The example cited above with Gelfond already contains an answer to this question, and we shall not follow the countless cases of Gelfond's manner of handling our Machists with J. Dietzgen. It is more expedient to present a series of arguments from J. Dietzgen himself in order to demonstrate his weak points.

"Thought is a function of the brain," says Dietzgen ("Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit", 1903, p. 52. There is a Russian translation: "The Essence of Mental Labour"). "Thought is a product of the brain… My writing desk, as the content of my thought, coincides with this thought, does not differ from it. But this writing desk, outside my head, is its object, entirely different from it" (53). These quite clear materialist propositions Dietzgen supplements, however, with the following: "But non-sensuous representation is itself sensuous, material, that is, actual… Spirit differs from a desk, light, from sound no more than these things differ from one another" (54). Here is obvious incorrectness. That both thought and matter are "actual," i.e., exist, is true. But to call thought material – means to take an erroneous step toward confusing materialism with idealism. In essence, this is rather an imprecision of expression in Dietzgen, who speaks correctly elsewhere: "Spirit and matter have, at least, this in common, that they exist" (80). "Thinking is bodily labour," says Dietzgen. "For thinking I need matter, about which one can think. This matter is given to us in the phenomena of nature and life… Matter is the limit of spirit; it cannot go beyond the bounds of matter. Spirit is a product of matter, but matter is greater than a product of spirit…" (64). From an analysis of such materialist reasonings by the materialist J. Dietzgen, the Machists abstain! They prefer to cling to Dietzgen's imprecisions and confusions. For example, he says that natural scientists can be "idealists only outside their domain" (108). Whether this is so and why it is so, the Machists remain silent. But a page earlier Dietzgen acknowledges "the positive side of contemporary idealism" (106) and "the insufficiency of the materialist principle," which should delight the Machists! Dietzgen's incorrectly expressed thought consists in that the distinction between matter and spirit is relative, not excessive (107). This is just, but from this follows not the insufficiency of materialism, but the insufficiency of metaphysical, anti-dialectical materialism.

"Simple, scientific truth is not based on personality. Its foundations lie outside (i.e., outside the individual), in its material, it is objective truth… We call ourselves materialists… Philosophical materialists are characterized by placing the corporeal world first, at the head, while regarding idea or spirit as a consequence – whereas our opponents, in the manner of religion, derive things from the word… derive the material world from idea" ("Kleinere philosophische Schriften", 1903, p. 59, 62[159]). This acknowledgement of objective truth and repetition of Engels's definition of materialism the Machists pass over. But here Dietzgen says: "We could with equal justice call ourselves idealists, for our system rests on the aggregate result of philosophy, on scientific investigation of idea, on clear understanding of the nature of spirit" (63). It is easy to seize upon this obviously incorrect phrase for renouncing materialism. In fact, in Dietzgen the formulation is more incorrect than the basic thought, which amounts to pointing out that old materialism did not know how to scientifically investigate ideas (by means of historical materialism).

Here is Dietzgen's reasoning about old materialism: "As our understanding of political economy, so our materialism is a scientific, historical conquest. Just as we differ in a fully definite way from the socialists of the past, so also from earlier materialists. We have in common with the latter only that we recognize matter as the presupposition or primary basis of idea" (140). Characteristic is this "only"! It contains within itself all the gnoseological foundations of materialism in distinction from agnosticism, Machism, idealism. But Dietzgen's attention is directed toward distinguishing himself from vulgar materialism.

On the other hand, what follows is directly incorrect: "The concept of matter must be broadened. Here belong all phenomena of reality, and consequently also our faculty of knowing, of explaining" (141). This is a confusion capable only of mixing materialism and idealism under the guise of "broadening" the former. To seize upon such "broadening" means to forget the foundation of Dietzgen's philosophy, the recognition of matter as primary, as "the limit of spirit". And a few lines further, Dietzgen essentially corrects himself: "The whole governs the part, matter governs spirit" (142)… "In this sense we can regard the material world… as the first cause, as the creator of heaven and earth" (142). That the concept of matter must include thoughts, as Dietzgen repeats in the "Excursions" (p. 214 of the cited work), this is confusion, for with such inclusion the gnoseological opposition of matter to spirit, of materialism to idealism, loses meaning – an opposition on which Dietzgen himself insists. That this opposition should not be "excessive," exaggerated, metaphysical, this is beyond dispute (and in emphasizing this lies a great merit of the dialectical materialist Dietzgen). The limits of absolute necessity and absolute truth of this relative opposition are precisely those limits that determine the direction of gnoseological investigations. Beyond these limits, to operate with the opposition of matter and spirit, physical and psychical, as with an absolute opposition, would be a tremendous error.

Dietzgen expresses his thoughts diffusely, unclearly, in a pulpy manner – in contrast to Engels. But, leaving aside the defects of exposition and particular errors, he rightly upholds "materialist theory of cognition" (p. 222, same p. 271), "dialectical materialism" (p. 224). "Materialist theory of cognition," says J. Dietzgen, "reduces to the recognition that the human organ of cognition does not emit any metaphysical light, but is a piece of nature reflecting other pieces of nature" (222–223). "The faculty of cognition is not some supernatural source of truth, but a mirror-like instrument reflecting the things of the world or nature" (243). Our profoundly thoughtful Machists avoid analyzing each individual proposition of J. Dietzgen's materialist theory of cognition, grasping instead at his deviations from it, at his obscurities and confusions. Reactionary philosophers could like J. Dietzgen because he muddies things here and there. Where there is muddiness, there the Machists are, this is self-evident.

Marx wrote to Kugelmann on December 5, 1868: "Dietzgen sent me long ago a fragment of his manuscript on 'The Capacity for Thinking,' which, despite some confusion in concepts and too frequent repetitions, contains much that is excellent and, as the product of independent thinking of a worker, worthy of admiration" (p. 53 Russian trans.){72}. Mr. Valentinov cites this opinion and does not think to ask himself in what Marx discerned confusion in J. Dietzgen: in that which brings Dietzgen closer to Mach, or in that which opposes Dietzgen to Mach? Mr. Valentinov did not raise this question because he read both Dietzgen and Marx's letters in the manner of Gogol's Petrusha. But this question is not difficult to answer. Marx repeatedly called his worldview dialectical materialism, and Engels's "Anti-Dühring," read by Marx in its entirety in manuscript, sets forth precisely this worldview. From this even Messrs. Valentinovs could have reasoned that confusion in J. Dietzgen could consist only in his deviations from consistent application of dialectics, from consistent materialism, in particular from "Anti-Dühring."

Does not Mr. Valentinov and company now suspect that Marx could call confusion in Dietzgen only that which brings Dietzgen closer to Mach, who proceeded from Kant not toward materialism, but toward Berkeley and Hume? Or perhaps the materialist Marx called confusion precisely Dietzgen's materialist theory of cognition and approved his deviations from materialism? Approved what is at variance with "Anti-Dühring" written under his participation?

Whom are our Machists deceiving, those who wish to be considered Marxists and at the same time proclaim to the whole world that "their" Mach approved Dietzgen? Did our heroes not realize that Mach could approve Dietzgen only for that for which Marx called him a muddler!

In the general assessment of J. Dietzgen as a whole, he does not deserve such sharp condemnation. He is 9/10 a materialist, never claiming either originality or a special philosophy distinct from materialism. Of Marx, Dietzgen spoke many times only as of the head of the movement ("Kleinere phil. Schr.", p. 4 – opinion from 1873; p. 95 – from 1876 – it is emphasized that Marx and Engels "possessed the necessary philosophical school," i.e., philosophical education; p. 181 – from 1886 – of Marx and Engels as "acknowledged founders" of the movement). Dietzgen was a Marxist, and Eugen Dietzgen and – alas! – comrade P. Dauge do him a disservice, fabricating "naturmonism," "Dietzgenism" and the like. "Dietzgenism" in distinction from dialectical materialism is confusion, a step toward reactionary philosophy, an attempt to build a line not from what is great in Joseph Dietzgen (there is much that is great in this worker-philosopher who discovered, in his own way, dialectical materialism!), but from what is weak in him!

I shall limit myself to two examples of how comrades P. Dauge and Eugen Dietzgen slide toward reactionary philosophy.

P. Dauge writes in the 2nd edition of "Acquisita," p. 273: "Even bourgeois criticism points to the connection of Dietzgen's philosophy with empirio-criticism and the immanent school," and below: "especially Leclaire" (in the quotation from "bourgeois criticism").

That P. Dauge values and respects J. Dietzgen is beyond question. But it is equally beyond question that he disgraces J. Dietzgen by citing without protest an opinion from a bourgeois scribbler, bringing the most resolute enemy of fideism and professors, "diplomated lackeys" of the bourgeoisie, close to a direct preacher of fideism and an outright reactionary, Leclaire. It is possible that Dauge repeated someone else's opinion about the immanents and Leclaire without being personally acquainted with the writings of these reactionaries. But let this serve him as a warning: the path from Marx to the peculiarities of Dietzgen – to Mach – to the immanents – is a path into the swamp. Not only bringing Dietzgen close to Leclaire, but also bringing Dietzgen close to Mach elevates the Dietzgen-muddler in distinction from Dietzgen-the-materialist.

I shall defend J. Dietzgen against P. Dauge. I assert that J. Dietzgen did not deserve such shame as being brought close to Leclaire. And I can refer to a witness, in such a question the most authoritative: to such a reactionary as Dietzgen, a fideist philosopher and "immanent," as Schubert-Soldern. In 1896 he wrote: "Social-democrats willingly attach themselves to Hegel, with greater or lesser (usually lesser) justice, but only they materialize Hegelian philosophy; cf. J. Dietzgen. In Dietzgen the absolute becomes the universe, and the latter becomes the thing-in-itself, the absolute subject whose phenomena are its predicates. That Dietzgen thus makes the purest abstraction the basis of the concrete process, this he naturally does not notice any more than Hegel noticed it… Hegel, Darwin, Haeckel and natural-historical materialism are often chaotically combined in Dietzgen" ("The Social Question", p. XXXIII). Schubert-Soldern understands philosophical nuances better than Mach, who praises everybody indiscriminately, even down to the Kantian Jeremiah.

Eugen Dietzgen had the naivety to complain to the German public that in Russia "narrow" materialists had offended Joseph Dietzgen, and he translated into German the articles of Plekhanov and Dauge about J. Dietzgen (see J. Dietzgen: "Erkenntnis und Wahrheit", Stuttgart, 1908[160], appendices). The poor "naturmonist" complained on his own head: Fr. Mehring, who understands something about philosophy and about Marxism, wrote in his review that Plekhanov is essentially right against Dauge ("Neue Zeit", 1908, No. 38, June 19, Feuilleton, p. 432[161]). That J. Dietzgen, deviating from Marx and Engels, fell into error (p. 431), this is beyond doubt for Mehring. Eugen Dietzgen answered Mehring with a long and whining note, in which he went so far as to say that J. Dietzgen might be useful "for the unification" of "warring brothers, orthodox and revisionists" ("N. Z.", 1908, No. 44, July 31, p. 652).

Another warning, comrade Dauge: the path from Marx to "Dietzgenism" and "Machism" is a path into the swamp, not for individuals, of course, not for Ivan, Sidor, Paul, but for a direction.

And do not cry out, gentlemen Machists, that I am referring to "authorities": your cries against authorities are simply a cover for the fact that you replace socialist authorities (Marx, Engels, Lafargue, Mehring, Kautsky) with bourgeois authorities (Mach, Petzoldt, Avenarius, immanents). Better not to raise the question of "authorities" and "authoritarianism" at all!