...of state supplies, while part remained on incomplete rations. Where should we seek a way out? Only in the fact that we learn, adapt ourselves, and are able to resolve these tasks in the way they must necessarily be resolved—that is, in accordance with the given conditions.

That is my answer to the comrades who spoke in connection with today's discussion, and now I shall proceed to answer briefly some of the submitted notes.

One of them says: "You refer to Port Arthur, but don't you imagine that we ourselves might become Port Arthur, surrounded by international bourgeoisie?"

Yes, comrades, I have already pointed out that the element of war—danger—is such that one cannot begin a war without reckoning with the possibility of suffering defeat. If we suffer defeat, then of course we shall find ourselves in the lamentable position of Port Arthur. In all my speech I had in mind Port Arthur of international capitalism, which is besieged and besieged not only by our army. Within each capitalist country, an army is growing ever larger that is besieging this Port Arthur of international capitalism.

One note asks: "And what will our tactics be on the day after the social revolution, if it breaks out in a year or two?" If one could answer such questions, it would be very easy to make revolutions, and we would have made a heap of them everywhere. Such questions cannot be answered because we cannot say what will happen not only in a year or two, but even in half a year. To pose such questions is as useless as attempting to decide which of the warring sides will find itself in the lamentable position of the fortress Port Arthur. We know only one thing: that in the end, the fortress of international Port Arthur will inevitably be taken, because in all countries forces are growing that will strike it down. For us, the fundamental question lies in how to ensure that under the most difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves, we preserve the possibility of restoring large-scale industry. We must not turn away from commercial calculation; rather, we must understand that only on this foundation can we create tolerable conditions that satisfy the workers both in terms of wages and in terms of the amount of work, and so on. Only on this foundation of commercial calculation can we build the economy. Prejudices and memories of yesterday hinder this. If we do not take this into account, then we shall be unable to carry out the new economic policy properly.

Questions are also posed such as: "Where are the limits of retreat?" Several notes pose the question in the same direction: how long can we retreat? I foresaw this question and said a few words about it in my first speech. This question is an expression of a certain mood of despondency and collapse and is completely without foundation. It is the same sort of question we heard during the conclusion of the Brest Peace. This question is incorrectly posed because only further implementation of our turn in practice can provide material for answering it. We shall retreat until we learn, until we prepare ourselves to transition to firm offensive action. Nothing more can be said in answer to this. Retreat is most unpleasant, but when one is being beaten, one does not ask about pleasantness or unpleasantness, and troops retreat, and no one is surprised by this. From conversations about how long we shall all continue to retreat, nothing useful can come. Why should we in advance invent such situations from which there is no way out? Instead of this, we must set about concrete work. We must carefully examine concrete conditions, the situation; we must determine what we can cling to—a river, a mountain, a swamp, this or that station—because only when we are able to cling to something can we transition to offensive action. And we must not surrender to despondency, must not dispose of the question with agitational exclamations, which are very valuable in their proper place, but in this question can bring nothing but harm.

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