with a bare fact, and once again the requirement of mediation remains unsatisfied—and that is precisely what is at stake, above all, when we apply the relation of causality. Upon closer examination, the inadequacy in applying the relation of interaction consists in the fact that this relation, instead of being equivalent to the concept, must itself be comprehended. And in order to comprehend the relation of interaction, we must not leave both sides of the relation as immediately given; but, as was demonstrated in the two preceding paragraphs, they must be recognized as moments of a third, more elevated determinateness, namely the concept itself.

Thus, for example, if we consider the customs of the Spartan people to be the action of its social structure, and conversely, the social structure to be the action of the customs, we shall perhaps have a correct view of the history of this people,

* — "concept." Ed.

At the end of the second volume of the Logic, vol. IV, p. 243 [694]*, in the transition to the "concept" the following definition is given: "the concept, the realm of subjectivity or freedom"...

NB Freedom = subjectivity,
("or")
aim, consciousness, striving

NB

* Hegel. Works, vol. V, Moscow, 1937. Ed.

