Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Conspectus of Hegel’sScience of Logic—Book III (Subjective Logic orthe Doctrine of the Notion)

Book Three:(Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)

In the first two parts, says Hegel, I hadno Vorarbeiten,[1]but here, on the otherhand, there is “verknöchertes Material”[2](which it is necessary to “in Flüssigkeit brin-gen”[3]...)(3)[4]

“Being and Essence are the moments ofits becoming” (=des Begriffs).[5](5)

Should be inverted: concepts arethe highest product of the brain,the highest product of matter.

“Accordingly Objective Logic, which con-sidersBeingandEssence, really constitutesthegenetic exposition of the Notion.”(6)

Passing to criticism ofKantian-ism, Hegel regards as Kant’s greatmerit (15) the advancement of theidea of the“transcendental unity ofapperception”(the unity of the con-sciousness in which the Begriff is cre-ated), but he reproaches Kant for hisone-sidednessandsubjec-tivism:

“The object is truly in and for it-self only as it is in thought; as it is inintuition or ideation, it is appear-ance....”(16)(HegelraisesKant’sidealism from being subjective to be-ing objective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of con-cepts (Wahrheit[10]is their object),but all the same leaves them subjective.

He makes Gefühl und Anschau-ung[11]precede Understanding. (Ver-stand). Hegel speaks of this asfollows:

“Now, first, with regard to this relationof the understanding or the Notion to thestages which are supposed to precede it,it is of importance what science it is thatis being treated, in order to determine theform of these stages. In our science, sinceit is pure logic, these stages areBeingandEssence. In psychology,sensationandin-tuitionand alsoideationin general pre-cede understanding. In the Phenomenologyof Mind, since it is the doctrine of con-sciousness, the acsent was made throughthe stages of sensuous consciousness and,next, perception, to understanding.”(17)In Kant the exposition is very “incom-plete” here.

After that—theCHIEF THING—

...“The Notion must not here beconsidered as an act of self-consciousunderstanding, or as subjective under-standing: what we have to do with

is the Notion in and for itself, whichconstitutes aSTAGE AS WELL OF

NATURE AS OF SPIRIT.  LIFE,OR ORGANIC NATURE, ISTHAT STAGE OF NATURE ATWHICH THE NOTION EMER-GES.”(18)

There follows a very interesting passage(pp. 19-27)whereHegel refutes Kant,precisely	epistemologically(Engelsprobablyhad this passage in mind when hewrote inLudwig Feuerbach[12]that themainpoint against Kant had already been madeby Hegel, insofar as this was possiblefrom an idealistic standpoint),—exposingKant’s duality and inconsistency, his,	soto speak, vacillation between empiricism(= materialism) and idealism, Hegel him-self arguingwholly and exclu-sivelyfrom the standpoint of amoreconsistentidealism.

Begriff is still not the highest concept:still higher is theIdea= the unity ofBegriff and Reality.

“‘It is only a notion’ is a thing com-monly said; and not only the Idea, but sen-suous, spatial, and temporally palpableexistence is opposed to the Notion, assomething which is more excellent thanit. And the abstract is counted of lessworth than the concrete, because from theformer so much, of that kind, of materialhas been omitted. To those who hold thisview, the process of abstraction means thatfor our subjective needsone or anothercharacteristic is taken out of the concrete insuch a manner that, while so many otherproperties and modifications of the ob-ject are omitted, it loses nothing in value

or dignity. They are the real and are reck-oned as counting in full, only they areleft on the other side; and it is only theincapacity of understanding to absorb suchriches that forces it to rest content with

meagre abstraction. But if the given ma-terial of intuition and the manifold ofideation are taken as the real in opposi-tioh to that which is thought and to the

Notion, then this is a view the renuncia-tion of which is not only a condition ofphilosophy, but is assumed even by reli-gion; for how can these be needed andhave significance if the fugitive and super-ficial appearance of the sensuous and the in-dividual are taken for the truth?.. Con-

sequently, abstracting thought must notbe considered as a mere setting-aside ofthe sensuous material, whose reality issaid not to be lowered thereby; but it isits transcendence, and the reduction of it(as mere appearance) to the essential, whichmanifests itself in the Notion only.”(19-21)

Essentially, Hegel is completely rightas opposed to Kant. Thought proceedingfrom the concrete to the abstract—provided it iscorrect(NB) (and Kant,like all philosophers, speaks of correctthought)—does not get awayfromthe truth but comes closer to it. Theabstraction ofmatter, of alawof nature,the abstraction ofvalue, etc., in shortallscientific (correct, serious, not ab-surd) abstractions reflect nature moredeeply, truly andcompletely. Fromliving perception to abstract thought,and from this to practice,—such is thedialectical path of cognition oftruth, of cognition of objective real-ity. Kant disparages knowledge in orderto make way for faith: Hegel exaltsknowledge, asserting that knowledge isknowledge of God. The materialist exaltsknowledge of matter, of nature,consigning God, and the philosophicalrabble that defends God, to the rubbishheap.

“A principal misapprehension here isthat the natural principle or the beginning,which is the starting-point in natural de-velopment or in the history of the individ-ual in its formation, is taken as the trueand as that which is first also in the No-tion.” (21) (—It is correct that peoplebegin withthat, buttruthlies not inthe beginning but in the end, or rather,in the continuation. Truth is not theini-tialimpression)....	“But philosophy is notmeant to be a narrative of what happens,but the cognition of what istruein happen-ings.”(21)

In Kant there is “psychological ideal-ism” (22): Kant's categories “areonlydeterminations which are derived from self-consciousness.” (22) Rising from under-standing (Verstand) to Reason (Vernunft),Kant belittles the significance of thought,denying is the capacity to “reach perfectedtruth.” (23)

“It is declared” (Kant) “to be an abuse iflogic, which ought to be merely acanonof judgment, is regarded as anorganforthe production ofobjectivediscoveries. Thenotions of Reason, in which a higher

force (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper(correct!!) content were of necessitydivined, are lessKonstitutives[13]|it shouldbe: Objektives[14]|than even the categories;they aremereideas. Their use may cer-tainly be permissible, but these intelligible

essences, which should wholly unlock thetruth, are to signify no more thanhypothe-ses; and it would be completely arbitraryand reckless to ascribe any truth to themin and for themselves, since theycan occurin no kind of experience. Could it everhave been thought that philosophy wouldgainsay the validity of the intelligible essencesbecause they are without the spatial andtemporal material of sensuousness?”(23)

Here, too, Hegel is essentiallyright:valueis	a category which entbehrt desStoffes der Sinnlichkeit,[15]but it istruerthan the law of supply anddemand.Only Hegel is an idealist; hence thenonsense of “konstitutives,”[16]etc.

Kant, on the other hand, quite clearly recog-nises the “objectivity” (24) of thought(“des Denkens”) (“an identity of the Notionand the thing”(24))—but, on the other hand,

“the assertion is made again that we sure-ly cannot know things as they are in andfor themselves, and that truth does notallow cognising reason to approach it; thattruth which consists in the unity of objectand Nation is after all only appearance, and

the reason now is that content is only themanifold of intuition. Of this argument ithas been remarked that this manifoldness,insofar as it belongs to intuition as op-posed to the Notion, is transcended preciselyin the Notion, and that the object is led back

by the Notion into its non-contingent essen-tiality; the latter enters into appearance,and for this very reason the appearance ismamfestatlon not merely non-essential, butmanifestation of Essence.”(24, 25)

“It will always remain a matter for aston-ishment how the Kantian philosophy knewthat relation of thought to sensuous exist-ence, where it halted, for a merely rela-tive relation of bare appearance, and fullyacknowledged and asserted a higher unityof the two in the Idea in general, and, forexample, in the idea of an intuitive under-standing; but yet stopped dead at this rel-

ative relation and at the assertion that theNotion is and remains utterly separated

from reality;—so that it affirmed astruthwhat it pronounced to be finite knowledge,and declared to be superfluous, improper,and figments of thought that which itrecognised astruth, and of which it estab-lished the definite notion” (26)

In logic, theIdea“becomes the creatorof Nature.”(26)

Logic is “formelle Wissenschaft”[17](27)asagainstthe concrete sciences (of natureand mind), but its object matter is “diereine Warheit”[18]....(27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is(27)(theCritique of Pure
      Reasonp. 83) andgiving a trivial answer (“correspondenceof knowledge with its object”), strikes athimself, for “the fundamental assertionof transcendental idealism” is—that “cognition is not capable of appre-hending Things-in-themselves”(27)——and it is clear that all this is “anuntrue idea.” (28)

In arguing against the purely formal con-ception of logic (which Kant, too, is saidto have)—saying that from the ordinarystandpoint (truth is the correspondence|“Übereinstimmung”|of knowledge withthe object) correspondence “essentially de-mands two sides”(29), Hegel says that theformal element in logic is “pure truth”(29)and that

...“this formal element must thereforebe thought of as being in itself much richerin determinations and content, and as hav-ing infinitely more influence upon theconcrete, than it is generally held to have....(29)

...“But, even if the logical forms are tobe regarded as nothing more than formalfunctions of thought, yet this characterwould make them worthy of an investi-gation as to how far they correspond tothe truth in themselves. A system of logicwhich neglects this can claim at mostto have the value of anatural-historicaldescription of the empirical phenomena ofthought.”(30-31)(Herein is said to lie

the immortal merit of Aristotle), but “itis necessary to go further....” (31)

Thus, not only a description of theformsof thought
		  and not only anat-ural-historical descrip-tion of the phenomenaofthought (wherein does that differ froma	description offorms??) but alsocorrespondence with truth,i.e.??, the quintessence  or, more sim-ply, the results and outcome of the his-tory of thought?? Here Hegel is ideal-istically unclear, and fails to speakout fully.Mysticism.

Notpsychology,notthephenomenology of mind,butlogic = the questionof truth.

In this con-ception, log-ic coincideswith thetheory ofknowl-edge. Thisis in generala veryimportantquestion.‡

Cf.Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI,p. 319[19]:“But in point of fact they” (die logischenFormen[20]), “turned round as forms of thenotion, constitute theliving spirit of theactual....”

The generallaws ofmove-ment of theworldandofthought

Begriff in its development into “adäquaten

Begriff,”[21]becomes the Idea. (33)[22]“Notion in its objectivity is the objectwhich is in and for itself.” (33)

= objectivism + mysticismand betrayal of development

The dialectical movement of the “No-tion”—from the purely “formal” notionat the beginning—to theJudgement(Urteil),then—to theSyllogism(Schluß) and—fi-nally to the transformation of the subjectiv-ity of the Notion into itsobjectivity.(34-35)[23]

The first distinguishing feature of theNotion isUniversaltity(Allegemeinheit). NB:The Notion grew out ofEssence, and thelatter out ofBeing.

The further development of theUni-versal, theParticular(Besonderes) and theIndividual(Einzelnes) is in the highestdegree abstract and “abstruse.”

The further development of theUni-versal, theParticular(Besonderes) and theIndividual(Einzelnes) is in the highestdegree abstract and “abstruse.”

En lisant...These partsof the workshould becalled: a bestmeans forgetting aheadache![24]

Kuno Fischer expounds the “abstruse”considerations very poorly, taking up thelighterpoints—examples  from theEncy-clopaedia, and adding banalities(against the French Revolution. KunoFischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530), etc.,but not showing the readerhowto lookfor the key to the difficult transitions,nuances, ebbs and flows of Hegel’sabstract concepts.

Obviously, here too the chief thingfor Hegel is totracethetransitions.From a certain point of view, undercertain conditions, the universal is theindividual, the individual is the uni-versal. Not only (1)connection, andinseparable connection, of all conceptsand judgements, but (2)transitionsfromone into the other, and not only transi-tions, but also (3)identity of opposites—that is the chief thing for Hegel. Butthis merely “glimmers” through thefogofextremely abstruse exposition. The his-tory of thought from the standpointof the development and application ofthe general concepts and categories ofthe Logic—voilà ce qu’il faut![25]

Or is thisafter allatribute to oldformal logic?Yes! Andanother trib-ute—a trib-ute to mys-ticism =idealism

Voilà anabundance of“determina-tions” and ofBegriffsbe-stimmungen[26]in this partof theLogic!

Quoting, onp. 125, the “famous” syllo-gism—“all men are mortal, Gaius is a man,therefore he is mortal”—Hegel shrewdly

adds:“Boredom immediately descends whensuch a syllogism is heard approaching”—this is declared to be due to the “unnützen

Form,”[27]and Hegel makes the profoundremark:

“All things are aSyllogism, a universalwhich is bound together with individualitythrough particularity; but of course theyare not wholes consisting ofthree propo-sitions.”(126)

Very good! The most common logical“figures”—(all this is in the Par. on the“First Figure of the Syllogism”) are themost common relations of things, setforth with the pedantic thoroughness ofa school textbook, sit venia verbo.[28]

Hegel’s analysis of syllogisms (E.—B.—A., Eins[29]; Besonderes[30]; Allge-meines,[31]B.—E.—A., etc.) recallsMarx’s imitation of Hegel in ChapterI.[32]

Inter alia:“Kant’s Antinomies of Reason are justthis, that first one determination of a No-tion is made the foundation of the Notion,and next, and with equal necessity,the other....”(128-129)

Two aphorisms:

1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (andagnosticism in general) more from a vul-gar-materialistic standpoint than from adialectical-materialistic standpoint,inso-far ashe merelyrejectstheir views a li-mine,[34]but does notcorrectthem (as He-gel corrected Kant), deepening, generalis-ing and extending them, showing theconnectionandtransitionsofeach and every concept.

2. Marxists criticised (at the beginningof the twentieth century) the Kantiansand Humists more in the manner of Feuer-bach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

...“An experience which rests upon in-duction is taken as validalthoughadmitted-ly the perception isnot completed; but nomore can be assumed than that no examplecan be produced contrary to this experience,insofar as the latter is true in and foritself.”(154)

This passage is in the §: “The Syllo-gism of Induction.” The simplest truthobtained in the simplest inductive wayisalwaysincomplete. Ergo: the connectionof induction with analogy—withsur-mise(scientific foresight), the relativityof all knowledge and the absolute con-tent in each step forward in cognition.

Aphorism:It is impossible completelyto understand Marx’sCapital, and es-pecially its first chapter, without havingthoroughly studied and understood thewholeof Hegel’sLogic. Consequently,half a century later none of the Marxistsunderstood Marx!!

Thetransitionfrom the syllogismof analogy (about analogy) to the syllogismof necessity,—from the syllogism of induc-tion to the syllogism of analogy,—thesyllogism of the universal to the individ-ual—the syllogism[35]from the individualto the universal,—the exposition ofcon-nectionandtransitions|con-nection is transition|, that is Hegel’s

task. Hegel actuallyprovedthatlogical forms and laws are not an emptyshell, but thereflectionof the objec-

tive world. More correctly, he did notprove, butmade a brilliant guess.

In theEncyclopaediaHegel re-marks that the division ofUnderstandingandReason, ofNotionsof one kind orthe other must be understood in such a way“that our mode of behaviour is either

to stop short at the merely negative andabstract form of the Notion, or to conceivethe latter, in accordance with its true

nature, as that which is at once positive

and concrete. Thus, for example, if freedomis regarded as the abstract opposite of ne-cessity, this is merely the Notion of under-standing of freedom, whereas the true andrational Notion of freedom contains ne-cessity as transcended within it.”(Pp. 347-348), Vol. VI[36])

Ibidemp. 349:Aristotledescribed thelogical forms so completely that “essen-tially” there has been nothing to add.

Usually the “figures of the syllogism”are regarded as empty formalism. “They”(these figures) “have, however, a very fun-damental meaning, based on the necessitythatevery moment, as determination ofthe Notion, itself becomes the whole andmediating Ground.”(352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia(Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)

“The objective meaning of the figuresof the syllogism is in general that every-thing rational is manifested as a threefoldsyllogism, such that each of its membersassumes the position of one of the extremes

as well as that of the mediating middle.Such, for example, is the case with the threebranches of philosophy, i. e., the Logical

Idea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Naturethat is first of all the middle, connectingmember. Nature, this immediate totality,unfolds itself in the two extremes of the

Logical Idea and Mind.”[37]

“Nature, this immediate totality, un-folds itself in the Logical Idea andMind.” Logic is the science of cognition.It is the theory of knowledge. Knowl-edge is the reflection of nature by man.But this is not simple, not an imme-diate, not a complete reflection, butthe process of a series of abstractions,the formation and development of con-cepts, laws, etc., and these concepts,laws, etc., (thought, science = “the log-ical Idea”)embraceconditionally, ap-proximately, the universal, law-governedcharacter of eternally moving and de-veloping nature. Here there areactually,objectively,threemembers: 1) nature;2) human cognition = the humanbrain(as the highest product of thissame nature), and 3) the form of reflec-tion of nature in human cognition, andthis form consists precisely of con-cepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannotcomprehend = reflect = mirror natureasa whole, in its completeness, its “imme-diate totality,” he can onlyeternallycome closer to this, creating abstrac-tions, concepts, laws, a scientific pic-ture of the world, etc., etc.

NB:Hegel “only”deifies this“logicalidea,” obe-dience tolaw, univer-sality

+ “Spirit, however, is only spirit throughbeing mediated by Nature....	”It is Spiritthat recognises the logical Idea in Nature

and so raises it to its essence....” “Thelogical Idea is ‘the absolute Substanceboth of Spirit and of Nature, the universal,the all-pervading.’”(353-354)

In regard to analogy an acute observation:

“It is theinstinctof reason which allowsone to divine that one or another empiri-cally found determination has its roots intheinner natureor genus, of an object,and which bases itself further on this de-termination.”(357)(VoL VI, p. 359)

Andp. 358: And justifiable contempt forthe philosophy of nature has beenevoked by the futile play withemptyanalogies.

Againsthimself!

In ordinary logic[38]thought is formal-istically divorced from objectivity.

“Thought is held here to be a mere sub-jective and formal activity, and what isobjective is held to be, in contrast tothought, something firm and present foritself. This dualism, however, is not thetruth, and it is thoughtless procedure toaccept the determinations of subjectivityand objectivity in this way without fur-ther question, and without inquiring intotheir origin....”(359-360)In reality, sub-jectivity is only a stage of developmentfrom Being and Essence—whereupon thissubjectivity “dialectically ‘breaks throughits barrier’” and “opens out into objectiv-ity by means of the syllogism.”(360)

Very profound and clever! The lawsof logic are the reflections of the objec-tive in the subjective consciousness ofman.

Vol. VI,p. 360“The realised Notion” is the object.

This transition from the subject, fromthe notion, to the object is said to seem“strange,” but by the object one shouldunderstand not simply Being, but some-thing definitive, “something independent,concrete and complete in itself....” (361)“The world is the other being of the Idea.”

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and theobject—are the sameandnot the same....(362).

Nonsense about the ontological argu-ment, about God!

...“It is wrong to regard subjectivity andobjectivity as a fixed and abstract antithe-sis. Both are wholly dialectical....” (367)

(Logic) V, 178:[39]The twofold significance of objectivity:...“similarly a twofold significance appearsfor Objectivity: it stands opposed to the in-dependent Notion, but also is that which

is in and for itself....” (178)

...“The knowledge of truth is placed inthe cognition of the object as object withoutthe addition of any subjective reflection...”(178)

Discourses on “mechanism”—furtheron—extremely abstruse and almost com-plete nonsense.Further, idem aboutchemism, the stagesof “judgment,” etc.

The paragraph entitled “Law” (198-199)does not give what could be expectedfrom Hegel on such an interesting question.It is strange why “law” is referred to “mech-anism”?

The concept of law approximateshere the concepts “order” (Ordnung);uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessi-

ty; the “soul” der objektiven Totalität;[40]the “principle of self-movement.”

All this from the standpoint that mech-anism is the other-being of spirit, ofthe Notion, etc., of the soul, of individ-uality.... Obviously, playing withempty analogies!

To be noted: onp. 210the concept of

“Naturnotwendigkeit”[41]is encountered—“both mechanism and Chemism are, then,comprehended under natural necessity”...for we see here “its” (des Begriffs) “submer-

(((sion into externality” (ibidem).))

“It was mentioned that the opposition be-tween Teleology and Mechanism is, in thefirst instance, the more general oppositionbetween freedom and necessity. Kant sets

out the opposition in this form under theAntinomies of Reason, as the ‘Third Con-flict of Transcendental Ideas.’”(213)Brieflyrepeating Kant’s proofs, thesis and antith-esis, Hegel notes the hollowness of theseproofs and directs attention to the resultof Kant’s considerations:

Kant’s solution of this Antinomy isthe same as the general solution of theothers: that reason can prove neither ofthese propositions, since we can have nodeterminant principle a priori about the pos-sibility of things according to mere empirical

laws of nature; consequently the two must

not be regarded as objective prop-ositions but as subjective maxims;

on the one hand I ought always to reflectupon all natural events according to theprinciple of pure natural mechanism; but

this does" not prevent me from investigat-ing certain forms of nature, should theoccasion be given, according to another

maxim, namely, that of final causes;—asthough these two maxims (which furtherare supposed to be required only by humanreason) were not in the same oppositionin which the propositions stand.—As was

observed above, from this whole standpointthe only question which is demanded byphilosophic interest is not looked into,namely, which of these two principles istrue in and for itself; but, for this point

of view, it is irrelevant whether the prin-ciples are to be considered as objective de-terminations of nature (that is here, as de-terminations existing externally) or as meremaxims of a subjective cognition.—Butin fact this is asubjective, that is, acontingent, cognition, which appliesone or the other maxim as theoccasionmay suggestaccording to whether it thinksit appropriate to the given objects, butotherwise does not ask about the truthof these determinations themselves, wheth-er both are determinations of the objectsor of cognition.”(215-216)

“The End has turned outto be thethirdterm withrespect to Mechanism andChemism; it is their truth.Since it still stands withinthe sphere of Objectivity orof the immediacy of the to-tal Notion, it is still affec-ted by externality as such;an objective world to whichit relates itself still standsopposed to it. From thisside mechanical causality(in which generally Chem-ism must be included)still appears in this End-relation (which is external),but as subordinated to itand as transcended in andfor itself.”(216-217)

...“From this results thenature of the subordinationof the two previous formsof the objective process: theOther, which in them liesin the infinite progress, isthe Notion which at firstis posited as external tothem, which is End; notonly is the Notion theirsubstance, but also exter-nality is the moment whichis essential to them and con-stitutes their determinate-

”The laws of the externalworld, of nature, which aredivided intomechanicalandchemical(this is veryimportant) are the bases ofman’spurposiveactivity.

In his practical activity,man is confronted with theobjective world, is depend-ent on it, and determineshis activity by it.

From this aspect, fromthe aspect of the practical(purposive) activity of man,the mechanical (and chemi-cal) causality of the world(of nature) appears as thoughsomethingexternal, asthough something secon-dary, as though somethinghidden.

Two forms of theob-jectiveprocess: nature(mechanical and chemical)and thepurposiveac-tivity of man. The mutualrelation of these forms. Atthe beginning, man’s endsappear foreign (“other”) inrelation to nature. Humanconsciousness, science (“der

ness. Thus mechanical orchemical technique sponta-neously offers itself to theEnd-relation by reason ofits character of being deter-mined externally; and thisrelation must now befurther considered.”(217)

Begriff”), reflects the essence,the substance of nature,but at the same time thisconsciousness is somethingexternal in relation to na-ture (not immediately, notsimply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL  ANDCHEMICAL TECHNIQUEserves human ends just be-

cause its character (essence)consists in its being deter-mined by external condi-tions (the laws of nature).

...“It” (der Zweck[42]) “has before it anobjective, Mechanical and Chemical world,to which its activity relates itself as tosomething already given....”(219-220)“Tothis extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, insofar asthis objectivity stands opposed to it....”(220)

In actual fact, man’s ends are engen-dered by the objective world and pre-suppose it,—they find it as somethinggiven, present. But itseemsto manas if his ends are taken from outsidethe world, and are independent of theworld (“freedom”).((NB. All this in the § in “The Sub-jective End.” NB)) (217-221)

“The End binds itself with objectivitythrough a Means, and in objectivity withitself.”(221§: “The
      Means.”)

Further, since the End is finite it hasa finite content; accordingly it is notabsolute or utterly in and for itself reason-able. The Means however is the externalmiddle of the syllogism which is the realisa-tion of the End; in it therefore reason-ableness manifests itself as such—as pre-serving itself in this external Other andprecisely through this externality. To thatextent the Means is higher than the finiteEnds of external usefulness: the ploughis more honourable than those immediateenjoyments which are procured by it, andserve as Ends. The instrument is preserved,while the immediate enjoyments pass away

and are forgotten.IN HIS TOOLS MANPOSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNALNATURE. ALTHOUGH AS REGARDSHIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUB-JECTED TO IT.”(226)

Vorbericht, i.e., preface of the bookdated: Nuremberg, 21.VII.1816

This is in the §:“The Realised End”

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM ASONE OF THE APPLICATIONS ANDDEVELOPMENTS OF THE IDEAS OFGENIUS—SEEDS EXISTING INEMBRYO IN HEGEL.

“The teleological process is the transla-tion into objectivity of the Notion (sic!)which exists distinctly as Notion....”(227)

When Hegel endeavours—sometimeseven huffs and puffs—to bring man’spurposive activity under the categoriesof logic, saying that this activityis the “syllogism” (Schluß), that thesubject (man) plays the role of a “mem-ber” in the logical “figure” of the

“syllogism,” and so on—THEN THATIS NOT MERELY STRETCHING APOINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HASA VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MA-TERIALISTIC CONTENT. IT HAS TOBE INVERTED: THE PRACTICALACTIVITY OF MAN HAD TO LEADHIS CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE REPE-

TITION OF THE VARIOUS LOGICALFIGURES THOUSANDS OF MILLIONSOF TIMESIN ORDER THATTHESE FIGURESCOULDOBTAINTHE SIGNIFICANCE OFAXIOMS.THIS NOTA BENE.

“The movement of the End has nowachieved that the moment of externalityis posited not only in the Notion, andthe Notion is not only Ought and tendency,but, as concrete totality, is identical

with immediate Objectivity.”(235)At theend of the § on “The Realised End,” at theend of the section (Chapter III: “Te-leology”)—of Section II: “Objectivi-ty,” the transition to Section III: “TheIdea.”

Remarkable: Hegel comes to the “Idea”as the coincidence of the Notion and theobject, astruth, throughthepractical, purposive activity of man.A very close approach to the view thatman by hispracticeproves the objectivecorrectness of his ideas, concepts, knowl-edge, science.

The beginning of Section III:“The Idea”

“The Idea is the adequate Notion:ob-jective truth, or the truth assuch.”(236)

In general, the introduction to Section III(“The Idea”) of Part II to theLogic(“Subjective Logic”) (Volume V, pp.236-243) and the corresponding §§ of the

Encyclopaedia(§§ 213-215)—ARE PER-HAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OFDIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence,

so to speak, of logic and epistemology isshown in a remarkable brilliant way.

The expression “Idea” is used also inthe sense of a simple representation.Kant.

“Kant has claimed the expressionideaagain for the Notion of reason. Now accord-

ing to Kant the Notion of reason is to be

the Notion of the unconditioned, and, withrespect to phenomena, to be transcen-dental, which means that it is impossibleto make any adequate empirical use ofit. Notions of reason (according to Kant)are to serve for the conceptual compre-hension, and Notions of understandingfor the bare understanding, of percep-tions. But, in fact, if the latter really

are Notions then they are Notions,—con

ceptual comprehension takes place throughthem....”(236)

See also below on Kant

It is equally incorrect to regard the Ideaas something “unreal”—as people say: “itis merely an idea.”

Ifthoughtsare merelysubjectiveandcontingent they certainly have no furthervalue; but in this they are not inferiorto temporal and contingentactualities,which also have no further value except that

which is proper to contingencies and phe-nomena. And if conversely the Idea is notto be rated as true because, with respectto phenomena, it istranscendental, and noobject can be assigned to it, in the sen-suous world, coinciding with it, thisis a strange lack of understanding,—forso the Idea is denied objective validitybecause it lacks that which constitutesappearance, or theuntrue beingof the ob-jective world.”(237-238)

In relation to practical ideas, Kant him-self admits that the appeal to experienceagainst ideas is pöbelhaft[43]: he holds ideasas a Maximum to which one should endeav-our to bring actuality closer. And Hegelcontinues:“But, the result having been reached thatthe Idea is the unity of the Notion andObjectivity, the truth, it must not merelybe considered as agoalwhich must be

approached while it still remains a kindofbeyond; it must be held that whateveris actual is only insofar as it containsand expresses the Idea. The object, and

the objective and subjective world, not

merelyought to conformto the Idea, butare themselves the conformity of Notionand reality; that reality which does notcorrespond to the Notion is mereappear-ance, or that subjective, contingent, ca-pricious entity which is not the truth.”(238)

“It” (die Idee) “is,first,simple truth, the identityof the Notion and Objec-tivity as a universal....(242)

...“Secondly, it is there-lationof the Subjectivity,which is for itself, of thesimple Notion to its Ob-jectivity which isdistinctfrom it, the former is es-sentially theimpulseto tran-scend this separation....

...“As this relation, theIdea is theprocessin whichit sunders itself into in-dividuality and its inor-ganic nature, and againbrings the latter back un-der the power of the sub-ject, returning to the firstsimple universality. Theself-identity of the Idea isone with theprocess; andthe thought which frees ac-tuality from the semblanceof purposeless changeabili-ty and transfigures it intothe Idea must not imaginethis truth of actuality asa dead repose or barepic-ture, matt, without im-pulse or motion, or as a gen-ius, number, or abstractthought. In the Idea theNotion reaches freedom, andbecause of this the Ideacontains also theharshest

The idea (read: man’sknowledge) is the coinci-dence (conformity) of no-tion and objectivity (the“universal”). This—first.

Secondly, the idea is therelationof the subjectiv-ity (= man) which is foritself (= independent, as itwere) to the objectivitywhich isdistinct(fromthis Idea)....

Subjectivity is theim-pulseto destroy this sepa-ration (of the idea fromthe object).Cognition is theprocessof the submersion (ofthe mind) in an inorganicnature for the sake ofsubordinating it to thepower of the subject andfor the sake of gener-alisation (cognition of theuniversal in its phenome-na)....The coincidence ofthought with the object is aprocess: thought (= man)must not imagine truth inthe form of dead repose,in the form of a bare pic-ture (image), pale (matt),without impulse, withoutmotion, like a genus, likea number, like abstractthought.The idea contains also

opposition; its repose con-sists in the security andcertainty with which it eter-nally creates and eternallyovercomes it, coinciding init with itself.”

the strongest contradiction,repose (for man’s thought)consists in the firmness andcertainty with which heeternally creates (this con-tradiction between thought

and object) and eternallyovercomes it....

Cognition is the eternal, endlessapproximation of thought to the ob-ject. Thereflectionof nature in man’sthought must be understood not “life-lessly,” not “abstractly,”not dev-oid of movement,not with-out contradictions, but in theeternalprocessof movement, the aris-ing of contradictions and their solution.

“The Idea is ... the Ideaof theTrueand of theGood, asCognitionandVo-lition.... The process of thisfinite cognition and (NB)action(NB) makes theuniversality, which at firstis abstract, into a totali-ty, whence it becomesper-fected objectivity.”(243)

The idea isCognitionandaspiration (volition) [ofman]... The process of (tran-sitory, finite, limited) cog-nition andactionconvertsabstract concepts intoper-fected objectivity.

Also in theEncyclo-paedia(Vol. VI).[45]En-cyclopaedia§ 213(p. 385)

...“The Idea istruth,for truth is the correspond-ence of objectivity withthe Notion.... But alsoeverythingactual, insofaras it is true, is the Idea...The individual Being issome one aspect of theIdea; hence it requires alsoother actualities, whichlikewise appear as existingspecially for themselves; itis only in all of them to-gether and intheir rela-tionthat) the Notion isrealised. The individual byitself does not correspondto its Notion; this limi-tation of its determinateexistence constitutes its fi-nitude and its downfall....”

Individual Being (an ob-ject, a phenomenon, etc.)is (only)one sideof theIdea (of truth).()Truth re-quires still other sides ofreality, which likewise ap-pear only as independentand individual (besondersfür sich bestehende[46]).Only in their	to-tality, (zusammen), andin theirrelation(Be-ziehung) is truth realised.

(Thetotality ofallsides of thephenomenon, of reality and their (re-ciprocal)relations—that is whattruth is composed of. The relations(= transitions = contradictions) ofnotions = the main content of logic,by	whichthese concepts (and theirrelations, transitions, contradictions)are shown as reflections of the objec-tive	world. The dialectics ofthingsproduces the dialectics ofideas, andnot vice versa.)

#This aphorism should be expressedmore popularly,withoutthe word dia-lectics: approximately as follows: Inthe alternation, reciprocal dependenceofallnotions, in theidentity of theiropposites, in thetransitionsof one no-tion into another, in the eternal change,movement of notions, Hegel brilliantlydivinedPRECISELY THIS RELA-TION OF THINGS, OF NATURE.

=......................mutual dependence of notions””all”without exceptiontransitions of notions fromone into another”all”withoutexception.

=NBEvery notion oc-curs in a certainrelation,in a certainconnection withallthe others

The relativity of opposition between notions...the identity of opposites between notions.

“Truth is first of all taken to meanthat Iknowhow somethingis. This istruth, however, only in reference to con-sciousness, or formal truth, bare correct-ness.(§ 213, 386)Truth in the deepersense, on the contrary; consists in theidentity between objectivity and theNotion....

“A bad man is an untrue man,i.e.,a man who does not behave in confor-mity with the notion of him, or his posi-tion. Nothing, however, can exist entire-ly devoid of identity between the no-tion and reality. Even what is bad anduntruehas beingonly insofar as its real-ity still, somehow, conforms to its no-tion....

...“Everything deserving the name ofphilosophyhas always been based onthe consciousness of an absolute unityof thatwhich the understandingaccepts as valid only in its sep-aration....”

“Thestages of Beingand Essence hith-erto considered, as well as those of No-tion and of Objectivity, are not, when sodistinguished,something permanent,restinguponthemselves. But they haveproved to be dialectical, and their truth con-sists only in beingmoments of theidea.”(387-388)

Vol. VI, 388

The moments of the cognition (= ofthe “idea”) of nature by man—theseare the categories of logic.

Vol. VI,p. 388 (§ 214):

“The Idea may be described in manyways. It may be called reason (this is theproper philosophical signification of rea-son); also subject-object; the unity of theideal and the real, of the finite and theinfinite, of soul and body; the possibilitywhich has its actuality in its own self;that whose nature can be conceived onlyas existent, etc. All these descriptions

apply, because the Idea contains all therelations of understanding; but containsthem in their infinite self-return and self-

“It is easy work for the understanding toshow that everything said of the Idea isself-contradictory. But that can quite as wellbe rendered to the understanding or ratherit is already accomplished in the idea. Andthis work, which is the work of reason, iscertainly not so easy as that of the under-standing.—The understanding may demon-strate that the Idea is self-contradictory,because, for instance, the subjective isonly subjective and is always confrontedby the objective; that Being is somethingquite different from the notion and there-fore cannot be extracted out of it; and thatlikewise the finite is only finite and the

exact antithesis of the infinite, and there-fore not identical with it; and so on withall the determinations. Logic, however,demonstrates the opposite of all this, name-

ly, that the subjective, which is to besubjective only, the finite, which is to befinite only, the infinite, which is to beinfinite only, and so on, have no truth,but contradict themselves, and pass intotheir opposites. Thus, this transition, andthe unity in which the extremes are in-cluded as transcended, as appearance ormoments, is revealed as their truth.(388)

“The understanding, when it tackles theIdea, falls into a double misunderstand-

ing. First, it takes the extremes of theIdea (be they expressed as they will, solong as they are in their unity) still inthat sense and determination in which

they are not in their concrete unity, but

remain abstractions outside of the Idea.“It” (der Verstand[47]) “no less mistakes therelationbetween them, even when it has

been expressly stated; thus, for example, it over-looks even thenature of the copulain the judgment, which affirms thattheindividual, the subject,is just asmuch not individual, but uni-versal.—In the second place, the understand-

ing believesitsreflection,—that the self-indent-ical Idea contains its own negative, thecontradiction,—to be anexternalreflec-tion which does not lie within the Idea itself.In fact, however, this is not the understand-ing’s own wisdom.The Idea itselfis the dialecticwhich for ever sepa-

rates and distinguishes the self-identicalfrom the differentiated, the subjective from

“eternallife” =dialectics

the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soulfrom the body. Only insofaris it an eter-nal creation, eternal vitality,and eternal spirit....”(389)

VI, § 215,p. 390:

The Idea is essentially aprocess, be-cause its identity is the absolute and freeidentity of the notion, only insofar asit is absolute negativity and for thatreason dialectical.”

Hence, Hegel says, the expression “uni-ty” of thinking and being, of finite andinfinite, etc., isfalsch,[48]because it ex-presses “quietlypersisting identity.” It isnot true that the finite simply neutral-ises (“netralisiert”) the infinite andviceversa. Actually, we have aprocess.

If one calculates ... every second morethan ten persons in the world die, andstill more are born. “Movement” and “mo-ment”: catch it. At every given moment... catch this moment. Idem in simplemechanicalmotion (contra Chernov).[49]

“The idea as a process runs throughthree stages in its development. The firstform of the idea isLife....	The second formis ... the idea in the form ofKnowledge,which appears under the double aspectof thetheoreticalandpracticalidea. Theprocess of knowledge results in the resto-ration of unity enriched by difference,and this gives the third form, that oftheAbsoluteIdea...”(391)

The idea is “truth”(p. 385, § 213).The idea, i.e.,truthas a process—for truth is aprocess—passes in itsdevelopment(Entwicklung) through threestages: 1) life; 2) the process of knowl-edge, which includes humanpracticeandtechnique(see above); 3) the stageof the absolute idea (i.e., of completetruth).Life gives rise to the brain. Natureis reflected in the human brain. Bychecking and applying the correctnessof these reflections in his practice andtechnique, man arrives at objectivetruth.

Logic. Volume V.

Section Three: Idea. Chapter I.Life.

The question ofLifedoes not belong to“logic as it is commonly imagined.” (Bd.V. p. 244[50])
	  If, however, the subject-mat-ter of logic istruth, and “truth assuch wesentlich im Erkennenist,[51]” then cognition has to be dealtwith—in connection with cognition it isalready(p. 245)necessary to speak oflife.

Sometimes so-called“pure logic” is fol-lowed by “applied” (angewandte) logic,butthen...

...“every science must be absorbed inlogic, since each is an applied logic in-sofar as it consists in apprehending itsobject in forms of thought and of theNotion.”(244)

The idea of includingLifeinlogic is comprehensible—and brilliant—from the standpoint of theprocessofthe reflection of the objective worldin the (at first individual) consciousnessof man and of the testing of thisconsciousness (reflection) through prac-tice—see:

Encyclopaedia[52]§ 216:only in theirconnection arethe individuallimbs of the bodywhat they are.A hand,separated fromthe body, is ahand only inname (Aristotle).

If one considers the relation of sub-ject to object in logic, one must takeinto account also the general premisesof Being of theconcretesubject (=lifeof man) in the objective surroundings.

Subdivisions:[53]1) Life, as “the livingindividual” (§ A)2) “The Life-process”3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung),re-production of man, and transition tocognition.

(1)“subjective totality” and “indiffer-ent objectivity.”(2)The unity of subject and object

Encyclopaedia § 219: ...“Inorganicnature which is subdued by the livingbeing suffers this because it isin itselfthe same as life isfor itself.”

Invert it = pure materialism. Ex-cellent, profound, correct!! And alsoNB: shows howextremelycorrect andapt are the terms “an sich” and “fürsich”!!![54]

Further, the “subsumption” under log-ical categories of “sensibility” (Sensi-bilität), “irritability” (Irritabilität)—this is said to be theparticularin con-trast to the universal!!—and “reproduc-tion” is an idle game. Forgotten is thenodal line, the transition into adif-ferentplane of natural phenomena.And so on. Pain is “actual existence”of contradiction in the living individual.

Or again, reproduction ofman ... “is their” (of twoindividuals of different sex)“realised identity, is thenegative unity of the kindwhich intro-reflects itselfout of the division....”(261)

...“Its” (des Begriffs[55]) “reality in gener-al is theform of its determinate existence,and what matters is the determinationof this form; upon this depends thedistinction of that which the Notion is initself or as subjective, and of what it isas submerged into Objectivity, and nextin the Idea of Life.”(263)

...“Spirit not only is infi-nitely richer than Nature,but the absolute unity ofopposites in the Notion con-stitutes its essence....”(264)

In Kant “the Ego” is as a transcenden-tal subject of thoughts”(264); “At thesame time this Ego, according to Kant’sown expression, is awkward in this respect,

i.e., that inKant the?“Ego” isan emptyform(“self-extraction”)withoutconcreteanalysis ofthe processof cognition

that we must always make use of it inorder to make any judgment about it....”(p. 265)

“In his” (= Kant’s) “criticism of thesedeterminations” (namely: abstrakte ein-

seitige Bestimmungen “der vormaligen—pre-Kantian—Metaphysik”[56]concerning the“soul”) “he” (Kant) “simply followed Hume’ssceptical manner: holds fast to that whichappears as Ego in self-consciousness, from

which however everything empirical mustbe omitted, since the aim is to know itsessence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now noth-ing remains but the phenomenon of theI thinkwhich accompanies every idea;and nobody has the slightest notion of this‘Ithink.’”(266)# # #

Apparently, Hegel perceives scepti-cism here in the fact that Hume andKant do not see theappearingThing-in-itself in “phenomena,” divorce phe-nomena from objective truth, doubt theobjectivity of cognition, remove, weg-lassen, alles Empirische[57]from theDing-an-sich....[58]And Hegel contin-ues:

# # # ...“It must certainly be admittedthat it is impossible to have the slightestnotion of Ego or anything else (the No-tion included), ifno Notion is formedand a halt is made at the simple, fixed,general idea and name.”(266)

In order to understand, it is necessaryempirically to begin understanding,study, to rise from empiricism to the uni-versal. In order to learn to swim, it isnecessary to get into the water.

According to Hegel, the old metaphysics,in the endeavour to cognisetruth, dividedobjects in accordance with the characteris-tic of truth into substances and phenomena.Kant’s Critiquerejectedthe investigationof truth.... “But to stand fast at appearanceand what proves to be mere sensuousrepresentation in everyday consciousnessis tantamount to a renunciation of theNotion and of philosophy.”(269)

§ A:“The Idea of the True. At first the sub-jective Idea isimpulse.... Consequently,the impulse has the determinateness ofcancelling its own subjectivity, of makingconcrete its reality (which was abstractat first) I and of filling it, forcontent,with the world which is presupposed byits subjectivity.... As Cognition is the Ideaas End or as subjective idea, so the ne-gation of the world which is presupposedas being in itself isfirstnegation....”(274-275)

i.e. the firststage, moment, begin-ning, approach of cognition is its fini-tude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, thenegation of the world-in-itself—the endof cognition is at first subjective....

“Strangely enough this sideoffinitudehas latterly” (ob-viously Kant) “been seized uponand has been taken to be theabsoluterelation of Cognition—

as though the finite as such wasto be the absolute! From thispoint of view the Object isassigned the unknown propertyof being aThing-in-itself beyondcognition, which, together withtruth, is considered an absoluteBeyondfor Cognition.

The determinations of thought in general,the categories and the determinations ofreflection as well as the formal Notion

and its moments, are here given the posi-tion not that they are finite determina-tions in and for themselves, but that theyare so in the sense that they are subjective

as against that emptyThinghood-in-itself;the error of taking this relation of theuntruth of Cognition as valid has becomethe universal opinion of modern times.”(276)

Kant took the finite, transitory, re-lative, conditional character of humancognition (its categories, causality, etc.,etc.) assubjectivism, and not as thedialectics of the idea (= of nature itself),divorcing cognition from the object.

...“But cognition must by its own pro-cess resolve its finitude and therefore itscontradiction.”(277)

...“It is one-sided to imagine analysisin such a manner as though nothing werein the object except what has beenputintoit; and it is equally one-sided tothink that the determinations which re-sult are simplytaken outof it. The formeridea is, as is known, the thesis of sub-jective idealism, which in analysis takesthe activity of Cognition only as a one-sidedpositing, beyond which theThing-in-itselfremains hidden; the latter ideabelongs to so-called realism, which takesthe subjective Notion as an empty iden-tity that absorbs the thought-determina-tionsfrom without.”(280)...“But the two moments cannot be sep-arated; in its abstract form, into which

analysis elaborates it, the logical is cer-tainly present only in Cognition; whileconversely it is not only somethingpositedbutalso something whichis in itself.”(280)

Logical concepts are subjective so longas they remain “abstract,” in their ab-stract form, but at the same time theyexpress also the Things-in-themselves.Nature isbothconcreteandabstract,bothphenomenonandessence,bothmo-mentandrelation. Human concepts aresubjective in their abstractness, sepa-rateness, but objective as a whole, inthe process, in the sum-total, in thetendency, in the source.

Very good is§ 225of theEncyclopae-diawhere “cognition” (“theoretical”) and“will,” “practical activity,” are depictedas two sides, two methods, two meansof abolishing the “one-sidedness” bothof subjectivity and of objectivity.

And further281-282very importanton thetransitionof the categoriesinto one another (and against Kant, p. 282).

Logic, Vol. V, p. 282 (the end)[60]

...“Kant ... takes up the determinateconnection (the relation-notions and the

synthetic principles themselves) fromfor-mal logicasgiven. They ought to havebeen deduced by theexposition of thetransitionof this simple unity of self-con-sciousness into these its determinations anddistinctions; but Kant spared himself thetrouble of demonstrating this veritablysyntheticprogress,that of the self-producing Notion.”(282)

Kant did not show thetransi-tionof the categories into one another.

286-287—Turning once more to highermathematics (showing, inter alia, thathe is familiar with Gauss’ solution ofthe equation Xm—1=0[61], Hegel againtouches on the differential and integralcalculus, and says that:

“to this day mathematics by itself, thatis, in a mathematical manner, has failedin justifying these operations, which arebased upon this transition” (from one mag-nitude to another), “for the transition isnot of a mathematical nature.” Hegel saysthatLeibnitz, to whom is ascribed the hon-our of having discovered the differentialcalculus, effected this transition “in a mostinadequate manner, a manner both thor-oughly notionless and unmathematical....”(287)

“Analyticcognition is the first premiseof the whole syllogism,—the immediaterelation of the Notion to the Object. Con-sequently, identity is the determinationwhich it recognises as its own: it is onlythe apprehension of what is. SyntheticCognition endeavours toform a Notionof what is, that is, to grasp the multiplic-ity of determinations in its unity. Henceit is the second premise of the syllogismin which terms various as such are related.Its goal is therefore necessity in general.”(288)

Regarding the practice in certain scien-ces (e.g., physics) of taking various “for-ces,” etc., for “explanation,” and of pullingin (stretching), adjusting the facts, etc.,Hegel makes the following clever remark:

“It is now seen that the so-called expla-nation and proof of the concrete elementwhich is brought into Propositions is partly

a tautology and partly a confusion of thetrue relationship; partly, too, it is seen thatthis confusion served to disguise the trickof Cognition, which takes up the data ofexperience one-sidedly (the only manner

in which it could reach its simple defini-tions and formulas), and does away withrefutation from experience by proposingand taking as valid experience not in itsconcrete totality but as example, and onlyin that direction which is serviceable forthe hypotheses and the theory. Concreteexperience being thus subordinated to thepresupposed determinations, the foundationof the theory is obscured, and is exhibitedonly from that side which is in conformitywith the theory.”(315-316)

The old metaphysics (e.g., of Wolff[example: ridiculous pomposity over tri-vialities, etc.]) was overthrown byKantandJacobi. Kant showed that “strict de-monstration” led to antimonies,“but he” (Kant) “did not reflect uponthe nature of this demonstration, which isbound to a finite content; yet the two standand fall together.”(317)

Synthetic cognition is still not complete,for “the Notion does not become unitywith

itself in its object or its reality.... Hencein this Cognition the Idea does not yetreach truth because of the inadequacy ofthe object to the subjective Notion.—Butthe sphere of Necessity is the highest

point of Being and of Reflection; in andfor itself it passes over into the freedomof the Notion, while the inner identitypasses over into its manifestation, whichis the Notion as Notion....”

...“The Idea, insofar as the Notion isnowfor itselfthe Notion determinate inand for itself, is thePracticalIdea, orAction.”(319)And the following § isheaded“B:
	  The Idea of the Good.”

Theoretical cognition ought to givethe object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory mo-vement, an-und für-sich.[62]But the humannotion “definitively” catches this object-ive truth of cognition, seizes and mastersit, only when the notion becomes “being-for-itself” in the sense of practice. Thatis, the practice of man and of mankindis the test, the criterion of the object-ivity of cognition. Is that Hegel’s idea?It is necessary to return to this.

Why is the transition from practice,from action, only to the “good,” dasGute? That is narrow, one-sided! Andtheuseful?There is no doubt the useful alsocomes in. Or is this, according to Hegel,also das Gute?

All this in the chapter “The Ideaof Cognition” (Chapter II)—in the tran-sition to the “Absolute Idea” (ChapterIII)—i.e., undoubtedly, in Hegel prac-tice serves as a link in the analysisof the process of cognition, and indeedas the transition to objective (“abso-lute,” according to Hegel) truth. Marx,consequently, clearly sides with Hegelin introducing the criterion of practiceinto the theory of knowledge: see theTheses on Feuerbach.[63]

Practice in the theoryof knowledge:

Alias:Man’s consciousnessnot only reflects the ob-jective world, but cre-ates it.

(320)“As subjective It”(der Begriff) “has again thepresupposition of an other-ness which is in itself; it istheimpulseto realise itself,or the end which tries togive itself objectivity in theobjective world, and to car-ry itself out, through itself.In the Theoretical Idea thesubjective Notion stands op-posed, as the universalwhich is indeterminate inand for itself, to the ob-jective world, from whichit draws determinate con-tent and fulfilment. But inthe Practical Idea it standsopposed as actual to theactual. But the self-certain-ty which the subject hasin the fact of its deter-minateness in and for itself,is a certainty of its ownactualityand of thenon-actualityof the world;....”......

The notion (= man), assubjective, again presup-posed an otherness whichis in itself (= nature inde-pendent of man). This no-tion (= man) is theim-pulseto realise itself, togive itself objectivity inthe objective world throughitself, and to realise (ful-fil) itself.In the theoretical idea(in the sphere of theory)the subjective notion (cog-nition?), as the universaland in and for itself inde-terminate, stands opposedto the objective world, fromwhich it obtains determi-nate content and fulfilment.In the practical idea (inthe sphere if practice) thisnotion as the actual (act-ing?) stands opposed to theactual.The self-certainty whichthe subject[[here sudden-

ly instead of	“Notion”]]hasin its being in and for it-self, as a determinate sub-ject, is a certainty of itsown actuality and of thenon-actualityof the world.

i.e., that the worlddoes not satisfy man andman decides to changeit by his activity.

...“This determinateness,which is contained in theNotion, and is equal to it,and includes within itselfthe demand of the individ-ual external actuality, istheGood. It appears with

The essence:The “good” is a “demandof external actuality,” i.e.,by the “good” is understoodman’spractice= the de-mand (1) also ofexternalactuality (2).

the dignity of absoluteness,because it is the totality ofthe Notion within itself—the objective in the formsimultaneously of free unity

and subjectivity. This Ideaishigher than the Ideaof Cognition which hasalready been consid-ered, for it has not only thedignity of the universal butalso of thesimply ac-tual....”(320-321)

Practice is higherthan (theoretical)knowledge, for it has notonly the dignity of univer-sality, but also of immedi-ate actuality.

...“Consequently, the ac-tivity of the end is not di-rected against itself, for thepurpose of absorbing andassimilating a given deter-mination; it aims rather atpositing its own determi-nation, and, by transcend-ing the determinations of

“The activity of the endis not directed against it-self....but aims, by destroyingdefinite (sides, features,phenomena) of theexter-nalworld, atgiving itselfreality in the form of ex-ternal actuality....”

the external world, at giv-ing itself reality in the formof external actuality....”(321)

...“The realised Good is good by virtue of what it isalready in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realisation givesit an external existence....”(322). “Presupposed to it (theGood) is theobjective world, in the presupposition of whichthe subjectivity and finitude of the Good consists andwhich, as being other, pursues its own course; and in iteven the realisation of the Good is exposed to obstacles,and may even be made impossible....” + (322-323) ...“Pre-supposed to it (the Good) is theobjective world, in the pre-supposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the Goodconsistsand which, as being other, pursues its owncourse;and in it even the realisation of the Good is exposedto obstacles, and may even be made impossible.....+(322-323)

The “objective world” “pursues its own course,and man’s practice, confronted by this objectiveworld, encounters “obstacles in the realisation”of the End, even “impossibility....”

+ ...“Thus the Good remains anOught; it is in and foritself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remainsdetermined against it as a not-Being too....”++(323)

The Good, welfare, well-meaning aspirations, remaina SUBJECTIVE OUGHT....

++ ...“Although the Idea of the perfected

Good is an absolute postulate, it is no morethan a postulate,—that is, the absoluteinfected with thedeterminateness of

subjectivity. There are stilltwo worldsin opposition:one a realm ofsubjec-

tivityin thepurespaces oftrans-parentthought, the other a realmofobjectivityin the element of an exter-nallymanifoldactuality, which is anunexplored realm of darkness. The com-plete development of the unresolved con-

tradiction, of that absolute end which thebarrier of this actuality insuperably op-poses, has been considered more closelyinPhänomenologie des Geistes, p. 453et seq....”(323)

A gibeat the pure “spaces of transparent thought”in the realm of subjectivity, which is confronted by the“darkness” of “objective,” “manifold” actuality.

...“In the latter” (= der theoretischenIdee[64]in
	  contrast to der praktischen Idee[65])...“Cognition knows itself only as appre-hension, as the self-identity of the No-tion, which for itself is indeterminate;fulfilment, that is, objectivity determinedin and for itself, isgivento it, and thatwhichtrulyis is theactuality that is

present independently of subjectivepositing. The Practical Idea on the other

hand counts this actuality (which at thesame time opposes it as an insuperablebarrier) as that which in and for itselfis null, which is to receive its true deter-mination and sole value through the endsof the Good. Will itself consequently bars

the wayto its own goal insofar as itseparates itself from Cognition andexternal actuality does not, for it,retain the form of that which truly

is; consequently the Idea of the Good canfind its complement only in the Idea ofthe True.”(323-324)

Cognition ... finds itself faced bythat which truly is as actuality presentindependently of subjective opinions(Setzen[66]). (This is pure materi-alism!) Man’s will, his practice, itselfblocks the attainment of its end...in that it separates itself from cog-nition and does not recognise externalactuality for that which truly is (forobjective truth). What is necessary istheunion of cognitionandpractice.

And immediately following this:“But it makes this transition through

itself” (the transition of the idea of truthinto the idea of the Good, of theory intopractice, and vice versa). “In the syllo-gism of action one premise is the immediate

relation of thegood end to actuality,of which it makes itself master, directingit (in the second premise) asexternalmeansagainst external actuality.”(324)

The “syllogism of action” ... For He-gelaction, practice, is alogical“syllogism,” a figure of logic. Andthat is true! Not of course, in the sensethat the figure of logic has its otherbeing in the practice of man (=abso-lute idealism), but vice versa: man’spractice, repeating itself a thousandmillion times, becomes consolidatedin man’s consciousness by figures of logic.Precisely (and only) on account of thisthousand-million-fold repetition, thesefigures have the stability of a preju-dice, an axiomatic character.First premise: Thegood end(subjectiveend) versusactuality(“external actuality”).Second premise: The externalmeans(in-strument), (objective).Third premise or conclusion: The coin-cidence of subjectiveand objective, the testof subjective ideas, thecriterion of objectivetruth.

...“The realisation of the Good in theteeth of an opposing and other actualityis the mediation which is essential forthe immediate relation and actualisationof the Good....”(325)

...“If now in spite of this” (through activ-ity) “the end of the Good should not berealised, then this is a relapse of the Notionto the standpoint which the Notion hasbefore its activity—the standpoint of thatactuality which was determined as nulland yet was presupposed as real. Thisrelapse becomes a progress to bad infin-ity; it has its only ground in the factthat in the transcendence of this abstract

reality the transcendence is equally imme-diately forgotten, or that it is forgottenthat this reality has already been presup-posed as non-objective actuality which isnull in and for itself.”(325)

The non-fulfilment of ends (of humanactivity) has as its cause (Grund) thefact that reality is taken as non-existent(nichtig), that its (reality’s) objectiveactuality is not being recognised.

“By the activity of the objective No-tion external actuality is altered, and itsdetermination is accordingly transcended;and by this very process it loses merelyapparent reality, external determinability,and nullity, and it is thuspositedas beingin and for itself....”(326)+

The activity of man, who hasconstructed an objective picture ofthe world for himself,changesexternal actuality, abolishes itsdeterminateness (= alters somesides or other, qualities, of it),

and thus removes from it the fea-tures of Semblance, externality andnullity, and makes it as being inand for itself (= objectively true).

+ ...Presupposition in general is heretranscended,—that is, the determination

of the Good as an end which ismerelysubjectiveand restricted in its content,

the necessity of realising it by subjectiveactivity, and this activity itself.In theresultmediation transcends itself; theresult is an immediacy which is not thereconstitution of the presupposition butrather the fact of its transcendedness. TheIdea of the Notion which is determinedin and for itself is thus positedno longermerely in the active subject, but equally

as an immediate actuality; and the latterconversely is posited as it is inCogni-tion,asobjectivity which truly is."(326)

The results of activity is the test of subjective cognitionand the criterion ofOBJECTIVITY WHICH TRULY IS.

...“In this result thenCognitionis re-

constructedand united with thePractical Idea; the actuality which isfound as given is at the same time determined

as the realised absolute end,—not however(as in inquiring Cognition) merely as ob-jective world without the subjectivity ofthe Notion, but as objective world whoseinner ground and actual persistence is theNotion. This is the Absolute Idea.”(327)((End of Chapter II. Transition to Chap-ter III: “The Absolute Idea.”))

Chapter III: “The Absolute Idea.”(327)

...“The Absolute Idea has turned outto be the identity of the Theoretical and thePractical Idea; .each of these by itselfis one-sided....” (327)

The unity of the theoretical idea (ofknowledge)and of practice—thisNB—and this unityprecisely inthe theory of knowledge, forthe resulting sum is the “absolute idea”(and the idea = “das objektive Wahre”[67])

What remains to be considered is no lon-ger Inhalt,[68]but ...“the universal elementof its form—that is, themethod.”(329)

“In inquiring cognition the method islikewise in the position, of atool, of ameans which stands on the subjective side,whereby the subjective side relates itself tothe object.... But in true cognition the meth-od is not merely a quantity of certaindeterminations; it is the fact that the No-tion is determined in and for itself, andis the middle member” (in the logical figureof the syllogism) “only because it equallyhas the significance of objective....”(331)

...“The absolute method” (i.e., the meth-od of cognition of objective truth) “onthe other hand does not behave as exter-nal reflection; it draws the determinateelement directly from its object itself,since it is the object’s immanent principleand soul.—It was this thatPlatodemanded

of cognition, that it shouldconsider thingsin and for themselves, and that while part-ly considering them in their universalityit should also hold fast to them, not catch-ing at externals, examples and compari-sons, but contemplating the things aloneand bringing before consciousness whatis immanent in them....”(335-336)

This method of “absolute cognition” isana-lytic... “but equally it issynthetic”(336)

“Dieses so sehr synthetische als analy-tische Moment desUrteils, wodurch dasanfängliche Allgemeine aus ihm selbst alsdasAndere Seinersich bestimmt, ist dasdialektische zu nennen” ...(336)(+seethe next page).[69]→

“This equally synthetic and analyticmoment of theJudgment, by which (themoment) the original universality[gen-eral concept]determines itself out ofitself as other in relation to itself,must be called dialectical.”

[Back to top]A determination which is not a clearone!![70]

1) The determination of the concept outof itself[the thing itself must be consid-ered in its relations and in its develop-ment];

2) the contradictory nature of the thingitself (das Andere seiner[71]), the contra-dictory forces and tendencies in each phe-nomenon;

3) the union of analysis and synthesis.

Such apparently are the elements ofdialectics.

One could perhaps present these ele-ments in greater detail as follows:

In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine ofthe unity of opposites. This embodies the essenceof dialectics, but it requires explanations and develop-ment.

←...“Dialectics is one of 
	  those ancientsciences which has been most misjudged inmodern metaphysics[here obviously = the-ory of knowledge and logic]and in thepopular philosophy of ancients and mod-

erns alike....”(336)Diogenes Laertiussaid ofPlatothat he was the father ofdialectics, the third philosophical science(as Thales was the father of natural phi-losophy and Socrates of moral philoso-

phy), but that those who are particularlyloud in talking about this merit of Plato’sgive little thought to it....

...“Dialectics has often been consideredan art, as though it rested upon a sub-jective talent and did not belong to theobjectivity of the Notion....”(336-337)

It is an important merit of Kant’s to havere-introduced dialectics, to have recognisedit as “necessary” (a property) “;of reason”(337) but the result (of the applicationof dialectics) must be “opposite” (to Kant-ianism).See below.

There follows a very interesting, clearand importantoutline of dialectics.

...“Besides generally appearing as con-tingent, dialectics usually has this moredetailed form, that when in respect of anyparticular object, e.g., the world, mo-tion, point, etc., it is shown that it hasany particular determination—e.g. (inthe order of the above-mentioned objects)finitude in space or time, presence atthisplace, absolute negation of space—it is, however, shown further that it haswith equal necessity the opposite deter-mination, e.g., infinity in space and time,non-presence at this place, and a rela-tion to space, consequently spatiality. The

older Eleatic school applied its dialec-tics chiefly against motion; Plato frequent-ly against contemporary ideas and con-cepts (especially those of the Sophists),

but also against pure categories and re-

flection-determinations; the developed lat-er scepticism extended it not only tothe immediate so-called data of conscious-ness and maxims of ordinary life, but

also to all the concepts of science. Theconclusion which is drawn from such dia-lectics iscontradictionand thenullityofthe assertions made. But it may occur ina double sense,—in the objective sense,theobjectwhich thus contradicts itselfbeing held to cancel itself and to be null(—this was, for instance, the Eleatic con-clusion, by which, for example, the world,motion, and the point were deprived oftruth), or in the subjective sense,cogni-

tion being held to be defective. The latterconclusion is sometimes understood to meanthat it is only this dialectics that effectsthe trick of an illusive show. This is the

ordinary view of so called sound commonsense, which holds fast to the evidenceof thesensesand to customary ideas andexpressions....”(337-338)

Diogenes the Dog,[73]for example,proved movement by walking up anddown, “a vulgar refutation”(338), saysHegel.

...“Or again the result reached—that ofsubjective nullity—relates, not to the dia-lectic itself, but rather to the cognitionagainst which it is directed, and in thesense of scepticism and likewise of theKantian philosophy, tocognitionin gener-

al....”(338)

“The fundamental prejudice here isthat the dialectic hasonly a negative re-sult,” (338)

Among other things, it is said thatit is a merit of Kant’s to have drawnattention to dialectics and to the con-sideration “of the determinations of thoughtin and for themselves”(339)

“The object in its existence withoutthought and Notion is an image or a name:itiswhat itisin the determinations ofthought and Notion....”

...“It must not therefore be considered thefault of an object, or of cognition, that theymanifest themselves as dialectical by theirnature and by an external connection....”

...“Thus all opposites which are takenas fixed, such as, for example, finite andinfinite, or individual and universal, arecontradictory not by virtue of some exter-nal connection, but rather are transitionsin and for themselves, as the considera-tion of their nature showed....”(339)

“Now this is the standpoint which wasreferred to above, in which a universal#first termconsidered in and for itselfshows itself to be its own Other....”(340)

...“But the Other is essentially not the

empty negative or Nothingwhich is com-monly taken as the result of dialec-tics, it is the Other of the first, the negative

of the immediate; it is thus determined

as mediated,—and altogether contains thedetermination of the first. The first is thusessentiallycontainedandpreservedin theOther.—To hold fast the positive initsneg-

ative, and the content of the presupposition

in the result, is the most important partof rational cognition; also only the simplestreflection is needed to furnish convictionof the absolute truth and necessity of thisrequirement, while with regard to theexamplesof proofs, the whole of Logicconsists of these.”(340)

Not empty negation, not futile negation,not scepti-calnegation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic andessential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly contains theelement of negation and indeed as its most importantelement — no, as a moment of development, retainingthe positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without anyeclecticism.

Dialectics consists in general in the ne-gation of thefirstproposition, in its re-placement by asecond(in the transitionof the first into the second, in the demon-stration of the connection of the firstwith the second, etc.). The second can bemade the predicate of the first—

— “for example, the finite is infinite,one is many, the individual is theuniversal....”(341)

...“The first or immediate term is the No-

tion initself, and therefore is the nega-tive onlyin itself; the dialectical momentwith it therefore consists in this, thatthedistinctionwhich itimplicitlycontainsis posited in it. The second term on theother hand is itself thedeterminate en-

tity, thedistinctionor relation; hence withit the dialectical moment consists in thepositing of theunitywhich is containedin it....”—(341-342)

(In relation to the simple and origi-nal, “first,” positive assertions, proposi-tions, etc., the “dialectical moment”,i.e.,scientific consideration, demands the dem-onstration of difference, connection, tran-sition. Without that the simple positiveassertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. Inrelation to the “second,” negative propo-sition, the “dialectical moment” demandsthe demonstration of “unity,” i.e., ofthe connection of negative and positive,the presence of this positive in the nega-tive. From assertion to negation—fromnegation to “unity” with the asserted—without this dialectics becomes empty ne-gation, a game, scepsis.)

... —“If then the negative, the deter-minate, the relation, judgment, and alldeterminations which fall under this sec-ond moment, do not of themselves appearas contradictory and dialectical, this isa mere fault of thought which does notconfront its thoughts one with another.For the materials—oppositedeterminationsinone relation—arepositedalready andare at hand for thought. But formal thoughtmakes identity its law, and allows thecontradictory content which lies before it

to drop into the sphere of sensuous repre-sentation, into space and time, where thecontradictory terms are heldapartin spa-tial and temporal juxtaposition and thuscome before consciousnesswithout mu-tual contact.”(342)

“Come before consciousness withoutmutual contact” (the object)—that isthe essence of anti-dialectics. It is onlyhere that Hegel has, as it were, allowedthe ass’s ear of idealism to show them-selves—by referring time and space (inconnection with sensuous representation)to somethinglowercompared withthought. Incidentally, in acertainsense,sensuous representation is, of course,lower. The crux lies in the fact thatthought mustapprehendthe whole “re-presentation” in its movement, butforthatthoughtmust be dialectical. Issensuous representationclosertoreality than thought? Both yes and no.Sensuous representation cannot, appre-hend movementas a whole, it can-not, for example, apprehend movementwith a speed of 300,000 km. per second,butthoughtdoes and must apprehend it.Thought, taken from sensuous representa-tion, also reflects reality; time is a formof being of objective reality. Here, in theconcept of time (and not in the relationof sensuous representation to thought)is the idealism of Hegel.

...“In this connection this thought[75]makes it its fixed principle that contradic-tion is unthinkable; but in truth the think-ing of contradiction is the essential mo-ment of the Notion; in point of fact formalthought does think contradiction, but im-mediately disregards it, and with the asser-tion of that principle” (the statement thatcontradiction is unthinkable) “passes overto abstract negation.”(342)

“The negativity which has just beenconsidered is theturning-pointof themovement of the Notion. It is the simple

point of negative self-relation, the inter-nal source of all activity, vital and spirit-ual self-movement, the dialectic soul which

all truth has in it and through which it

alone is truth; for the transcendence ofthe opposition between the Notion andReality, and that unity which is the truth,rest upon this subjectivity alone.—Thesecond negative, the negative of the neg-

ative, which we have reached, is this

transcendence of the contradiction, but isno more theactivityofanexternal reflec-tion than the contradiction is; it is thein-nermostandmost objectivemoment of Lifeand Spirit, by virtue of which a subject,the person, the free, has being.”(342-343)

Important here is 1) the char-acterisation of dialectics: self-move-ment, the source of activity, themovement of life and spirit; thecoincidence of the concepts of thesubject (man) with reality; 2) ob-jectivism to the highest degree (“derobjektivste Moment”[76]).

This negation of the negation is thethird term, says Hegel (343)—“ifnumberis applicable”—but it can also be takenas thefourth(Quadruplicität[77]), (344)countingtwonegations: the “simple” (or“formal”) and the “absolute.” (343 i.f.)

The difference is not clear to me, is not the absolu-te equivalent to the more concrete?

“That this unity, as well as the wholeform of the method, is atriplicityis wholly,however, the merely superficial and ex-ternal side of the manner of cognition”(344)

—but, he says, that is already “an infi-nite merit of Kant’s philosophy” that itat least (even if ohne Begriff[78]) demon-strated this.

“Formalists, it is true, have also seizedupon triplicity, and have held fast to itsemptyframework; and this form has beenrendered tedious and of ill-repute by theshallow misuse and the barrenness of mod-ern so-called philosophicconstruction,which consists simply in attaching the for-mal framework without concept and im-manent determination to all sorts of mat-ter and employing it for external arrange-ment. But its inner value cannot be dimin-ished by this vapid misuse, and it muststill be deemed of high value that the out-ward form of the rational has been dis-covered, albeit not understood.”(344-345)

The result of the negation of the nega-

tion, this third term is “not a qui-escent third term, but, as this unity”(of contradictions), “is self-mediatingmovement and activity....” (345)

The result of this dialectical transforma-tion into the “third” term, into the synthe-sis, is a new premise, assertion, etc., whichin turn becomes the source of a furtheranalysis. But into it, into this “third”stage has already entered the “content”of cognition (“the content of cognition assuch enters within the sphere of contempla-tion”) — and themethodis extended intoasystem. (346)

The beginning of all consideration, ofthe whole analysis—this first premise—now appears indeterminate, “imperfect”;the need arises to prove, “derive” (ablei-ten) (347) it and it turns out that“this may seem equivalent to the demandfor an infinitebackwardprogress in proof andderivation”(347)—but, on the other hand,the new premise drivesforward....

...“Thus, cognition rolls forward from con-tent to content. This progress determinesitself, first, in this manner, that it be-gins from simple determinatenesses andthat each subsequent one isricherandmore concrete. For the result contains itsown beginning, and the development ofthe beginning has made it the richer bya new determinateness. The universal isthe foundation; the progress therefore mustnot be taken as a flow from Other to Other.In the absolute method the Notionpre-servesitself in its otherness, and the uni-versal in its particularisation, in the Judg-ment and in reality; it raises to each nextstage of determination the whole mass ofits antecedent content, and by its dialec-tical progress not only loses nothing andleaves nothing behind, but carries withit all that it has acquired, enriching andconcentrating itself upon itself....”(349)

(This extract is not at all bad as a kindof summing up of dialectics.)

Butexpansionrequires alsodeepening

(“In-sich-gehen”[79]) “ and greater extensionis also higher intensity.” (349)

“The richest consequently is also themost concrete andsubjective, and thatwhich carries itself back into the simplestdepth is also the most powerful and com-prehensive.”(349)

“In this manner it comes about that eachstep in the progress of further determi-nation in advancing from the indetermi-nate beginning is also arearward approachto it, so that two processes which mayat first appear to be different (the regres-sive confirmation of the beginning and itsprogressive further determination) coincideand are the same.”(350)

It is impermissible deprezieren[80]thisindeterminate beginning:

“It requires no apology that it”(the beginning) “may be admitted mere-ly as provisional and hypothetical. Anyobjections which might be advanced—about the limits of human cognition, orthe need of a critical investigation of theinstrument of cognition before the prob-lem is attacked—are themselves supposi-

tions which, as concrete determinations,imply the need for their mediation andproof. Formally then they are no betterthan thatbeginningagainst which they

protest, and rather require a derivationby reason of their more concrete content; sothat it issheer presumptionto demand

that they should have preferential consid-eration. Their content is untrue, for they

make incontrovertible and absolute whatis known to be finite and untrue (namely,

a restricted cognition which is determinedas form and instrument as against its

content); and this untrue cognition is it-self form and regressive confirmation.—The method of truth too knows the begin-ning to be incomplete because it is be-ginning, but also knows this incompleteterm in general as necessary, because truthis only the coming to itself through thenegativity of immediacy....”(350-351)

...“By reason of the nature of the methodwhich has been demonstrated, science isseen to be acirclewhich returns upon it-self, for mediation bends back its end intoits beginning, simple ground. Further, thiscircle is acircle of circles.... The varioussciences ... are fragments of this chain....”(351)“The method is the pure Notion whichis related only to itself; it is thereforethe simple self-relation which is Being.But now it is also Beingfulfilled, the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the con-crete and also thoroughly intensive to-tality....”(352)

...“Secondly, this Idea” ((die Idee desabsoluten Erkennens[82])) “still is logical,it is enveloped in pure thought, and isthe science only of the divine Notion.The systematic development is itself a real-isation, but is maintained within thesame sphere. Since the pure Idea of Cogni-tion is to that extent enclosed in subjectiv-ity, it is animpulseto transcend the latter,and pure truth, as the last result, also

becomes thebeginning of another sphereand science. This transition need here onlybe intimated.

“For the Idea posits itself as the abso-lute unity of the pure Notion and itsReality, and thus gathers itself into theimmediacy ofBeing; and in doing so,as totality in this form, it isNature.”(352-353)

This sentence on thelast(353)page oftheLogicis highly noteworthy. The tran-sition of the logical idea tonature. Itbrings one within a hand’s grasp of mate-rialism. Engels was right[83]when he saidthat Hegel’s system was materialism turnedupside down. This is not the last sen-tence of theLogic, but what comes afterit to the end of the page is unimportant.

End of theLogic. 17.XII.1914.

NB:In the smallLogic (Ency-clopaedia, Par.244, Zusatz[84]p.414[85]thelastsen-tenceof thebook reads:“diese seiendeIdee aberist dieNatur”[86]

It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the “Absol-ute Ideas” scarcely says a word about God (hardly everhas a “divine” “notion” slipped out accidentally) andapart from that—this NB—it contains almost nothingthat is specificallyidealism, but has for its mainsubject thedialecticalmethod. The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel’s logic is thedialectical method—this is extremely noteworthy. Andone thing more: in thismost idealisticofHegel’s works there is theleastidealism and themost materialism. “Contradictory,” but a fact!

TheEncyclopaedia§ 227—excellent ontheanalyticalmethod (to “analyse” the“Given concrete” phenomenon—“to give the

form of abstraction” to its individualaspects and “herausheben” “to bring intorelief”—“the genus, or force and law”p. 398—and on its application:

It is not at all “an arbitrary matter”(398)whether we apply the analytical or thesynthetical method (as man pflegt zu sprech-en[88])—“it
      is the form of the very objectsthat have to be cognised upon which itdepends” (399)

Locke and the empiricists adopt thestandpoint of analysis. And they oftensay that “in general cognition cannotdo more.”(398)

“It is, however, at once apparent that

this turns things upside down, and thatcognition which wishes to take things astheyarethereby falls into contradictionwith itself.” The chemist, for example,“martert”[90]a piece of flesh and discovers

in it nitrogen, carbon, etc. “But then theseabstract substances have ceased to beflesh.”

There can be many definitions, for ob-jects have many aspects.

“The richer the object to be defined,i.e., the more numerous the aspects whichit offers to one’s notice, the more variousalso are the definitions framed from them”(400 § 229)—for example, the definitionof life, of the state, etc.

In their definitions,Spinozaand Schel-ling present a mass of “speculation” (Hegelhere obviously uses this word in the goodsense) but “in the form of assurances.”Philosophy, however, must prove and de-rive everything, and not limit itself todefinitions.

Division (Einteilung) must be “naturaland not merely artificial, i.e., arbitrary.”(401)

Pp.403-404— anger at 
	  “construction”and the “play” of construing, whereas itis a question of the Begriff, the “Idee,” of “Ein-heit des Begriffs und der Objektivität....”[91](403)

In the smallEncyclopaedia§ 233,sectionbis entitleddas Wollen[92](which in thelarge Logicis “Die Idee desGuten”[93]).

Activity is a “contradiction”—the pur-pose is real and not real, possible andnot ... etc.

“Formally, however, the disappearanceof this contradiction consists in activityabolishing the subjectivity of the pur-pose and along with it the objectivity,the opposite, in virtue of which bothare finite, and abolishing not merely theone-sidedness of this subjectivity, but thesubjectivity as a whole”(406).

The standpoint ofKantandFichte(es-pecially in moral philosophy) is the stand-point of purpose, of subjective ought(407)(without connection with the objective)....

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegelridicules(§ 237, Vol. VI, p. 409)“decla-mation” over it, as if everything wererevealed in it, and he remarks that“the absolute idea” ... is ... “the univer-sal,” “but the universal not merely as ab-stract form, to which (sic!) the particularcontent stands contrasted as an Other,

but as the absolute form into which alldeterminations, the whole fullness of thecontent posited by it, have retreated. Inthis respect the absolute idea can be com-pared to an old man, who utters the samestatements of religion as a child, but forwhom they have the significance of hiswhole lifetime. Even if the child under-stands the religious content, it is for himstill only something outside of which thewhole of life and the whole of the worldlie.”(410)

...“The interest lies in the whole move-ment....”(§ 237, 409)

...“The content is the living develop-ment of the idea....” “Each of the stageshitherto reviewed is an image of the ab-solute, but at first in a limited way....”(401)

§ 238 Addendum:“The philosophical method is both ana-lytical and synthetical, but not in thesense of a bare juxtaposition or a merealternation of these two methods of finitecognition, but rather in such a way thatit holds them transcended in itself, and

in everyone of its movements, there-fore, it proves itself simultaneously ana-lytical and synthetical. Philosophical

thought proceeds analytically, insofar as it

only accepts its object, the Idea, allowsthe latter its own way and, as it were,only looks on at its movement and de-velopment. To this extent philosophisingis wholly passive. Philosophic thought,

however, is equally synthetic and showsitself to be the activity of the Notion itself.That, however, involves the effort to re-frain from our own fancies and privateopinions, which always seek to obtrudethemselves....”(411)

(§ 243, p. 413)... “Thus the method isnot an external form, but the soul andnotion of the content....”

(End of theEncyclopaedia;see aboveon the side the extract from the end ofLog-ic.[94])

[2]“ossified material”—Ed.

[3]“to render fluid”—Ed.

[4]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[5]ofthe Notion—Ed.

[6]in fine—at the end—Ed.

[7]“to speak ill” of imagination and memory—Ed.

[8]“the summit of thought”—Ed.

[9]“the incomprehensible”—Ed.

[10]truth—Ed.

[11]sensation andintuition—Ed.

[12]SeeF. Engels,Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical
	German Philosophy(Marx and Engels,Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 371).

[13]constitutive—Ed.

[14]objective—Ed.

[15]dispenses with the material of sensuousness—Ed.

[16]constitutive—Ed.

[17]“formalscience”—Ed.

[18]“pure truth”—Ed.

[19]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[20]thelogicalforms—Ed.

[21]“adequate notion”—Ed.

[22]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[23]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[24]Lenin wrote this in English.—Ed.

[25]That’s what is needed!—Ed.

[26]notion-determinations—Ed.

[27]“otiose form”—Ed.

[28]If I may be allowed to say so.—Ed.

[29]individual—Ed.

[30]particular—Ed.

[31]universal—Ed.

[32]Chapter I ofCapital—Ed.

[33]to be inverted—Ed.

[34]from the threshold—Ed.

[35]Apparently the preposition “to” before the
	word “syllogism” is omitted.—Ed.

[36]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[37]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[38]The word “logic” in the manuscript is linked to the word
	“here” in the following quotation from Hegel.—Ed.

[39]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[40]of objective totality—Ed.

[41]“natural necessity”—Ed.

[42]the End—Ed.

[43]vulgar—Ed.

[44]“beyond”—Ed.

[45]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[46]existing specially for themselves.—Ed.

[47]the understanding—Ed.

[48]false—Ed.

[49]A critique of the metaphysical views of theMachistV.Chernovis presented by Lenin in 
	his bookMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism(see V. I. Lenin,Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960).

[50]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[51]essentially is in cognition—Ed.

[52]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.——Ed.

[53]Hegel,Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834, pp. 248-262.—Ed.

[54]“in itself” and “for itself”!!!—Ed.

[55]the Notions—Ed.

[56]abstract one-sided determinations of 
	“former—pre-Kantian—metaphysics”—Ed.

[57]everythingempirical—Ed.

[58]Thing-in-itself—Ed.

[59]“Beyond”—Ed.

[60]At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues
	in the notebook “Hegel. Logic. Section III”—Ed.

[61]The solution of this equation was given by Gauss
	in his workDiisquisitiones arithmeticae (Arithmetical Studies), 1801.

[62]in and for itself—Ed.

[63]Lenin is referring to Marx’s“Theses on Feuerbach,”written in 1845 and published by Engels in 1888 as an appendix toLudwig Feuerbach and the
	End of Classical German Philosophy(see Marx and Engels,Selected Works, Vol. II,
	Moscow, 1958, pp. 403-405).

[64]the Theoretical Idea—Ed.

[65]the Practical Idea—Ed.

[66]positing—Ed.

[67]“the objectivly true”—Ed.

[68]content—Ed.

[69]In the manuscript, there isan arrowfrom the parenthesis 
	pointing to the paragraph:“Dialectics is...,”located on the following 
	page of	the manuscript. (See p. 223 of this volume.)—Ed.

[70]This section is known as Lenin’s “Summary of Dialectics,” and
	also exists in the Lenin Internet Archive on aseparate pagepaired with
	Lenin’s“On the Question of Dialectics”—KCG, 2007.

[71]the other of itself—Ed.

[72]See p. 220 of this volume.—Ed.

[73]The reference is toDiogenes of Sinope, a
	representative of the Cynic school who was nicknamed the “Dog,”
	probably because of his beggarly life and disregard for public morals.

[74]noting else—Ed.

[75]formal thought—Ed.

[76]“the most objective moment”—Ed.

[77]quadruplicity—Ed.

[78]without any concept—Ed.

[79]Going into itself—Ed.

[80]to depreciate—Ed.

[81]“fulfilledBeing”—Ed.

[82]the idea of absolutecognition—Ed.

[83]See F. Engels,Ludwig Feuerbach and the End 
	of Classical German Philosophy(Marx and Engels,Selected Works,
	Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 372).

[84]addendum—Ed.

[85]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[86]“but this Idea which has Being is Nature”—Ed.

[87]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[88]is usually said—Ed.

[89]See K. Marx,Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959,Chapter VII, p. 179. In footnote 1, Marx quotes from Hegel’sEncyclopaedia:
	“Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally
	in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and react on each other
	in accordance with their own nature, in this way, without any direct interference
	in the process, carries out reason’s intentions.” (Hegel;Enzyklopädie,
	Erster Theil, “Die Logik,” Berlin, 1840, S. 382).

[90]tortures—Ed.

[91]the Notion, the “idea”, “the unity
	of the Notion and objectivity”—Ed.

[92]volition—Ed.

[93]“The Idea of the Good”—Ed.

[94]See p. [233] of this volume.—Ed.