Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

(THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)

P. Little Annoyances Should Not Stand in the Way of a Big
    Pleasure

The League’s rejection of the resolution declaring that its
      Rules must be endorsed by the Central Committee (League Minutes,
      p. 105) was, as the Party Congress majority at once unanimously
      noted, a “crying violation of the Party Rules”.
      Regarded as the act of men of principle, this violation was
      sheer anarchism; while in the atmosphere of the post-Congress
      struggle, it inevitably created the impression that the Party
      minority were trying to “settlescores” with the Party majority
      (League Minutes, p. 112); it meant that they did not wish to
      obey the Party or to remain within the Party. And when the
      League refused to adopt a resolution on the Central Committee
      statement calling for changes in its Rules (pp. 124-25), it
      inevitably followed that this assembly, which wanted tobe
      countedan assembly of a Party organisation but at the same
      time not to obey the Party’s central institution, had to be
      pronouncedunlawful. Accordingly, the followers of the
      Party majority at once withdrew from this quasi-Party assembly,
      so as not to have any share in an indecent farce.

The individualism of the intellectual, with its platonic
      acceptance of organisational relations, which was revealed in
      the lack of steadfastness over Paragraph 1 of the Rules thus in
      practice reached the logical end I had predicted even in
      September, that is, a month and a half before, namely, the point
      ofdisruptingthe Party organisation. And at that
      moment, on the evening of the day the League Congress ended,
      Comrade Plekhanov announced to his colleagues on both the
      Party’s central institutions that he could not bear to “fire on
      his comrades”, that “rather than have a split, it is better to
      put a bullet in one’s brain”, and that, to avert a greater evil,
      it was necessary to make the maximum personal concessions, over
      which, in point of fact (much more than over the principles to
      be discerned in the incorrect position on Paragraph 1), this
      destructive struggle was being waged. In order to give a more
      accurate characterisation of Comrade Plekhanov’s
      right-about-face, which has acquired a certain general Party
      significance, I consider it advisable to rely not on private
      conversations, nor on private letters (that last resort in
      extremity), but on Plekhanov’s own statement of the case to the
      whole Party, namely, his article “What Should Not Be Done” in
      No. 52 ofIskra, which was written just after the
      League Congress, after I had resigned from the editorial board
      of the Central Organ (November 1, 1903), and before the
      co-optation of the Martovites (November 26, 1903).

The fundamental idea of “What Should Not Be Done” is that in
      politics one must not be too stiff-necked, too harsh and
      unyielding; that it is sometimes necessary, to avoid a split, to
      yield even to revisionists (among those movingtowards us or
      among the inconsistents) and to anarchistic individualists. It
      was only natural that these abstract generalities should arouse
      universal perplexity amongIskrareaders. One cannot
      help laughing when reading the proud and majestic statements of
      Comrade Plekhanov (in subsequent articles) that he had not been
      understood because of the novelty of his ideas and because
      people lacked a knowledge of dialectics. In reality, “What
      Should Not Be Done” could only be understood, at the time it was
      written, by some dozen people living in two Geneva suburbs whose
      names both begin with the same

      letter.[8]Comrade Plekhanov’s
      misfortune was that he put into circulation among some ten
      thousand readers an agglomeration of hints, reproaches,
      algebraical symbols, and riddles which were intended only for
      these dozen or so people who had taken part in all the
      developments of the post-Congress struggle with the
      minority. This misfortune befell Comrade Plekhanov because he
      violated a basic principle of that dialectics to which he so
      unluckily referred, namely, that there is no abstract truth,
      that truth is always concrete. That is why it was out of place
      to lend an abstract form to the perfectly concrete idea of
      yielding to the Martovites after the League Congress.

Yielding—which Comrade Plekhanov advocated as a new
      war-cry—is legitimate and essential in two cases: when the
      yielder is convinced that those who are striving to make him
      yield are in the right (in which case, honest political leaders
      frankly and openly admit their mistake), or when an irrational
      and harmful demand is yielded to in order to avert a greater
      evil. It is perfectly clear from the article in question that it
      is the latter case the author has in mind: he speaks plainly of
      yielding to revisionists and anarchistic individualists (that
      is, to the Martovites, as every Party member now knows from the
      League Minutes), and says that it is essential in order to avert
      a split. As we see, Comrade Plekhanov’s supposedly novel idea
      amounts to no more than the not very novel piece of commonplace
      wisdom that little annoyances should not be allowed to stand in
      the way of a big pleasure, that a little opportunist folly and a
      little anarchistic talk is better than a big Party split. When
      Comrade Plekhanov wrote this article he clearly realised that
      the minority representedthe opportunist wing of our Party and
      that they were fighting with anarchistic weapons. Comrade
      Plekhanov came forward with the plan to combat this minority by
      means of personal concessions, just as (againsi licet parva
      componere magnis)the German Social-Democrats combated
      Bernstein. Bebel publicly declared at congresses of his Party
      that he did not know anyone who was so susceptible to the
      influence of environment as Comrade Bernstein (not
      Mr. Bernstein, as Comrade Plekhanov was once so fond of calling
      him, but Comrade Bernstein): let us take him into our
      environment, let us make him a member of the Reichstag, let us
      combat revisionism, not by inappropriate harshness(à
      laSobakevich-Parvus) towards the revisionist, but by
      “killing him with kindness”—as Comrade M. Beer, I recall,
      put it at a meeting of English Social-Democrats when defending
      German conciliatoriness, peaceableness, mildness, flexibility,
      and caution against the attack of the English
      Sobakevich—Hyndman. And in just the same way, Comrade
      Plekhanov wanted to “kill with kindness” the little anarchism
      and the little opportunism of Comrades Axelrod and Martov. True
      while hinting quite plainly at the “anarchistic individualists”,
      Comrade Plekhanov expressed himself in a deliberately vague way
      about the revisionists; he did so in a manner to create the
      impression that he was referring to theRabocheye
      Dyelo-ists, who were swinging from opportunism towards
      orthodoxy, and not to Axelrod and Martov, who had begun to swingfrom orthodoxy towards revisionism. But this was only
      an innocent military

ruse,[1][1]There was never any question after the Party Congress of making
      concessions to Comrades Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère. I
      am not aware that they too demanded “co-optation”. I even doubt
      whether Comrade Starover or Comrade Martov consulted Comrade
      Brouckère when they sent us their epistles and “notes”? in
      the name of “half the Party”. . . . At the League Congress
      Comrade Martov rejected, with the profound indignation of an
      unbending political stalwart the very idea of a “union with
      Ryazanov or Martynov”, of the possibility of a “deal” with them,
      or even of joint “service to the Party” (as an editor; League
      Minutes, p. 53). At the League Congress Comrade Martov sternly
      condemned “Martynov tendencies” (p. 88), and when Comrade

      Orthodox[11]subtly hinted that Axelrod and Martov no doubt
      “consider that Comrades Akimov, Martynov, and others also have
      the right to get together, draw up Rules for themselves, and act
      in accordance with them as they see fit” (p. 99), the Martovites
      deniedit, as Peter denied Christ (p. 100: “Comrade Orthodox’s
      fears” “regarding the Akimovs, Martynovs, etc.”, “have no
      foundation”).
    —Lenina feeble bulwarkthat was incapable of
      withstanding the artillery fire of Party publicity.

And anyone who acquaints himself with the actual state of
      affairs at the political juncture we are describing, anyone who
      gains an insight into Comrade Plekhanov’s mentality, will
      realise that I could not have acted in this instance otherwise
      than I did. I say this for the benefit of those supporters of
      the majority who have reproached me for surrendering the
      editorial board. When Comrade Plekhanov swung round after the
      League Congress and from being a supporter of the majority
      became a supporter of reconciliation at all costs, I was obliged
      to put the very best interpretation on it. Perhaps Comrade
      Plekhanov wanted in his article to put forward a programme for
      an amicable and honest peace? Any such programme boils down to a
      sincere admission of mistakes by both sides. What was the
      mistake Comrade Plekhanov laid at the door of the majority? An
      inappropriate, Sobakevich-like, harshness towards the
      revisionists. We do not know what Comrade Plekhanov had in mind
      by that: his witticism about the asses, or his extremely
      incautious—in Axelrod’s presence—reference to
      anarchism and opportunism. Comrade Plekhanov preferred to
      express himself “abstractly”, and, moreover, with a hint at the
      other fellow. That is a matter of taste, of course. But, after
      all, I had admitted my personal harshness openly both in the
      letter to theIskra-ist and at the League Congress. How
      then could I refuse to admit that the majority were guilty of
      such a “mistake”? As to the minority, Comrade Plekhanov pointed
      to their mistake quite clearly, namely, revisionism (cf. his
      remarks about opportunism at the Party Congress and about
      Jauresism at the League Congress) and anarchism which had led to
      the verge of a split. Could I obstruct an attempt to secure an
      acknowledgement of these mistakes and undo their harm by means
      of personal concessions and “kindness” in general? Could I
      obstruct such an attempt when Comrade Plekhanov in “What Should
      Not Be Done” directly appealed to us to "spare the
      adversaries" among the revisionists who were revisionists
      “only because of a certain inconsistency”? And if I did not
      believein this attempt, could I do otherwise than make a
      personal concession regarding the Central Organ and move over to
      the Central Committee in order to defend the position of the

      majority?[2][2]Comrade Martov put it very aptly when he said that I had moved
      overavec armes et bagages.Comrade Martov is very fond
      of military metaphors: campaign against the League, engagement,
      incurable wounds, etc., etc. To tell the truth, I too have a
      great weakness for military metaphors especially just now, when
      one follows the news from the Pacific with such eager
      interest. But, Comrade Martov, if we are to use military
      language, the story goes like this. We capture two forts at the
      Party Congress. You attack them at the League Congress. After
      the first brief interchange of shots, my colleague, the
      commandant of one of the forts, opens the gates to the
      enemy. Naturally, I gather together the little artillery I have
      and move into the other fort, which is practically unfortified,
      in order to “stand siege” against the enemy’s overwhelming
      numbers. I even make an offer of peace for what chance do I
      stand against two powers? But in reply to my offer, the new
      allies bombard my last fort. I return the fire. Where upon my
      former colleague—the commandant—exclaims in
      magnificent indignation: “Just look, good people, how bellicose
      this Chamberlain is!”
    —LeninI could not absolutely deny the
      feasibility of such attempts and take upon myself the full onus
      for the threatening split, if only because I had myself been
      inclined, in the letter of October 6, to attribute the wrangle
      to “personal irritation”. But I did consider, and still
      consider, it my political duty to defend the position of the
      majority. To rely in this on Comrade Plekhanov would have been
      difficult and risky, for everything went to show that he was
      prepared to interpret his dictum that “a leader of the
      proletariat has no right to give rein to his warlike
      inclinations when they run counter to political good
      sense”—to interpret it in a dialectical way to mean that if
      you had to fire, then it was better sense (considering the state
      of the weather in Geneva in November) to fire at the
      majority.... To defend the majority’s position was essential,
      because, when dealing with the question of the free (?) will of
      a revolutionary, Comrade Plekhanov—in defiance of
      dialectics, which demands a concrete and comprehensive
      examination—modestly evaded the question ofconfidence
      in a revolutionary, of confidence in a “leader of the
      proletariat” who was leading a definite wing of the Party. When
      speaking of anarchistic individualism and advising us to close
      our eyes “at times” to violations ofdiscipline and to yield
      “sometimes” to intellectualist license, which “is rooted in a
      sentiment that has nothing to do with devotion to the
      revolutionary idea”, Comrade Plekhanov apparently forgot that we
      must also reckon with the free will of the majority of the
      Party, and that it must be leftto the practical
      workersto determine theextentof the concessions
      to be made to the anarchistic individualists. Easy as it is to
      fight childish anarchistic nonsense on the literary plane, it is
      very difficult to carry on practical work in the same
      organisation with an anarchistic individualist.A writer who took
      it upon himself to determine the extent of the concessions that
      might be made to anarchism in practice would only be betraying
      his inordinate and truly doctrinaire literary conceit. Comrade
      Plekhanov majestically remarked (for the sake of importance, as

      Bazarov[9]used to say) that if a new split were to occur the
      workers would cease to understand us; yet at the same time he
      initiated an endless stream of articles in the newIskrawhose real and concrete meaning was bound to be
      incomprehensible not only to the workers, but to the world at
      large. It is not surprising that when a member of the Central
      Committee read the proofs of “What Should Not Be Done” he warned
      Comrade Plekhanov that his plan to somewhat curtail the size of
      a certain publication (the minutes of the Party Congress and the
      League Congress) would be defeated by this very article, which
      would excite curiosity, offer for the judgement of the man in
      the street something that was piquant and at the same time quite
      incomprehensible to

him,[3][3]We are having a heated and passionate argument in
      private. Suddenly one of us jumps in, flings open the window,
      and begins to clamour against Sobakeviches, anarchistic
      individualists, revisionists, etc. Naturally, a crowd of curious
      idlers gathers in the street and our enemies rub their hands in
      glee. Other of the disputants go to the window too and want to
      give a coherent account of the whole matter, without hinting at
      things nobody knows anything about. Thereupon the window is
      banged to on the plea that it is not worth while discussingsquabbles (Iskra, No. 53, p. 8, col. 2, line
      24 up). It was not worth whilebeginning in " Iskra"on
      a discussion of “squabbles”, Comrade

      Plekhanov[12]—that would be nearer the truth!
      —Leninand inevitably cause people to ask in
      perplexity: “What has happened?” It is not surprising that owing
      to the abstractness of its arguments and the vagueness of its
      hints, this articleof Comrade Plekhanov’s caused jubilation in
      the ranks of the enemies of Social-Democracy—the dancing of
      thecancanin the columns ofRevolutsionnaya
      Rossiyaand ecstatic praises from the consistent
      revisionists inOsvobozhdeniye. The source of all these
      comical and sad misunderstandings, from which Comrade Plekhanov
      later tried so comically and so sadly to extricate himself, lay
      precisely in the violation of that basic principle of
      dialectics: concrete questions should be examined in all their
      concreteness. The delight of Mr. Struve, in particular, was
      quite natural: he was not in the least interested in the “good”
      aims (killing with kindness) which Comrade Plekhanov pursued
      (but might not achieve); Mr. Struve welcomed, and could not but
      welcome, thatswing towards the opportunist wing of our
      Partywhich had begun in the newIskra, as
      everybody can now plainly see. The Russian bourgeois democrats
      are not the only ones to welcome every swing to wards
      opportunism, even the slightest and most temporary, in any
      Social-Democratic party. The estimate of a shrewd enemy is very
      rarely based on sheer misunderstanding: you can tell a man’s
      mistakes by the people who praise him. And it is in vain that
      Comrade Plekhanov hopes the reader will be inattentive and tries
      to make out that the majority unconditionally objected to a
      personal concession in the matter of co-optation, and not to a
      desertion from the Left wing of the Party to the Right. The
      point is not that Comrade Plekhanov made a personal concession
      in order to avert a split (that was very praiseworthy), but
      that, though fully realising the need tojoin issuewith the inconsistent revisionists and anarchistic
      individualists, he chose instead to join issue with the
      majority, with whom he parted companyover the extentof the possible practical concessions to anarchism. The point is
      not that Comrade Plekhanov changed the personal composition of
      the editorial board, but that he betrayed his position of
      opposing revisionism and anarchism and ceased to defend that
      position in the Central Organ of the Party.

As to the Central Committee, which at this time was the sole
      organised representative of the majority, Comrade Plekhanov
      parted company with it thenexclusively over the possible
      extent of practical concessions to anarchism. Nearlya
      month had elapsed since November 1, when my resignation had
      given a free hand to the policy of killing with
      kindness. Comrade Plekhanov had had every opportunity, through
      all sorts of contacts, to test the expedience of this
      policy. Comrade Plekhanov had in this period published his
      article “What Should Not Be Done”, which was—and
      remains—the Martovites’ sole ticket of admittance, so
      to speak, to the editorial board. The
      watchwords—revisionism (which we should contend with, but
      sparing the adversary) and anarchistic individualism (which
      should be courted and killed with kindness)—were printed on
      this ticket in imposing italics. Do come in, gentlemen, please,
      I will kill you with kindness—is what Comrade Plekhanov
      said by this invitation card to his new colleagues on the
      editorial board. Naturally, all that remained to the Central
      Committee was to say its last word (that is what ultimatum
      means—a last word as to a possible peace) about what, in
      its opinion, was the permissible extent of practical concessions
      to anarchistic individualism. Either you want peace—in
      which case here are a certain number of seats to prove our
      kindness, peaceableness, readiness to make concessions, etc. (we
      cannot allow you any more if peace is to be guaranteed in the
      Party, peace not in the sense of an absence of controversy, but
      in the sense that the Party will not be destroyed by anarchistic
      individualism); take these seats and swing back again little by
      little from Akimov to Plekhanov. Or else you want to maintain
      and develop your point of view, to swing over altogether to
      Akimov (if only in the realm of organisational questions), and
      to convince the Party that you, not Plekhanov, are right—in
      which case form a writers’ group of your own, secure
      representation at the next Congress, and set about winning a
      majority by an honest struggle, by open controversy. This
      alternative, which was quite explicitly submitted to the
      Martovites in the Central Committee ultimatum of November 25,
      1903 (seeState of Siege and Commentary on the League

      Minutes[4]),

was in full harmony with the letter
      Plekhanov and I had sent to the former editors on October 6,
      1903:either it is a matter of personal irritation (in which
      case,if the worst comes to the worst, we might even
      “co-opt”), or it is a matter of a difference of principle (in
      which case you must first convince the Party, and only then talk
      about changing the personal composition of the central
      bodies). The Central Committee could the more readily leave it
      to the Martovites to make this delicate choice for themselves
      sinceat this very timeComrade Martov in hisprofession de foi (Once More in the Minority)wrote the following:

“The minority lay claim to only one honour, namely, to be the
      first in the history of our Party to show that one can be ’defeated’and yet not form a new party. This position of the minority
      follows from all their views on the organisational development of the
      Party; it follows from the consciousness of their strong ties with the
      Party’s earlier work. The minority do not believe in the mystic power of
      ’paper revolutions’, and see in thedeep rootswhich their
      endeavours havein lifea guarantee thatby purely
      ideological propaganda within the Party they will secure the triumph of
      their principles of organisation.” (My italics.)

What proud and magnificent words! And how bitter it was to be taught by
      events that they were—merely words.... I hope you will
      forgive me, Comrade Martov, but nowI claim on behalf of the
      majoritythis “honour” whichyou have not deserved. The
      honour will indeed be a great one, one worth fighting for, for the circles
      have left us the tradition of an extraordinarily light-hearted attitude
      towards splits and an extraordinarily zealous application of the maxim:
      “either coats off, or let’s have your hand!”

The big pleasure (of having a united Party) was bound to
      outweigh, and did outweigh, the little annoyances (in the shape
      of the squabbling over co-optation). I resigned from the Central
      Organ, and Comrade Y (who had been delegated by Plekhanov and
      myself to the Party Council on behalf of the editorial board of
      the Central Organ) resigned from the Council. The Martovites
      replied to the Central Committee’s last word as to peace with a
      letter (see publications mentioned) which was tantamount to a
      declaration of war. Then, and only then, did I write my letter
      to the editorial board(Iskra, No. 53) on the subject
      of

			      publicity.[5]If it comes to talking about
      revisionism and discussing inconsistency, anarchistic
      individualism, and the defeat of various leaders, then,
      gentlemen, let us tell all that occurred, without
      reservation—that was the gist of this letter about
      publicity. The editorial board replied with angry abuse and the
      lordly admonition: do not dare to stir up "the pettiness and
      squabbling of circle life"(Iskra, No. 53). Is
      that so, I thought to myself: “the pettiness and squabbling of
      circle life”?... Well,es ist mir recht, gentlemen,
      there I agree with you. Why, that means that you directly class
      all this fuss over “co-optation” ascircle squabbling.
      That is true. But what discord is this?—in the editorial of
      this same issue, No. 53, this same editorial board (we must
      suppose) talks about bureaucracy, formalism, and the

rest.[6][6]As it subsequently turned out, the “discord” was explained very
      simply—it was a discord among the editors of the Central
      Organ. It was Plekhanov who wrote about “squabbling” (see his
      admission in “A Sad Misunderstanding”, No. 57), while the
      editorial, “Our Congress”, was written by Martov (State of
      Siege, p. 84). They were tugging in different directions.
    —LeninDo not dare to raise the question of the fight for co-optation
      to the Central Organ, for that would be squabbling. But we will
      raise the question of co-optation to the Central Committee, and
      will not call it squabbling, but a difference of principle on
      the subject of “formalism”. No, dear comrades, I said to myself,
      permit me not to permit you that. You want to fire at my fort,
      and yet demand that I surrender my artillery. What jokers you
      are! And so I wrote and published outside ofIskramyLetter to the Editors(Why I Resigned from the“Iskra”Editorial

Board),[7]briefly relating what
      had really occurred, and asking yet again whether peace was not
      possible on the basis of the following division: you take the
      Central Organ, we take the Central Committee. Neither side will
      then feel “alien” in the Party, and we will argue about the
      swing towards opportunism, first in the press, and then,
      perhaps, at the Third Party Congress.

In reply to this mention of peace the enemy opened fire with all
      his batteries, including even the Council. Shells rained on my
      head. Autocrat,

      Schweitzer,[10]bureaucrat, formalist,
      supercentre, one-sided, stiff-necked, obstinate, narrow-minded,
      suspicious, quarrelsome.... Very well, my friends! Have you
      finished? You have nothing more in reserve? Poor ammunition, I
      must say....

Now comes my turn. Let us examine thecontentof the
      newIskra’s new views on organisation and the relation
      of these views to that division of our Party into “majority” and
      “minority” the true character of which we have shown by our
      analysis of the debates and voting at the Second Congress.

[1]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[2]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[3]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[4]I shall not, of course, go into the tangle Martov created ovor
      this Central Committee ultimatum in hisState of Siegeby quoting private conversations and so on. This is the “second
      method of struggle”I described in the previous section, which
      only a specialist in nervous disorders could hope to
      disentangle. It is enough to say that Comrade Martov insists
      that there was an agreement with the Central Committee not to
      publish the negotiations, which agreement has not been
      discovered to this day in spite of a most assiduous
      search. Comrade Travinsky, who conducted the negotiations on
      behalf of the Central Committee, informed me in writing that he
      considered me entitled to publish my letter to the editors
      outside ofIskra.

But there was one phrase of Comrade Martov’s that I particularly
      liked. That was the phrase “Bonapartism of the worst type”. I
      find that Comrade Martov has brought in this category very
      appropriately. Let us examine dispassionately what the concept
      implies. In my opinion, it implies acquiring power byformallylegal means, butactuallyin defiance
      of the will of the people (or of a party). Is that not so
      Comrade Martov? And if it is, then I may safely leave it to the
      public to judge who has been guilty of this “Bonapartism of the
      worst type”: Lenin and

Comrade Y[13], who might have availed themselves of
      theirformalright not to admit the Martovites, butdid not avail themselvesof it, though in doing so they
      would have been backed by the will of the Second
      Congress—or those who occupied the editorial board byformally legitimate means(“unanimous co-optation”),
      but who knew thatactually this was not in accordance with
      the will of the Second Congressand who are afraid to have
      this will tested at the Third Congress.
    —Lenin

[5]See pp. 115-18 of this volume.—Ed.

[6]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[7]See pp. 119-25 of this volume.—Ed.

[8]Probably
      Carouge and Cluse, where the supporters of the majority and the minority
      lived.

[11]Orthodox—pseudonym of the Menshevik Lyubov Axelrod.

[9]Bazarov—themain character in Turgenev’sFathers and
      Sons.

[12]Together with Lenin’s “Letter toIskra”(pp. 115-15 of
      this vol ume),Iskra, No. 53 (November 25, 1903) had printed an
      editorial reply written by Plekhanov. Lenin in his letter proposed a full
      discussion in the paper of the differences of principle between the
      Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Plekhanov rejected this, describing the
      differences as “the squabbling of circle life”.

[13]Ywas L. Y. Galperin (also referred to as Ru, Valentin,
      and Konyagin), a Central Organ delegate to the Party Council,
      afterwards co-opted to the Central Committee.

[10]Schweitzer, J. B.(1833-1875)—a leader
      of the German Lassal leans in the sixties; after Lassalle’s death, president
      of the German General Labour League, of which he made himself virtual
      dictator, arousing widespread resentment among the membership.