We have already spoken above about the fact that the growth of the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population is a phenomenon necessary in every capitalist society. We have also examined how the successive separation of industry from agriculture is accomplished, and now it remains only to draw conclusions on this question.

1) The Growth of Cities

The most vivid expression of the process we are examining is the growth of cities. Here are the data on this growth in European Russia (50 provinces) in the post-reform epoch[690]:

Thus, the percentage of urban population is constantly increasing, that is, there is a drawing away of population from agriculture toward commercial-industrial occupations[691]. Cities grow twice as fast as the rest of the population: from 1863 to 1897, the total population increased by 53.3%, the rural population by 48.5%, and the urban population by 97.0%. Over 11 years (1885–1897) the "minimum influx of rural population into cities" was determined by Mr. V. Mikhailovsky at 2½ million people[692], that is, more than 200,000 people per year.

The population of cities, which represent major industrial and commercial centers, grows much faster than the population of cities in general. The number of cities having 50,000 or more inhabitants more than tripled from 1863 to 1897 (13 and 44). In 1863, of all urban dwellers only about 27% (1.7 million out of 6.1) was concentrated in such large centers; in 1885, about 41% (4.1 million out of 9.9)[693], and in 1897 already more than half, about 53% (6.4 million out of 12 million). Thus, if in the 1860s the character of urban population was determined predominantly by the population of not very large cities, then in the 1890s the major cities achieved complete predominance. The population of the 14 cities which were the largest in 1863 increased from 1.7 million inhabitants to 4.3 million, that is, by 153%, whereas the entire urban population increased by only 97%. Consequently, the tremendous growth of major industrial centers and the formation of a whole series of new centers is one of the most characteristic symptoms of the post-reform epoch.

2) The Significance of Internal Colonization

As we have already pointed out above (Ch. I, § II)[694], theory derives the law of growth of industrial population at the expense of agricultural population from the circumstance that in industry variable capital increases absolutely (the growth of variable capital means the growth in the number of industrial workers and the growth of the entire commercial-industrial population), whereas in agriculture "the variable capital required for the cultivation of a given plot of land decreases absolutely." "Consequently," Marx adds, "an increase in variable capital in agriculture is possible only when new land is brought under cultivation, and this in turn presupposes an even greater increase in the non-agricultural population"{106}. From this it is clear that the phenomenon of growth of industrial population can be observed in pure form only when we have before us a territory already settled, in which all lands are already occupied. The population of such a territory, driven out of agriculture by capitalism, has no other choice but to emigrate either to industrial centers or to other countries. But the matter changes essentially if we have before us a territory in which not all lands are yet occupied, which is not yet entirely settled. The population of such a territory, driven out of agriculture in the settled district, can move to unsettled parts of the territory and take up the "cultivation of new land." The result will be growth of agricultural population, and this growth can proceed (for a certain time) not less rapidly, if not more so, than the growth of industrial population. In this case we have before us two different processes: 1) the development of capitalism in the old, settled country or part of a country;

2) the development of capitalism on "new land." The first process expresses the further development of established capitalist relations; the second expresses the formation of new capitalist relations on new territory. The first process means the development of capitalism in depth, the second in breadth. Obviously, the confusion of these processes must inevitably lead to an erroneous conception of the process that draws population away from agriculture toward commercial-industrial occupations.

Post-reform Russia presents us with precisely the simultaneous manifestation of both processes. At the beginning of the post-reform epoch in the 1860s, the southern and eastern borders of European Russia were to a considerable degree unsettled territory, toward which a huge influx of settlers from central agricultural Russia was directed. This formation of new agricultural population on new lands obscured to a certain extent the simultaneous drawing away of population from agriculture toward industry. To vividly represent this distinctive feature of Russia based on data about urban population, it is necessary to divide the 50 provinces of European Russia into separate groups. We present data on urban population in 9 districts of European Russia in 1863 and 1897 [see table on p. 565. Ed.].

Provinces included in the groups: I) St. P. and Moscow; II) Vladimir, Kaluga, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, and Yaroslavl; III) Voronezh, Kazan, Kursk, Oryol, Penza, Poltava, Ryazan, Saratov, Simbirsk, Tambov, Tula, Kharkov, and Chernigov; IV) Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Orenburg, Samara, Taurida, Kherson, and Ufa; V) Courland, Livonia, and Estonia; VI) Vilna, Vitebsk, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, and Mogilev; VII) Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev; VIII) Vyatka and Perm; IX) Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Olonets.

On the question that interests us, the data on three districts are of greatest significance: 1) the non-agricultural-industrial district (11 provinces of the first two groups, including 2 capital provinces)[695]. This is the district from which emigration to other districts was very weak. 2) The Central agricultural district (13 provinces – the 3rd group). From this district emigration was very strong, partly to the previous district, but mainly to the following one. 3) The agricultural border districts (9 provinces of the 4th group) – the district colonized during the post-reform epoch. The percentage of urban population in all these 33 provinces differs, as can be seen from the table, very little from the percentage of urban population in all of European Russia.

In the first district, the non-agricultural or industrial district, we observe a particularly rapid increase in the percentage of urban population: from 14.1% to 21.1%. The growth of rural population here is very weak – almost twice weaker than in all Russia in general. The growth of urban population, on the other hand, is considerably above average (105% against 97%). If we compare with Western European industrial countries (as is often done among us), then we must compare these countries with only this district, because only it is in approximately identical conditions with industrial capitalist countries.

In the second district, the central agricultural district, we see a different picture. The percentage of urban population here is very low and increases more slowly than average. The increase in population from 1863 to 1897, both urban and rural, is considerably weaker here than on average in Russia. The explanation for this phenomenon lies in the fact that a huge stream of settlers from this district went to the border regions. According to the calculations of Mr. V. Mikhailovsky, from 1885 to 1897 approximately 3 million people left this district, that is, more than one-tenth of the population[696].

In the third district, on the borders, we see that the percentage of urban population increased somewhat less than average (from 11.2% to 13.3%, that is, in the proportion 100: 118, against the average of 9.94–12.76, that is, in the proportion 100: 128). Meanwhile, the growth of urban population was here not only not weaker, but much greater than average (+ 130% against + 97%). The drawing away of population from agriculture toward industry proceeded, consequently, very strongly, but it is concealed by the tremendous growth of agricultural population as a result of emigration: in this district rural population increased by 87% against the average for Russia of 48.5%. By individual provinces this obscuring of the process of population industrialization is even more evident. For example, in Taurida province the percentage of urban population in 1897 remained the same as in 1863 (19.6%), and in Kherson province this percentage even decreased (from 25.9% to 25.4%), although the growth of cities in both provinces slightly lagged behind the growth of the capitals (+ 131, + 135% against + 141% in the two capital provinces). The formation of new agricultural population on new lands thus leads, in turn, to even greater growth of non-agricultural population.

3) The Growth of Factory and Commercial-Industrial Settlements and Villages

Besides cities, industrial centers are represented, firstly, by suburbs, which are not always counted together with cities and which embrace an ever-larger circle of the surrounding districts of a major city; and secondly, by factory settlements and villages. Such industrial centers[697] are especially numerous in industrial provinces, in which the percentage of urban population is extremely low[698]. The table presented above with district data on urban population shows that in 9 industrial provinces this percentage was in 1863 – 7.3%, in 1897 – 8.6%. The matter is that the commercial-industrial population of these provinces is concentrated mainly not in cities, but in industrial settlements. Among the "cities" of Vladimir, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, and other provinces there are not a few which have fewer than 3,000, 2,000, or even 1,000 inhabitants, whereas a whole series of "villages" contains 2–3–5 thousand factory and mill workers alone. In the post-reform epoch – correctly states the compiler of the "Survey of Yaroslavl Province" (vol. II, 191) – "cities began to grow even faster, and they were joined by the growth of human settlements of a new type, a type intermediate between city and village – factory and mill centers." Data on the tremendous growth of these centers and on the number of factory and mill workers concentrated in them have already been presented above. We have seen that there are quite a few such centers throughout Russia, not only in industrial provinces, but also in the south. In the Urals the percentage of urban population is the lowest: in Vyatka and Perm provinces 3.2% in 1863 and 4.7% in 1897, but here is an example of the relative magnitude of "urban" and industrial population. In Krasnoufimsk district of Perm Province, urban population equals 6.4 thousand (1897), whereas the zemstvo census of 1888–1891 counts in the factory part of the district 84.7 thousand inhabitants, of whom 56 thousand are not engaged in agriculture at all and only 5.6 thousand derive their livelihood mainly from the land. In Yekaterinburg district, according to the zemstvo census, 65 thousand souls are landless and 81 thousand have only meadow rights. Thus, the industrial extra-urban population of two districts alone exceeds the urban population of the entire province (in 1897 – 195.6 thousand!).

Finally, apart from factory settlements, industrial centers are also represented by commercial-industrial villages, which either stand at the head of large artisan districts or developed rapidly in the post-reform epoch thanks to their location on river banks, near railway stations, etc. Several examples of such villages were presented in Ch. VI, § II, where we saw that such villages, like cities, attract population from the countryside and are ordinarily distinguished by higher literacy among the population[699]. We present further data on Voronezh Province to show the comparative significance of urban and non-urban commercial-industrial populated places. The "Consolidated Collection" on Voronezh Province provides a combination table with grouping of settlements by 8 districts of the province {107}. There are 8 cities in these districts with a population of 56,149 people (1897). From the villages, however, 4 stand out with 9,376 homesteads, with 53,732 inhabitants – that is, considerably larger than the cities. In these villages there are 240 commercial and 404 industrial establishments. Of all homesteads, 60% do not cultivate land at all, 21% cultivate it by hire or sharecropping, 71% have neither work animals nor implements, 63% buy grain year-round, 86% engage in trades. In attributing all the population of these centers to the commercial-industrial population, we not only do not exaggerate but even underestimate the size of the latter, because in all these 8 districts there are 21,956 homesteads that do not cultivate land at all. And yet, in the agricultural province we have chosen, the commercial-industrial population outside cities proves to be no less than in the cities.

4) Non-Agricultural Migratory Trades

But even the addition to cities of factory, mill, and commercial-industrial villages and settlements does not by far exhaust all of the industrial population of Russia. The absence of freedom of movement, the corporate exclusiveness of the peasant commune fully explain that remarkable peculiarity of Russia, that to the industrial population must be attributed no small part of the rural population, which derives its livelihood from work in industrial centers and spends part of the year in these centers. We are speaking of the so-called non-agricultural migratory trades. From the official point of view, these "industrialists" are peasant-farmers with only "subsidiary earnings," and the majority of representatives of Populist political economy uncritically adopted this point of view. The unsoundness of this view, after all that has been set forth above, requires no detailed proof. In any case, however differently one may regard this phenomenon, it cannot be subject to any doubt that it expresses the drawing away of population from agriculture toward commercial-industrial occupations[700]. How much this fact changes the conception of the size of industrial population given by cities can be seen from the following example. In Kaluga Province the percentage of urban population is much lower than the average for Russia (8.3% against 12.8%). But the "Statistical Survey" of this province for 1896, based on passport data, calculates the total number of months of absence of migratory workers. It turns out to be equal to 1,491.6 thousand months; dividing this by 12 gives 124.3 thousand absent population, that is, "about 11% of the entire population" (ibid., 46)! Add this population to the urban population (1897: 97.9 thousand), and the percentage of industrial population will prove to be very substantial.

Of course, a certain part of non-agricultural migratory workers is registered in the number of present population of cities, and also enters the population of those non-urban industrial centers of which we have already spoken. But only a part, because owing to the migratory character of this population it is difficult to register it in the census of individual centers; and besides, censuses of population usually take place in winter, whereas the majority of migratory trade workers leave home in spring. Here are the data on this for some of the major provinces of non-agricultural migration[701].

The maximum number of passports issued falls everywhere in spring. Consequently, of the temporarily absent workers the majority does not appear in the censuses of cities[702]. But even these temporary city dwellers can with much greater justification be attributed to urban rather than rural population: "A family that derives its means of existence for a year or the greater part of it from earnings in the city, with far greater justification can consider the city that ensures its existence as its place of residence than the village, with which it has only kinship and fiscal ties"[703]. How great significance these fiscal ties still have can be seen, for example, from the fact that among migrant workers from Kostroma "owners rarely receive from it [the land] a known small part of the taxes, and usually rent it out only so that those who hire it will build vegetable gardens around it, while the owner himself pays all the taxes" (D. Zhbankov: "The Women's Side." Kostroma, 1891, p. 21). And in the "Survey of Yaroslavl Province" (vol. II, Yaroslavl, 1896) we repeatedly encounter indications of this necessity for migrant trade workers to buy themselves out from the village and from the allotment (pp. 28, 48, 149, 150, 166, etc.)[704].

How great, then, is the number of non-agricultural migratory workers? The number of workers engaged in various migratory trades constitutes no fewer than 5–6 million. Indeed, in 1884 in European Russia up to 4.67 million passports and permits were issued[705], and passport revenue increased from 1884 to 1894 by more than a third (from 3.3 to 4.5 million rubles). In 1897 there were issued throughout Russia 9,495.7 thousand passports and permits (including in 50 provinces of European Russia 9,333.2 thousand). In 1898 – 8,259.9 thousand (European Russia 7,809.6 thousand)[706]. The number of excess (compared to local demand) workers in European Russia Mr. S. Korolenko determined at 6.3 million. Above we saw (Ch. III, § IX, p. 174)[707] that for 11 agricultural provinces the number of passports issued turned out to exceed Mr. S. Korolenko's calculation (2 million against 1.7 million). Now we can add data on 6 non-agricultural provinces: Mr. Korolenko counts in them excess workers of 1,287.8 thousand people, and the number of issued permits equals 1,298.6 thousand[708]. Thus, in 17 provinces of European Russia (11 black-earth plus 6 non-black-earth) Mr. S. Korolenko counted 3 million excess (compared to local demand) workers. And in the 1890s in these 17 provinces 3.3 million passports and permits were issued. In 1891 these 17 provinces yielded 52.2% of all passport revenue. Consequently, the number of migratory workers, in all probability, exceeds 6 million people. Finally, the data of zemstvo statistics (mostly outdated) led Mr. Uvarov to the conclusion that Mr. S. Korolenko's figure is close to the truth, and the figure of 5 million migratory workers is "in the highest degree probable"[709].

The question now arises: how great is the number of non-agricultural and agricultural migratory workers? Mr. N. —ov very boldly and completely erroneously claims that "the vast majority of peasant migratory trades are precisely agricultural ones" ("Essays," p. 16). Cheslawski, whom Mr. N. —ov cites, expresses himself much more cautiously, providing no data and limiting himself to general considerations about the size of districts sending out one type of worker and the other. Mr. N. —ov's data about passenger traffic on railways prove absolutely nothing, because non-agricultural workers leave home also predominantly in spring and moreover use railways to an incomparably greater degree than agricultural workers[710].

We believe, on the contrary, that the majority (though not the "vast majority") of migratory workers are probably non-agricultural workers. This opinion is based, firstly, on data about the distribution of passport revenue, and secondly, on data from Mr. Vesin. As early as Flerovsky, on the basis of 1862/63 data about the distribution of revenue from "duties of various kinds" (passport duties yielded more than a third of them), drew the conclusion that the greatest movement of peasants for earnings is directed from the capital and non-agricultural provinces[711]. If we take those 11 non-agricultural provinces which we combined above (point 2 of this section) into one district and from which the vast majority of non-agricultural workers leave, we will see that in 1885 these provinces contained only 18.7% of the population of all European Russia (in 1897 – 18.3%), whereas they yielded 42.9% of passport revenue in 1885 (in 1891 – 40.7%)[712]. Non-agricultural workers are sent by many other provinces as well, and we must therefore suppose that agricultural workers constitute less than half of the migrants. Mr. Vesin distributes 38 provinces of European Russia (which yield 90% of the total number of permits for absence) into groups according to the predominance of different types of migration and presents the following data[713]:

"These figures show that migratory trades are more developed in the first group than in the third… Furthermore, from the figures presented it is evident that correspondingly to the distinction between groups, the very duration of absences for earnings also varies. Where non-agricultural migratory trades predominate, the duration of absences proves to be much greater" ("Delo," 1886, No. 7, p. 134).

Finally, the statistics indicated above of enterprises subject to excise and so on give us the opportunity to distribute the number of issued residence permits among all 50 provinces of European Russia. Making the indicated corrections to Mr. Vesin's grouping and distributing among the same three groups the 12 provinces missing from 1884 (to group I – Olonets and Pskov; to group II – Baltic and North-Western, that is, 9 provinces; to group III – Astrakhan), we obtain the following picture:

* Among other things. The author of the review of these data (ibid., Ch. VI, p. 639) explains the decrease in passport issuance in 1898 by the decrease in migration of seasonal workers to southern provinces due to crop failure and the spread of agricultural machinery. This explanation is worthless, because the number of issued residence permits decreased least of all in group III, most of all in group I. Are the registration procedures comparable in 1897 and 1898? (Note to 2nd ed.)

Migratory trades, according to these data, are considerably stronger in group I than in group III.

Thus, it is beyond doubt that the mobility of population in the non-agricultural zone of Russia is incomparably higher than in the agricultural zone. The number of non-agricultural migratory workers must be higher than that of agricultural workers and constitute no fewer than three million people.

All sources testify to the tremendous and ever-increasing growth of migration. Passport revenue increased from 2.1 million rubles in 1868 (1.75 million rubles in 1866) to 4.5 million rubles in 1893/94, that is, more than doubled. The number of passports and permits issued in Moscow Province increased from 1877 to 1885 by 20% (male) and 53% (female); in Tver Province from 1893 to 1896 by 5.6%; in Kaluga Province from 1885 to 1895 by 23% (and the number of months of absence by 26%); in Smolensk Province from 100 thousand in 1875 to 117 thousand in 1885 and to 140 thousand in 1895; in Pskov Province from 11,716 in 1865–1875 to 14,944 in 1876 and to 43,765 in 1896 (male). In Kostroma Province in 1868 there were issued 23.8 passports and permits per 100 men, 0.85 per 100 women, and in 1880 – 33.1 and 2.2. And so on and so forth.

Like the drawing away of population from agriculture to cities, non-agricultural migration represents a progressive phenomenon. It tears the population out of forsaken, backward, historically forgotten backwaters and draws it into the whirlwind of modern social life. It increases the literacy of the population[714] and its consciousness[715], instills in it cultured habits and needs[716]. Peasants are drawn to migration by "motives of a higher order," that is, the greater external refinement and polish of the Petersburger; they seek "where it is better." "St. Petersburg work and life are considered easier than village life"[717]. "All village dwellers are called gray and, which is strange, are not in the least offended by this name, and call themselves such, complaining about their parents who did not send them to study in St. Petersburg. However, it must be noted that even these gray village dwellers are far from as gray as in purely agricultural localities: they unwillingly acquire the outward appearance and habits from Petersburgers, the capital's light is indirectly shed upon them as well"[718]. In Yaroslavl Province (apart from examples of enrichment) "there is still another cause that drives everyone from his home. This is public opinion, which assigns to a man who has not lived in Petersburg or somewhere else and is engaged in agriculture or some craft, for his whole life the name of a shepherd, and such a man finds it difficult to find himself a bride" ("Survey of Yaroslavl Province," II, 118). Migration to cities raises the civic personality of the peasant, freeing him from that abyss of patriarchal and personal relations of dependence and estate that are so strong in villages[719]… "The first-rank factor supporting the existence of migration is the growth of self-consciousness of the individual in the popular milieu. Liberation from serfdom, the long-standing intercourse of the most energetic part of the rural population with city life long ago awakened in Yaroslavl peasantry the desire to assert their 'I', to extricate themselves from the woeful and dependent position to which the conditions of village life condemned them, toward a sufficient, independent and honorable [position]… A peasant, living on outside earnings, feels freer, and also more equal in rights with persons of other estates, and therefore rural youth increasingly strive toward the city" ("Survey of Yaroslavl Province," II, 189–190).

Migration to cities weakens the old patriarchal family, places woman in a more independent position, equal with man. "In comparison with settled localities, the Soligalich and Chukhloma family" (the most migratory districts of Kostroma Province) "is far less firm not only in the sense of patriarchal authority of the elder, but even in the relations between parents and children, husband and wife. From sons sent to Petersburg from age 12, one cannot of course expect strong love for their parents and attachment to the parental home; they become unwillingly cosmopolitans: 'where it is good, there is the fatherland'"[720]. "Accustomed to managing without male authority and help, the Soligalich woman is not at all like the downtrodden peasant woman of the agricultural zone: she is independent, self-reliant… Beatings and abuse of women here are a rare exception… In general, the equality of woman with man manifests itself almost everywhere and in everything"[721].

Finally – last but not least[722] – non-agricultural migration raises wages not only of the migrant wage workers themselves but also of those remaining.

Most vividly this fact is expressed in the general phenomenon that non-agricultural provinces, distinguished by higher wages than agricultural provinces, attract rural workers from the latter[723]. Here are interesting data from Kaluga Province:

"These figures fully clarify… those phenomena, 1) that migratory trades influence the raising of wages in agricultural production and 2) that they attract away the best forces of the population"[724]. Not only monetary but also real wages increase. In the group of districts giving 60 or more migrants per 100 workers, the average wage for a yearly farm laborer – 69 rubles or 123 puds of rye; in districts with 40–60% migratory workers – 64 rubles or 125 puds of rye; in districts giving less than 40% migrants – 59 rubles or 116 puds of rye[725]. For these same groups of districts the percentage of correspondence with complaints about shortage of workers regularly decreases: 58%—42%—35%. In processing industry wages are higher than in agriculture, and "trades, according to the testimony of very many respondents, promote the development in the peasant milieu of new needs (tea, printed cotton fabrics, boots, watches, etc.), raise the general level of the latter and thus influence the raising of wages"[726]. Here is a typical statement of one respondent: "The shortage [of workers] is always complete, and the reason is that the suburban population has been spoiled, working in railway shops and serving there. The proximity of Kaluga and the markets in it constantly gather the surrounding inhabitants to sell eggs, milk, and so on, and then general drunkenness in taverns; the reason is that the entire population strives for high wages and idleness. To live as a rural worker is considered shameful, and they strive toward the cities, where they form the proletariat and golden companies; the village suffers from the lack of decent and healthy workers"[727]. Such an evaluation of migratory trades we can with full right call Populist. Mr. Zhbankov, for example, pointing out that those who leave are not surplus but "necessary" workers, replaced by incoming agricultural workers, finds it "evident" that "such mutual replacements are very disadvantageous"[728]. For whom, Mr. Zhbankov? "Life in the capitals imparts many cultured habits of the lower sort and a tendency toward luxury and foppishness, which carries away uselessly (sic!!) much money"[729]; the expenditure on this foppishness, etc., for the most part is "unproductive" (!!)[730]. Mr. Gertsenshtein directly exclaims about "flashy civilization," "wild revelry," "reckless debauchery," "wild drunkenness and cheap depravity," etc.[731]. Moscow statisticians from the fact of massive migration directly draw the necessity for "measures that would reduce the need for migratory earnings"[732]. Mr. Karyshev reasons about migratory trades: "Only an increase in peasant land use to dimensions sufficient to satisfy the chief (!) needs of the family can resolve this most serious problem of our national economy"[733].

And it does not occur to any of these kind-hearted gentlemen that, before discussing the "resolution of serious problems," it is necessary to concern oneself with complete freedom of movement for peasants, freedom to refuse land and to leave the commune, freedom of settlement (without "redemption" money) in whatever urban or rural commune of the state!

Thus, the drawing away of population from agriculture is expressed in Russia in the growth of cities (somewhat obscured by internal colonization), suburbs, factory and mill, and commercial-industrial villages and settlements, as well as in non-agricultural migration. All these processes, rapidly developing both extensively and intensively during the post-reform epoch, are a necessary component part of capitalist development and have deeply progressive significance in relation to the old forms of life.