(Logic) V, 178* [VI, 161-162]**:

The dual meaning of objectivity: ..."it turns out that objectivity likewise has a twofold meaning - the meaning of something standing opposed to autonomous Being-in-itself, but also the meaning of something existing in-itself and for-itself"... (178) [161].

..."The cognition of truth is posited in cognizing the object as it is as an object, free from the admixture of subjective reflection"... (178) [162].

Discussions of "mechanism" - further on - are exceedingly abstruse and scarcely anything but sheer nonsense.

Further on, idem concerning chemism, the stage of "judgment," etc.

The paragraph headed "Law" (198-199) [179-180] does not deliver what one might expect from Hegel on such an interesting question. It is strange why "law" is relegated to "mechanism."

The concept of law is here brought together with the concepts: "order" (Ordnung), uniformity (Gleichformigkeit); necessity; the "soul" of the objective totality***; "the principle of self-movement."

objectivity
cognition
of the
object

this rapprochement is very
important

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834. Editor.
** Hegel. Works, vol. VI, Moscow, 1939. Editor.
*** - of objective totality. Editor.

All this from the standpoint of the notion that mechanism is the other-being of spirit, Being-in-itself, etc., of the soul, of individuality... A game of empty analogies, apparently!

It should be noted that on p. 210 [190] there appears the concept
"Naturnotwendigkeit"* - "both mechanism and chemism are thus encompassed by the concept of natural necessity"... because here we see "its" (des Begriffs) "immersion into externality" (ib.).

"It has already been mentioned that the opposition between teleology and mechanism is first and foremost the more general opposition of freedom and necessity. Kant brought this opposition into this form in his exposition of the antinomies of Reason, and precisely as the third collision of transcendental ideas" (213) [193].

Briefly recapitulating Kant's arguments for the thesis and antithesis, Hegel notes the emptiness of these arguments and draws attention to what Kant's reasoning amounts to:

"Kant's resolution of this antinomy is the same as his general resolution of the other antinomies; namely, it consists in the fact that Reason cannot prove either proposition, since we cannot have any determining principle a priori from purely empirical laws of nature concerning the possibility of things; that therefore both propositions must be regarded not as objective propositions but as subjective maxims; that I, on the one hand, must constantly reflect upon all events of nature according to the principle of mechanism alone

"nature =
immersion
of Being-in-itself
into
externality"
(ha-ha!)

freedom and
necessity

Hegel against Kant
(on freedom
and necessity)

* - "of natural necessity." Editor.