(RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE, APRIL 29, 1919)*

The threat posed by Kolchak to the Volga compels us to adopt urgent measures for the withdrawal of oil products from the threatened section and for the timely passage through the threatened section of oil products intended for the upper wharves.

For the successful execution of the indicated tasks, the following is prescribed:

1) The Chief Oil Committee shall immediately dispatch its representatives to the Volga wharves for the transfer of oil products into barges and the guidance of vessels carrying oil products;

2) The Chief Water Authority shall provide the necessary tanker vessels and tugboats by agreement with the Chief Oil Administration;

3) All military and civil authorities shall render full assistance to the representatives of the Chief Oil Administration and shall in no way obstruct their orders regarding the loading and movement of vessels.

Those failing to carry out the present resolution shall be subject to trial before revolutionary military tribunals under the laws of wartime.

Chairman of the Council of Defense
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

* On the original document signed by V. I. Lenin, there are his annotations: "Approved in the Council of Defense April 29. Do not publish."

RESOLUTION AND ANNOTATIONS ON THE TELEGRAM
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE XI ARMY
May 2, 1919

To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: this is *very* important; 
it is necessary to *leave behind* part of the 33rd Division and *immediately* 
obtain an *exact* 
telegram about this from the Commander-in-Chief to Astrakhan.

Lenin

There is occurring some sort of dreadful misunderstanding regarding the dispatch of the 33rd Division, which must be clarified immediately, because, in carrying out the Commander-in-Chief's order with precision, we shall in the course of several days leave the army's front without troops and shall be forced to: 1) cease all operations on the Black Market and Kizlyar, 2) renounce the seizure of Guryev and Rakushin, where there is oil, 3) place the fleet in an impossible position, since, aside from the landing detachment of 400 men already dispatched for the seizure of Petrovsk, we shall not only be unable to provide troops for the holding of Petrovsk and the defense of the fleet's base, but shall even leave the sole rear and the main fleet base in Astrakhan without adequate protection...

The calculation for the possibility of rapidly forming the 34th Division was based on promised reinforcements by march companies, just as was anticipated in bringing the 33rd Division up to full strength. However, neither the reinforcements nor supplies have been received to this day; therefore, at present the possibility of forming the 34th Division is in no way secured and cannot replace both units of the 33rd Division for operations on the coast and landings...

Telegram No. 1844 of April 28 made it possible to leave the XI Army with some minimum quantity of troops, but the very next telegram once again places the army in an impossible position. Once again confirming the precise execution of the Commander-in-Chief's order, which requires* the dispatch of the 33rd Division on the specified date, precisely April 25, and that there shall be *not the slightest delay* in its dispatch—this is clear.

NB
Yes!