Let us now cast a glance at the development of Machism after Mach and Avenarius. We have seen that their philosophy is a hodgepodge, a collection of contradictory and disjointed epistemological propositions. We must now examine how and whither, that is, in what direction this philosophy is growing – this will help us settle some "disputed" questions by reference to indisputable historical facts. Indeed, given the eclecticism and incoherence of the foundational philosophical premises of the school in question, heterogeneous interpretations and fruitless disputes over particulars and trifles are completely inevitable. But empirio-criticism, like any ideological current, is a living thing, growing and developing, and the fact of its growth in one direction or another will better than lengthy arguments help settle the fundamental question of the true essence of this philosophy. One does not judge a man by what he says or thinks about himself, but by his deeds. Philosophers must not be judged by the labels they hang on themselves ("positivism," philosophy of "pure experience," "monism" or "empirio-monism," "philosophy of natural science," etc.), but by how they in fact decide the fundamental theoretical questions, whom they walk hand in hand with, what they teach and what they have taught their disciples and followers.

This last question is now the object of our inquiry. Everything essential was said by Mach and Avenarius more than twenty years ago. In that time it could not fail to become clear how those who wished to understand these "leaders" understood them, and whom they themselves (at least Mach, who outlived his colleague) consider the continuers of their work. To be precise, let us take those who call themselves disciples of Mach and Avenarius (or followers of theirs), and whom Mach himself counts in this camp. Thus we shall obtain a conception of empirio-criticism as a philosophical current, not as a collection of literary oddities.

In Mach's preface to the Russian translation of *The Analysis of Sensations*, he recommends as a "young researcher" proceeding "if not along the same, then along very similar paths," Hans Cornelius (p. 4). In the text of *The Analysis of Sensations* Mach once again "with pleasure points to the works," among others, of G. Cornelius and others, "who have revealed the essence of Avenarius's ideas and developed them further" (48). We take the little book by G. Cornelius *Introduction to Philosophy* (German edition 1903): we see that its author likewise points to his endeavor to follow in the footsteps of Mach and Avenarius (p. VIII, 32). Before us, consequently, is a disciple recognized by his teacher. This disciple also begins with sensations-elements (17, 24), categorically declares that he confines himself to experience (p. VI), calls his views "consistent or epistemological empiricism" (335), condemns with utmost decisiveness both the "one-sidedness" of idealism and the "dogmatism" of both idealists and materialists (p. 129), extremely energetically rejects the possible "misunderstanding" (123) that his philosophy leads to the recognition of the world as existing in man's head, flirts with naive realism no less skillfully than Avenarius, Schuppe, or Bazarov (p. 125: "visual and every other perception has its location there and only there, where we find it, i.e., where it is localized by naive consciousness, untouched by false philosophy") – and this disciple, recognized by his teacher, arrives at immortality and at god. Materialism, thunders this petty official on the professor's chair, that is: the disciple of the "newest positivists," transforms man into an automaton. "Needless to say, that together with belief in the freedom of our decisions, it undermines the entire evaluation of the moral worth of our actions and our responsibility. In the same way, it leaves no room for the thought of the continuation of our life after death" (p. 116). The finale of the book: education (obviously of youth, stupefied by this man of science) is necessary not only for activity, but "first and foremost" "education for reverence (Ehrfurcht) – not before the temporal values of random tradition, but before the imperishable values of duty and beauty, before the divine principle (dem Göttlichen) within us and outside us" (357).

Compare this with A. Bogdanov's assertion that for the ideas of god, freedom of will, and immortality of soul, in Mach's philosophy, with his denial of any "thing-in-itself," there is absolutely no place (Bogdanov's emphasis) and "cannot be any place" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. XII). And Mach in this very book (p. 293) declares: "there is no philosophy of Mach" and recommends not only the immanentists, but also Cornelius, who has revealed the essence of Avenarius's ideas! In the first place, consequently, Bogdanov absolutely does not know "Mach's philosophy" as a current, not only nestling under the wing of fideism, but even leading to fideism. In the second place, Bogdanov absolutely does not know the history of philosophy, for to link the denial of these ideas with the denial of any thing-in-itself is to mock that history. Would Bogdanov dare deny that all consistent followers of Hume, denying any thing-in-itself, precisely leave room for these ideas? Has Bogdanov not heard of subjective idealists who, denying any thing-in-itself, thereby leave room for these ideas? "There cannot be any place" for these ideas exclusively in the philosophy which teaches that only sensuous being exists, – that the world is moving matter, – that the external world known to all and sundry, the physical – is the sole objective reality, i.e., in the philosophy of materialism. And it is precisely against this, against this very thing, that the immanentists recommended by Mach and Mach's disciple Cornelius and all contemporary academic philosophy wage war.

Our Machists began to renounce Cornelius when it was pointed out to them how unseemly it was. Such renunciations are worth little. Friedrich Adler, apparently, was not "warned" and therefore recommends this Cornelius in a socialist journal (*Der Kampf*, 1908, 5, p. 235[141]: "an easily readable work, deserving the highest recommendation"). Through Machism they smuggle direct philosophical reactionaries and preachers of fideism into the role of teachers of the workers!

Petzoldt without warnings noticed the falsity of Cornelius, but his method of combating this falsity is a real gem. Listen: "To assert that the world is a representation" (as the idealists assert, those with whom we are fighting, do not joke!), "makes sense only if by this one wishes to say that it is the representation of the speaker or at least of all speakers (those making utterances), i.e., that it depends in its existence exclusively on the thinking of this person or these persons: the world exists only insofar as this person thinks it, and when he does not think it, the world does not exist. We, on the contrary, make the world dependent not on the thinking of an individual person or individual persons or even better and more clearly: not on the act of thinking, not on any actual thinking – but on thinking in general and that exclusively logically. The idealist confuses the one with the other, and the result is agnostic semi-solipsism, as we see it in Cornelius" (*Einf.*, II, 317[142]).

Stolypin refuted the existence of secret police operations!{64} Petzoldt smashed the idealists to smithereens, – one can only wonder how this extermination of idealism resembles advice to idealists to hide their idealism more cleverly. The world depends on human thinking – this is perverted idealism. The world depends on thinking in general – this is the newest positivism, critical realism, in a word – sheer bourgeois charlatanism! If Cornelius is an agnostic semi-solipsist, then Petzoldt is a solipsistic semi-agnostic. You are ushering in a flea, gentlemen!

Now judge the audacity of Bogdanov's assertion that in Mach's philosophy there is "absolutely no place for freedom of will," when Mach himself recommends such a subject as Kleinpeter! We have already seen that the latter does not conceal his and Mach's idealism. In 1898–1899 Kleinpeter wrote: "Hertz displays the same" (as in Mach) "subjectivist view of the nature of our concepts…". "… If Mach and Hertz" (as to how justified is Kleinpeter's dragging in the famous physicist, this will be discussed separately) "have earned themselves, from the standpoint of idealism, the merit of emphasizing the subjective origin of all our concepts and the connection between them, rather than individual concepts, – then from the standpoint of empiricism they have earned no less merit by recognizing that only experience decides the question of the correctness of concepts as an instance independent of thinking" (*Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. V, 1898–1899, p. 169–170[143]). In 1900: Kant and Berkeley, for all their differences from Mach, "in any case stand closer to him than the metaphysical empiricism dominant in natural science" (i.e., materialism! Mr. Professor avoids calling the devil by his proper name!), "which constitutes the main object of Mach's attacks" (ibid., vol. VI, p. 87). In 1903: "The starting point of Berkeley and Mach is irrefutable"… "Mach – the completer of Kant's work" (*Kantstudien*, vol. VIII, 1903, p. 314, 274[144]).

In the preface to the Russian translation of *The Analysis of Sensations*, Mach also names T. Ziehen as "proceeding, if not along the same, then along very similar paths." We take the book of Professor T. Ziehen *Psychophysiological Theory of Knowledge* (Theodor Ziehen: *Psychophysiologische Erkenntnistheorie*, Jena, 1898) and see that the author already in the preface refers to Mach, Avenarius, Schuppe, etc. Again, consequently, a disciple recognized by his teacher. Ziehen's "newest" theory consists in the fact that only the "crowd" is capable of thinking that "actual things cause our sensations" (p. 3) and that "at the entrance to the theory of knowledge there can be no other inscription than the words of Berkeley: 'external objects exist not in themselves, but in our minds'" (p. 5). "Given to us are sensations and representations. Both are psychological. The non-psychological is a word devoid of content" (p. 100). The laws of nature are relations not between material bodies, but "between reduced sensations" (p. 104: in this "new" concept of "reduced sensations" consists the whole originality of Ziehen's Berkeleyanism!).

From Ziehen, as an idealist, Petzoldt distanced himself already in 1904 in the second volume of his *Introduction* (p. 298–301). In 1906 he lists Cornelius, Kleinpeter, Ziehen, Verworn in his list of idealists or psychomonists (*Das Weltproblem etc.*, p. 137, note). All these gentlemen professors, you see, have a "misunderstanding" in the interpretation of "the views of Mach and Avenarius" (ibid.).

Poor Mach and Avenarius! Not only enemies have slandered them regarding idealism and "even" (as Bogdanov puts it) solipsism – no, friends too, disciples, followers, specialist-professors have misunderstood their teachers, in an idealistic sense. If empirio-criticism grows into idealism, this does not at all prove the fundamental falsity of its confused Berkeleyan foundational premises. God forbid! It is merely a little "misunderstanding" – in the Nozdryov-Petzoldt sense of the word.

Most comical of all here is, perhaps, the fact that Petzoldt himself, the guardian of purity and innocence, in the first place, "supplemented" Mach and Avenarius with "logical a priori," and in the second place, coupled them with the conductor of fideism Wilhelm Schuppe.

Had Petzoldt known the English followers of Mach, he would have had to significantly expand the list of those who have fallen (through "misunderstanding") into idealism. We have already pointed to the celebrated Karl Pearson recommended by Mach as a thorough idealist. Here are the opinions of two "slanderers," saying the same thing about Pearson: "The doctrine of Prof. K. Pearson is a simple echo of the truly great teachings of Berkeley" (Howard V. Knox in *Mind*, vol. VI, 1897, p. 205[145]). "Mr. Pearson, there can be no doubt about it, is an idealist in the strictest sense of the word" (Georges Rodier in *Revue philosophique*{65}, 1888, II, vol. 26, p. 200[146]). The English idealist William Clifford, whom Mach considers "very close" to his philosophy (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 8), must be called rather a teacher than a disciple of Mach, since Clifford's philosophical works appeared in the 1870s of the last century. The "misunderstanding" here comes directly from Mach, who in 1901 "failed to notice" the idealism in Clifford's doctrine that the world is "mind-stuff," – a "social object," "highly organized experience," etc.[147] To the characterization of the charlatanism of German Machists it should be noted that Kleinpeter in 1905 raises this idealist to the rank of founder of "the epistemology of modern natural science"!

On p. 284 of *The Analysis of Sensations* Mach points to the American philosopher P. Carus who has "drawn near" (to Buddhism{66} and to Machism). Carus, calling himself "an admirer and personal friend" of Mach, edits in Chicago the journal *The Monist*{67}, devoted to philosophy, and the little journal *The Open Court*{68}, devoted to the propagation of religion. "Science is divine revelation," – says the editorial of this popular little journal. – "We hold the opinion that science can produce a reform of the churches, which will preserve from religion all that is true, healthy, and good in it." Mach is a regular contributor to *The Monist*, publishing in it his new works in separate chapters. Carus "corrects" Mach a little in the direction of Kant, declaring that Mach "is an idealist or, as I would say, a subjectivist," but that he, Carus, despite partial disagreements, is convinced that "we and Mach think alike"[148]. Our monism, – declares Carus, – "is not materialistic, not spiritualistic, not agnostic; it means simply and exclusively consistency… it takes experience as its foundation, and employs as method the systematized forms of the relations of experience" (apparently a plagiarism from A. Bogdanov's *Empirio-Monism*!). Carus's motto: "not agnosticism, but positive science, not mysticism, but clear thought; not supernaturalism, not materialism, but a monistic view of the world, not dogma, but religion, not faith as doctrine, but faith as mood" (not creed, but faith). In fulfillment of this motto Carus preaches a "new theology," "scientific theology," or theonomy, which denies the letter of the Bible, but insists that "all truth is divine and god reveals himself in natural science just as in history"[149]. It should be noted that Kleinpeter in the above-mentioned book on the epistemology of modern natural science recommends Carus alongside Ostwald, Avenarius, and the immanentists (p. 151–152). When Haeckel issued his theses for a union of monists, Carus came out decisively against it: in the first place, Haeckel wrongly rejects apriorism, which "is fully compatible with scientific philosophy"; in the second place, Carus is against Haeckel's doctrine of determinism, which "excludes the possibility of free will"; in the third place, Haeckel "makes the error of emphasizing the one-sided point of view of the naturalist against the traditional conservatism of the churches. He thus comes forward as an enemy of existing churches, instead of joyfully laboring over their higher development into new and truer interpretations of dogmas" (ibid., vol. XVI, 1906, p. 122). Carus himself admits that he is "considered a reactionary by many freethinkers, who censure me for not joining their chorus of attacks on all religion as prejudice" (355).

It is perfectly obvious that we have before us – the leader of a company of American literary adventurers who occupy themselves with plying the people with the religious opium. Mach and Kleinpeter fell into membership of this company too, obviously, through a little "misunderstanding."