Having examined the detailed data on peasant agriculture – especially important for us because it is precisely in questions of peasant agriculture that the center of gravity of the contemporary agrarian question lies – we shall now proceed to the general data of German agricultural statistics and shall verify the conclusions connected with these data drawn by the "critics." We present in brief the main results of the censuses of 1882 and 1895:

Three circumstances must be examined in connection with this picture of changes, variously interpreted by Marxists and "critics": the growth in the number of the smallest farms, the growth of latifundia, i.e., farms having 1,000 or more hectares and merged in our brief table with all farms having more than 100 hectares, and, finally, the fact that provokes most dispute and draws most attention – the growth of middle-peasant (5–20 ha) farms.

The growth in the number of the smallest farms indicates an enormous growth of poverty and proletarianization, inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of owners of less than 2 hectares cannot subsist by agriculture alone and lives by wages, i.e., by hired labor. There are, of course, exceptions; with specialized crops, viticulture, market gardening, the cultivation of commercial-industrial plants, suburban agriculture generally, and the like, an independent (sometimes even not petty) farmer is possible with 1½ hectares. But in the total sum of 3 million farms – these are completely insignificant exceptions. That the mass of these petty "farmers" (constituting almost 3/5 of all proprietors) – are hired laborers is clearly demonstrated by the data of German statistics on the principal occupations of farmers of different groups. Here are these data in abbreviated form:

We see from this that of the total number of German farmers only 45%, i.e., less than half, represent independent farmers by their principal occupation. And even from among these independent farmers, one-fifth (20.1%) have still additional occupations. 17.5% of farmers by their principal occupation are merchants, industrialists, market gardeners, and the like ("independent," i.e., occupying the position of proprietor, not worker, in the corresponding occupation). Almost one-third (31.1%) – are hired laborers ("non-independent" in all branches of agriculture and industry). 6.4% of farmers are engaged principally in service (military, officials, and the like), free professions, and the like. From the number of farmers having up to 2 ha, half are hired laborers; "independent" farmers among these 3.2 million "proprietors" – are a small minority, only 17.4% of the total number. And even from these 17 percent, one-fourth (26.1%) have additional occupations, i.e., are hired laborers in their non-principal (as the above-mentioned 50.3%) but additional occupation. Even from the number of farmers with 2–5 ha, only somewhat more than half (546 thousand out of 1,016 thousand) represent independent farmers without any additional occupation.

From this one can see to what an astonishing degree Mr. Bulgakov misrepresents the matter when he, asserting (and moreover, as has already been shown, erroneously) an increase in the total number of persons actually engaged in agriculture, explains this by "the growth of independent farms – as we already know, first of all middle-peasant farms at the expense of large ones" (II, 133). If the share of middle-peasant farms in the total number of farms increased most (from 17.6% to 18%, i.e., +0.4%), this still in no way means that the growth of rural population was explained first of all by the growth of middle-peasant farms. To answer the question of which categories contributed the greatest increment to the overall increase in the number of proprietors, we have direct and unambiguous data: the total number of farms increased by 282 thousand, including farms having up to 2 ha increased by 174 thousand. Consequently, the growth of rural population (to the extent it is observed) is explained by the growth precisely of non-independent farms (inasmuch as farms with land up to 2 ha are in their mass non-independent). The increase falls most of all on parcel farms, whose growth means the growth of proletarianization. Even the increase (by 35 thousand) in the number of farms with 2–5 ha we have no right to attribute wholly to the growth of independent farms, inasmuch as even from these proprietors only 546 thousand out of 1,016 thousand – are independent farmers without supplementary earnings.

Passing to the question of large farms, we must first note the following characteristic (and very important for the refutation of any apology) fact: the combination of agriculture with other occupations has different and opposite significance in different groups of farmers. For petty farms it means proletarianization, a decrease in the independence of the farmer, because here are combined with agriculture such occupations as hired labor, petty crafts and trading, and the like. For large farms it means either a strengthening of the political significance of large landed property through state, military service, and the like, or the combination with agriculture of forestry and agricultural technical productions. And this last phenomenon, as is known, – is one of the most characteristic signs of capitalist progress in agriculture. This is why we see that the percentage of those farmers who consider "independent" agriculture their principal occupation (i.e., conduct it in the capacity of proprietor, not worker) rapidly increases with the increase in farm size (17–72–90–96%), but falls to 93% in the group of farms with 100 and more hectares: in this group 4.2% of proprietors consider service their principal occupation (category "other occupations"), 0.4% of proprietors consider "non-independent" labor their principal occupation (these are not hired laborers but managers, inspectors, and the like; cf. "Stat. d. D. R.", 112 vol., p. 49*). Similarly, we see that the percentage of those independent farmers who have additional occupations rapidly decreases with the increase in farm size (26–25–15–9%), but sharply increases among proprietors with 100 and more ha (23%).

As regards the number of large farms (100 and > ha) and their area, the data presented above show a decrease in their share both in the total number of farms and in the total area. The question arises: can one conclude from this that large farms are being displaced by small and middle-peasant farms, as Mr. Bulgakov hastens to conclude? We think not, and that Mr. Bulgakov's angry outbursts against Kautsky on this point proved only his inability to refute Kautsky's opinion on the merits. First, the decrease in the share of large farms is very slight (in the number of farms from 0.47% to 0.45%, i.e., by two hundredths of a percent, and in the share of area from 24.43% to 24.088%, i.e., by 35 hundredths of a percent). That in the intensification of farms it is sometimes necessary to diminish the area somewhat, that large farmers sell off in small pieces land remote from the center of their estates in order to acquire laborers – these are well-known phenomena. We showed above how the author of a detailed description of large and small farms in eastern Prussia directly acknowledges the servile role of small landownership in relation to large farms and earnestly recommends the creation of settled laborers. Second, the displacement of large farms by small ones cannot be in question precisely because data on farm area alone are insufficient yet for judging the scale of production. And that in this regard large farms have made a very great step forward is irrefutably demonstrated by data on the use of machines (see above) and on agricultural technical productions (we shall examine these data separately below, given Mr. Bulgakov's astonishingly distorted interpretation of the corresponding data from German statistics). Third, in the group of farms with 100 and more ha, latifundia are particularly distinguished – farms with 1,000 and > ha, the number of which increased by an even larger percentage than the number of middle-peasant farms, namely from 515 to 572, i.e., by 11%, while the number of middle-peasant farms increased from 926 thousand to 998 thousand, i.e., by 7.8%. The area of latifundia increased from 708 thousand ha to 802 thousand, i.e., by 94 thousand ha: in 1882 it constituted 2.22% of the entire agricultural area, in 1895 already 2.46%. Mr. Bulgakov supplements his unfounded objections to Kautsky on this point in the "Beginning" with the following, even more unfounded, generalization in his book: "The sign," he writes, "testifying to the decline of large farms is… the increase of latifundia, although the progress of agriculture, the growth of its intensity should be accompanied by fragmentation" (II, 126) – and Mr. Bulgakov, paying no heed, already speaks directly of the "latifundial (!) degeneration" of large farms (II, 190, 363). See how remarkably logical is the reasoning of our "scholar": because the decrease in farm area sometimes means, with intensification, growth in production, therefore the increase in the number and area of latifundia must generally mean decline! But if the logic is so poor, why not turn to statistics for help? After all, we have in that very source from which Mr. Bulgakov draws a whole series of data on the economy of these latifundia. We shall present some of these data: 572 of the largest farms had in 1895 a total area of 1,159,674 hectares, including 802 thousand of agricultural land, 298 thousand of forest land (some of these latifundia proprietors are chiefly forest-industry people, not farmers). Livestock is kept by generally 97.9% of them; draft animals – 97.7%; machines are used by 555 farms, and per one farm falls, as we have seen, the maximum number of instances of using different machines; steam plows were used by 81 farms, i.e., 14% of all latifundia. They had livestock – cattle 148,678 head, horses – 55,591, sheep – 703,813, pigs – 53,543. Of these farms combined with sugar refineries – 16, with distilleries – 228, breweries – 6, starch factories – 16, mills – 64. One can judge the intensification by the fact that 211 cultivate beets (under which 26 thousand ha) and 302 – potatoes for technical processing. 21 supply milk to cities (from 1,822 cows, i.e., 87 cows per farm on average) and 204 participate in dairy cooperatives (with 18,273 cows – 89 per farm on average). Is this not indeed like "latifundial degeneration"?

We turn to the question of middle-peasant farms (5–20 ha). Their share in the total number of farms increased from 17.6% to 18.0% (+0.4%), and in the total area from 28.7% to 29.9% (+1.2%). And precisely these data, quite naturally, all manner of "destroyers of Marxism" consider their chief trump card. Mr. Bulgakov draws from this both the "displacement of large farms by small ones," and "a tendency toward decentralization," and so forth. We showed above that precisely with regard to "the peasantry" aggregate data are especially unsuitable, especially capable of misleading: precisely here the processes of formation of small entrepreneurial farms and the "progress" of peasant bourgeoisie are most capable of masking the proletarianization and impoverishment of the majority. And if we generally, with regard to the entire agriculture of Germany, observe, on the one hand, undoubted development of large capitalist farms (growth of latifundia, development of machine use and agricultural technical productions), and on the other hand, even more undoubted intensification of proletarianization and impoverishment (flight to cities, intensification of land fragmentation, growth in the number of parcel farms, growth of supplementary hired labor, deterioration of nutrition of petty peasants, and so forth) – then it would be directly incredible and impossible that the same processes were not taking place among "the peasantry." And indeed the detailed data point to these processes with complete clarity, confirming the thought that statistics of areas alone in this case are completely insufficient. Therefore Kautsky was entirely right when, on the basis of the general picture of capitalist development of German agriculture, he concluded that drawing conclusions from these data about the victory of small production over large production is unfounded.

There are, however, also direct and moreover massive data proving that the growth of "middle-peasant farms" means growth of need, not growth of contentment and well-being. These are precisely those data on draft animals to which Mr. Bulgakov approached so unsuccessfully both in the "Beginning" and in his book. "If it were still necessary to prove this," wrote Mr. Bulgakov about his assertion on the progress of middle and the decline of large farms, "then to the sign of the quantity of labor power one could add the sign of the availability of draft animals. Here is an eloquent table"[95]:

"The quantity of farms having draft animals equally decreased in both large and small farms, and increased only in medium farms" (journal "Beginning" No. 1, p. 20).

It would be even more pardonable if Mr. Bulgakov in a hastily written journal article had overlooked the error that induced him to draw from data on draft animals precisely the opposite of what these data say – but our "rigorous scholar" repeats the same error also in his "research" (Vol. II, p. 127, where, moreover, the figures +30,407 and –360 are referred to the number of animals, whereas they refer to the number of farms using draft animals; but this, of course, is a trifle).

We shall ask our "rigorous scholar," who speaks so bravely of the "regression of large farms" (II, 127): what significance has the increase in the number of middle-peasant farms holding draft animals by 30 thousand, when the total number of middle-peasant farms increased by 72 thousand (II, 124)? Is it not clear from this that the percentage of middle-peasant farms having draft animals declined? And if this is so, should one not have looked at what percentage of farms in different groups held draft animals in 1882 and 1895 – especially since these data are presented on that very same page and in that very same table from which Mr. Bulgakov took the absolute figures ("Stat. d. D. R.", 112 vol., p. 31[96]).

Here are these data:

So, the percentage of farms with draft animals generally declined by more than two percent, and this decline was above average in small-peasant and middle-peasant farms, below average – in large farms. Besides, one must not forget that "precisely in large farms, often in place of animal power is used mechanical power in the form of all sorts of machines generally and steam power in particular (steam plows and the like)" ("Stat. d. D. R.", 112 vol., p. 32*). Therefore, if among large farms (100 and more ha) the number of farms with draft animals decreased by 360, while at the same time the number of farms using steam plows increased by 615 (710 in 1882 and 1,325 in 1895), then it is clear that on the whole large farms not only did not lose but even gained. Consequently, we arrive at the conclusion that the only group of German farmers who undoubtedly improved the conditions of their farming (in regard to the use of animals for field work or the replacement of animals with steam) – are large proprietors with 100 and > ha. In all other groups the conditions of farming deteriorated, and they deteriorated most of all precisely in the group of middle-peasant farms, where the decline in the percentage of farms with draft animals is highest. The difference between large (100 and > ha) and medium (5–20 ha) farms in the level of the percentage of farms with draft animals was previously less than three percent (99.42–96.56), but is now more than five percent (97.70–92.62).

This conclusion is very significantly reinforced by data on the composition of draft animals. The smaller the farm, the worse the composition of draft animals: the smaller relatively are oxen and horses used for field work and the greater are the much weaker cows used. Here are the data on how matters stood in this regard in 1882 and 1895:

Per hundred farms having animals for field work, used:

We see a general deterioration in the composition of draft animals (parcel farms, for the reason already indicated, do not count) and the greatest deterioration precisely in the group of middle-peasant farms. In this group, among farms having draft animals, the percentage of those forced to use cows for field work increased most of all – as well as those which can use only cows for field work. At present already more than one-third of farms having draft animals in the middle-peasant group are forced to use cows for field work (which leads, of course, to deterioration of plowing, and consequently to a decrease in harvests and to a decrease in the milk yield of cows) – and already more than one-fifth can use only cows for field work.

If we take the quantity of animals used for field work, we shall see in all groups (except parcel farms) an increase in the number of cows. The number of horses and oxen changed as follows:

Except for parcel farms, an increase in actual draft animals is observed only among large proprietors.

The general conclusion, consequently, on the change in farming conditions in regard to animal and mechanical power for field work is this: improvement only among large proprietors, deterioration among all others, and greatest deterioration in middle-peasant farms.

The data for 1895 allow us further to divide the entire group of middle-peasant farms into two subgroups: 5–10 ha and 10–20 ha. As was to be expected, in the first (much more numerous in number of farms) subgroup the conditions of farming in regard to the use of draft animals are incomparably worse. Of 606 thousand proprietors of 5–10 ha, 90.5% have draft animals (of 393 thousand with 10–20 ha – 95.8%), and of these latter use for field work cows – 46.3% (17.9% in the group with 10–20 ha); use only cows 41.3% (4.2% in the group with 10–20 ha). And it turns out that precisely this group with 5–10 ha, especially poorly equipped in regard to the use of draft animals, increased most of all both in number of farms and in area from 1882 to 1895. Here are the corresponding data:

In the group with 10–20 ha the increase in the number of farms is completely negligible; the share of total area even decreased, while the share of agricultural area increased much less than in farms with 5–10 ha. Consequently, the growth of middle-peasant farms falls principally (partly even exclusively) on the group with 5–10 ha, i.e., on the very group in which the conditions of farming in regard to the use of draft animals are especially poor.

We see, thus, that statistics irrefutably establishes the true significance of the notorious growth of middle-peasant farms: this is not growth of contentment but growth of need, not progress of small agriculture but its degradation. If middle-peasant farms deteriorated their farming conditions most of all, were forced most of all to expand the use of cows for field work, then from this one aspect of farming alone (and one of the most important aspects of farming generally) we not only have the right but are obliged to draw a conclusion about all other aspects of farming. If the number of horseless farms increased (using a term familiar to the Russian reader and fully applicable to the given case), if the composition of draft animals deteriorated, then there can be no doubt whatsoever that the keeping of livestock generally deteriorated, the treatment of land deteriorated, the nutrition and living conditions of the farmer deteriorated, because in peasant agriculture, as everyone knows, the worse the livestock is kept and the harder it works, the worse the human being lives and the harder he works as well, and vice versa. The conclusions we drew above from the detailed investigation of Klawki are fully confirmed by the massive data on all small peasant farms of Germany.