Those who six and five and a half years ago sounded the alarm about the negotiations of the Cadets with ministers in general, and about ministerial portfolios in particular, cannot help but experience now a feeling of deep satisfaction. Historical truth takes its course and comes to light sometimes from a quarter where one would least expect truth to emerge. Now exposures have begun and, despite all efforts of "interested" persons (and parties) to hush them up, the exposures will not stop. With complete confidence one can say that these exposures will confirm and will fully confirm the complete correctness of our attacks on the Cadets at that time.

The exposures were begun by Witte with his polemic against Guchkov. The aim of Witte's statement and the character of his statement—the most base; intrigue of the worst sort, a desire to trip someone up and edge closer to a portfolio, these are his motives. But it is known that when two thieves quarrel, this always yields some gain for honest people, and if three thieves quarrel, the gain will most likely increase.

In Witte's letter, the most essential thing was, of course, that he was compelled, willy-nilly, to establish certain facts—opening the possibility (and creating the necessity) of verifying these facts by questioning all participants in the matter. The basic facts emerging from Witte's letter are as follows:

1) At the conference with Witte there participated Shipov, Guchkov, Urusov, Ye. Trubetskoy, and M. Stakovich, i.e., figures from the Cadet, Peaceful Renewal, and Octobrist parties.

2) "At the first session of the conference between Count Witte (we cite his letter) and the aforementioned public figures, there was reached a principled agreement on all the main questions, with the exception of the question of the appointment of Minister of Internal Affairs."

3) "Count Witte insisted on the appointment of Durnovo, while the public figures, with the exception of Prince Urusov, spoke against this appointment. Prince Urusov, however, persuaded his colleagues at the conference, in view of the difficult moment and the impossibility of delay, to agree to the appointment of Durnovo and, for his part, in order to set an example, declared that he was prepared to accept the post of Deputy to Durnovo in the ministry… At the following session Shipov, Guchkov, and Prince Trubetskoy declared that they could not enter the ministry in which Durnovo would be…"

4) The candidacy of Stolypin was put forward, but they did not come to an agreement on it; some were for it, others against.

The question arises: what corrections did Guchkov introduce into this account of the matter? He confirmed that "the ardent defender of the candidacy of Durnovo was Prince Urusov, subsequently a member of the First State Duma." According to Guchkov, Witte wavered and was at one moment ready to abandon Durnovo, because exposures were being prepared in the press and thunderous articles against him. "All the happenings described," added Guchkov, "took place immediately after the Manifesto of October 17th, when there prevailed the broadest, I would say, unbridled freedom of the press."

The negotiations were lengthy: Guchkov writes of "painful days of protracted negotiations." Concerning Stolypin, they say, "no one made a negative assessment, of which Count Witte writes." Characterizing the general situation at that time, Guchkov says: "Many 'saviors' of the fatherland appeared at that time… But where were they then?.. Many of them had not yet decided then which side of the barricade to stand on."

Such are the essential points of the exposures by Witte and Guchkov; we leave aside the trifles, of course. Historical truth emerges quite definitely: 1) there were no serious differences between the Cadets and the Octobrists at this most serious moment of Russian history; 2) "Many" (of the bourgeois figures, and by the "subtle" hint of Guchkov, perhaps also from among the ministers) "had not yet decided then which side of the barricade to stand on." But the fact is that those who gathered for conference, and more than once, were people of one definite "side of the barricade." Both ministers and Octobrists and Cadets at the conferences stood on one side of the barricade. Historical truth permits neither doubts nor reinterpretations: these were conferences, negotiations of the government with the counter-revolutionary, liberal bourgeoisie.

Now look at the conduct of the Cadets. After the exposures by Witte and Guchkov (the letters of both were printed in Petersburg on the 26th, in Moscow on the 27th of September old style), the Cadets maintain complete silence about their participation, attempting only to "bait" Guchkov. Both *Rech'* of September 28th and *Russkiye Vedomosti*{58} of the same date precisely "bait" Guchkov for the fact that he later was a colleague of like-minded supporters of Durnovo, but they print neither corrections nor refutations concerning the historical facts. The third thief hopes that in the dispute between Witte and Guchkov he will not be noticed!

Then the Octobrists begin to "take vengeance" on both Witte and the Cadets at once. In *Golos Moskvy* of October 14th (two weeks of reconnaissance among the Octobrists, cowardly and vile silence among the Cadets!) there appears a "note" under the heading: "The Alliance of Count Witte and P. N. Durnovo with the Cadets." The new exposures reduce to the following: 1) Ye. Trubetskoy at that time was a member of the Cadet party. 2) "Not wishing to lead Count Witte into any misunderstanding, Prince Trubetskoy considered himself obliged to warn him that about all his negotiations with public figures" (it is understood that workers and peasant democrats are not included by either the Octobrists or the Cadets in "public figures": in October 1905 workers and peasants were, evidently, "figures" outside society!) "he, Prince Trubetskoy, would inform the bureau of his party, which met daily to discuss current business in Professor Petrazhitsky's apartment." 3) Against the candidacy of Stolypin, Mr. Petrunkevich rose up with particular ardor, finding that "in the extreme case (sic![15]) one should advise Count Witte to appoint as Minister of Internal Affairs Durnovo rather than Stolypin. The other figures of the Cadet party fully agreed with Petrunkevich's opinion, and Prince Trubetskoy was entrusted with conveying to Count Witte the conclusions of the public figures who had met in Petrazhitsky's apartment." Trubetskoy the next morning went to Count Witte and conveyed exactly the assessment of the Cadet party bureau concerning both candidates.

Did Ye. Trubetskoy confirm the reference to him? He fully confirmed it, calling the communication in *Golos Moskvy* "completely accurate"—both to the correspondent of *Novoye Vremya*{59} (No. of October 15th) and to the correspondent of *Rech'* (No. of October 19th). "Perhaps the word 'bureau' is not suitable," said Trubetskoy, "one should say: the leaders of the party (Cadet)," another, equally insignificant, "correction" of Trubetskoy's concerns the fact that he went to Witte "perhaps not the next morning, but 2–3 days later." Finally, to the correspondent of *Rech'* Trubetskoy said:

"One should object to one assertion of Guchkov's. He said that the public figures did not enter the cabinet only because of Durnovo. This is not quite so (not quite so!) as far as I am concerned and, if I am not mistaken, as far as Shipov is concerned. Shipov and I expressed agreement to enter the cabinet on the condition of the preliminary working out of a program, but Witte persuaded us to enter the ministry without setting this condition. Herein lies our difference from Guchkov, who, as far as I remember, did not set such a condition." Cautiously does Mr. Trubetskoy express himself on this point: "not quite so," "as far as I remember"!

Mr. Petrunkevich appears in *Rech'* on October 19th—three weeks after the beginning of the exposures!! And see how he appears.

He begins with a long disquisition (27 lines) on the fact that one cannot rely on memory, and memoirs were kept only by Shipov.

What is the purpose of this disquisition? Do you want the truth revealed immediately and fully? Then there is nothing easier than to name all the participants and question them. If, however, you do not want the truth about your party revealed, then there is no point in playing hide-and-seek, referring to Shipov.

Further, in 27 lines there is a disquisition about the Octobrists' tendency toward "false reports." What has this disquisition to do with anything, once *Golos Moskvy* has named the person who confirmed the communication?? Mr. Petrunkevich is clearly striving to cumber a simple and clear question with a heap of literary and diplomatic refuse. This is a dishonest procedure.

There follows 20 lines of barbs directed at Mr. Trubetskoy: "personal recollection"—there are no other recollections but personal ones!—the prince said about this "not a word to anyone"—Petrunkevich's italics, clearly reproaching Trubetskoy in this way for indiscretion. Instead of a direct answer to the question, the Cadets begin to reproach each other for indiscretion! What meaning could such a procedure have, except that it betrays the Cadets' vexation at the exposures? it betrays their attempts to hush the matter up (so to speak, don't be indiscreet any further, Prince!).

After 74 lines of preamble there finally follows a refutation on the merits: 1) the bureau of the Cadet party was in Moscow and therefore could not have met at Petrazhitsky's; 2) Petrazhitsky "at that time was not part of the persons directing the party's affairs"; 3) "certain members (of the bureau of the Cadet party) who were in Petersburg were not authorized to enter into any negotiations, much less into alliances with Count Witte, Durnovo, or anyone else." 4) "I personally (Mr. Petrunkevich) was at Petrazhitsky's only (Mr. Petrunkevich's italics) once, and at that time there indeed occurred a conversation about the possibility of the candidacy of Prince Ye. Trubetskoy for the post of Minister of Public Education, at which all present expressed the conviction that the Prince could occupy the offered post only on condition of a clear and definite program for the entire ministry, fully corresponding to the conditions of the political moment, moreover a ministry to which "society" (recall what all the disputants understand by "society": workers and peasants are not "society") could have confidence. It is quite possible that in this discussion one evaluated the personal and political qualities of various candidates, including Durnovo and Stolypin, but neither has my memory retained the ardent speech that convinced all those present, nor has the memory of the latter, whose recollections I have consulted, done so."

That is all the business-like "refutation" of Mr. Petrunkevich, who adds in 48 more lines a series of barbs directed at Trubetskoy, saying that memory has failed him, that the Cadet party concluded no alliance with Durnovo "and did not permit a member of its party Prince Trubetskoy to enter the ministry, which the party could not support."

Nothing new is added by the letters of Trubetskoy and Petrunkevich in *Rech'* of October 27th: the first insists that it was precisely Petrunkevich who "advised preferring Durnovo to Stolypin," the second denies it.

What then is the upshot?

Mr. Petrunkevich declared that certain members of the bureau who were in Petersburg were not authorized to enter into any negotiations, but he confirms against his will the very fact of negotiations! "At the conference at Petrazhitsky's," writes Mr. Petrunkevich himself (*Rech'* Oct. 27), "we discussed the candidacy of Prince Trubetskoy."

So there were negotiations. If the "party," as that same Mr. Petrunkevich writes, "did not permit" Trubetskoy, then the negotiations were conducted in the name of the party!

Mr. Petrunkevich defeats himself with remarkable skill. There were no negotiations, but… but there was a "conference on the candidacy." There were no sessions of the party bureau, but… but there was a decision of the party. Such pitiful evasions characterize people vainly attempting to hide. What could be simpler, really, than to name all the participants of the conference? how to adduce the exact decision of the "bureau" or the party, or the leading figures? how to set forth the allegedly clear, allegedly definite program which (allegedly) the Cadets demanded from Witte's ministry? But therein lies the misfortune of our liberals—that they cannot tell the truth, that they fear it, that it destroys them.

And so there emerge petty, miserable dodges, evasions, excuses, making it difficult (for the inattentive reader, at least) to grasp the great historical importance of the question of the relation of liberals to the government in October 1905.

Why does truth destroy the Cadets? Because the fact of negotiations, their circumstances and conditions, refute the fable about the "democracy" of the Cadets and prove the counter-revolutionary character of their liberalism.

Could a genuinely democratic party have entered into negotiations with such a man as Witte at such a time as October 1905? No, it could not; for such negotiations a certain common ground was inevitable, namely a common ground of counter-revolutionary strivings, sentiments, and designs. There was nothing to negotiate with Witte about except the cessation of the democratic, mass movement.

Further. Even if one were to admit for a moment that the Cadets entered into negotiations not without democratic aims, could a democratic party have kept silent before the people about these negotiations when they were broken off? In no way could it. Herein is revealed the difference between counter-revolutionary liberalism and what does not deserve such a characterization—democracy. The liberal desires an expansion of freedom, but such that democracy not be strengthened thereby, such that negotiations and rapprochement with the old power continue, be consolidated, be strengthened; therefore the liberal cannot, after the break-off of negotiations, publish them, for thereby he would hinder the resumption of negotiations, would "expose himself" to democracy, would break with the authorities, and it is precisely with them that the liberal is unable to break. By contrast, the democrat, had he found himself in the position of negotiating with Witte and seen the futility of the negotiations, would immediately have published them, thereby disgracing Messrs. Witte and exposing their game, thereby calling forth further movement of democracy forward.

Pay attention also to the question of the ministry's program and composition. About the latter all participants speak and speak precisely and clearly: such-and-such portfolios were offered to such-and-such a person. About the former, i.e., the program, not a single clear and precise word! What candidates were contenders for the portfolios—both Trubetskoy and Petrunkevich remember well and speak of it. What was the "program"—not one of them speaks of it!! Is this chance? Of course not. This is the result of (and an indubitable proof of) the fact that "programs" stood at the ninth place with the gentlemen liberals, were an empty placard, "verbiage"—in actuality there could be no other program for Witte except the strengthening of power and the weakening of democracy, and with any promises, inducements, and declarations he would have conducted only such a policy—but the real business for them was the distribution of portfolios. Only for this reason could Witte, for example, completely forget about the program (according to Witte there was even complete principled agreement!), but as for who was better (or who was worse?), Durnovo or Stolypin—about this dispute everyone remembers, everyone speaks, everyone cites references either to the speeches or to the arguments of one or another person.

You cannot hide an awl in a sack. Historical truth even from deliberately embellished accounts of three or four persons emerges with sufficient definiteness.

The entire liberal bourgeoisie of Russia, from Guchkov to Milyukov—who is undoubtedly politically responsible for Trubetskoy—turned immediately after October 17th away from democracy toward Witte. And this is not chance, not the betrayal of individual persons, but the transition of a class to the counter-revolutionary position corresponding to its economic interests. Only by taking this position could the Cadets negotiate with Witte through Trubetskoy in 1905, with Trepov through Muromtsev in 1906, and so on. Without understanding the distinction between counter-revolutionary liberalism and democracy, one can understand nothing either in the history of the latter or in its tasks.

*Prosveshcheniye* No. 1, December 1911. Signature: P.

Printed according to the text of the journal *Prosveshcheniye*