On the Beaten Track!

Published:Proletary, No. 29, April 16 (29), 1908.

      Published according to the text inProletary.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      Progress Publishers,1973,

      Moscow,Volume 15,

      pages40-47.Translated:Transcription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2004).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

Assessmentof the Russian revolution, i.e., of its three
first years, is the topic of the day. Unless the class nature of our
political parties is ascertained, unless the interests and the mutual
relations of classes in our revolution are taken into account, no step
forward can be made in defining the immediate aims and tactics of the
proletariat. We intend in this article to draw the attention of our readers
to one attempt at such an assessment.

Inissue No. 3 ofGolos Sotsial-Demokrata,[1]F. Dan and G. Plekhanov have
written, the one a systematic assessment of the results of the revolution,
the other summarised conclusions about the tactics of the workers’
party. Dan’s assessment amounts to this, that hopes of a dictatorship
of the proletariat and the peasantry were bound to prove illusory. “The
possibility of new revolutionary mass action of the proletariat ... depends
to a great extent on the position of the bourgeoisie.” “In the first
stages [of such up surge], so long as the mounting revolutionary
working-class movement has not stirred up the town middle class, and the
development of revolution in the towns has not lit a conflagration in the
countryside—the proletariat arid the bourgeoisie will find themselves
face to face as the principal political forces."

Onthe tactical conclusions to be drawn from this kind of “truth”
F. Dan is obviously reticent. He was evidently ashamed to say, in so many
words, what follows automatically from his statement, namely, that the
working class should be recommended to adopt the famous tactics of the
Mensheviks, that is, support of the bourgeoisie (recall the blocs with the
Cadets. support of the watchword of a CadetMinistry, Plekhanov’s Duma with full powers, etc.). But Plekhanov
supplements Dan by ending his article in issue No. 3 ofGolos
Sotsial-Demokratawith the words: “It would be a good thing, for
Russia if the Russian Marxists in 1905-06 had been able to avoid these
mistakes made by Marx and Engels in Germany more than half a century ago!”
He is referring to underestimation of the capacity of capitalism at the
time to develop further, and overestimation of the capacity of the
proletariat for revolutionary action.)

Nothingcould be clearer. Dan and Plekhanov are trying ever so
carefully, not calling things directly by their proper names, to justify
the Menshevik policy of proletarian dependence on the Cadets. So let us
look more closely at the “theoretical case” they try to make out.

Danargues that the “peasant movement” depends on the “growth and
development of the urban revolution in its bourgeois and proletarian
channels”. Therefore the rise of the “urban revolution” was followed by
the rise of the peasant movement, while after its decline “the internal
antagonisms of the countryside, held in check by the rise of revolution,
once again began to become acute”, and “the government’s agrarian
policy, the policy of dividing the peasantry, etc.,. began to enjoy a
relative success”. Hence the conclusion we have quoted earlier—that in
the first stages of the new upsurge the main political forces will be the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. “This situation,” in Dan’s
opinion, “can and must be made use of by the proletariat for such a
development of the revolution as will leave far behind thepoint of
departureof the new upsurge, and will lead to the complete
democratisation of society under the badge (sic!] of a radical
[!!] solution of the agrarian question."

Itis not difficult to see that this whole argument is based on aradicalfailure to understand the agrarian question in our
revolution, and that this incomprehension is badly covered up by cheap and
empty phrases about “complete democratisation”, “under the badge” of a
“solution” of the question.

F.Dan imagines that “hopes of a dictatorship of the proletariat and
the peasantry” depend and depended on Narodnik prejudices, on forgetting
the internal antagonisms in the countryside and the individualist character
of thepeasant movement. These are the usual Menshevik views, long known to
everyone. But hardly anyone yet has revealed all their absurdity so
strikingly as F. Dan has done in the article in question. Our most worthy
publicist has contrivednot to noticethatboththe
“solutions” of the agrarian question which he contrasts are in
keeping with the “individualist character of the peasant movement"!  For
the Stolypin solution, which in Dan’s opinion is enjoying “relative
success”, is in fact founded on the individualism of the peasants. That is
unquestionable. Well, and what about the other solution, which F. Dan
called “radical” and bound up with “the complete democratisation of
society"? Does the most worthy Dan imagine, by any chance, that it isnot foundedon the individualism of the peasants?

Thetrouble is that Dan’s empty phrase about “the complete
democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the
agrarian question” serves to conceal a radical piece of
stupidity. Unthinkingly, groping like a blind man, hebumps upagainst two objectively possible, and historically not yet finally chosen,
“solutions” of the agrarian question, without being able clearly and
precisely to grasp the nature ofbothsolutions, and the
conditions in which one and other are feasible.

Whycan Stolypin’s agrarian policy enjoy “relative success"?
Because within our peasantry capitalist development has long ago brought
into being two hostile classes— a peasant bourgeoisie and a peasant
proletariat. Is the complete success of Stolypin’s agrarian policy
possible, and if so, what does it mean? It is possible, if circumstances
develop exceptionally favourably for Stolypin; and it means the
“solution” of the agrarian question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of
thefinal(up to the proletarian revolution) consolidation of
private property overallthe land, both that of the landlords and
that of the peasants. This will be a “solution” of thePrussiantype, which will certainly ensure the capitalist development of Russia, but
an incredibly slow development, endowing the Junker with authority for many
years, and a thousand times more agonising for the proletariat and the
peasantry than the other, objectivelypossibleand also
capitalist, “solution of the agrarian question”.

Thisother solution Dan has called “radical”, without thinking of
what it implies. It is a cheap catchword, and there is not the very germ of
an idea in it. Stolypin’s solution is also very radical, since it is
radically breaking up the old village commune and the old agrarian system
in Russia. The real difference between thepeasantsolution of the
agrarian question in the Russian bourgeois revolution, and theStolypin-Cadetsolution, is that the first destroys the landlords’
private property in land beyond question, and peasant private property very
probably (we shall not deal here with this particular question of the
peasants’ allotment land, because all Dan’s arguments are wrong even
from the standpoint of our present “municipalising” agrarian programme).

Nowone may ask, is it true that this second solution is objectively
possible?  Beyond doubt. All thinking Marxists are in agreement on this,
forotherwisethe support by the proletariat of the small
proprietor’s striving to confiscate large-scale landed property would
be a reactionary piece of charlatanry. In no other capitalist country will
a single Marxist draw up a programme supporting thepeasants’
aspiration to confiscate large-scale landed property. In Russia both
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are in agreement as to the necessity of such
support. Why? Becauseobjectively, for Russiaanotherpath of capitalist agrarian development is possible—not the “Prussian”
but the “American”, not the landlord-bourgeois (or Junker) but the
peasant-bourgeois path.

Stolypinand the Cadets, the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, Nicholas II
and Pyotr Struve are all agreed that there must be a capitalist
“cleansing” of the decaying agrarian system in Russia by preserving the
landed property of the landlords. All they differ on is how best to
preserve it, and how much of it to preserve.

Theworkers and peasants, the Social-Democrats and the Narodniks
(Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Socialist Revolutionaries included) are all
agreed that there should be acapitalist“cleansing” of the
decaying agrarian system in Russia by means of the forcible abolition of
the landed property of the landlords. They differ in this, that the
Social-Democrats understand the capitalist character inpresent society of any agrarian revolution, however ultra-radical it may
be—municipalisation and nationalisation, socialisation and
division—while the Narodniks don’t understand this, and wrap up
their struggle for peasant-bourgeois agrarian evolution against
landlord-bourgeois evolution in philistine and utopian phrases about
equalisation.

Allthe muddle and shallow thinking of F. Dan are due to the fact that
he has radically failed to understand the economic basis of the Russian
bourgeois revolution. The differences between Marxist and petty-bourgeois
socialism in Russia on the question of the economic content and
significance of the peasants’ struggle for the land in this revolution
loomed so large for him that he has “failed to notice” the
struggle of the real forces in society for one or other of the objectively
possible roads in capitalist agrarian evolution. And he has covered up this
complete incomprehension with phrases about the “relative success” of
Stolypin and “the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a
radical solution of the agrarian question".

Actually,the situation in regard to the agrarian question in Russia
today is this. The success of Stolypin’s policy would involve long
years of violent suppression and extermination of a mass of peasants who
refuse to starve to death and be expelled from their villages. History has
known examples of thesuccessof such a policy. It would be empty
and foolish democratic phrase-mongering for us to say that the success of
such a policy in Russia is “impossible”. It is possible! But our business
is to make the people see clearly at what a price such a success is won,
and to fight with all our strength for another, shorter and more rapid road
of capitalist agrarian developmentthrougha peasant revolution. A
peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in a capitalist
country is difficult, very difficult, but it is possible, and we must fight
for it. Three years of the revolution have taught us and the whole people
not only that we must fight for it but also how to fight for it. No
Menshevik "methods of approach” to the policy of supporting the Cadets
will drive these lessons of the revolution out of the consciousness of the
workers.

Toproceed. What if, in spite of the struggle of the masses,
Stolypin’s policy holds good long enough for the “Prussian” way to
succeed?  Then the agrarian system in Russia will become completely
bourgeois, the big peasants will grab nearly all the allotment land,
agriculture will become capitalist, and no “solution” of the agrarian
question under capitalism—whether radical or non-radical—will be
possible any more. Then Marxists who are honest with themselves will
straightforwardly and openly throw all “agrarian programmes on the
scrap-heap altogether, and will say to the masses: “The workers have done
all they could to give Russia not a Junker but an American capitalism. The
workers call you now to join in the social revolution of the proletariat,
forafterthe ‘solution’ of the agrarian question in the Stolypin
spiritthere can be no otherrevolution capable of making a
serious change in the economic conditions of life of the peasant masses.

Thatis how the question of the relationship between a bourgeois and a
socialist revolution in Russia stands to day—a question muddled up
particularly by Dan in his German version of his Russian article

(Neue Zeit,[2]No. 27).

Bourgeoisrevolutions are possible, even inevitable, in Russia as well
on the basis of Stolypin-Cadet agrarian policies. But insuchrevolutions, as in the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, there could be
no question of “the complete democratisation of society under the badge of
a radical solution of the agrarian question”. Or, more precisely, in such
revolutions only petty-bourgeois quasi-Socialists will still babble about a
“solution” (and especially a “radical” solution) of an agrarian
question which has already been solved in a country where capitalism is
fully developed.

Butin Russia a capitalist agrarian system is very far as yet from
having been developed. This is clear not only to us, both Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks, not only for people who sympathise with the revolution and hope
that it may rise again; it is clear even to such consistent, conscious and
frankly outspoken enemies of the revolution and friends of the
Black-Hundred autocracy as Mr. Pyotr Struve. If he “cries with a loud
voice” that we need a Bismarck, that we need the transformation of
reaction into revolutionfrom above, it is because Struve sees in Russianeithera Bismarcknorrevolution from above. Struve sees that the Stolypin reaction
and a thousand gallows alone are not enough to create a landlord-bourgeois
Russia, made safe for theKnecht. You need something more,
something like the solution (albeit a Bismarckian solution) of the historic
tasks of the nation, like the unification of Germany, the introduction of
universal suffrage. But Stolypin can only unite Dumbadze with the heroes of
the.

Riga museum![3]He evenhas toabolish the franchise introduced
by Witte under the law of

December 11, 1905![4]Instead of peasants contented with Dan’s
“relative success” of the agrarian policy, Stolypin is forced to hear
“Trudovik” demands put forward even by the peasant deputies of the Third
Duma!

Howcan Pyotr Struve, then, not “cry with a loud voice”, not groan
and weep, when he sees clearly thatit isn’t working—thatwe are still not getting anything like a well-regulated, modest, moderate
and precise, curtailed but stable “constitution"?

Struveknows very well where he is going. But F. Dan has learned
nothing and forgotten nothing during the three years of revolution. He is
still, like a blind man, seeking to drag the proletariat under the wing of
the Struves. He is still muttering the same reactionary Menshevik speeches
about our proletariat and bourgeoisie being able to appear as “the
principal political forces” ... against whom, most worthy Dan?  Against
Guchkov, or against the monarchy?

Theincredible lengths to which Dan goes here in painting the liberals
in rosy colours is revealed by his German article. He is not ashamed even
to tell the German public that in the Third Duma the petty bourgeoisie in
the towns chose “progressive electors” (meaning the Cadets) while the
peasants gave 40 per cent of reactionary electors! Long live the
“progressive” Milyukovs and Struves, applauding Stolypin! Long live the
alliance of the Dans and the Milyukovs against the “reactionary”
peasants, displaying their Trudovik spirit in the Third Duma!

AndPlekhanov falsifies Engels to serve the purpose of the same
reactionary Menshevik theories. Engels said thatthe tactics of Marx in 1848 werecorrect, that they and only they
really provided reliable, firm and unforgettable lessons for the
proletariat. Engels said that these tactics were unsuccessfulin spite
oftheir being the only correct tactics. They were unsuccessful
because the proletariat was insufficiently prepared, and capitalism was
insufficiently

developed.[5]While Plekhanov, as though he were trying to make fun of
Engels, as though to gladden the heart of the Bernsteins and the

Streltsovs,[6]interprets Engels as though he “regretted” Marx’s
tactics, as though he later admitted them to be mistaken, and declared his
preference for the tactics of supporting the German Cadets!

Willnot G. Plekhanov tomorrow tell us that in regard to the risings in
1849 Engels came to the conclusion that “they should not have taken to
arms"?

Marxand Engels taught the proletariat revolutionary tactics, the
tactics of developing the struggle to its very highest forms, the tactics
which rally the peasantry behind the proletariat—and not the proletariat
behind the liberal traitors.

[1]GolosSotsial-Demokrata(Voice of the
Social-Democrat)—a newspaper, organ of the Menshevik liquidators,
published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva and later in
Paris.

[2]DieNeue Zeit—the theoretical journal of the German
Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to
October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, and subsequently by Heinrich
Cunow. Several works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were published in
this journal for the first time, among them Marx’sCritique of
the Gotha Programmeand Engels’sContribution to the
Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891. Engels
often gave pointers to the editors ofDie Neue Zeitand criticised
the journal for its deviations from Marxism. Prominent leaders of the
German and international labour movement of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries contributed to the journal, among them August Bebel,
Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Paul
Lafargue, and G. V. Plekhanov. Beginning with the middle nineties, after
the death of Engels, the journal regularly published articles by
revisionists, including a series of articles by Eduard Bernstein “Problems
of Socialism”, inaugurating a revisionists’ crusade against
Marxism. During the First World War (1914-18) the journal took a Centrist
stand and virtually supported the social-chauvinists.

[3]Dumbadze,I. A.—a Black-Hundred general of the tsarist
army. As military chief of the town of Yalta he was conspicuous for his
brutal treatment of the peaceful population.

TheRigaMuseum—torture-chamber of the Riga Police
Investigation Department where prisoners under examination were cruelly
tortured. When the practices of the police were exposed in the press the
tsarist government tried to deny the charges by declaring that the
instruments of torture kept by the police had been collected “for museum
purposes”. As a result of this “explanation” the torture-chamber became
known as “the Riga museum”.

[4]Thelaw of December 11(24), 1905—an electoral law for
elections to the First Duma. Under this law the electorate was divided into
four curias, namely, agricultural (landlords) , urban (bourgeoisie),peasant and worker curias. The vote of a landlord was equivalent to 3 votes
cast by the urban bourgeoisie, to 15 peasant votes, and to 45 workers’
votes. The electoral law gave to a handful of landlords and capitalists an
overwhelming preponderance in the Duma.

[5]Thisrefers to Engels’s introduction to Marx’s pamphletThe
Class Struggles in France(see K. Marx and F. Engels,Selected
Works,Vol. 1, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38).

[6]Streltsov,B. V—a Social-Democrat, a revisionist.