The Boycott

Written:Written August 12 (25), 1906Published:Published August 21, 1906 inProletary, No. 1.

      Published according to theProletarytext.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      Progress Publishers,1965,

      Moscow,Volume 11,

      pages141-149.Translated:Transcription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2004).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

TheLeft-wing Social-Democrats must reconsider the question of boycotting the
State Duma. It should be borne in mind that we have always presented this
question concretely, and in connection with a definite political situation. For
instance,Proletary(Geneva)[4]wrote that “it would be ridiculous to renounce utilising even
the Bulygin

				Duma”[1]—if

it could come into being. And
in referring to the Witte Duma in the pamphletSocial-Democracy and the
State Duma(by N. Lenin and F. Dan), N. Lenin wrote: “We must by all
means carefully reconsider the question of tactics... The situation has
changed” at the time of the Bulygin Duma (see p. 2 of the pamphlet

			       cited).[2]

Theprincipal difference between revolutionary Social-Democracy and opportunist
Social-Democracy on the question of boycott is as follows: the opportunists in
all circumstances confine themselves to applying the stereotyped method copied
from a specific period in the history of German socialism. We must utilise
representative institutions; the Duma is a representative institution; therefore
boycott is anarchism, and we must go into the Duma. All the arguments used by
our Mensheviks, and especially by Plekhanov, on this topic, could be reduced to
this childishly simple syllogism. The Menshevik resolution on the importance of
representative institutions in a revolutionary period (seeParttiniye Izvestia,[5]No. 2) strikingly reveals the stereotyped
and anti-historical nature of their argument.

Therevolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, lay chief emphasis on the
      necessity of carefully appraising the concrete political situation. It is
      impossible to cope with the tasks of the revolutionary epoch in Russia by
      copying in a biased manner one of the recent German stereotyped patterns,
      forgetting the lessons of 1847-48. The progress of our revolution will be
      altogether incomprehensible if we confine ourselves to making bare
      contrasts between “anarchist” boycott and Social-Democratic
      participation in elections. Learn from the history of the Russian
      revolution, gentlemen!

Thishistory hasprovedthat the tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma
were the only correct tactics at that time, and were entirely justified by
events. Whoever forgets this and argues about boycott without taking the lessons
of the Bulygin Duma into account (as the Mensheviks always do) is certifying his
own mental poverty, his inability to ex plain and take into account one of the
most important and eventful periods of the Russian revolution. The tactics of
boycotting the Bulygin Duma were based on a correct appraisal of the temper of
the revolutionary proletariat and of the objective features of the situation,
which made an immediate general outbreak inevitable.

Letus pass to thesecondlesson of history—to the Witte, Cadet
Duma. Nowadays we often hear Social-Democratic intellectuals making repentant
speeches about the boycott. of that Duma. The fact that it did assemble and
undoubtedly rendered indirect service to the revolution is considered to be
sufficient reason for penitently confessing that the boycott of the Witte Duma
had been a mistake.

Sucha view, however, is extremely biased and short sighted. It fails to take
into consideration a number of very important facts of the period prior to the
Witte Duma, the period of its existence and the period after its
dissolution. Remember that the electoral law for that Duma was
promulgated on December 11,[6]at a time when the insurgents were waging an armed fight for a
constituent assembly. Remember thateven the Menshevik“Nachalo” wrote at the time: “The proletariat willalsosweep away the Witte Duma, just as it swept away the Bulygin
Duma.” Under such circumstances the proletariat, could not and should not havesurrendered to the tsar without a fight the power to convene the first
representative assembly in Russia. The proletariat had to fight against the
autocracy being strengthened by a loan on the security of the Witte Duma. The
proletariat had to combat the constitutional illusions which, in the spring of
1906, formed theentirebasis of the election campaign of the Cadets
and the elections among the peasantry. At that time, when the importance of the
Duma was being immeasurably exaggerated, the only means of combating such
illusions was the boycott. The degree to which thespreadof
constitutional illusions was connected with participation in the election
campaign and in the elections in the spring of 1906 is strikingly revealed by
the attitude adopted by our Mensheviks. Suffice it to recall that, in spite of
the warnings of the Bolsheviks, in the resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party the Duma was referred to as a
“power”! Another instance:

with complete self-assurance, Plekhanov wrote: “The government willfallinto the abyss when it dissolves the Duma.” In reply to him it was
said at that time: we must prepare topushthe enemy into the abyss and
not, like the Cadets, place hopes on its “falling” into the abyss by
itself. And how soon the words then uttered were proved

			       correct![3]

Itwas the duty of the proletariat to exert every effort to preserve the
independence of its tactics in our revolution, namely: together with the
politically conscious peasantry against the vacillating and treacherous
liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. But it wasimpossibleto employ these
tactics during the elections to the Witte Duma owing to a number of
circumstances, both objective and subjective, which, in the vast majority of
localities in Russia, would have made participation in the elections tantamount
to the workers’ party tacitly supporting the Cadets. The proletariat could not
and should not have adopted half-hearted and artificially concocted tactics,
prompted by “cunning” and confusion, of elections for an unknown
purpose, of elections to the Duma, but not for the Duma. And yet it is a
historical fact, which cannot be abolished by the silence, subterfuges and
evasions of the Mensheviks, thatnot oneof them, not even Plekhanov,daredadvocate in the press that we should
    go into the Duma. It is a fact thatnot a singlecall was issued
    in the press to go into the Duma. It is a fact that the Mensheviks then
    selves, in the leaflet issued by the Joint Central Committee of the
    R.S.D.L.P., officially recognised the boycott and confined the disputeonlyto the question of the stage at which the boycott was to be
    adopted. it is a fact that the Mensheviks laid emphasis, not on the
    electionsto the Duma, but on the elections assuch, and
    even on the process of electing as a means of organisingforan
    uprising andforsweeping away the Duma. Events proved, however,
    that it was impossible to carry on mass agitation during the elections, and
    that the Duma alone provided certain opportunities for carrying on agitation
    among the masses.

Whoeverreally makes an effort to consider and weigh all these complicated
facts, both objective and subjective, will see that the Caucasus was only an
exception which proved the general rule. He will see that contrite speeches and
explaining away the boycott as a piece of “youthful impetuousness”
reveal an extremely narrow, superficial and short-sighted estimate of events.

Thedissolution of the Duma has now clearly demonstrated that in the conditions
prevailing in the spring of 1906 the boycott, on the whole, was the right
tactics and advantageous. Under the conditions whichthenprevailed,onlyby means of the boycott could the Social-Democrats fulfil their
duty of giving the people the necessary warning against the tsar’s constitution
and supplying the necessary criticism of the chicanery of the Cadets during the
elections; and both (warning and criticism) were strikingly confirmed by the
dissolution of the Duma.

Hereis a small instance to illustrate the above. In the spring of 1906,
Mr. Vodovozov, who is half-Cadet and half Menshevik, was whole-heartedly in
favour of participating in the elections and supporting the Cadets. Yesterday
(August 11) he wrote inTovarishch[7]that the Cadets “wanted to be a parliamentary party in a country
that has no parliament and a constitutional party in a country that
has no constitution”; that “the whole character of the
Cadet Party has been determined by the fundamental contradiction
betweena radical programme and quite non-radical tactics”.

TheBolsheviks could not desire a greater triumph than this admission on the
part of a Left Cadet or Right-wing Plekhanovite.

However,while absolutely rejecting faint-hearted and short-sighted speeches of
repentance, as well as the silly explanation of the boycott as “youthful
impetuousness we do not by any means reject thenewlessons of the
Cadet Duma. It would be pedantic obstinacy to be afraid of frankly admitting
these new lessons and taking them into account. History has shown that when the
Duma assembles opportunities arise for carrying on useful agitation both from
within the Duma and around it; that the tactics of joining forces with the
revolutionary peasantry against the Cadets can be applied in the Duma. This may
seem paradoxical, but such, undoubtedly, is the irony of history: it was the
Cadet Duma that clearly demonstrated to the masses the correctness of what we
might briefly describe as “anti-Cadet” tactics. History has
ruthlessly confuted all constitutional illusions and all “faith in the
Duma”; but history has undoubtedly proved that that institution is of
some, although modest, use to the revolution as a platform for agitation, for
exposing the true “inner nature” of the political parties, etc.

Hencethe conclusion: it would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to realities. The
time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be
boycottists. We shall not refuse to go into the Second Duma when (or “if”)
it is convened. We shall not refuse to utilise this arena, but we shall not
exaggerate its modest importance; on the contrary, guided by the experience
already provided by history, we shall entirely subordinate the struggle we wage
in the Duma to another form of struggle, namely, strikes, up risings, etc. We
shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve thatin the
event of elections taking place, it will be necessary to enter into an
electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth
Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election
campaign; and “blocs with other parties” are absolutely prohibited
by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the
Cadets.

Thisconclusion, however, does not by any means reveal the whole complexity of
      the task that confronts us. We deliberately emphasised the words:“in the event ofelections taking place”, etc. We do
    not know yet whether the Second Duma will be convened, when the elections
    will take place, what the electoral laws will be like, or what the situation
    will be at that time. Hence our conclusion suffers from being extremely
    general: we need it to enable us to sum up past experience, to take note of
    the lessons of the past, to put the forthcoming questions of tactics on a
    proper basis; but it is totally inadequate for solving the concrete problems
    of immediate tactics.

OnlyCadets and the “Cadet-like” people of all sorts can be
satisfied with such a conclusion at the present time, can create a “slogan”
for themselves out of the yearnings for a new Duma and try to persuade the
government of the desirability of convening it as quickly as possible, etc. Only
conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution wouldat the present
timeexert all efforts to divert the inevitable new rise of temper and
excitement into the channel of an election and not into that of a fight waged by
means of a general strike and uprising.

Thisbrings us to the crux of the question of present-day Social-Democratic
tactics. The issue now is not whether we should take part in the elections. To
say “yes” or no in this case means saying nothing at all about the
fundamental problem of the moment. Outwardly, the political situation in August
1906 is similar to that in August 1905, but enormous progress has been made
during this period:

the forces that are fighting on the respective sides, the forms of the struggle,
and the time required for carrying out this or that strategic move—if we
may so express it— have all become more exactly defined.

Thegovernment’s plan is clear. It was absolutely right in its calculations when
it fixed the date of the convocation of the Duma and did notfix—contrary to thelaw—the date of the elections.
The government does not want to tie its hands or show its cards. Firstly, it is
gaining time in which to consider an amendment of the electoral
law. Secondly— and this is the most important—it is keeping the date
of the elections in reserve until the character and intensity ofthe new rise of temper can be fully gauged. The government wishes to fix the
date of the elections at the particular time (and perhaps in the particular
form, i.e., the form of elections) when itcan split and paralyse the
incipient uprising. The government’s reasoning is correct: if things remain
quiet, perhaps we shall not convene the Duma at all, or revert to the Bulygin
laws. If, however, a strong movement arises, then we can try to split it by
fixing a date for the elections for the time being and in this way entice
certain cowards and simpletons away from the direct revolutionary struggle.

Liberalblockheads (seeTovarishchandRech) so utterly fail
to understand the situation that they are of their own accord crawling into the
net set by the government. They are trying with might and main “to
prove” the need for the Duma and thedesirabilityof diverting
the rising tide into the channel of an election. But even they cannot deny that
the question of what form the impending struggle will assume is still an open
one. Today’s issue ofRech(August 12) admits: “What the peasants
will say in the autumn ...

is still unknown.” ...

“It will be difficult to make any general forecasts
until September-October, when the temper of the peasantry is definitely
revealed.”

Theliberal bourgeois remain true to their nature. They do not want to assist
actively in choosing the form of the struggle and in moulding the temper of the
peasants one way or another, nor are they capable of doing so. The interests of
the bourgeoisie demand that the old regime be not overthrown, but merely
weakened, and that a liberal Cabinet be formed.

Theinterests of the proletariat demand the complete overthrow of the old,
tsarist regime and the convocation of a constituent assembly with full
power. Its interests demand the most active intervention in moulding the temper
of the peasants, in choosing the most resolute forms of struggle, as well as the
best moment for it. On no account must we

with draw,or obscure, the slogan:
convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, i.e., through the
medium of a provisional revolutionary government. We must concentrate all
efforts on explaining the conditions for an uprising: that it must be combined
with the strike movement;that all the revolutionary forces must be rallied and prepared for it, etc. We
      must resolutely take the path that was indicated in the well-known
      manifestoes: “To the Army and Navy” and “To All the
      Peasants”, which were signed by the “bloc” of all
      revolutionary organisations, including the Trudovik Group. Lastly, we
      must take special care that the government does not under any
      circumstances succeed in splitting, stopping, or weakening the incipient
      uprising by ordering elections. In this respect the lessons of the Cadet
      Duma must be absolutely binding for us, viz., the lessons that the Duma
      campaign is a subordinate and secondary form of struggle, and that, owing
      to the objective conditions of the moment, direct revolutionary actions by
      the broad mass of the people still remain the principal form of struggle.

Ofcourse, subordinating the Duma campaign to the main struggle, assigning a
secondary role to this campaign for the contingency of an unfavourable outcome
of the battle, or postponing the battle until experience of the Second Duma is
obtained—such tactics may, if you like, be described as the old boycott
tactics. On formal grounds this description might be justified, because, apart
from the work of agitation and propaganda, which is always obligatory,
“preparation for elections” consists of minute technical
arrangements, which can very rarely be made a long time before the
elections. We do not want to argue about words; in substance these tactics are the
logicaldevelopmentof the old tactics, but not arepetitionof them; they are a deduction drawn from the last boycott, but not the last
boycott itself.

Tosum up. We must take into account the experience of the Cadet Duma and spread
its lessons among the masses. We must prove to them that the Duma is
“useless”, that a constituent assembly is essential, that the Cadets
are wavering; we must demand that the Trudoviks throw off the yoke of the
Cadets, and we must support the former against the latter. We must recognise at
once the need for an electoral agreement between the Social-Democrats and the
Trudoviks in the event of new elections taking place. We must exert all our
efforts to counteract the government’s plan to split the uprising by ordering
elections. Advocating their tried revolutionary slogans with greater energy than
ever, Social-Democratsmust exert every effort to unite all the revolutionary elements and
classes more closely, to convert the upsurge that is probable in the
near future into an armed uprising of the whole people against the
tsarist government.

[1]See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 182.—Ed.

[2]Ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 104-05.—Ed.

[3]See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 476.—Ed.

[4]Proletary(The Proletarian)—an illegal
Bolshevik weekly, official organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a
resolution of the Third Congress of the Party. Lenin was appoint ed
editor-in-chief by a decision of a plenary session of the Party’s Central
Committee, on April 27 (May 10), 1905.

Proletarywas published in Geneva from May 14 (27) till November 12
(25), 1905, a total of twenty-six issues being brought out. Active in the work
of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and
M. S. Olminsky.Proletarycontinued the policy of the old, LeninistIskra, and maintained full continuity with the Bolshevik newspaperVperyod.

Leninwrote more than 50 articles and items forProletary, his articles
being reprinted in local Bolshevik periodicals, and also published in the form
of leaflets.

PublicationofProletarywas discontinued shortly after Lenin’s
departure for Russia in November 1905, the last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26)
being edited by V. V. Vorovsky.

[5]Partiiniye Izvestia(Party News)—a newspaper,
the organ of the Joint Central Committee of the R.S,D.L.P., which was published
illegally in St. Petersburg on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the
Party. Two issues were brought out: those of February 7 (20) and March 20
(April 2), 1906. The editorial board was composed on an equal basis of editors
of the Bolshevik organ (Proletary) and the Menshevik organ (the newIskra).The Bolshevik members of the editorial board included Lenin,
Lunacharsky and others.

Lenin’sarticles “The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the
Workers’ Party”, “The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the
Proletariat” were printed inPartiiniye Izvestiaover the
signature “Bolshevik” (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 112-19,
135-45). After the Congress, publication of the newspaper was
discontinued.

[6]The Law of December 11 (24), 1905, was the law on
elections to the State Duma. By it the voters were divided into four curias:

agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie), peasant and workers’. One
landlord vote was made equivalent in value to three votes of urban bourgeois
representatives, 15 peasant votes or 45 workers’votes. The law ensured the huge preponderance of the clique of
landlords and capitalists in the Duma.

[7]Tovarishch (The Comrade)—abourgeois daily
newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 to January
1908. Formally, it was not the organ of any party, but in effect it
was an
organ of the Left Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to the
newspaper.