**Source: PSS vol. 29**

from formal logic, taking them as given; their deduction ought to have been a depiction of the transition of this simple unity of self-consciousness into such determinations and distinctions of it; but Kant spared himself the labor of pointing to this genuinely synthetic forward movement of the concept producing itself (282) [255].

Kant did not show the transition of categories into one another.

286-287 [259-260] — Returning once more to higher mathematics (disclosing, incidentally, familiarity with how Gauss solved the equation X
"mathematics... to this day has not been in a position to justify by its own powers, i.e., mathematically, those operations which are based on this transition" (transition from certain magnitudes to certain magnitudes), "since this transition is not of a mathematical nature."

Leibniz — to whom the honor of discovering differential calculus is attributed — produced this transition "in the most inadmissible, equally completely foreign to the concept as to the non-mathematical manner"... (287) [259-260].

"Analytic knowledge is the first premise of all inference — the immediate relation of the concept to the object; identity is therefore the determinateness which knowledge recognizes as its own, and this knowledge is merely the grasping of what is. Synthetic knowledge strives toward understanding what is, i.e., toward the comprehension of the manifold of determinations in its unity. It is therefore the second premise of the inference, in which the different as such proves to be correlated. Its aim therefore is necessity in general" (288) [260-261].

With regard to the procedure of certain sciences (for example, physics) of taking various "forces" etc. for "explanation" and fitting (forcing), adapting facts etc., Hegel makes the following clever remark:

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V. I. LENIN

"The so-called explanation and proof of the concrete material introduced into theorems proves to be partly tautology, partly a distortion of the true state of affairs; partly moreover this distortion served to conceal the deception of knowledge, which one-sidedly selected experiments, whereby it could only obtain its simple definitions and principles; and the objection drawn from experience, it eliminates by understanding and interpreting experience not in its concrete totality, but as an example, and moreover from the side favorable to hypotheses and theories. In this subordination of concrete experience to presupposed determinations the basis of the theory is obscured and is shown only from the side confirming the theory" (315-316) [285-286].

The old metaphysics for example, Wolff's example: absurd pompous pretension with banalities etc.

Kant showed that "strict proofs" lead to antinomies.

"but concerning the very nature of this proof, which is bound up with some finite content, he" (Kant) "did not reflect; meanwhile one must fall together with the other" (317) [287].

Synthetic knowledge is not yet complete, because "the concept does not become unity with itself in its object or in its reality... Therefore the idea does not yet attain truth in this knowledge owing to the disparity of the object with the subjective concept. — But the sphere of necessity is the highest pinnacle of being and reflection; it of itself transitions into

**remarkably correct and profound** cf. the political economy of the bourgeoisie against subjectivism and one-sidedness
i.e., Kant did not understand the universal law of dialectics of the "finite"?

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