Report on the Internal and External Position of the Republic at a Meeting of Activists of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)

October 9, 1920

Published:First published in 1959 inLenin Miscellany XXXVI.

      Printed from the shorthand record.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      2nd English Printing,

      Progress Publishers,1971,

      Moscow,Volume 42,

      pages214b-217a.Translated:Bernard IsaacsTranscription\Markup:D. WaltersPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2003).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
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There is no need to speak of our
internal position at this meeting, since all the comrades are sufficiently
informed about this from our press and from work in the local areas. Food
collections are much bigger than they were last year, so are fuel
collections, and these are the foundations of our work. We are worse off as
regards supply, though. Someof the big factories can now be started, and the temper of the workers in
them cannot be as hopeless as it was when the factories were at a
standstill. Considering our economic situation, we can expect a change of
heart.

Ifind it necessary to dwell on our external position, on the news of
foreign policy. Poland is in the grip of a tremendous crisis:
economically, Poland has suffered worse destruction than we have;
politically, things have reached a point when even an opportunist party
like the

P.P.S.,[1]which has always conducted a vicious smear campaign against
the Bolsheviks, protests against the brutal manner in which the government
deals with the workers. In the territory which we are ceding to them under
the peace treaty Poland will be able to rule only by violence. Among the
worker and peasant masses of Poland there is a tremendous desire for
peace. In offering Poland peace and making tremendous concessions we shall
make the political parties realise that we were right, make them realise
that we did not want war with Poland. By taking indemnities from us, Poland
gains nothing. She will not receive the money-France will take it. Up till
now this fact has been concealed in Poland, but the position is gradually
being brought home to the workers, and we must see to it that it is brought
home to them still more clearly. Therefore it is necessary that we now
conclude peace. Besides, we shall win time and use it to strengthen our
army.

Onthe Wrangel front the odds are in our favour, but at one time there
was a grave danger to the Donets coal-field. Wrangel is frustrating our
plan of a general offensive by dealing separate blows in various
directions.

An,at first glance insignificant, incident is characteristic
politically. Germany has allowed entry to Comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin to
attend the forthcoming congress of the Independent Party in Germany. Maybe
this is sheer provocation, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that
Zinoviev’s arrival will speed up and deepen the split that had already
started among the “Independents”. Part of the breakaway “Independents”
and up to a million members of the Communist Party of Germany will
constitute an imposing revolutionary force. What is more, it will serve as
immense propaganda material for all Europe.

Thecrux of the matter is that the imperialist policy of France now
stands, revealed-of France, who has always upset our peace talks and is now
putting spokes in our wheel again. We must make use of every hour of the
armistice to strengthen ourselves. We must step up our supply activities,
achieve quick successes on the Wrangel front, and then we can hope to tear
the web of diplomatic intrigues against us.

Thesituation in the Far East is such that Japan is bound to withdraw,
since she cannot possibly face a winter campaign. This strengthens us. At
the present time there is an American multi-millionaire in Moscow, who is
negotiating a concession on Kamchatka. By granting this concession we shall
aggravate relations between Japan and America.

InTurkestan and the Caucasus the situation is more
complicated. Recently the Turks have started to move on Armenia with the
aim of seizing Batum, and afterwards, perhaps, Baku. Obviously we must show
the greatest caution in this matter. So far we have no information about
military complications.

Howevergreat the disagreements between France and Britain,, we-cannot
work on them now so long as we are having defeat instead of
victory. Apparently, disagreements do exist. Britain wants to trade with us
and we are trying to achieve this.

Asto how our army is equipped with weapons I cannot say in any
detail. There was a shortage of cartridges until recently, but the
difficulties now have lessened. The work is on a strong foundation, it only
has to be intensified still more. The Party organisations must help in this
by working in the Party cells and through the trade unions.

Asto what the chances are for victory, I cannot say just now, as the
general feeling is hard to define at the moment. The disappointment is too
great; six weeks have already passed since we started to retreat and we are
still retreating. The thing is we are late with winter supplies; this has
coincided with the defeat. Without doubt, we must make use of every moment
of the armistice to strengthen ourselves.

Wecannot set the tone for agitation until we know something
definite. This meeting is already setting the tone.

Accordingto Comrade Trotsky the question of Makhno has been very
seriously discussed in military circles and it has been ascertained that we
can expect nothing but a winning hand here. The reason is that the elements
grouped around Makhno have already had experience of Wrangel’s regime, and
were not satisfied with what he could give them. Our agreement with Makhno
is hedged around with guarantees that he will not go against us. We have
the same, picture here as with Denikin and Kolchak: as soon as they
infringed upon the interests of the kulaks and the peasantry as a whole,
the latter sided with us.

Unquestionably,the Poles, too, will use the armistice to strengthen
themselves; maybe they will bring up munitions during that period, but that
does not mean that we should not do the same.

Solong as there is war, secret diplomacy must exist as a means of
warfare. We cannot renounce it. An assessment of this diplomacy depends on
a general assessment of the war.

[1]P.P.S.—Polska Partia Socjalistyczna(The Polish Socialist
Party)—a reformist and nationalist party founded in 1892. Throughout the
party’s history Left-wing groups kept springing up within it as a result of
pressure from the rank-and-file workers. Some of these groups eventually
joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement.

In1906 the party split up into the P.P.S. Left wing
and the Right, chauvinist wing (the so-called "revolutionary
faction"). Under the influence of the Bolshevik Party and the
Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Left wing gradually
adopted a consistent revolutionary stand.

Duringthe First World War a large part of the
P.P.S. Left wing adopted an internationalist stand. In December 1918 it
united with the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania to form the
Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (as the Communist Party of Poland was
known up to 1925).

Duringthe First World War the P.P.S. Right wing
continued the policy of national chauvinism, organising Polish legions on
the territory of Galicia to fight on the side of Austro-German
imperialism. With the formation of the Polish bourgeois state the Right
P.P.S. in 1919 united with the P.P.S. organisations on Polish territories
formerly seized by Germany and Austria, and resumed the name of the
P.P.S. On becoming the ruling party, it helped transfer power to the
Polish bourgeoisie, systematically carried on anti-communist propaganda,
and supported a policy of aggression against the Soviet Union, a policy of
conquest and oppression against Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia. Various groups in the P.P.S. who disagreed with this policy
joined the Communist Party of Poland.

AfterPilsudski’s coup (May 1926) the P.P.S. was
nominally a parliamentary opposition, but actually it carried on no active
fight against the regime, and continued its anticommunist and anti-Soviet
propaganda. During that period the Left-wing elements of the
P.P.S. collaborated with the Polish Communists and supported united front
tactics in a number of campaigns.

Duringthe Second World War the P.P.S. again split
up. A reactionary and chauvinist faction, which assumed the name

Wolność, Równość,
Niepodległość (Liberty, Equality, Independence),
joined the reactionary Polish émigré "government" in
London. The Left faction, which called itself the Workers’ Party of Polish
Socialists, under the influence of the Polish Workers’ Party, which was
founded in 1942, joined the popular front against the Nazi invaders, fought
for Poland’s liberation, and pursued a policy of friendly relations with
the U.S.S.R.

In1944, after the liberation of Poland’s eastern
territories by the Russia’s Red Army and the formation of a Polish
Committee of National Liberation, the Workers’ Party of Polish Socialists
resumed the name of P.P.S.  and together with the P.W.P. participated in
the building up of a post-war Poland. In December 1948 the P.W.P.  and the
P.P.S. amalgamated and formed the Polish United Workers’ Party.