V. I. Lenin

Questions To Delegates To The Army Congress On The
      Demobilisation Of The
      Army[1]

Delivered:17 December, 1917First Published:1927 inTransactions of the Lenin Institue, Volume IISource:Lenin’sCollected
      Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 26, 1972,
      pp. 388-390Translated:Yuri Sdobnikov and George
      Hanna, Edited by George HannaTranscription & HTML Markup:Charles
      Farrell and David WaltersOnline Version:Lenin Internet ArchiveNovember,
      2000

(1) Is the likelihood of the Germans starting an offensive
      in the near future great or small—

(a) from the viewpoint of the physical and technical
      possibility of a winter offensive;

(b) from the viewpoint of the mood of the mass of the
      German soldiers; is that mood capable of preventing an
      offensive, or at least of retarding it?

(2) Can it be assumed that the Germans, if
      we immediately break off peace negotiations, and if their troops
      immediately take the offensive, are capable of inflicting a
      decisive defeat upon us? Will they be able to take Petrograd?

(3) Is it to be feared that the news of
      the peace negotiations having been broken off will result in
      widespread anarchist sentiments in the army and in desertions from
      the front, or may we be confident that the army will staunchly
      hold the front even after the receipt of such news?

(4) Would our army be capable, from the
      military viewpoint, of resisting a German offensive, if it began
      on January 1? If not, when would our army be in a position to
      resist a German offensive?

(5) In the event of a swift German
      advance, could our army retire in good order and preserve its
      artillery, and if so. could the Germans’ advance into the
      heart of Russia be held up for long?

(6) General conclusion: from the point of
      view of the state of the army, should we strive to drag out the
      peace negotiations, or would it be preferable to break them off
      immediately in revolutionary fashion, because of the Germans
      annexationist policy and as a decisive and firm step which would
      prepare the ground for a possible revolutionary war?

(7) Should we at once undertake intensive
      agitation against the Germans’ annexationist policy and for a
      revolutionary war?

(8) Would it be possible at very short
      notice (5-10 days, say) to arrange a canvass of fairly wide
      sections of the army at the front with a view to obtaining fuller
      replies to the above questions in more suitable form?

(9) Is it to be hoped that the dissensions
      with the Ukrainians will weaken, or even yield place to a firm
      consolidation of forces when they hear of the Germans’
      annexationist demands, or it may be expected that the Ukrainians
      will take advantage of the Great Hussians’ greater
      difficulties to step up the struggle against them?

(10) If the army could vote would it be in
      favour of immediate peace on annexationist (loss of the occupied
      regions) and economically very harsh terms for Russia, or would it
      favour the maximum effort for a revolutionary war, i.e.,
      resistance to the Germans?

[1]The questions were raised by Lenin on December 17 (30), 1917. at
      a conference of delegates to the Army Congress on the
      Demobilisation of the Army whom the Congress had elected to
      participate in a Commission for the Demobilisation of the Army
      under the People’s Commissariat for the Army. No answers or
      summaries of answers have been discovered in the archives. It
      would appear that the answers helped Lenin to arrive at the firm
      conviction that it would be impossible to continue the war with
      the Germans, and were taken into account in working out the
      Party’s tactics at the peace talks with Germany. The
      results of the questionnaire were discussed by the government on
      December 18 (31) after a report given by N. V. Krylenko on the
      situation at the front and the morale of the army. The
      government resolved to recognise the results of the
      questionnaire as being exhaustive and adopted a resolution
      drafted by Lenin.

The manuscript of Lenin’s questionnaire has not come down
      to us; the text published here was given in a letter from a man
      who was present at the conference, D. S. Vitebsky, to the Lenin
      Institute in 1924.

The Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army was held in
      Petrograd from December 15 (28), 1917, to January 3 (16),
      1918. It was attended by delegates from the Soviets of
      Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies front-line arid corps
      committees, engineers, artillery units and brigades, staffs,
      etc. When the Congress opened there were 234 delegates, 119 of
      them Bolsheviks and 45 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. The
      Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries appeared to
      have formed the so-called extra-factional group. The number of
      delegates subsequently increased to 272. The task of the
      Congress was to control the spontaneous demobilisation of the
      army and to discuss the creation of a new army of the socialist
      state. The Congress was for all purposes a caretaker organ to
      guide the army demobilisation and did a great deal of work to
      that effect.

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Congress discussed
      the organisation of a socialist army, and the Bolshevik group
      motioned a project for the formation of a workers’ and
      peasants’ army. It was opposed by the Mensheviks and Right
      Socialist-Revolutionaries. After some hesitation the
      Left-wingers supported the Bolsheviks. The project was adopted
      by 153 to 40 with 13 abstentions.

Lenin was expected to speak at the Congress but was unable to do
      so because of pressure of work. On January 3 (16), the closing
      day, he sent a message of greetings to the delegates.