Our reference to Marx's position on Irish separation is parried by the Polish comrades, exceptionally, not indirectly but directly. What precisely consists their objection? References to Marx's position from 1848–1871 have, in their opinion, "not the slightest value." This extraordinarily angry and decisive declaration is motivated by the fact that Marx "simultaneously" spoke out against the aspirations for independence of "the Czechs, South Slavs, etc."{23}.

The motivation is precisely so angry because it is precisely so groundless. It turned out with the Polish Marxists that Marx was simply a muddle-headed person who "simultaneously" said opposite things! This is entirely untrue and this is entirely not Marxism. It is precisely the requirement of "concrete" analysis, which the Polish comrades advance in order not to apply it, that obliges us to examine whether Marx's different attitude toward different concrete "national" movements did not flow from one and the same socialist worldview.

As is well known, Marx stood for Polish independence from the point of view of the interests of European democracy in its struggle against the force and influence—one might say: against the omnipotence and predominant reactionary influence—of Tsarism. The correctness of this point of view received the most vivid and factual confirmation in 1849, when the Russian serf army crushed the nationally-liberatory and revolutionarily-democratic uprising in Hungary. And from that time until Marx's death, even later, until 1890, when a reactionary war threatened—Tsarism in alliance with France against the non-imperialist, but nationally independent Germany—Engels stood first and foremost for the struggle against Tsarism. Therefore, and only therefore, Marx and Engels were against the national movement of the Czechs and South Slavs. A simple reference to what Marx and Engels wrote in 1848–1849 will show anyone who is interested in Marxism not in order to dismiss Marxism, that Marx and Engels directly and definitively counterposed then "entire reactionary peoples," serving as "Russian outposts" in Europe, to "revolutionary peoples": Germans, Poles, Magyars. This is a fact. And this fact was then indisputably correctly indicated: in 1848, revolutionary peoples were fighting for freedom, the chief enemy of which was Tsarism, and the Czechs, etc., were indeed reactionary peoples, outposts of Tsarism.

What then does this concrete example tell us, which one must examine concretely if one wishes to be faithful to Marxism? Only this: that 1) the interests of the liberation of several major and largest peoples of Europe stand above the interests of the liberatory movement of small nations; 2) that the demand of democracy must be taken on an all-European—now one should say: world-wide—scale, and not in isolation.

Nothing more. Not a shadow of refutation of that elementary socialist principle, which the Poles forget and to which Marx was always faithful: a people oppressing other peoples cannot be free{24}. If the concrete situation before which Marx stood in the epoch of the predominant influence of Tsarism in international politics should repeat itself, for example, in such a form that several peoples begin a socialist revolution (as in 1848 in Europe they began a bourgeois-democratic revolution), and other peoples prove to be the main pillars of bourgeois reaction, we too must be for revolutionary war against them, for "crushing" them, for destroying all their outposts, whatever small-national movements might be advanced here. Consequently, we must not at all reject the examples of Marx's tactics—that would mean preaching Marxism in words and breaking with it in deed—but from their concrete analysis derive invaluable lessons for the future. Individual demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a particle of the general democratic (now: general socialist) world movement. It is possible that in individual concrete cases the particle contradicts the general, then one must reject it. It is possible that a republican movement in one of the countries is merely an instrument of clerical or financial-monarchical intrigue of other countries—then we must not support this given, concrete movement, but it would be absurd on such grounds to throw the slogan of the republic out of the program of international social-democracy.

How precisely has the concrete situation changed from 1848–1871 to 1898–1916 (I take the largest milestones of imperialism as a period: from the Spanish-American imperialist war to the European imperialist war)? Tsarism has indisputably and beyond question ceased to be the chief bulwark of reaction, first, in consequence of its support by international financial capital, especially France, second, by virtue of 1905. Then the system of large national states—democracies of Europe—carried democracy and socialism to the world against Tsarism[12]. Marx and Engels did not live to see imperialism. Now there has formed a system of a handful (5–6 in number) of "great" imperialist powers, each of which oppresses foreign nations, and this oppression is one of the sources of the artificial retardation of the fall of capitalism, artificial maintenance of opportunism and social-chauvinism of the imperialist nations dominating the world. Then Western European democracy, liberating the largest nations, was against Tsarism, using certain small national movements for purposes of reaction. Now the alliance of Tsarism with advanced capitalist, European imperialism, on the basis of the universal oppression by them of a number of nations, stands against the socialist proletariat, split into chauvinist, "social-imperialist," and revolutionary.

Therein consists the concrete change of situation, precisely ignored by the Polish social-democrats, despite their promise to be concrete! From this follows the concrete change in the application of those same socialist principles: then first and foremost "against Tsarism" (and against the certain small-national movements it utilized in an anti-democratic direction) for the large-national, revolutionary, peoples of the West. Now against the unified, equalized, front of imperialist powers, imperialist bourgeoisie, social-imperialists, for the utilization for purposes of the socialist revolution of all national movements against imperialism. The purer now the struggle of the proletariat against the general imperialist front, the more pressing, obviously, the internationalist principle: "a people oppressing foreign peoples cannot be free."

The Proudhonists, in the name of a doctrinaire-understood social revolution, ignored the international role of Poland and dismissed national movements. Precisely so doctrinaire do the Polish social-democrats conduct themselves, breaking the international front of struggle with social-imperialists, helping (objectively) the latter through their wavering on the question of annexations. For it is precisely the international front of proletarian struggle that has changed in relation to the concrete position of small nations: then (1848–1871) small nations had significance as a possible ally either of "Western democracy" and revolutionary peoples, or of Tsarism; now (1898–1914) small nations have lost such significance; their significance now—one of the nutritive sources of parasitism and, consequently, of the social-imperialism of "great-power nations." What is not important is whether 1/50 or 1/100 of small nations will be liberated before the socialist revolution, but what is important is that the proletariat in the imperialist epoch, in consequence of objective causes, has split into two international camps, of which one is corrupted by crumbs falling from the table of great-power bourgeoisie—among other things, from the double or triple exploitation of small nations—and the other cannot free itself without freeing small nations, without educating the masses in an anti-chauvinist, that is anti-annexationist, that is "self-determinationist" spirit.

This, the most important, side of the matter is ignored by the Polish comrades, viewing things not from the central position in the epoch of imperialism, not from the point of view of the two camps of international proletariat.

Here are further vivid examples of their Proudhonism: 1) the attitude toward the Irish uprising of 1916, about which there is discussion below; 2) the statement in the theses (II, 3, at the end of § 3) that the slogan of socialist revolution "must not be covered by anything." This is precisely a deeply anti-Marxist idea, as though one could "cover" the slogan of socialist revolution by connecting it with a consistently revolutionary position on every, including the national, question.

The Polish social-democrats find our program "nationally-reformist." Compare two practical proposals: 1) for autonomy (Polish theses III, 4) and 2) for freedom of separation. Indeed, it is by this and only by this that our programs differ! And is it not clear that it is the first that is reformist, in distinction from the second? A reformist change is one that does not undermine the foundations of the power of the ruling class, being only a concession from it, while maintaining its domination. A revolutionary change undermines the foundation of power. What is reformist in the national program does not abolish all privileges of the ruling nation, does not create complete equality of rights, does not eliminate all national oppression. An "autonomous" nation is not equal in rights with a "sovereign" nation; the Polish comrades could not fail to notice this, had they not persistently ignored (just like our old "Economists") the analysis of political concepts and categories. Autonomous Norway, as a part of Sweden, enjoyed until 1905 the broadest autonomy, but it was not equal in rights to Sweden. Only its free separation revealed in fact and proved its equality of rights (and let us add in parentheses—this very free departure created the basis for a tighter, more democratic rapprochement, based on equality of rights). While Norway was only autonomous, Swedish aristocracy had one additional privilege, and this privilege was not "weakened" (—the essence of reformism is the weakening of evil, not its elimination), but by separation was eliminated completely (—the fundamental characteristic of what is revolutionary in a program).

By the way: autonomy, as a reform, is in principle distinct from freedom of separation, as a revolutionary measure. This is beyond doubt. But a reform—as everyone knows—is often in practice merely a step toward revolution. It is precisely autonomy that enables a nation, forcibly held within the boundaries of a given state, to constitute itself finally as a nation, to gather, to recognize, to organize its forces, to choose a fully suitable moment for the declaration... in the "Norwegian" spirit: we, the autonomous diet of such-and-such a nation or territory, declare that the Russian Emperor has ceased to be King of Poland, etc. To this one usually "objects": such questions are decided by wars, not by declarations. True: in the vast majority of cases by wars (as questions of the form of government of large states are in the vast majority of cases decided only by wars and revolutions). However, it is not amiss to think: is it logical to advance such an "objection" to the political program of a revolutionary party? Do we stand against wars and revolutions for what is just and beneficial to the proletariat, for democracy and socialism?

"But surely we cannot stand for war between great peoples, for the slaughter of 20 million people for the problematic liberation of a small nation, perhaps consisting of 10–20 million population"! Of course, we cannot. But not because we throw complete national equality out of our program, but because the interests of democracy of one country must be subordinated to the interests of democracy of several and all countries. Let us imagine that between two large monarchies there is one small one, whose little king is "bound" to the monarchs of both neighboring countries by ties of kinship and otherwise. Let us further imagine that the proclamation of a republic in the small country, the expulsion of its monarch, would mean in practice war between the two neighboring large countries over the restoration of one or the other monarch of the small country. There is no doubt that all international social-democracy, as also the actually internationalist part of the social-democracy of the small country, would be against the replacement of monarchy by republic in this case. The replacement of monarchy by republic is not an absolute, but one of the democratic demands, subordinated to the interests of democracy (and still more, of course, to the socialist proletariat) as a whole. Surely such a case would not arouse the shadow of disagreement between social-democrats of any countries. But if on this basis some social-democrat proposed to throw out of the program of international social-democracy altogether the slogan of the republic, he would surely be considered mad. He would be told: one cannot after all forget the elementary logical distinction between the particular and the general.

This example brings us, somewhat from another side, to the question of internationalist education of the working class. Can such education—about the necessity and utmost importance of which disagreements are unthinkable among the Zimmerwald Left—be concretely identical in large, oppressing nations and in small, oppressed nations? in annexing nations and annexed nations?

Obviously, no. The path to one goal: to complete equality of rights, closest rapprochement and further merger of all nations, runs here, obviously, by different concrete roads,—the same as, say, the path to a point situated in the middle of a given page runs to the left from one lateral edge of it and to the right from the opposite edge. If a social-democrat of a large, oppressing, annexing nation, professing in general the merger of nations, forgets even for a moment that "his" Nicholas II, "his" Wilhelm, George, Poincaré, etc., are also for merger with small nations (by means of annexations)—Nicholas II for "merger" with Galicia, Wilhelm II for "merger" with Belgium, etc.—then such a social-democrat will prove to be a ridiculous doctrinaire in theory, an accomplice of imperialism in practice.

The center of gravity of internationalist education of workers in oppressing countries must inevitably consist in the preaching and defense by them of the freedom of separation of oppressed countries. Without this there is no internationalism. We have the right and the duty to treat every social-democrat of an oppressing nation who does not conduct such propaganda as an imperialist and as a scoundrel. This is an unconditional demand, even if the case of separation were possible and "realizable" before socialism in only 1 out of 1000 cases.

We are obliged to educate workers in "indifference" to national differences. This is beyond dispute. But not in the indifference of annexationists. A member of an oppressing nation must be "indifferent" to the question of whether small nations belong to his state or to a neighboring one or to themselves, depending on their sympathies: without such "indifference" he is not a social-democrat. In order to be an internationalist social-democrat, one must think not only of one's own nation, but place the interests of all above it, their universal freedom and equality of rights. In "theory" everyone agrees with this, but in practice they show precisely annexationist indifference. Here lies the root of evil.

On the contrary. A social-democrat of a small nation must place the center of gravity of his agitation on the second word of our common formula: "voluntary union" of nations. He can, without violating his obligations as an internationalist, be for the political independence of his nation and for its inclusion in a neighboring state X, Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must struggle against small-national narrowness, isolation, separatism, for taking account of the whole and the universal, for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general.

People who have not thought deeply about the question find it "contradictory" that social-democrats of oppressing nations insist on "freedom of separation," while social-democrats of oppressed nations insist on "freedom of union." But a little reflection shows that there is no other path to internationalism and merger of nations, no other path to this goal from the given situation and cannot be.

And here we have approached the special position of Dutch and Polish social-democracy.