Division (Einteilung) must be "natural, and not purely artificial, i.e., arbitrary" (401) [334].

Pages 403-404 [336] — against "construction" and "play" at constructing, whereas the matter concerns "concept," "idea," "the unity of concept and objectivity"... (403) [336].

In the small Encyclopedia § 233, section b is entitled D a s W o l l e n* (that which in the large Logic is "Die Idee des Guten"**).

Activity is "contradiction" — the end is actual and unactual, possible and not... etc.

"Formally, the elimination of this contradiction consists in the fact that activity sublates the subjectivity of the end, and thereby also objectivity, sublates the opposition by virtue of which they both appeared as finite, not only the one-sidedness of the given subjectivity, but subjectivity as such" (406) [338].

The standpoint of Kant and Fichte (especially in moral philosophy) is the standpoint of the end, of subjective the Ought (407) [338-339] (outside connection with the objective)...

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegel mocks (§ 237, vol. VI, p. 409 [340]) the "declamations" about it, as if everything is revealed in it, and remarks that "the Absolute Idea"... is... "the universal," "but this universal is not simply an abstract form to which (sic!) all particular content stands opposed as something other, but as the absolute form into which all determinations have returned, the entire fullness of content posited by it. In this respect the Absolute Idea can be compared with an old man who utters the same religious truths as a child, but for whom they have the significance of his whole life. The child also understands the religious content, but it has for him the significance only as something outside of which still lies a whole life and the whole world."

tres bien!
Beautiful
comparison!
instead of
vulgar
religion one
should
take any
abstract
truths

* — Willing, d e s i r e. Ed.
** — "The Idea of the Good." Ed.

"The interest lies in the whole movement"... (§ 237, p. 409 [341]).

"Content is the living development of the idea"... "Each of the previously considered stages is an image of the absolute, but above all in a limited sense"... (410) [341].

§ 238, addendum:

"The method of philosophy is at one and the same time synthetic and analytical; but not at all in the sense that both of these methods of finite cognition stand side by side or simply alternate, but in such a way that they are both contained in the philosophical method in sublated form, and it at each of its movements acts simultaneously both analytically and synthetically. Philosophical thinking acts analytically insofar as it only perceives its object — the idea, allows it to act without hindrance and as it were merely follows its movement and development. Philosophizing is to that extent completely passive. But at the same time philosophical thinking is synthetic and manifests itself as the activity of the concept itself. The philosophical method moreover requires abstaining from accidental personal presuppositions and from particular opinions, which constantly strive to display themselves"... (411) [342].

(§ 243, p. 413 [344])... "The method is thus not an external form, but the soul and concept of the content"...

(End of the Encyclopedia; see above in the margin the excerpt from the end of the Logic*.)

splendid!
tres bien
very
good!
(and vivid)

* See present volume, p. 215. Thereafter in the notebook follow blank pages; at the end of the notebook are written the note "On the Latest Literature on Hegel" and a note on a review of Perren's book (see present volume, pp. 347-351). Ed.