# Date: 1905

The article "An Unsuccessful Maneuver" represents a summary of 
correspondence from military observers in the foreign press, 
devoted to Kuropatkin's attempt to go on the offensive 
against the Japanese at Hun-ho. As is evident from the document 
printed above No. 7/7 (p. 45), Lenin initially planned to give this 
summary the headline: "A Diversion at Hun-ho." The article was 
intended for No. 5 of *Vperyod* of February 7 (January 25), 1905, but 
was not printed.

AN UNSUCCESSFUL MANEUVER.

[February, before 7, 1905. Geneva.]

"The transition to an offensive by the Tsar's army at Hun-ho, a few 
days after the bloody suppression of a workers' demonstration in 
Petersburg, gives rise to many reflections. Military considerations 
could scarcely have prompted this transition to an offensive, unless 
we assume a colossal [overestimation] of their own strength by the 
Russian generals. From a purely military point of view, the disadvan
tages of such a step are enormous and obvious: our military corres
pondent shows this in detail in his article today. General Kuropatkin 
is not the sort of man to throw fresh troops, only just arrived, into 
an attack which is manifestly hopeless against an enemy equal in 
strength or even stronger, an enemy possessing especially hardened 
fighters and commanding very strong fortifications. These fresh troops 
were his chief resource for the forthcoming campaign. Why then 
demoralizeize them at the start of this campaign, subjecting them to 
all the hardships of an offensive in this terribly severe winter season, 
while being morally certain that the attack would be repulsed with 
heavy losses? The answer to this question is given by comparing the 
dates and a moment's reflection on the urgent needs of the autocracy 
in its domestic policy. On Sunday, January 9 (22), the workers of the 
capital were shot down in the streets. On January 12 (25), the newly 
arrived reinforcements were thrown into an attack against the Japanese 
at Hun-ho. Clearly, there was a desire to divert the attention of the 
Russian people as quickly as possible from events which caused the 
whole world to shudder with horror. Before the blood had even ceased 
to flow in Petersburg, reports began to come in of alarming popular 
disturbances in many major provincial cities. How could it be under 
these conditions that the court clique and its allies in the bureaucracy 
did not desperately desire to give the masses some other absorbing 
subject of interest? The court clique could scarcely flatter itself with 
any particular hope of victory; but a military event, whatever it might 
be, even if only a defeat, could in any case provide the public with 
new food for conversation. Better let them talk about a repulsed attack 
at Hun-ho than about a battle on Nevsky Prospect. Of course, we cannot 
assert with certainty that the higher spheres reasoned precisely in this 
way while preparing the military operation, which according to reports 
from Tokyo added another 10,000 men* to the enormous list of Russian 
soldiers lost in such enterprises as any military man would deem hope
less. But this fatal predominance of politics over strategy, which has 
manifested itself more than once before, when the necessity to divert 
attention from domestic affairs was far less pressing, fully justifies 
the suspicion that the unfortunate Kuropatkin was once again con
demned to sacrifice his troops in pursuance of orders from Petersburg 
on operations that were manifestly hopeless."

Thus wrote on Tuesday, January 31 (18), the solid newspaper *Times*, 
which ordinarily discusses Russian events with great and considerable 
sobriety from a "reasonably conservative" bourgeois point of view. 
This newspaper was so sober that it recently wrote of the "hysteri
cal" exaggerations of the Petersburg massacre (1), that it even warned 
the British public against the "tactlessness" of collecting money in 
England to aid Russian brooms for freedom. All the more valuable to us 
are the cool judgments of this faithful interpreter of the interests of 
big capital regarding the significance of the latest military events.

In Russia there is so little possibility of obtaining reliable information 
about these events, it is so incredibly difficult to hear any somewhat 
conscientious military assessment of them, so difficult to evaluate the 
political and politicking significance of the various "maneuvers" of the 
Tsar's gang, that we shall cite further opinions of that military corres
pondent to whom the *Times* refers. The authority of this correspondent 
in military matters has long been recognized by both the European and 
Russian press—insofar as it is at all honest.

"The battle, which began on Wednesday between considerable forces of 
the hostile Manchurian armies, bears all the marks of a popular spec
tacle arranged by order of the Tsar's Village prisoner for purposes of 
political distraction of attention.

"A short time after the last major battle, which would more properly 
be called the battle of Yentai than of Sha-ho, the Japanese extended 
their left flank to Hun-ho, and the last battle was confined to the line 
of several fortified villages near this river. Of these villages, the chief 
points of attack were Sandepoo and the settlement of Hei-kau-tai (or 
Keigutaya or Chei-gutai, depending on the transliteration). The Russian 
forces consisted, according to Oyama's reports, of the 8th European 
Army Corps, one division of the 10th Corps, the 61st Reserve Division, 
and two divisions of the 1st East Siberian Army Corps, in addition to 
a considerable cavalry detachment under the command of the enterpris
ing Mishchenko.

"Tokyo reports estimate the number of Russians at 65,000 men, but 
this estimate should be below the reality if all the military units just 
mentioned participated in the battle. According to Oyama's report, the 
8th and 10th Russian corps attacked Chen-chieh-pu, while the remain
ing forces attacked Gei-kau-tai. The latter village, according to Kuro
patkin's first telegram of January 26 (13), was taken after brave defense 
between 10 and 11 p.m. on Wednesday. But Sandepoo held firm, although 
part of this village was occupied by the Russians, and the two Russian 
corps, having lost from 1,600 to 4,000 men (according to unofficial data), 
withdrew and contented themselves with bombardment of Sandepoo. 
General Sakharov deserves congratulation on a very felicitous turn of 
phrase in his description of this affair. He expressed it precisely thus: 
that the Russians could not remain in Sandepoo without risking suffer
ing defeat. Until now, indeed, the usual phenomenon has been that one 
of the warring armies leaves the field of battle at the end of a battle, 
but until now it was ordinarily thought that this army, abandoning the 
field of battle, does so not in order to avoid the danger of suffering 
defeat, but because it has already suffered defeat.

"As soon as the Russian offensive developed, Oyama, following the 
example of the previous battle at Sha-ho, quickly shifted to the offen
sive on his left flank. The battle turned into a series of skirmishes for 
possession of various villages, especially the village of Gei-kau-tai. In 
the end, both this village and other important positions remained in 
the hands of the Japanese. The Russians were repulsed and driven north
ward, losing 500 prisoners and masses of killed and wounded"... (At 
present the severity of these losses is becoming increasingly clear. The 
wounded suffered terribly from the intense cold, and masses died, as is 
known from the newspapers. Ed.)

"Among Russian society there are educated people who desperately desire 
victory, hoping that only after victory can one persuade the Tsar to 
think about peace. But however much the Japanese themselves may desire 
peace, it is hardly to be expected that they will facilitate the realization 
of these praiseworthy Russian aspirations. Besides, it remains entirely 
problematical whether a Russian victory would lead to peace; it is far 
more probable that it would, on the contrary, strengthen the Grand 
Ducal party with its jingoism and desire to continue the war. In any 
case, this latest fruitless attempt by Kuropatkin ended in the same fail
ure as all the previous ones during the entire year of war. This year has 
now ended with yet another heavy defeat of the Russians.

"Kuropatkin has not yet deigned to give a concluding report on the bat
tle, unless one counts his childish communication (telegraphed today) 
of the loss of three killed and 35 wounded; and it is possible that new 
trials await him. But if the Japanese victory on Sunday was the conclu
sion of this battle—and this still remains in doubt—then it is entirely 
incomprehensible what special military considerations could have prompt
ed the Russians to assume the offensive. How could the Russians have 
counted on success? To assume the offensive under such climatic condi
tions as now obtain, against an enemy equal in strength or even stronger, 
an enemy which had three months to fortify its positions, means to sacri
fice one's army without mercy on the altar of patriotism. Judging by the 
composition of the troops that participated in the battle, these were 
troops not of Grippenberg alone, but of all three armies, that is, perhaps 
the best, picked troops were sent? In one respect Kuropatkin has undoubt
edly displayed outstanding abilities during this campaign. No general has 
been able to send fresh troops to certain defeat so quickly, barely had 
they arrived at the army, as has Kuropatkin. His skill in squandering 
young forces is beyond question (His success in blooding his "young 
entry" is beyond dispute). The 8th Army Corps, the 61st Reserve Brigade, 
and both rifle brigades that participated in the battle at Hun-ho, all of 
these were fresh troops, not yet in combat. The situation seemed to de
mand that these fresh troops not be subjected to the demoralizing in
fluence of defeat and be preserved for a serious blow in a major battle. 
Instead, they are subjected to all the hardships of a march in snow, in 
terrible cold, for four whole days; their energy is undermined by entrust
ing them with the most difficult of all field operations: an attack on 
fortified terrain (villages), an operation which experienced generals 
avoid insofar as possible, since it invariably leads to the loss of the best 
officers and soldiers.

"Russian writers have often stated that in deep winter Russian soldiers 
have more chances of victory than the Japanese. He who knows the living 
conditions of a Russian peasant and a Japanese peasant has always doubted 
the correctness of this assertion. The Japanese are more accustomed to 
work in the open air in cold seasons of the year than peasants who spend 
the winter lying on stoves in sheepskins. Besides, in the training of 
Japanese soldiers, winter maneuvers and movements of troops to harden 
them played an important role. To require of a Russian soldier, with his 
lack of training, in his heavy cumbersome clothing, with unskillful 
leadership—that he assume the offensive in winter, when silhouettes are 
especially prominent against the snow, and attack Japanese who have made 
themselves comfortable in previously fortified positions, this has always 
seemed to us downright folly.

"Reports about the great battle at Sha-ho in October are still far from 
complete. As more detailed descriptions arrive, they increasingly strength
en the impression of the enormous differences in military capability of 
the two armies. General Kuropatkin, it would seem, himself directed the 
entire battle at Sha-ho not only in the sense of general command, but 
often in detailed movements as well. As a result, various military units 
received contradictory orders from different generals, or received no 
orders at all and wasted time in useless waiting.

* We have just read in the *Temps* that the correspondent of *Novoe Vremya* 
estimates Russian losses in the latest battle at Hun-ho at 43,000 men. Ed. 
[Lenin's note. Ed.]

** In the manuscript there is a typographical error: written "sobriety." Ed.