Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

(THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)

N. General Picture of the Struggle at the Congress. The
      Revolutionary and Opportunist Wings of the Party

Having finished our analysis of the Congress debates and voting,
      we must now sum up, so that we may, on the basis of theentireCongress material, answer the question: what
      elements, groups, and shades went to make up the final majority
      and minority which we saw in the elections and which were
      destined for a time to become the main division in our Party? A
      summary must be made of all the material relating to shades of
      principle, theoretical and tactical, which the minutes of the
      Congress provide in such abundance. Without a general
      “resumé” without a general picture of the Congress as a
      whole, and of all the principal groupings during the voting,
      this material is too disjointed, too disconnected, so that at
      first sight the individual groupings seem accidental, especially
      to one who does not take the trouble to make an independent and
      comprehensivestudyof the Congress Minutes (and how
      many readers have taken that trouble?).

In English parliamentary reports we often meet the
      characteristic word “division”. The House “divided” into such
      and such a majority and minority, it is said when an issue is
      voted. The “division” of our Social-Democratic House on the
      various issues discussed at the Congress presents a picture of
      the struggle within the Party, of its shades of opinion and
      groups, that isunique of its kind and unparalleled for its
      completeness and accuracy. To make the picture a graphic
      one, to obtain arealpicture instead of a heap of
      disconnected, disjointed, and isolated facts and incidents, to
      put a stop to the endless and senseless arguments over
      particular votings (who voted for whom and who supported whom?),
      I have decided to try to depictall the basictypesof
      “divisions” at our Congress in the form of adiagram.
      This will probably seem strange to a great many people, but I
      doubt whether any other method can be found that would really
      generalise and summarise the results in the most complete and
      accurate manner possible. Which way a particular delegate voted
      can be ascertained with absolute accuracy in cases when a
      roll-call vote was taken; and in certain important cases when no
      roll-call vote was taken it can be determined from the minutes
      with a very high degree of probability, with a sufficient degree
      of approximation to the truth. And if we take into accountallthe roll-call votes and all the other votes on
      issues of any importance (as judged, for example, by the
      thoroughness and warmth of the debates), we shall obtain the
      most objective picture of our inner Party struggle that the
      material at our disposal permits. In doing so, instead of giving
      a photograph, i.e., an image of each voting separately, we shall
      try to give a picture, i.e., to present all the maintypesof voting, ignoring relatively unimportant
      exceptions and variations which would only confuse matters. In
      any case, anybody will be able with the aid of the minutes to
      check every detail of our picture, to amplify it with any
      particular voting he likes, in short, to criticise it not only
      by arguing, expressing doubts, and making references to isolated
      incidents, but by drawing adifferent pictureon the
      basis of the same material.

In marking on the diagram each delegate who took part in the
      voting, we shall indicate by special shading the four main
      groups which we have traced in detail through the whole of the
      Congress debates, viz., 1) theIskra-ists of the
      majority; 2) theIskra-ists of the minority; 3) the
      “Centre”, and 4) the anti-Iskra-ists. We have seen the
      difference in shades of principle between these groups in ahost of instances, and if anyone does not like thenamesof the groups, which remind lovers of zigzags too
      much of theIskraorganisation and theIskratrend, we can tell them that it is not the name that
      matters. Now that we have traced the shades through all the
      debates at the Congress, it is easy to substitute for the
      already established and familiar Party appellations (which jar
      on the ears of some) a characterisation of theessence of
      the shades between the groups. Were thissubstitution made,
      we would obtain the following names for these same four groups:
      1) consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats; 2) minor
      opportunists; 3) middling opportunists; and 4) major
      opportunists (major by our Russian standards). Let us hope that
      these names will be less shocking to those who have latterly
      taken to assuring themselves and others thatIskra-ist
      is a name which only denotes a “circle”, and not atrend.

Let us now explain in detail the types of voting “snapped” on
      this diagram:

The first type of voting (A) covers the cases when the “Centre”
      joined with theIskra-ists against the
      anti-Iskra-ists or a part of them. It includes the vote
      on the programme as a whole (Comrade Akimov alone

abstained, all the
      others voted for); the vote on the resolution condemning
      federation in principle (all voted for except the five
      Bundists); the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules (the five
      Bundists voted against us; five abstained, viz.: Martynov,
      Akimov, Brouckère, and Makhov with his two votes; the rest
      were with us);it is this vote that is represented in
      diagram A. Further, thethreevotes on the
      question of endorsingIskraas the Party’s Central
      Organ were also of this type: the editors (five votes)
      abstained; in all three cases there were two votes against
      (Akimov and Brouckère), and, in addition, when the vote on
      themotivesfor endorsingIskrawas taken, the
      five Bundists and Comrade Martynov

abstained.[1][1]Why was the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules taken for
      depiction in the diagram? Because the votes on endorsing Iskra
      were not as full, while the votes on the programme and on the
      question of federation referred to political decisions of a less
      definite and specific character. Speaking generally, the choice
      of one or another of a number of votesof the same typewill not in the least affect the main features of the picture,
      as anyone may easily see by making the corresponding changes.
    —Lenin

This type of voting provides the answer to a very interesting
      and important question, namely, when did the Congress “Centre”
      vote with theIskra-ists? It was either when the
      anti-“Iskra”-ists, too, were with us, with a few
      exceptions (adoption of the programme, or endorsement ofIskrawithout motives stated), or else when it was a
      question of the sort ofstatementwhich was not in
      itself a direct committal to a definite political position
      (recognition ofIskra’s organising work was not in
      itself a committal to carry out its organisational policy in
      relation to particular groups; rejection of the principle of
      federation did not preclude abstention from voting on a specific
      scheme of federation, as we have seen in the case of Comrade
      Makhov). We have already seen, when speaking of the significance
      of the groupings at the Congress in general, how falsely this
      matter is put in the official account of the official Iskra;,
      which (through the mouth of Comrade Martov)slurs and
      glosses overthe difference between theIskra-ists
      and the “Centre”, between consistent revolutionary
      Social-Democrats and opportunists, by citing cases when the
      anti-“Iskra”-ists, too, voted with us! Even the most
      “Right-wing” of the opportunists in the German and French
      Social-Democratic parties never vote against such points asthe adoption of the programme as a whole.

The second type of voting (B) covers the cases when theIskra-ists, consistent and inconsistent, voted together
      against all the anti-Iskra-ists and the entire
      “Centre”. These were mostly cases that involved giving effect to
      definite and specific plans of theIskrapolicy, that
      is, endorsingIskra in fact and not only in word. They
      include the Organising Committee

incident;[2][2]It is this vote that is depicted in Diagram B; theIskra-ists secured thirty-two votes, the Bundist
      resolution sixteen. It should be pointed out that of the votes
      of this typenot one was by roll-call. The way the
      individual delegates voted can only be established—but with
      a very high degree of probability—by two sets of evidence:
      1) in the debate the speakers of both groups ofIskra-ists spoke in favour those of the
      anti-Iskra-ists and the “Centre” against; 2) the number
      of votes castin favourwas always very close to
      thirty-three. Nor should it be forgotten that when analysing the
      Congress debates we pointed out, quite apart from the voting,a numberof cases when the “Centre” sided with the
      anti-Iskra-ists (the opportunists) against us. Some of
      these issues were: the absolute value of democratic demands,
      whether we should support the oppositional elements, restriction
      of centralism, etc.
    —Leninthe question of making the
      position of the Bund in the Party the first item on the agenda;
      the dissolution of theYuzhny Rabochygroup; two votes
      on the agrarian programme, and, sixthly and lastly, the voteagainstthe Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad(Rabocheye Dyelo), that is, the recognition of theLeague as the only Party organisation abroad. The old,
      pre-Party, circle spirit, the interests of opportunist
      organisations or groups, the narrow conception of Marxism were
      fighting here against the strictly consistent and principled
      policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy; theIskra-ists of the minority still sided with us in quite
      a number of cases, in a number of exceedingly important votes
      (important from the standpoint of the Organising Committee,Yuzhny Rabochy, andRabocheye Dyelo). . . until their own circle spirit andtheir owninconsistency came into question. The “divisions” of this type
      bring out with graphic clarity that on a number of issues
      involving the practical application of our principles,the
      Centre joined forces with the anti-“Iskra”-ists,displaying a much greater kinship with them than with us, a much
      greater leaningin practicetowards theopportunistthan towards therevolutionarywing of Social-Democracy. Those who wereIskra-ists
      in name  but were ashamed to beIskra-ists
      revealed their true nature, and the struggle that inevitably
      ensued caused no little acrimony, which obscured from the less
      thoughtful and more impressionable the significance of the
      shades of principle disclosed in that struggle. But now that the
      ardour of battle has somewhat abated and the minutes remain as a
      dispassionate extract of a series of heated encounters, only
      those who wilfully close their eyes can fail to perceive that
      the alliance of the Makhovs and Egorovs with the Akimovs and
      Liebers was not, and could not be, fortuitous. The only thing
      Martov and Axelrod can do is keep well away from a comprehensive
      and accurate analysis of the minutes, or try at this late date
      toundotheir behaviour at the Congress by all sorts of
      expressions ofregret. As if regrets can remove
      differences of views and differences of policy! As if the
      present alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Akimov,
      Brouckère, and Martynov can cause our Party, restored at
      the Second Congress, to forget the struggle which theIskra-ists waged with the anti-Iskra-ists
      almost throughout the Congress!

The distinguishing feature of the third type of voting at the
      Congress, represented by the three remaining parts of the
      diagram (C, D, and E), is thata small section of the“Iskra”-ists broke away and went over to the
      anti-“Iskra”-ists,who accordingly gained the
      victory (as long as they remained at the Congress). In order to
      trace with comp]ete accuracy the development of this celebratedcoalitionof theIskra-ist minority with the
      anti-Iskra-ists, the mere mention of which drove Martov
      to write hysterical epistles at the Congress, we have reproduced
      all the three main kinds ofroll-callvotes of this
      type. C is the vote on equality of languages (the last of the
      three roll-call votes on this question is given, it being the
      fullest). All the anti-Iskra-ists and the whole Centre
      stand solid against us; from theIskra-ists a part of
      the majority and a part of the minority break away.It is
      not yet clear which of the“Iskra”-ists are capable of
      forming a definite and lasting coalition with the opportunist
      “Right wing” of the Congress. Next comes type D—the
      vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules (of the two votes, we have
      taken the one which was more clear-cut, that is, in which there
      were no abstentions).The coalition stands out more
      saliently and assumes firmer

shape[3][3]Judging by all indications, four other votes on the
      Ruleswere of the same type: p. 278—27 for Fomin, as
      against 21 for us; p. 279—26 for Martov, as against 24 for
      us; p. 280—27 against me, 22 for; and, on the same page, 24
      for Martov, as against 23 for us. These are the votes on the
      question of co-optation to the central bodies, which I have
      already dealt with. No roll-call votes are available (there was
      one, but the record of it has been lost). The Bundists (all or
      part) evidentlysavedMartov. Martov’s erroneous
      statements (at the League) concerning these votes have been
      corrected above.
    —Lenin:alltheIskra-ists of the minority are now on the side of
      Akimov and Lieber, but only a very small number ofIskra-ists of the majority, these counterbalancing
      three of the “Centre” and one anti-Iskra-ist who have
      come over to our side. A mere glance at the diagram suffices to
      show which elements shifted from side to side casually and
      temporarily and whichwere drawn with irresistible force
      towards a lasting coalition with the Akimovs. The last vote
      (E—elections to the Central Organ, the Central Committee,
      and the Party Council),which in fact represents the final
      division into majority and minority, clearly reveals the
      complete fusion of theIskra-ist minority with theentire“Centre” and theremnantsof the
      anti-Iskra-ists. By this time, of the eight
      anti-Iskra-ists, only Comrade Brouckère remained
      at the Congress (Comrade Akimov had already explained his
      mistake to him and he had taken hisproper place in the ranks of
      theMartovites). The withdrawal of the sevenmost
      “Right-wing” of the opportunistsdecided the issue of the
      elections against

Martov.[4][4]The seven opportunists who withdrew from the Second Congress
      were the five Bundists (the Bund withdrew from the Party after
      the Second Congress rejected the principle of federation) and
      twoRabocheye Dyelo-ists, Comrade Martynov and Comrade
      Akimov. These latter left the Congress after theIskra-ist League was recognised as the only Party
      organisation abroad, i.e., after theRabocheye
      Dyelo-ist Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was
      dissolved. (Author’s footnote to the 1907
      edition.—Ed.)—Lenin

And now, with the aid of the objective evidence of votes ofevery type, let us sum up the results of the Congress.

There has been much talk to the effect that the majority at our
      Congress was “accidental”. This, in fact, was Comrade
      Martov’s sole consolation in hisOnce More in the
      Minority. The diagram clearly shows that inone
      sense, but in only one, the majority could be called
      accidental, viz., in the sense that the withdrawal of the seven
      most opportunist delegates of the "Right"
      was—supposedly—a matter ofaccident.To
      the extentthat this withdrawal was an accident (and no
      more), our majority was accidental. A mere glance at the diagram
      will show better than any long arguments on whose side these
      seven would have been,were bound to have

been.[5][5]We shall see later thatafterthe Congress both Comrade
      Akimov and the Voronezh Committee, which has the closestkinshipwith Comrade Akimov, explicitly expressed their
      sympathy with the “minority”.

    —LeninBut the
      question is: how far was the withdrawal of the seven really an
      accident? That is a question which those who talk so freely
      about the “accidental” character of the majority do not like to
      ask themselves. It is an unpleasant question for them. Was it an
      accident that the most extreme representatives of theRightand not of theLeftwing of our Party
      were the ones to withdraw? Was it an accident that it wasopportunistswho withdrew, and not consistentrevolutionary Social-Democrats? Is there no connection
      between this “accidental” withdrawal and the struggle against
      the opportunist wing which was waged throughout the Congress and
      which stands out so graphically in our diagram?

One has only to ask these questions, which are so unpleasant to
      the minority, to realise what fact all this talkabout the
      accidental character of the majority is intended to conceal. It
      is the unquestionable and incontrovertible fact thatthe
      minority was formed of those in our Party who gravitate most
      towards opportunism. The minority was formed of those
      elements in the Partywho are least stablein theory,least steadfast in matters of principle. It was from
      theRight wingof the Party that the minority was
      formed. The division into majority and minority is a direct and
      inevitable continuation of that division of the Social-Democrats
      into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, into a Mountain
      and a

      Gironde,[9]which did not appear only yesterday, nor in the
      Russian workers’ party alone, and which no doubt will not
      disappear tomorrow.

This fact is of cardinal importance for elucidating the causes
      and the various stages of our disagreements. Whoever tries toevadethe fact by denying or glossing over the struggle
      at the Congress and the shades of principle that it revealed,
      simply testifies to his own intellectual and political
      poverty. And in order todisprovethe fact, it would
      have to be shown,in the first place, that the general
      picture of the voting and “divisions” at our Party Congress was
      different from the one I have drawn; and,in the second
      place, that it was the most consistent revolutionary
      Social-Democrats, those who in Russia have adopted the name ofIskra-ists,[6][6]Note for Comrade Martov’s benefit. If Comrade Martov has now
      forgotten that the term “Iskra”-ist impliesthe
      follower of a trendand nota member of a circle,we would advise him to read in the Congress Minutes the
      explanation Comrade Trotsky gave Comrade Akimov on this
      point. There were threeIskra-istcircles(in
      relation to the Party) at the Congress: the Emancipation of
      Labour group, theIskraeditorial board, and theIskraorganisation. Two of these three circles had the
      good sense to dissolve themselves; the third did not display
      enough Party spirit to do so, and was dissolved by the
      Congress. The broadest of theIskra-ist circles, theIskraorganisation (which included the editorial board
      and the Emancipation of Labour group), had sixteen members
      present at the Congress in all, of whomonly elevenwere entitled to vote.Iskra-istsby trend, on
      the other hand, not by membership in anyIskra-ist
      “circle”, numbered, by my calculation,twenty-seven,
      with thirty-three votes. Hence, less than half of theIskra-ists at the Congress belonged toIskra-istcircles.
    —Leninwhowere in the wrong on the
      substanceof all those issues over which the Congress
      “divided”. Well, just try to show that, gentlemen!

Incidentally, the fact that the minority was formed of the most
      opportunist, the least stable and consistent elements of the
      Party provides an answer to those numerous objections and
      expressions of doubt which are addressed to the majority by
      people who are imperfectly acquainted with the matter, or have
      not given it sufficient thought. Is it not petty, we are told,
      to account for thedivergenceby a minor mistake of
      Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod? Yes, gentlemen, Comrade
      Martov’s mistake was a minor one (and I said so even at the
      Congress, in the heat of the struggle); but this minor mistakecould (and did) cause a lot of harm because
      Comrade Martov was pulled over to the side of delegates who had
      madea whole series of mistakes, had manifested an
      inclination towards opportunism and inconsistency of principle
      on a whole series of questions. That Comrade Martov and Comrade
      Axelrod should have displayed instability was an unimportant
      fact concerning individuals; it was not an individual fact,
      however, but a Party fact, and anot altogether unimportant
      one, that a very considerable minority should have been
      formed ofallthe least stable elements, ofallwho either rejectedIskra’s trend
      altogether and openly opposed it, or paid lip service to it but
      actually sided time and again with the
      anti-Iskra-ists.

Is it not absurd toaccountfor the divergence by the
      prevalence of an inveterate circle spirit and revolutionary
      philistinism in the small circle comprised by the oldIskraeditorial board? No, it is not absurd, becauseall those in our Partywho all through the Congress had
      foughtfor every kind of circle, all thosewho were
      generally incapable of risingabove revolutionary
      philistinism, all those who talked about the “historical”
      character of the philistine and circle spirit in order to
      justify and preserve that evil,rose upin support ofthis particularcircle. The fact that narrow circle
      interests prevailed over the Party interest in the one little
      circle of theIskraeditorial board might, perhaps, be
      regarded as an accident; but it was no accident that in staunch
      support of this circle rose up the Akimovs and Brouckères,
      who attached no less (if not more) value to the “historical
      continuity” of the celebrated Voronezh Committee and the
      notorious St. Petersburg “Workers’

      Organisation”[10];the Egorovs,
      who lamented the “murder” ofRabocheye Dyeloas
      bitterly as the “murder” of the old editorial board (if not more
      so); the Makhovs, etc., etc. You can tell a man by his
      friends—the proverb says. And you can tell a man’spolitical complexionby his political allies, by the
      people who vote for him.

The minor mistake committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade
      Axelrod was, and might have remained, aminorone until
      it became the starting-point for adurable alliancebetween them and the whole opportunist wing of our Party, until
      it led, as a result of that alliance, to arecrudescenceof opportunism, to the exaction ofrevengeby all whomIskrahad fought and who
      were now overjoyed at a chance ofventing their spleenon the consistent adherents of revolutionary
      Social-Democracy. And as a result of the post-Congress events,
      what we are witnessing in the newIskrais precisely a
      recrudescence of opportunism, the revenge of the Akimovs and
      Brouckères (see the leaflet issued by the Voronezh

      Committee[7]),

and the glee of the
      Martynovs, who have at last (at last!) been allowed, in the
      detestedIskra, to have a kick at the detested “enemy”
      for each and every former grievance. This makes it particularly
      clear how essential it was to “restoreIskra’s old
      editorial board” (we are quoting from Comrade Starover’s
      ultimatum of November 3, 1903) in order to preserveIskra“continuity”....

Taken by itself, there was nothing dreadful, nor critical, nor
      even anything abnormal in the fact that the Congress (and the
      Party) divided into a Left and a Right, a revolutionary and an
      opportunist wing. On the contrary, the whole past decade in the
      history of the Russian (and not only the Russian)
      Social-Democratic movement had been leading inevitably and
      inexorably to such a division. The fact that the division took
      place over a number of very minor mistakes of the Right wing, of
      (relatively) very unimportant differences (a fact which seems
      shocking to the superficial observer and to the philistine
      mind), markeda big step forward for our Party as a
      whole. Formerly we used to differ over major issues, such
      as might in some cases even justify a split; now we have reached
      agreement on allmajor and important points, and are only
      divided byshades, about which we mayand
      shouldargue, but over which it would be absurd and
      childish to part company (as Comrade Plekhanov has quite rightly
      said in his interesting article “What Should Not Be Done”, to
      which we shall revert).Now, when theanarchistic
      behaviourof the minoritysince the Congresshas
      almost brought the Party to a split, one may often hear
      wiseacres saying: Was it worth while fighting at the Congress
      over such trifles as the Organising Committee incident, the
      dissolution of theYuzhny Rabochygroup orRabocheye Dyelo, or Paragraph 1, or the dissolution of
      the old editorial board, etc.? Those who argue in this

way[8]are in
      fact introducing the circle standpoint into Party affairs: a
      struggle ofshadesin the Party isinevitable and
      essential, as long as it does not lead to anarchy and
      splits, as long as it is confinedwithin boundsapproved by the common consent of all comrades and Party
      members. Andour struggleagainst the Right wing of the
      Partyat the Congress, against Akimov and Axelrod,
      Martynov and Martov,in no way exceeded those bounds.
      One need only recall two facts which incontrovertibly prove
      this: 1) when Comrades Martynov and Akimov were about to quit
      the Congress,we were all preparedto do everything to
      obliterate the idea of an “insult”;we all adopted(by
      thirty-two votes) Comrade Trotsky’s motion inviting these
      comrades to regard the explanations as satisfactory and withdraw
      their statement; 2) when it came to the election of the central
      bodies, we were prepared to allow the minority (or the
      opportunist wing) of the Congressa minority on both central
      bodies: Martov onthe Central Organ and Popov on the
      Central Committee. Wecould notact otherwise from the
      Party standpoint, since even before the Congress we had decided
      to elect two trios.If the difference of shades revealed at
      the Congress was not great, neither was thepracticalconclusion we drew from the struggle between
      these shades: the conclusion amountedsolelyto this,
      thattwo-thirdsof the seats on both bodies of three
      ought to be given to the majority at the Party Congress.

It was only therefusalof the minority at the Party
      Congress to be aminority on the central bodiesthat
      led first to the “feeble whining” of defeated intellectuals, and
      then toanarchistic talkand anarchistic actions.

In conclusion, let us take one more glance at the diagram from
      the standpoint of the composition of the central bodies. Quite
      naturally,in additionto the question of shades, the
      delegates were faced during the elections with the question of
      thesuitability, efficiency, etc., of one or anotherperson. The minority are now very prone to confuse
      these two questions. Yet that they are different questions is
      self-evident, and this can be seen from the simple fact, for
      instance, that the election of aninitialtrio for the
      Central Organ had been pIanned evenbefore the
      Congress, at a time when no one could have foreseen the
      alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Martynov and
      Akimov. Different questions have to be answered in different
      ways: the answer to the question of shades must be sought for in
      theminutes of the Congress, in theopendiscussions and voting on each and every issue. As to the
      question of the suitability ofpersons, everybody at
      the Congress had decided that it should be settled bysecret
      ballot. Why didthe whole Congress unanimouslytake that decision? The question is so elementary that it would
      be odd to dwell on it. But (since their defeat at the
      ballot-box) the minority have begun to forget even elementary
      things. We have heard torrents of ardent, passionate speeches,
      heated almost to the point of irresponsibility, in defence of
      the old editorial board, but we have heardabsolutely
      nothingabout the shadesat the Congressthat were
      involved in the struggle over a board of six or three. We hear
      talk and gossip on all sides about the ineffectualness, the
      unsuitability, the evil designs, etc., of the persons elected to
      the Central Committee, but we hearabsolutely nothingabout the shadesat the Congressthat fought for
      predominance on the Central Committee. To me it seems indecent
      and discreditable to go about talking and gossipingoutside
      the Congressabout the qualities and actions of individuals
      (for in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred these actions are an
      organisational secret, which can only be divulged to the supreme
      authority of the Party). To fightoutside the Congressby means of such gossip would, in my opinion, bescandal-mongering. And the only public reply I could
      make to all this talk would be to point to the struggle at the
      Congress: You say that the Central Committee was elected by a
      narrow majority. That is true. But this narrow majority
      consisted of all who had most consistently fought, not in words
      but in actual fact, for the realisation of theIskraplans. Consequently, themoralprestige of this
      majority should be even higher—incomparably so—than
      itsformalprestige—higher in the eyes of all who
      value the continuity of theIskra trendabove the
      continuity of a particularIskra circle. Who wasmore competent to judgethe suitability of particular
      persons to carry out theIskrapolicy—those who fought
      for that pol icy at the Congress, or those who in no few cases
      fought against that policy and defended everything retrograde,
      every kind of old rubbish, every kind of circle mentality?

[1]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[2]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[3]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[4]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[5]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[6]Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[7]See pp. 408–09 of this
      volume.–Ed. —Lenin

[8]I cannot help recalling in this connection a conversation I
      happened to have at the Congress with one of the “Centre”
      delegates. “How oppressive the atmosphere is at our Congress!”
      he complained. “This bitter fighting, this agitation one against
      the other, this biting controversy, this uncomradely attitude!
      . . .” “What a splendid thing our Congress is!” I replied. “A
      free and open struggle. Opinions have been stated. The shades
      have been revealed. The groups have taken shape. Hands have been
      raised. A decision has been taken. A stage has been
      passed. Forward! That’s the stuff for me! That’s life! That’s
      not like the endless, tedious word-chopping of your
      intellectuals, which stops not because the question has been
      settled, but because they are too tired to talk any more....”

The comrade of the “Centre” stared at me in perplexity and
      shrugged his shoulders. We were talking different languages.
    —Lenin

[9]Mountain and Gironde—thetwo political groups of the
      bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the close of the eight
      eenth century. Montagnards, or Jacobins, was the name given to the more
      resolute representatives of the bourgeoisie, the revolution ary class of the
      time; they stood for the abolition of absolutism and the feudal system. The
      Girondists, in distinction to them, vacillated between revo ion and
      counter-revolution, and their policy was one of compromise with the
      monarchy.

Lenin applied the term “Socialist Gironde” to the opportunist
      trend in the Social-Democrati” movement, and the term
      “Mountain”, or proletarian Jacobins, to Lhe revolutionary
      Social-Democrats.

[10]TheVoronezh Committeeand theSt. Petersburg “Workers’
      Organisation”were in the hands of the Economists and were
      hostile to Lenin’sIskraand its organisational plan for building a
      Marxist party.