New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture

PART ONE—Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America

12. Different Types of Enterprises
in Agriculture

WhatI have said above about the intensive, large-scale
      capitalist enterprises on small tracts raises this question: is
      there any reason to believe that the intensification of
      agriculture leads to a reduction of farm acreage? In other
      words, are there any conditions relating to modern farming
      techniques as such that require smaller farm acreage for greater
      intensity of farming?

Noanswer is provided either by general theoretical reasoning or
      by examples. In each case it is a matter of the concrete
      technical level of agriculture under a given set of conditions,
      and the actual amount of capital required by a given system of
      farming. In theory, any amount of capital can be invested in any
      acreage in any possible way, but it is obvious that “this
      depends” on the existing economic, technical, and cultural
      conditions, etc., and the whole point is the kind of conditions
      prevalent in a given country at a given time. Examples serve no
      purpose at all, because in the sphere of such complex, varied,
      interwoven and contradictory trends in the economics of modern
      agriculture, any number of examples will be found to support
      opposite views. What this calls for above all—and more so
      than in any other sphere—is a picture of the processas
      a whole, with all the trends taken into account and summed
      up in the form of a resultant.

Thethird method of grouping used by American statisticians in
      1900 helps to find an answer to this question. It is
      classification according to theprincipal source of
      income. Accordingly, farms fall into one of the following
      groups: (1) hay and grain as the principal source of income; (2)
      miscellaneous; (3) livestock; (4) cotton; (5) vegetable; (6)
      fruit; (7) dairy produce; (8) tobacco; (9) rice; (10) sugar;
      (11) flowers and plants; (12) nursery products; (13) taro; and
      (14) coffee. The last seven groups (8-14) together make up only
      2.2% of the total number of farms, i.e., such an insignificant
      share, that I shall not consider them separately. These groups
      (8-14) are similar to the preceding three groups (5-7) in
      economic characteristics and significance and constitute a
      single type.

Hereare the data characterizing the various types of farms;

Itis clear that the first two groups of enterprises (hay and
      grain, and miscellaneous) may be classified as average both as
      regards the degree of their capitalist development (their
      expenditures for hired labour are nearest the average—0.35
      to 0.47, as against an average of 0.43 for the U.S.A.) and the
      intensiveness of agriculture. All the characteristics of
      intensive operations—expenditures for fertilizers, the
      per-acre value of machinery and livestock—are nearest to
      the general average for the U S.A.

Thereis no doubt that these two groups are especially typical
      of the majority of agricultural enterprises in general. Hay and
      grain, followed by a combination of various farm products
      (“miscellaneous” sources of income), are the chief types of
      agricultural enterprises in all countries. It would be extremely
      interesting to have more detailed data about these groups, such,
      for instance, as a breakdown into more and less commercialized
      enterprises, etc. But, as we have seen, the American Census,
      having made one step in that direction, did not go forward, but
      went back.

Thenext two groups, livestock and cotton, are an example of
      farms with the least capitalistic development (the expenditures
      for hired labour: 0.29 to 0.30 as against the average of 0.43),
      and the least intensive methods of agriculture. Their values of
      implements and machinery are the lowest and considerably lower
      than the average (0.66 and 0.53 as against 0.90). Farms whose
      principal source of income is livestock naturally have more
      livestock per acre than the average for the U.S.A. (4.45 as
      against 3.66), but appear to be engaged in extensive livestock
      raising: their expenditures for fertilizers are the minimum,
      they have the largest average acreage (226.9 acres) and the
      smallest proportion of improved acreage (86.1 out of 226.9). The
      cotton farms have a higher than-average figure for fertilizers,
      but other indexes indicative of intensive agriculture (the
      per-acre value of livestock and machinery) are very low.

Finally,the last three groups—vegetables, fruit, and dairy
      produce—include farms which are, first, the smallest in
      acreage (33 to 63 acres of improved land, as against 42 to 86
      and 46 to 111 in the other groups); secondly, the most
      capitalist: they have the heaviest expenditure of hired labour,from 2 to 6 times the average; and thirdly, the most
      intensive. Almost all the indexes of intensive agriculture are
      above the average: the expenditure on fertilizers, the value of
      machinery, the value of livestock (a minor exception are the
      fruit-growing farms which lag behind the average, but are well
      ahead of the farms which derive their income chiefly from hay
      and grain).

Letus now see what is the share of these highly capitalist
      farms in the country’s economy. But we must first examine their
      intensive character in somewhat greater detail.

Takethe farms whose main income is derived from vegetables. It
      is well known that in all capitalist countries the development
      of towns, factories, industrial settlements, railway stations,
      ports, etc., stimulates a demand for this type of product, it
      pushes up their prices, and increases the number of agricultural
      enterprises raising them for the market. The average “vegetable”
      farm hasless than one-thirdof the improved acreage of
      an “ordinary” farm deriving income chiefly from hay and grain:
      the former is 33.8 acres, and the latter, 111.1. This means that
      this particular technical level with this particular
      accumulation of capital in agriculture requires “vegetable”
      farms of smaller acreage; in other words, if capital invested in
      agriculture is to yield a not less-than average profit, a
      vegetable-raising farm should have, technology being what it is,
      asmaller acreagethan a hay-and grain farm.

Butthat is not all. The growth of capitalism in agriculture
      consists above all in a transition from natural agriculture to
      commercial agriculture. This is being constantly forgotten, and
      must be brought up again and again. Commercial agriculture, it
      should be noted, does not develop along the “simple” lines
      imagined or projected by bourgeois economists, namely, through
      an ever greater output ofthe sameproducts. Not at
      all. Commercial agriculture very frequently develops by shifting
      from one type of product to another, and the shift from hay and
      grain to vegetables is very common. But what bearing does it
      have on the question before us, that of farm acreage and the
      growth of capitalism in agriculture?

Sucha shift signifies thesplit-upof a “large”
      111.1-acre farm into more than three “small” 33.8-acre
      farms. The old farm produced a value of $760—the average
      value of its products, less the feed raised on the farm, whose
      chief source of income is hay and grain. Each of the new farms
      produces a value of $665, or a total of $665 x 3 = $1,995, i.e.,
      more than double the original figure.

Aslarge-scale production displaces small-scale production, farm
      acreage isreduced.

Theaverage expenditure on hired labour on the old farm was $76;
      on the new farm it is $106, or almost half as much again, while
      acreage is one-third or even less. Expenditure on fertilizers
      has gone up from $0.04 per acre to $0.59, an increase of almost
      15 times; the value of implements and machinery has doubled from
      $1.04 to $2.12, etc.

Therewill, of course, be the usual objection that the number of
      such highly capitalist farms with specialized “commercial” crops
      is negligible, as compared with the total. The answer is that,
      first, the number and therole, the economic role of
      such farms, are much greater than is generally realized; and
      secondly—and this is the most important point—it
      is such cropsthat are developedmore rapidlythan
      others in the capitalist countries. That is just why a reduction
      in farm acreage with the intensification of agriculture so often
      implies an increase and not a reduction in the scale of
      operations, an increase and not a decrease in the exploitation
      of hired labour.

Hereare the exact American statistics for the country as a
      whole. Let us take all the special, or “commercial”, crops
      listed above under heads 5-14, namely, vegetables, fruit, dairy
      produce, tobacco, rice, sugar, flowers, nursery products, taro,
      and coffee. In 1900, these products were theprincipalsource of income for 12.5% of all farms in the U.S.A. This is
      one-eighth, a very small minority. Their acreage was 8.6%, or
      one-twelfth, of the total. But to continue. Let us take the
      total value of the products of American agriculture (less
      feed). Of this value the farms in question accounted for as much
      as 16%, i.e., their share of the value was almost double their
      share of the acreage.

Thismeans that the productivity of labour and land on these
      farms was almost double the average.

Letus take the sum total of expenditure on hired labour in
      American agriculture. Of this total, 26.6%, i.e., over
      one-quarter, fell to the farms in question. This is more than
      three times their share of the acreage, and more than three
      times the average. This means that these farms are very much
      more capitalist than the average.

Theirshare of the total value of implements and machinery is
      20.1%, and of the expenditures for fertilizers, 31.7%, i.e.,
      slightly less thanone-thirdof the total, and nearlyfour timesthe average.

Consequently,an incontrovertible fact is established for the
      country as a whole. It is that the especially intensive farms
      have an especially small acreage, especially great employment of
      hired labour, and especially high productivity of labour; that
      the economic role of these farms in the nation’s agriculture is
      two, three and more times greater than their proportion of the
      total number of farms, to say nothing of their share of the
      total acreage.

Astime goes on, does the role of these highly capitalist and
      highly intensive crops and farms increase or decrease in
      comparison with other crops and farms?

Theanswer is provided by a comparison of the last two census
      reports: their role is unquestionablyincreasing. Let
      us take the acreage planted to the various crops. From 1900 to
      1910, the acreage under grain increased by only 3.5% for the
      U.S.A.; under beans, peas, and the like, 26.6%; hay and forage,
      17.2%; cotton, 32%; vegetables, 25.5%; sugar-beets, sugar-cane,
      etc., 62.6%.

Letus examine the crop returns. From 1900 to 1910, the grain
      crop went up only 1.7%; beans, 122.2%; hay and forage, 23%;
      sugar-beets, 395.7%; sugar-cane, 48.5%; potatoes, 42.4%; grapes,
      97.6%; there was a poor crop of berries, apples, etc., in 1910,
      but the orange and lemon crops, etc., were treble those of
      1900.

Thus,the apparently paradoxical but nevertheless proven fact
      bas been shown to apply to U.S. agriculture as a wholethat,
      generally speaking, small-scale production is not only being
      displaced by large scale production, but also that this
      displacement is taking place in the following form:

Small-scaleproduction is being crowded out by large-scale production
      through the displacement of farms which are “larger” in acreage,
      but are less productive, less intensive and less capitalist, by
      farms which are “smaller” in acreage, but are more productive,
      more intensive, and more capitalist.