contrast between perceptions and things, between the world of inner experiences and the world of things. It is then that the necessity for new cognitive forms becomes urgent. ... What immediately interests us is the logical process which in the newest philosophy led to dialectical materialism.

—The psychologism of Hume, Berkeley and others operates mainly through the psychical—sensuous world. Sensuous images are the objects of cognition. The result to which the development of |English empiricism| led states: Esse = percipi,—that which is given in perception exists, and everything given in perception possesses objective Being, exists...

Kant understood that truly scientific cognition is possible only through the mediation of "mathematical intuition." Sensuous intuition does not include within itself the conditions necessary for universally binding cognition. Sensuous images are incapable of encompassing the entire aggregate of phenomena subject to cognition. And Kant accomplishes the transition from psychologism to transcendentalism...

[43] Hegelian philosophy represents the last and concluding link in this chain. We have seen that in Hume, Kant, Fichte the subject was placed above the object, which was declared to be something inseparable from the subject...

[48-58] Categories, i.e. pure universal concepts such as time, space, causality, are from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the one hand, logical determinations, on the other hand, real forms of things...

The limitation of transcendentalism consists in the fact that it does not extend its rights to the real sphere of things and considers categories merely as subjective, and moreover aprioristic, forms of consciousness. Phenomena, however, transcendentalism encompasses with categorical, i.e. logically-universal forms, which provide the possibility of formulating strictly mathematical laws of nature, of imparting to them a universal character. But transcendentalism, like sensationalist phenomenalism, deals only with phenomena. For them Being, things-in-themselves are inaccessible...

Dialectical materialism achieves the "unconditionality" and universality of cognition by declaring forms to be universal, objectively-real "intuitions." Upon this rests the possibility of mathematical or, if you will, "geometric," i.e. precise cognition of reality. "Geometric" space and "pure time" are universal-real
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intuitions and represent the presupposition of "mathematical" cognition of the sensuous world...

But at the same time dialectical consciousness reveals the capacity to rise to the "intuition" of nature as a "whole," to the intuition of necessity, of the internal conditionedness of the universal order of nature...

Man cognizes to the extent that he acts and to the extent that he himself is subject to the action of the external world. Dialectical materialism teaches that man is prompted to reflection chiefly by those sensations which he experiences in the process of his action upon the external world... Dialectical materialism, proceeding from the consideration that it is possible to dominate nature only by obeying it, prescribes to us that we accord our activity with the universal laws of nature, with the necessary order of things, with the universal laws of the development of the world...

Parmenides thus saw the true essence of things ("the One") in that which can be cognized by thought or by Reason and which lies behind the flowing and changing phenomena. By this very fact he separated sensuous perceptions from their basis, the phenomenal world from the metaphenomenal...

If for metaphysical rationalists true reality is given in the concept, then for sensualists what is real is that which is given in sensuous perception or intuition. That which lies beyond the senses is inaccessible to cognition. Phenomena, which are elevated to absolute reality, are the object of cognition. The content of empirical consciousness is changeable and fluid. The real substratum of qualities is rejected by phenomenalism. Diversity is given, multiplicity of phenomena is given, but there is no substantial unity...

Kant succeeded in combining the phenomenalist teaching of the unknowability of things-in-themselves with the teaching of rationalist-metaphysicians of the existence of absolutely-real Being, "things-in-themselves."

French materialists, with Holbach at their head, counterposed nature as the metaphysical essence of a thing to its properties. This counterposition means in a certain sense the same dualism as between the "thing-in-itself" and "phenomena" in Kant...

We would be, however, unjust to French materialism if we identified
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