1 The telegram concerns the destruction by the enemy of a bridge across the Volga in Simbirsk. Katin, Chief of Military Communications of the Eastern Front, requested technical assistance from Moscow for the restoration of the bridge. On the telegram there is a note by A. P. Kizas, secretary of the SNK, recording L. D. Trotsky's response that such an order had been issued three days earlier.

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY

[30 September 1918]

Forward to Chicherin:
It is necessary to send a strict reprimand to:
1) Muklevich* for slacking—he should have made an arrest;
2) to Petrograd to Zorin² on how they dare issue documents without Moscow's authorization.
3) Open an investigation against Zorin and Co.

Lenin

1 The instruction was written on a telegram from R. A. Muklevich, special frontier commissioner, to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin, concerning diplomatic couriers traveling through Toroshino station to Pskov who were abusing documents issued by the foreign department in Petrograd, using them for speculative purposes to transport gold, silver, manufactured goods, rubber, and private items under the guise of embassy inventory and diplomatic correspondence. On the telegram there is a note by Chicherin's secretary recording his response that he would speak with Petrograd by telephone.
2 S. Zorin—chairman of the revolutionary tribunal.

NOTE TO B. S. WEISSBROD

Dear Comrade Weissbrod!
I send my warmest greetings and wishes for you to rest well and to "help" the Europeans well!

15/X - 1918
Your Lenin

1 B. S. Weissbrod—a physician who treated V. I. Lenin.
2 What is being referred to has not been established.
* A slip of the pen; the reference is to R. A. Muklevich.

LENIN COLLECTION

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

[23 October 1918]

Stalin arrived today and brought news of three major victories by our troops near Tsaritsyn: one victory 10 versts from Tsaritsyn, another—the destruction of 4 enemy regiments by the steppe army at Svetlyy Yar, which, as it turns out, had been requested by the Tsaritsyn men, and a third—near Muzga, where 4 enemy regiments were also destroyed.

Stalin persuaded Voroshilov and Minin¹, whom he considers highly valuable and irreplaceable workers, not to leave and to offer complete obedience to the orders of the Center; the sole cause of their discontent, according to him, is the extreme delays and failure to send shells and ammunition, due to which the two-hundred-thousand-strong and splendidly motivated Caucasus army is also perishing.

Stalin would very much like to work on the Southern Front; he expresses great apprehension that people with little knowledge of this front will make mistakes, of which he provides numerous examples. Stalin hopes that in his work he will succeed in convincing [the others] of the correctness of his view, and he does not issue an ultimatum demanding the removal of Sytin and Mekhonoshiin², agreeing to work together with them in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, and also expressing a desire to be a member of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic.

In reporting to you, Lev Davidovich, all these statements of Stalin, I ask you to consider them and answer, first, whether you are willing to speak personally with Stalin, for which purpose he is prepared to come, and second, whether you consider it possible, on known concrete conditions, to eliminate previous friction and establish joint work, which is what Stalin desires so much.

As for me, I believe it is necessary to exert all efforts to establish joint work with Stalin.

1 This telegram of V. I. Lenin was occasioned by grave anxiety over the situation on the Southern Front. By a resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of 17 September 1918, I. V. Stalin, S. K. Minin, the front commander P. P. Sytin, and the assistant commander K. E. Voroshilov were appointed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the front. Later K. A. Mekhonoshiin was also introduced into the Revolutionary Military Council of the front. Between Stalin, Minin, and Voroshilov, on the one hand, and Sytin and Mekhonoshiin on the other, sharp disagreements arose from the very beginning. Their essence lay in the unwillingness of the Tsaritsyn workers to reckon with the Party's line on the use of old military specialists in building the Red Army, in attempts to introduce collegiate command of troops, which the Party had rejected.