products existing in an out-ward way. As early as 1789, Loustallot’s journal[28]had themotto:

Les grands ne nous paraissent
                  grandsQue parceque nous sommes à genoux.Levons-nous![29]

But in order to rise (122), says Marx, it is not
                  enoughto do so in thought, in the idea.

“YetAbsolute Criticismhas learnt from Hegel’sPhen-omenology[30]at least theartof convertingreal objectivechains that existoutside meintomerely ideal, merelysub-jectivechains existing merelywithin me, and thus ofconverting allexteriorpalpable struggles into pure strugglesof thought.” (122)

In this way it is possible to prove, says Marx bitingly,the pre-established harmony between Critical Criticism andthe censorship, to present the censor not as a police hangman(Polizeischerge) but as my own personified sense of tactand moderation.

Preoccupied with its “Geist,” Absolute
                  Criticism doesnot investigate whether the
                  phrase, self-deception andpithlessness
                  (Kernlosigkeit) are not in its own empty(windig) pretensions.

“The situation is the same with ‘progress.’ In spite ofthe pretensions of ‘progress,’ continualretrogressionsandcircular movementsare to be observed. Far from suspectingthat the category ‘progress’ is completely empty andabstract, Absolute Criticism is instead so ingenious as to re-cognise ‘progress’ as being absolute, in order to explainretrogression by assuming a ‘personal adversary’ ofprogress,the mass.” (123-124)

“All communist and socialist writers proceeded fromthe observation that, on the one hand, even the mostfavourable brilliant deeds seemed to remain without brilliantresults, to end in trivialities, and, on the other, allprogressof the spirithad so far been progress against themassof mankind, driving it to an ever moredehumanisedsituation.They therefore declared “progress” (seeFourier) to be aninadequate abstractphrase; they assumed (seeOwen, amongothers) a fundamental flaw in the civilised world; that iswhy they subjected therealbases of contemporary societyto incisivecriticism. This communist criticism immediatelyhad its counterpart in practice in the movement of thegreat mass, in opposition to which the previous historicaldevelopment had taken place. One must be acquaintedwith the studiousness, the craving for knowledge, the moralenergy and the unceasing urge for development of the Frenchand English workers to be able to form an idea of thehumannobility of this movement.” (124-125)

“What a fundamental superiority over the
                  communistwriters it is not to have traced
                  spiritlessness, indolence,superficiality and
                  self-complacency to their origin but tohave
                  denounced themmorallyandexposedthem as theopposite of the spirit, of
                  progress!” (125)

“The relation between ‘spirit and mass,’ however, hasstill ahiddensense, which will be completely revealedin the course
                  of the reasoning. We only make mentionof it
                  here. That relationdiscoveredby Herr
                  Bruno is, in fact,nothing but acritically
                  caricatured culmination of Hegel’sconception of
                  history; which, in turn, is nothing but thespeculative expression of theChristian-Germanicdogmaof the
                  antithesis betweenspiritandmatter, betweenGodand theworld. This antithesis is expressed in
                  history, inthe human world itself, in such a
                  way that a few chosenindividualsas
                  theactivespirit stand opposed to the
                  restof mankind, as thespiritless
                  mass, asmatter.” (126)

And Marx points out that Hegel’s conception of history(Geschichtsauffassung) presupposes an abstract andabsolute spirit, the embodiment of which is the mass. Par-allel with Hegel’s doctrine there developed in France thetheory of
                  theDoctrinaires[31](126) who proclaimed thesovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of thepeople in order to exclude the mass and rule alone(allein).

Hegel is “guilty of a double half-heartedness” (127):1) while declaring that philosophy is the being of the Abso-lute Spirit, he does not declare this the spirit of the philo-sophical individual; 2) he makes the Absolute Spirit thecreator of history only in appearance (nur zum Schein),only post festum,[32]only in consciousness.

Bruno does away with this half-heartedness; he
                  declaresthatCriticismis the Absolute
                  Spirit and the creator of his-tory in actual fact.

“On the one side stands the Mass, as the
                  passive, spirit-less, unhistoricalmaterialelement of history; on the
                  other—theSpirit,Criticism,
                  Herr Bruno and Co. as the active ele-ment from
                  which allhistoricalaction arises. The act
                  ofthe transformation of society is reduced to
                  thebrain workof Critical
                  Criticism.” (128)

As the first example of “the campaigns of
                  Absolute Crit-icism against the Mass,”
                  Marx adduces Bruno Bauer’sattitude to theJudenfrage, and he refers to the
                  refutationof Bauer[33]inDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.

“One of the chief pursuits of Absolute
                  Criticism consistsin first bringing all
                  questions of the day intotheirright
                  setting. For it does not answer, of course, therealquestions—but substitutesquite differentones.... It thusdistorted the ‘Jewish question,’ too, in such a way
                  that itdid not need to investigatepolitical emancipation, whichis the
                  subject-matter of that question, but could instead
                  besatisfied with a criticism of the Jewish
                  religion and a des-cription of the
                  Christian-German state.

“This method, too, like all Absolute Criticism’s
                  original-ities, is the repetition of aspeculativeverbal trick.Spec-ulativephilosophy, in particularHegel’sphilosophy,must transpose all
                  questions from the form of commonsense to the
                  form of speculative reason and convert thereal
                  question into aspeculativeone to be able
                  to answerit. Having distortedmyquestions and having, like the cate-chism, placedits ownquestions into my mouth,
                  specullative philosophy could, of course, again
                  like the catechism,have its ready answer to each of my questions.” (134-135)

In Section 2a (...“‘Criticism’ and
                  ‘Feuerbach’—Damna-tion of
                  Philosophy...”)—pp. 138-142—written by
                  Engels,one finds Feuerbach warmly praised. In
                  regard to “Criti-cism’s” attacks on
                  philosophy, its contrasting to philosophythe
                  actual wealth of human relations, the “immense
                  contentof history,” the “significance
                  of man,” etc., etc., right upto the
                  phrase: “the mystery of the system
                  revealed,”Engels says:

“But who, then, revealed the mystery of the
                  ‘system’?Feuerbach. Who annihilated
                  the dialectics of concepts, thewar of the gods
                  known to the philosophers along?Feuer-bach. 
				  Who substituted for the old rubbish and
                  for ‘infiniteself-consciousness’ not, it is
                  true, ‘the significance ofman’—as
                  though man had another significance than that ofbeing man—but still ‘Man’?Feuerbach, and onlyFeuer-bach. And he did more. Long ago he did away with thevery categories that ‘Criticism’ now wields—the ‘realwealth of human relations, the immense content of history,the struggle of history, the fight of the mass against the spirit,’etc., etc.

“Once man is conceived as the essence, the
                  basis of allhuman activity and situations, only
                  ‘Criticism’ can inventnew
                  categoriesand transformmanhimself
                  again into acategory and into the principle
                  of a whole series of categoriesas it is doing
                  now. It is true that in so doing it takes theonly road to salvation that remained for frightened
                  andpersecutedtheologicalinhumanity.Historydoesnothing,
                  it‘possessesnoimmense wealth,’ it 
				  ‘wagesnobattles.’ It ismanand not ‘history,’ real living man, that does all
                  that, thatpossesses and fights; ‘history’ is
                  not, as it were, a personapart, using man as a
                  means to achieveits ownaims; historyisnothing butthe activity of man pursuing
                  his aims. IfAbsoluteCriticism,
                  afterFeuerbach’sbrilliant reasoning,
                  stilldares to reproduce the old trash in a new
                  form...” (139-140)etc.—then, Engels says,
                  this fact alone is sufficient toassess the
                  Critical naïveté, etc.

And after this, in regard to the opposition of
                  Spiritand “Matter” (Criticism calls
                  the mass “matter”), Engelssays:

“Is Absolute Criticism then notgenuinely Christian-German? After the
                  old contradiction between spiritualism

and materialism has been fought out on all sides and over-come once for all byFeuerbach, ‘Criticism’ again makesa basic dogma of it in its ugliest form and gives the victoryto the ‘Christian-German spirit.’” (141)

In regard to Bauer’s words: “To the extent
                  of the prog-ress now made by the Jews in
                  theory, they are emancipated;to the extent that
                  they wish to be free, they are free” (142),Marx says:

“From this proposition one can immediately
                  measurethe critical gap which separatesmassprofane communismand socialism
                  fromabsolutesocialism. The first
                  propositionof profane socialism rejects
                  emancipationin mere theoryas an
                  illusion and forrealfreedom it demands
                  besidesthe idealistic ‘will,’ very
                  tangible, very material conditions.How low
                  ‘the Mass’ is in comparison with holy
                  Criticism,the Mass which considers material,
                  practical upheavalsnecessary, merely to win the
                  time and means requiredto deal with
                  ‘theory’!” (142)

Further, (pp. 143-167), the most boring,
                  incrediblycaviling criticism of theLiterary Gazette, a sort of wordby
                  word commentary of a “blasting”
                  type. Absolutely noth-ing of interest.

The end of the section ((b) The Jewish Question
                  No. II.pp. 142-185)—pp.167-185provides
                  an interesting answerby Marx to Bauer on the
                  latter’s defence of his bookJuden-frage, 
				  which was criticised in theDeutsch-FranzösischeJahrbücher. (Marx constantly refers to the
                  latter.) Marx heresharply and clearly stresses
                  the basic principles of his entireworld outlook.

“Religious questions of the day have at
                  present a social sig-nificance” (167)—this
                  was already pointed out in theDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. It characterised
                  the “realpositionof Judaism in
                  civil society today.” “Herr Bauer
                  explainstherealJew by theJewish
                  religion, instead of explainingthe mystery
                  of the Jewish religion by thereal
                  Jew.” (167-168)

Herr Bauer does not suspect “that real,
                  worldly Judaism,and hence religious Judaism
                  too, is being continually pro-duced by
                  present-day civil life and finds its final
                  develop-ment in themoney
                  system.”

It was pointed out in theDeutsch-Französische Jahr-bücherthat the development of Judaism has to be sought“in der kommerziellen und industriellen Praxis”[34](169),—that practical Judaism “vollendete Praxis der christlichenWelt selber 
				  ist.”[35](169)

“It was proved that the task of abolishing
                  the essenceof Judaism is in truth the task of
                  abolishingJudaism incivil society,
                  abolishing the inhumanity of the present-daypractice of life, the summit of which is themoney system.” (169)

In demanding freedom, the Jew demands
                  somethingthat in no way contradicts political
                  freedom (172)—it isa question ofpoliticalfreedom.

“Herr Bauer was shown that it is by no means
                  contraryto political emancipation todivideman into the non-re-ligiouscitizenand the religiousprivate
                  individual.” (172)

And immediately following the above:

“He was shown that as the state emancipates
                  itself fromreligion by emancipating itself fromstate religionandleaving religion to
                  itself within civil society, so the indi-vidual
                  emancipates himselfpoliticallyfrom
                  religion by re-garding it no longer as a public
                  matter but as aprivatematter. Finally, it was shown that the
                  terroristic attitudeof the FrenchRevolutiontoreligion, far from
                  refuting thisconception, bears it out.”
                  (172)

The Jews desire allgemeine Menschenrechte.[36]

“In theDeutsch-Französische
                  Jahrbücherit wasexpounded to Herr Bauer that this ‘free humanity’ andthe ‘recognition’ of it are nothing but the recognition of theselfish, civil individualand of theuncurbedmovementof the spiritual and material elements which are the contentof his life situation, the content of civil lifetoday; that theRights of Mando not, therefore, free man from religionbut give himfreedom of religion; that they do not freehim from property, but procure for himfreedom of prop-erty; that they do not free him from the filth of gain but givehimfreedom of choice of a livelihood.

“He was shown that therecognition of the Rightsof Man by the modern statemeans nothing more thandid therecognition of slavery by the ancientstate. Infact, just as the ancient state had slavery as itsnaturalbasis, themodern statehas civil society and themanofcivil society, i.e., the independent man connected withother men only by the ties of private interest anduncon-sciousnatural necessity, theslaveof labour for gain andof his own as well as other men’sselfishneed. The mo-dern state has recognised this as its natural basis assuch in theuniversal Rights of Man.”[37](175)

“The Jew has all the more right to the
                  recognition ofhis ‘free humanity’”
                  “as ‘free civil society’ is of a thoroughlycommercial and Jewish nature and the Jew is a necessarylink in it.” (176)

That the “Rights of Man” are not
                  inborn, but arose histor-ically, was known
                  already to Hegel. (176)

Pointing out the contradictions ofconstitutionalism,“Criticism” does not generalise them (faßt
                  nicht den allge-meinen Widerspruch des
                  Constitutionalismus[38]). (177-178)If it had done so, it would have proceeded from constitu-tional 
				  monarchy to thedemocratic representative
                  state,to the perfect modern state. (178)

Industrial activity is not abolished by the
                  abolitionof privileges (of the guilds,
                  corporations, etc.); on the con-trary it develops
                  more strongly. Property in land is notabolished
                  by the abolition of privileges of landownership,“but, rather, first begins its universal
                  movement with theabolition of its privileges
                  and through the free divisionand free
                  alienation of land.” (180)

Trade is not abolished by the abolition of trade
                  privilegesbut only then does it become
                  genuinely free trade, so also

with religion, “so religion
                  develops in itspracticaluniver-sality 
				  only where there is noprivilegedreligion (one callsto mind the North American
                  States).”

...“Precisely theslavery of bourgeois
                  societyis inap-pearancethe
                  greatestfreedom....” (181)

To the dissolution (Auflösung) (182) of thepoliticalexistence of religion (the
                  abolition of the state church),ofproperty(the abolition of the property
                  qualificationfor electors), etc.—corresponds
                  their “most vigorous life,which now obeys
                  its own laws undisturbed and developsinto its
                  full scope.”

Anarchyis the law of bourgeois society
                  emancipatedfrom privileges. (182-183)

“The ideas”—Marx quotes
                  Bauer—“which the FrenchRevolution gave
                  rise to did not, however, lead beyond theorderthat it wanted to abolish by
                  force.

“Ideascan never lead beyond an old
                  world order butonly beyond the ideas of the old
                  world order. Ideas cannotcarry anything
                  outat all. In order to carry out ideas menare needed who dispose of a certain practical
                  force.” (186)

The French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of communism(Babeuf), which, consistently developed, contained the ideaof a new  Weltzustand.[39]

In regard to Bauer’s statement that the state
                  must hold incheck the separate egotistic atoms,
                  Marx says (188-189) thatthe members of civil
                  society are, properly speaking, by nomeans
                  atoms, but only imagine themselves to be such, for
                  theyare not self-sufficient like atoms, but
                  depend on other persons,their needs continually
                  forcing this dependence upon them.

“Therefore, it isnatural necessity, essential humanproperties, however alienated they may seem to be, andinterestthat hold the members of civil society together;civil, notpoliticallife is theirrealtie.... Onlypoliticalsuperstitionstill imagines today that civil life must beheld together by the state, whereas in reality, on the contrary,the state is held together by civil life.” (189)

Robespierre, Saint-Just and their party fell
                  because theyconfused the ancient
                  realistically-democratic society, basedon
                  slavery, with the modern,
                  spiritualistically-democraticrepresentative
                  state, based on bourgeois society. Beforehis
                  execution Saint-Just pointed to the table
                  (Tabellea poster? hanging) of theRights of
                  Manand said: “C’estpourtant moi qui
                  ai fait cela.”[40]“This
                  very table proclaimedthe rights of a man who
                  cannot be the man of the ancientrepublic any
                  more than hiseconomic and industrialrelationsare those of theancient
                  times.” (192)

On the 18th Brumaire,[41]not the revolutionary movementbut the liberal bourgeoisie became the prey of Napoleon.After the fall of Robespierre, under the Directorate, theprosaic realisation of bourgeois society begins: Sturm

und Drang[42]of commercial enterprise, the whirl (Taumel)of the new bourgeois life; “realenlightenmentof thelandof France, the feudal structure of
                  which hadbeen smashed by the hammer of
                  revolution, and which thenumerous new owners in
                  their first feverish enthusiasm nowput under
                  all-round cultivation; the first movements ofan
                  industry that had become free—these are a few of the
                  signsof life of the newly arisen bourgeois
                  society.” (192-193)

CHAPTER VI. ABSOLUTE CRITICAL CRITICISM,OR CRITICAL CRITICISMIN THE PERSON OF HERR BRUNO

[[This chapter (subsection d in the third section of
                  Chap-ter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. Here
                  thereis absolutely no word by word criticism, but a completelypositive exposition. It isa short sketch of the historyof
				  French materialism. Here one ought to copy out
                  thewhole chapter, but I shall limit myself to a short
                  summaryof of the contents.]]

The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century andFrench materialism are not only a struggle against the
                  exist-ing political institutions, but equally an open struggle
                  againstthemetaphysicsof the seventeenth century,
                  namely,

against the metaphysics ofDescartes, Malebranch, Spin-oza and
                  Leibnitz. “Philosophy was opposed to
                  metaphys-ics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive
                  attack on Hegel,opposed sober philosophy to
                  drunken speculation.” (196)

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century,
                  defeated bythe materialism of the eighteenth
                  century, underwent a vic-torious and weighty
                  (gehaltvolle) restoration in German phi-losophy,
                  especially in speculative German philosophy of
                  thenineteenth century. Hegel linked it in a
                  masterly fashion withthe whole of metaphysics
                  and with German idealism, and hefounded ein
                  metaphysisches Universalreich.[43]This was fol-lowed again by an “attack on 
				  speculative metaphysics andmetaphysics in general. 
				  It will be defeated for ever by mater-ialism, which has 
				  now been perfected by the work of specu-lation itself and
                  coincides with humanism. Just as Feuerbachin
                  the theoretical field, French and English
                  socialism and co-mmunism in the practical field
                  represented materialism coin-ciding with
                  humanism.” (196-197)

There are two trends of French materialism: 1) from Des-cartes, 2) from Locke. The latter mündet direkt in den
                  Soc-ialismus.[44](197)

The former, mechanical materialism, turns into French
                  nat-ural science.

Descartesin his physics declares matter the only sub-stance. Mechanical French materialism takes over
                  Descartes’physics and rejects his
                  metaphysics.

“This school begins with the
                  physicianLe Roy, reaches itszenith
                  with the physicianCabanis, and the
                  physicianLamet-trieis its
                  centre.” (198)

Descartes was still living
                  whenLe Roytransferred themechanical
                  structure of animals to man and declared the
                  soulto bea modus of the body, and ideas
                  to be mechanicalmovements. (198)Le
                  Royeven thought that Descartes hadconcealed his real opinion. Descartes protested.

At the end of the eighteenth centuryCabanisperfectedCartesian
                  materialismin his bookRapports du
                  physiqueet du moral de l’homme.[45]

From the very outset the metaphysics of the
                  seventeenthcentury had its adversary in
                  materialism. Descartes—Gas-sendi, the
                  restorer of Epicurean materialism, in England—Hobbes.

Voltaire (199) pointed out that
                  the indifference of theFrenchmen of the
                  eighteenth century to the disputes of theJesuits and others was due less to philosophy that
                  toLaw’sfinancial speculations. The
                  theoretical movement towardsmaterialism is
                  explained by the practical Gestaltung[46]ofFrench life at that time. 
				  Materialistic theories correspondedto
                  materialistic practice.

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes,Leibnitz) was still linked with a positive (positivem)
                  content.It made discoveries in mathematics,
                  physics, etc. In theeighteenth century the
                  positive sciences became separatedfrom it and
                  metaphysics war fad geworden.[47]

In the year of Malebranche’s death, Helvétius and Cond-illac
				  were born. (199-200)

Pierre Bayle, through his weapon of scepticism,
                  theore-tically undermined seventeenth-century
                  metaphysics. He re-futed chiefly Spinoza and
                  Leibnitz. He proclaimed atheisticsociety. He
                  was, in the words of a French writer, “the
                  lastmetaphysician in the seventeenth-century sense
                  of the wordand the first philosopher in the
                  sense of the eighteenth cen-tury.” (200-201)

This negative refutation required a positive,
                  anti-meta-physical system. It was provided byLocke.

Materialism is the son of Great
                  Britain. Its scholasticDuns Scotushad
                  already raised the question: “ob dieMaterie nicht denken könne?”[48]He was a nominalist.Nominalism is in general the first
                  expression of material-ism.[49]

The real founder of English materialism wasBacon. (“Thefirst and most
                  important of the inherent qualities of matter ismotion, not only as mechanical and mathematical movement,but still more as impulse, vital
                  spirit, tension, or ... the throes(Qual) ... of
                  matter.”—202)

“InBacon, its
                  first creator, materialism has still concealedwithin it a naïve way the germs of all-round
                  development.Matter smiles at man as a whole
                  with poetical sensuousbrightness.”

In Hobbes, materialism becomesone-sided,
                  menschen-feindlich, mechanisch.[50]Hobbes systematised Bacon,
                  buthe did not develop (begründet) more deeply
                  Bacon’s fund-amental principle: the origin of
                  knowledge and ideas fromthe world of the senses
                  (Sinnenwelt).—P. 203.

Just asHobbesdid away with thetheisticprejudices
                  ofBacon’s materialism, so Collins, Dodwell,
                  Coward, Hartley,Priestley, etc., destroyed the
                  last theological bounds ofLocke’s
                  sensualism.[51]

Condillacdirected Locke’s sensualism against seven-teenth-century metaphysics; he published a refutation of
                  thesystems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz,
                  and Malebranche.

The French
                  “civilised” (205) the materialism of the
                  English.

InHelvétius(who also
                  derives from Locke), materialismwas given a
                  properly French character.

Lamettrieis
                  a combination of Cartesian and English
                  mat-erialism.

Robinethas the most
                  connection with metaphysics.

“Just asCartesianmaterialism passes intonatural sci-ence proper, the other trend
                  of French materialism flowsdirectly intosocialismandcommunism.”
                  (206)

Nothing is easier than to derive socialism
                  from the premis-es of materialism
                  (reconstruction of the world of the
                  senses—linking private and public
                  interests—destroying the Geburts-stätten[52]of crime, etc.).

Fourierproceeds immediately from the
                  teaching of theFrench materialists. TheBabouvists[53]were crude, immaturematerialists. Bentham based his system on the
                  morality ofHelvétius, whileOwentakes
                  Bentham’s system as his starting-point for
                  founding English communism.Cabetbrought com-munist ideas from England into France
                  (populärste wenn auchflachste[54]representative of communism) 208.
				   The “morescientific” areDézamy,Gay, etc., who
                  developed the teach-ing of materialism asreal humanism.

On pp. 209-211 Marx
                  gives in a note (two pages of smallprint)extractsfromHelvétius,HolbachandBentham, in or-der
                  to prove the connection of thematerialismof the eight-eenth century withEnglishandFrench communismof thenineteenth century.

Of the subsequent sections the
                  following passage is worthnoting:

“The dispute betweenStraussandBaueroverSubstanceandSelf-Consciousnessis a disputewithin
                  Hegelianspeculation. In Hegel there arethreeelements:Spinoza’sSubstance,Fichte’s Self-Consciousness,
                  andHegel’sne-cessary and contradictoryunityof the two, theAbsoluteSpirit. The first element is metaphysically
                  disguisednatureinseparationfrom man; the second is metaphysically disguisedspiritin separation from nature;
                  the third is the metaphysical-ly disguisedunityof both,real manand
                  the realhumanrace” (220), and
                  the paragraph with its assessment of Feuer-bach:

“In the domain of theology,Straussquite consistentlyexpoundedHegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and
                  Bauerdid the same fromFichte’s point of
                  view. BothcriticisedHegel
                  insofar as with him each of the two elements wasfalsifiedby the other, while they carried
                  each of the elementsto itsone-sidedand hence consistent development.—Bothof them
                  therefore gobeyondHegel in their
                  Criticism, butboth of them also remain withinthe frameworkof his specu-lation and
                  each represents onlyoneside of his
                  system.Feuer-

bachwas the first to bring
                  to completion and criticiseHegelfrom
                  Hegel’s point of view, by resolving the
                  metaphysicalAbsoluteSpirit into
                  ‘real man on the basis of nature,’ andthe first to bring to completion theCriticism
                  of religionbysketching in a masterly
                  manner the general basic featuresof theCriticism of Hegel’s speculationand hence
                  ofeverykind of metaphysics.”
                  (220-221)

Marx ridicules Bauer’s “theory of
                  self-consciousness” onaccount of its
                  idealism (the sophisms of absolute idealism—222),
				  points out that this is a periphrasing of
                  Hegel, andquotes the latter’sPhenomenologyandFeuerbach’scriti-cal remarks (fromPhilosophie der
                  Zukunft,[55]p. 35, thatphilosophy
                  negates—negiert — the “materially
                  sensuous,”just as theology negates
                  “nature tainted by original sin”).

The following chapter (VII) again begins with a
                  series ofhighly boring, caviling criticisms[1). Pp. 228-235]. Insection2athere
                  is an interesting passage.

Marx quotes from theLiterary Gazettethe letter of a
                  “re-presentative of the Mass,” who calls
                  for the study of reality, ofnatural science and
                  industry (236), and who on that accountwas
                  reviled by “criticism”:

“Or”(!), exclaimed “the
                  critics” against this representa-tive of
                  the Mass,—“do you think that the knowledge of
                  his-torical reality is already complete? Or (!)
                  do you know

of any single period in history
                  which is actually known?”

“Or does Critical Criticism”—Marx
                  replies—“believe thatit has reached even
                  thebeginningof a knowledge of
                  histori-cal reality so long as it excludesfromthe historical move-ment the
                  theoretical and practical relation of man to na-ture, 
				  natural science and industry? Or does it think
                  that itactually knows any period without
                  knowing, for example,the industry of that
                  period, the immediate mode of pro-duction of
                  life itself? True, spiritualistic,theologicalCrit-ical Criticism only
                  knows (at least it imagines it knows)the major
                  political, literary and theological acts of his-tory. 
				  Just as it separates thinking from the senses,
                  thesoul from the body and itself from the
                  world, it separateshistory from natural science
                  and industry and sees the originof history not
                  in vulgarmaterialproduction on the
                  earthbut in vaporous clouds in the
                  heavens.” (238)

Criticism dubbed this representative of the mass
                  amas-senhafter Materialist.[56](239)

“The criticism of the French and the English is not
                  an abs-tract, preternatural personality outside
                  mankind; it is therealhuman activityof individuals who are active members ofsociety
                  and who as human beings suffer, feel, think and
                  act.That is why their criticism is a the same
                  time practical, theircommunism a socialism in which
                  they give practical, tangiblemeasures, and in
                  which they do not only think but even moreact;
                  it is the living real criticism of existing
                  society, the discov-ery of the causes of
                  ‘decay’.” (244)

[[The whole of Chapter VII
                  (228-257), apart from the pas-sages quoted above,
                  consists only of the most incredible capti-ous
                  criticisms and mockery, noting contradictions of
                  the mostpetty character, and ridiculing each and
                  every stupidity in theLiterary
                  Gazette, etc.]]

In Chapter VIII (258-333)
                  we have a section on the “Crit-ical
                  Transformation of a Butcher into a
                  Dog”—and further onE u g è n e 
                   S u e ’ sFleur de
                  Marie[57](evidently anovel with
                  this title or the heroine of some novel or
                  other) withcertain “radical“ but
                  uninteresting observations by Marx. Worthmentioning perhaps are only
                  p.2 8 5Ⅹ— againstEugèneSue’sdefence of the prison cell system
                  (Cellularsystem).

“The mystery of this” (305)
                  (there was a quotation fromAnekdota[58]above) “courage of
                  Bauer’s isHegel’s Phenom-enology.
				  Since Hegel here puts self-consciousness in theplace of man,
				  the mostvariedhuman reality appears onlyas adefiniteform, as adetermination of
                  self-consciousness.But a mere
                  determination of self-consciousness is a
                  ‘purecategory,’ a
				  mere ‘thought’ which
                  I can consequently alsotranscend in ‘pure’
                  thought and overcome through pure

thought. In Hegel’sPhenomenologythematerial,sensuous,objectivebases of
                  the various alienated forms of humanself-consciousnessare leftas they
                  are. The whole destructivework results in the
                  mostconservative philosophy[sic!]because it thinks it has overcome
                  theobjective world, thesensuously real
                  world, by merely transforming it into

a ‘thing of thought,’ a meredetermination of self-con-sciousness,
                  and can therefore dissolve its opponent, whichhas becomeethereal, in the ‘ether
                  of pure thought.’ ThePhenomenologyis therefore quite consistent in ending
                  by re-placing all human reality by ‘Absolute
                  Knowledge’ —Knowledge, because
                  this is the only mode of existence ofself-consciousness, and because
                  self-consciousness is con-sidered as the only
                  mode of existence of man;—AbsoluteKnowledge for the very reason that
                  self-consciousness knowsonly itself and is no
                  more disturbed by any objective world.Hegel
                  makes manthe man of self-consciousnessinsteadof making self-consciousness theself-consciousness of man,of the real
                  man, and therefore of man living also in a real
                  objec-tive world and determined by that world. He
                  stands the worldon its headand can
                  thereforein his headdissolve all
                  limita-tions, which nevertheless, of course,
                  remain in existence fore-vil
                  sensuousness, forrealman. Moreover,
                  everything whichbetrays thelimitations of
                  general self-consciousness— allsensuousness, reality, individuality of men and of
                  their world—is neccessarily held by him to be a
                  limit. The whole of thePhe-nomenologyis intended to prove thatself-consciousnessis theonly realityandall reality....” (306)

...“Finally, it goes without saying that if
                  Hegel’sPhe-nomenology, in spite of
                  its speculative original sin, givesin many
                  instances the elements of a true description of
                  hu-man relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the
                  other hand,provide only an empty
                  caricature....” (307)

“Thereby Rudolph unconsciously revealed the
                  mystery,long ago exposed, that human misery
                  itself, the infinite ab-jectness which is obliged
                  to receive alms, has to serve asaplaythingto the aristocracy of money and
                  education tosatisfy their self-love, tickle
                  their arrogance and amusethem.

“The
                  numerous charitable associations in Germany, thenumerous charitable societies in France and the
                  great num-ber of charitable quixotic societies
                  in England, the concerts,balls, plays, meals
                  for the poor and even public subscriptionsfor
                  victims of accidents have no other
                  meaning.” (309-310)

And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:

“Ah, Madame, it is not enough to
                  have danced for the be-nefit of these poor
                  Poles.... Let us be philanthropic to theend.... Let us havesuppernowfor the
                  benefit of thepoor!”[60](310)

On pp. 312-313 quotationsf r o m 
                   F o u r i e r(adultery is good tone, infanticide by the
                  victims of seduction— a vicious
                  circle.... “The degree of emancipation of
                  womanis the natural measure of general
                  emancipation....” (312) Civ-ilisation
                  converts every vice from a simple into a complex, am-biguous, hypocritical form), and Marx adds:

“It is superfluous to contrast to Rudolph’s
                  thoughtsFourier’s masterly characterisation ofmarriage[61]or the

works of the materialist section of
				  French communism.” (313)

P. 313 u. ff., against thepolitical-economicprojects ofEugène SueandRudolph(presumably
                  the hero of Sue’snovel?), projects for the
                  association of rich and poor, andthe organisation of labour
				  (which the state ought to do),etc.—e.g., also theArmenbank[62][7)—b) “The bank forthe Poor” pp. 314-318]= 
				  interest-free loans to the unem-ployed. Marx takes thef i g u r e sof the project andexposes their meagreness in relation to need.
				  And the ideaof an Armenbank, says Marx, is no better than 
				  Sparkas-sen[63]..., 
				  i.e., die Einrichtung[64]of the bank “rests on
                  thedelusion that only a differentdistributionof wages
				  is neededfor the workers to be able to live through the whole
                  year.”(316-317)

Section c) “Model Farm at Bouqueval”
                  318-320, Ru-dolph’s project for a model farm,
                  which was praised by“Criticism,” is
                  subjected to devastating criticism: Marx
                  de-clares it to be a utopian project, for on the
                  average oneFrenchman gets only a quarter of a
                  pound of meat per day,only 93 francs in annual
                  income, etc.; in the project theyworktwice
                  as muchas before, etc., etc. 
				  ((Not interesting.))

320: “The miraculous means by which Rudolph
				  accomp-lishes all his redemptions and
                  marvellous cures is not his finewords but hisready money. That is what the moralists
				  arelike, says Fourier. One must be a
                  millionaire to be able toimitate their heroes.

“Morality is ‘Impuissance mise en 
				  action.’[65]Every timeit fights a vice it is defeated. And Rudolph does 
				  not even riseto the standpoint of independent morality based
                  at least onthe consciousness ofhuman
                  dignity. On the contrary, hismorality is
                  based on the consciousness of human weakness.He representstheological morality.” (320-321)

...“As inreality alldifferences boil down
				  more and moreto the difference betweenpoorandrich, so in theideadoallaristocratic differences become
                  resolved into the opposi-tion betweengoodandevil. This distinction is
                  the last formthat the aristocrat gives to his
                  prejudices....” (323-324)

...“Every movement of his soul is of infinite
				  importance toRudolph. That is why he constantly observes and
                  appraisesthem....” (Examples.)
                  “This great lord is like the members of‘Young England,’ who also wish to
                  reform the world, toperform noble deeds, and
                  are subject to similar hystericalfits....” (326)

Has  not  Marx  in  mind  here  theEnglish  Tory  philanthropists  whopassed  the  Ten  Hours’  Bill?[66]

[1]The Holy Family, or
                  Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer
                  and Co.—the first joint work ofKarl MarxandFrederick Engels. It was written between September
                  and November 1844 and was published in February 1845
                  in Frankfort-on-Main.

“The Holy Family” is a mocking
                  reference to theBauer brothersand their followers
                  grouped around theAllgemeine Literatur-Zeitung(General Literary Gazette). While
                  attacking the Bauers and the otherYoung Hegelians(or Left Hegelians), Marx and Engels at the same
                  time criticised theidealistphilosophy of
                  Hegel.

Marx sharply disagreed with the Young Hegelians
                  as early as the summer of 1842, when the club of
                  “The Free” was formed in Berlin.  Upon
                  becoming editor of theRheinische Zeitung(Rhine Gazette)in October 1842, Marx
                  opposed the efforts of several Young Hegelian staff
                  members from Berlin to publish inane and pretentious
                  articles emanating from the club of “The
                  Free,” which had lost touch with reality and
                  was absorbed in abstract philosophical
                  disputes. During the two years following Marx’s
                  break with “The Free,” the theoretical and
                  political differences between Marx and Engels on the
                  one hand and the Young Hegelians on the other became
                  deep-rooted and irreconcilable. This was not only
                  due to the fact that Marx and Engels had gone over
                  from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary
                  democratism to communism, but also due to the
                  evolution undergone by the Bauer brothers and
                  persons of like mind during this time. In theAllgemeine Literatur-Zeitung,Bauer and his
                  group denounced “1842 radicalism” and its
                  most outstanding proponent—theRheinische
                  Zeitung. They slithered into vulgar subjective
                  idealism of the vilest kind—propagation of a
                  “theory” according to which only select
                  individuals, bearers of the “spirit,” of
                  “pure criticism,” are the makers of
                  history, while the masses, the people, serve as
                  inert material or ballast in the historical
                  process.

Marx and Engels decided to devote their first
                  joint work to the exposure of these pernicious,reactionaryideas and to the defence of their newmaterialistandcommunistoutlook.

During a ten-day stay of Engels in Paris the plan
                  of the book (at first entitledCritique of
                  Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.)was drafted, responsibility for the various
                  chapters apportioned between the authors, and the
                  “Preface” written.  Engels wrote his
                  chapters while still in Paris. Marx, who was
                  responsible for a larger part of the book, continued
                  to work on it until the end of November
                  1844. Moreover, he considerably increased the
                  initially conceived size of the book by
                  incorporating in his chapters parts of his economic
                  and philosophical manuscripts on which he had worked
                  during the spring and summer of 1844, his historical
                  studies of the bourgeoisFrench Revolutionat the
                  end of the 18th century, and a number of his
                  excerpts and conspectuses. While the book was in the
                  process of being printed, Marx added the wordsThe Holy Familyto the title. By using a
                  small format, the book exceeded 20 printer’s sheets
                  and was thus exempted from preliminary censorship
                  according to the prevailing regulations in a number
                  of German states.

[2]Engels, F. und Marx, K.,Die heilige Familie, 
				  oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik, Frankfurt a. M., 1845.—Ed.

[3]Allgemeine
                  Literatur-Zeitung(General Literary
                  Gazette)—a German monthly published in
                  Charlottenburg from December 1843 to October 1844 by
                  Bruno Bauer, the Young Hegelian.

[4]pedantic
                  thoroughness—Ed.

[5]und folgende bis—and
                  following up to—Ed.

[6]formula and
                  significance—Ed.

[7]justice—Ed.

[8]juridical
                  practice—Ed.

[9]characterising translation
                  No. I, II, etc.—Ed.

[10]critical gloss No. I,
                  etc.—Ed.

[11]Umrisse zu einer Kritik
                  der Nationalökonomie(Outlines of a
                  Critique of Political Economy)was first
                  published by Engels at the beginning of 1844 inDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher(Franco-German Annals)—see Marx,Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
                  1844. Moscow, 1959, pp. 175-209.

[12]Deutsch-Französische
                  Jahrbücher(Franco-German Annals)—a
                  magazine published in German in Paris and edited by
                  Karl Marx andArnold Ruge. The only issue to appear
                  was a double number published in February 1844. It
                  included Marx’s articles“A Critique of the
                  Hegelian Philosophy of Law (Introduction)”and“On the Jewish Question,”and also Engels’
                  articles“Outlines of a Critique of Political
                  Economy”and“The Position of
                  England.Thomas Carlyle.‘Past and Present’.”
                  These works mark the final transition of Marx and
                  Engels tomaterialismandcommunism. Publication of
                  the magazine was discontinued chiefly as a result of
                  the basic differences between Marx’s views and the
                  bourgeois-radical views of Ruge.

[13]party—Ed.

[14]This refers toProudhon’swork of 1840Qu’est-ce que la propriété ou
                  Recherches sur le principe du droit et du
                  gouvernement(What Is Property? or Studies
                  on the Principle of Law and Government).  Marx
                  presents a critique of this work in a letter to
                  Schweitzer dated January 24, 1865 (see Marx and
                  Engels,Selected Correspondence,Moscow,1955,pp. 185-192).

[15]Marx is quoting
                  Edgar.

[16]if the word may be
                  allowed—Ed.

[17]“blacksmith”—Ed.

[18]“if the rich only
                  knew it!”—Ed.

[19]debasing of
                  sensuousness—Ed.

[20]This refers to Eugène Sue’s
                  novelLes mystères de Paris(Mysteries
                  of Paris), which was written in the
                  spirit ofpetty-bourgeoissentimentality. It was
                  published in Paris in 1842-43 and very popular in
                  France and abroad.

[21]a
                  student—Ed.

[22]worker—Ed.

[23]“from the
                  outset”—Ed.

[24]Marx is referring here to
                  articles by Jules Faucher entitledEnglische
                  Tagesfragen(Topical Questions in
                  England), which were published in
                  Nos. VII and VIII (June and July 1844) of theAllgemeine Literatur-Zeitung.

[25]at the
                  end—Ed.

[26]spirit—Ed.

[27]mass—Ed.

[28]Loustallot’s journal of
                  1789—a weekly publication entitledRévolutions de Paris(Parisian
                  Revolutions), which appeared in Paris from July
                  1789 to February 1794. Until September 1790 it was
                  edited by Elisée Loustallot, a revolutionary
                  publicist.

[29]The great only seem
                  great to usBecause we are on our knees.Let us rise!—Ed.

[30]Phänomenologie des
                  Geistes(Phenomenology of Mind)
				   byG. W. F. Hegelwas first published in
                  1807. In working onThe Holy Family,Marx
                  made use of Vol. II of the second edition of Hegel’s
                  works (Berlin, 1841). He called this first large
                  work of Hegel, in which the latter’s philosophical
                  system was elaborated, “the source and secret
                  of Hegel’s philosophy.”

[31]Doctrinaires—members of a bourgeois
                  political grouping in France during the period of
                  the Restoration (1815-30). As constitutional
                  monarchists and rabid enemies of the democratic and
                  revolutionary movement, they aimed to create in
                  France a bloc of the bourgeoisie and landed
                  aristocracy after the English fashion. The most
                  celebrated of the Doctrinaires wereGuizot, a
                  historian, and Royer-Collard, a philosopher. Their
                  views constituted a reaction in the field of
                  philosophy against the French materialism of the
                  18th century and the democratic ideas of the French
                  bourgeois revolution (seeHoly Familych.VI 3. d.).

[32]after the
                  event—Ed.

[33]The refutation of the
                  views expounded by Bruno Bauer in his bookDie
                  Judenfrage(The Jewish Question),
                  Braunschweig, 1843, was made by Marx in an article
                  entitled “Zur Judenfrage” (“On the
                  Jewish Question”), published in 1844 inDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.

[34]“in commercial and
                  industrial practice”—Ed.

[35]“is the perfected
                  practice of the Christian world
                  itself”—Ed.

[36]the universal rights of
                  man—Ed.

[37]The Universal Rights
                  of Man—the principles enunciated in the“Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
                  Citizen”and proclaimed during the time of the
                  French bourgeois revolution of 1789-93.

[38]does not conceive the
                  general contradiction of constitutionalism—Ed.

[39]world
                  order—Ed.

[40]“Yet it was I who
                  made that.”—Ed.

[41]The18th Brumaire(9 November 1799)—the day of the coup d’état of
                  Napoleon Bonaparte, who overthrew the Directorate
                  and established his own dictatorship.

[42]Storm and
                  stress—Ed.

[43]a metaphysical universal
         		  kingdom—Ed.

[44]flows directly into
         		  socialism—Ed.

[45]Cartesian
         		  materialism—the materialism of the followers ofDescartes(from the Latin spelling of
         		  Descartes—Cartesius).The indicated
         		  book—Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme(Relation of the Physical to the Spiritual in
         		  Man) by P. J. G. Cabanis—was published in Paris in
         		  1802.

[46]mould—Ed.

[47]became insipid—Ed.

[48]“whether matter can
         		  think?”—Ed.

[49]Nominalism—the trend in
         		  medieval philosophy that considered general concepts as
         		  merely the names of single objects in contrast to medieval
         		  “realism,” which recognised the existence of
         		  general concepts or ideas independent of things.

Nominalism recognised objects as primary and
         		  concepts as secondary. Thus, as Marx says inThe Holy
         		  Family, nominalism represents the first expression of
         		  materialism in the Middle Ages (see Marx and Engels,The
         		  Holy Family,Moscow, 1956, p. 172).

[50]misanthropic,
         		  mechanical—Ed.

[51]Sensualism—the
         		  philosophical doctrine that recognises sensation as the sole
         		  source of cognition.

[52]sources—Ed.

[53]Babouvists—adherents ofGracchus Babeuf, 
				  who in 1796 led a utopian communist movement
         		  of “equals” in France.

[54]the most popular, though most
         		  superficial—Ed.

[55]Lenin is referring to Feuerbach’sGrundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft(Principles
				  of the Philosophy of the Future),1843, which constitutes a continuation of the latter’s
         		  aphorismsVorläufige Thesen zu einer Reform der
         		  Philosophie(Preliminary Theses on the Reform of
         		  Philosophy), 1842, in which the author expounds the
         		  basis of his materialist philosophy and criticises Hegel’s
         		  idealist philosophy.

[56]mass materialist—Ed.

[57]Fleur de Marie—heroine
         		  of Eugène Sue’s novelMysteries of Paris.

[58]Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen
         		  Philosophie und Publizistik. Von Bruno Bauer, Ludwig
         		  Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk, Arnold Ruge und
         		  einigen Ungenannten(Unpublished Recent German
         		  Philosophical and Other Writings of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig
         		  Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk, Arnold Ruge and
         		  Several Anonymous Writers)—a collection of articles
         		  that were banned for publication in German magazines. It was
         		  published in 1843 in Zurich by Ruge and included Marx as one
         		  of its contributors.

[59]the law of the talion—an
         		  eye for an eye—Ed.

[60]criminal justice and justice for
         		  virtue!—Ed.

[61]plaything—Ed.

[62]bank for the poor—Ed.

[63]savings-banks—Ed.

[64]the institution—Ed.

[65]“impotence in
         		  action”—Ed.

[66]Tory philanthropists—a
         		  literary-political group—“Young England.”

This group was formed in the early 1840s and
         		  belonged to the Tory Party. It voiced the dissatisfaction of
         		  the landed aristocracy with the increased economic and
         		  political might of the bourgeoisie, and resorted to demagogic
         		  methods to bring the working class under its influence and
         		  use it in its fight against the bourgeoisie.

“In order to arouse sympathy,”
         		  Marx and Engels wrote in theManifesto of the Communist
         		  Party,“the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight,
         		  apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their
         		  indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the
         		  exploited working class alone.”

Ten Hours’ Bill—a law on the
         		  l0-hour working day for women and juveniles, adopted by the
         		  English Parliament in 1847.

Ⅹ“According to Hegel, the criminal in his
                  punishment passes sentence on
                  himself.Gansdeveloped this theory at
                  greater length. InHegelthis is thespeculative disguiseof the oldjus
                  talionis[59]thatKantexpounded as theonly juridicalpenal
                  theory. For Hegel, self-judgment of the criminal
                  remains a mere ‘Idea,’ a mere speculative
                  interpretation of thecurrent empirical
                  penal code. He thus leaves the mode of
                  application to the respective stages of development of the
				  state, i.e., he leaves punishment just
                  as it is. Precisely in that does he show himself
                  more critical than this Critical echoer. Apenaltheory that at the same time sees
                  in the criminal themancan do so only inabstraction,
				  in imagination, precisely
                  becausepunishment,coercion,
                  is contrary tohumanconduct. Besides, the
                  practical realisation of such a theory would
                  be impossible. Pure subjective arbitrariness
                  would replace abstract law because in each case
                  it would depend on official ‘honest and decent’
                  men to adapt the penalty to the individuality of the
                  criminal. Plato long ago had the insight to
                  see that thelawmust be one-sided and
                  mustmake abstractionof the individual.
				  On the other hand, underhumanconditions punishment willreallybe
                  nothing but the sentence passed by the culprit
                  on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade
                  him thatviolence from without, exerted on
                  him by others, is violence exerted on himself by
                  himself. On the contrary, he will see inothermen his natural saviours from the
                  sentence which he has pronounced on himself;
                  in other words, the relation will be exactly
                  reversed.” (285-286)