objects, finitude in space or in time, location in this place, absolute negation of space; but that, furthermore, equally necessary and the opposite determinateness is required — for example, infinity in space and time, non-location in this place, relation to space and thereby spatiality. The more ancient Eleatic school applied its dialectic chiefly against motion, whereas Plato often [applied it] against the representations and concepts of his time, especially against the Sophists, but also against pure categories and determinations of reflection; later developed skepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of everyday life, but also to all scientific concepts. And the conclusion drawn from such a dialectic is in general the contradictoriness and nullity of the recognized assertions. But such a result can have a twofold meaning: either that objective meaning, that the very object, which thus contradicts itself, *sublates* and annihilates itself (such, for example, is the Eleatics' conclusion, by which the truth of the world, of motion, of the point, was negated); or that subjective meaning, according to which cognition itself is unsatisfactory. Or this latter conclusion is understood as meaning that this very dialectic produces a trick, creating such a kind of false appearance. Such is the customary view of so-called common human sense, adhering to sensory evidence and customary
[marginal notes:]
*from the history of dialectic*
*the role of skepticism in the history of dialectic*
*dialectic understood as a trick*

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V. I. LENIN

representations and utterances*... (337-338) [304-305].
For example, Diogenes-the-dog
By the way, Kant's merit [lies in drawing] attention to dialectic and to the examination of "determinations of thought in themselves and for themselves" (339) [306].

"An object, as it is without thinking and without concept, is a representation or even merely a name; only in the determinations of thought and concept is it that which it is"...

... "Therefore one cannot blame any object or cognition if, in accordance with its nature or through some external connection, it manifests itself as dialectical"...

... "Thus all opposites, recognized as something fixed — for example, the finite and the infinite, the singular and the universal — are contradictions not through any external combination, but, rather, —

[marginal notes:]
*This is correct!*

*representation and thought,*
*development of both,*
*nil aliud**
*Kantianism = (likewise)*
*skepticism*

*Object manifests itself as dialectical*

*Concepts are not immobile, but —*
*in themselves, by their own*

* — nothing other. Ed.

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