[Late March 1916]

1) Don't hold up the Russian [issue] and send proofs. We'll 
bring it out immediately, entirely in Russian. Send the distribution 
and article lengths.

2) Concerning the "Communist" now (I'm sending another letter to 
Ko.² Return it), I think you'll be convinced you were wrong. Our 
proposal about the CC—Alexander³ would have accepted it, taken it 
to Russia, and stirred up a scandal. Now there's only one way out: 
make them bear responsibility; show and prove that they acted as 
a faction.

3) Alexander's letter is vitally important. It's clear that the "old 
woman's"⁴ gossip is working full tilt and has won over Alexander 
on 9/10 of the issues. Is it worth inviting him out? I'm wavering. It's 
already too late. Already hopeless (because even Kollontai⁵ is against 
it—hm! hm! NB nota bene!!). Wouldn't it be better to try to send 
someone to Russia? But whom? Liudmila?⁶ That would be good. Inessa?⁷ 
That would be good too, but she won't go. This needs to be thought 
through more carefully.

4) "Not for a million" a bloc with "Nashe Slovo" etc. in the 
transport. Entirely agree with you.

5) I don't want to let my reply to Bukharin go beyond the circle 
you indicated. I'll only send it to papa⁸ and Liudmila as well.

6) Radek is liquidating the Bureau of the Left. If he's going for 
peace, then let him send our theses to Kniff⁹ and other leftists, or 
better yet give us their addresses. Formally we haven't violated the 
bloc in any way, and substantively neither. The proposal from the CC 
doesn't exclude compromise on the Zimmerwald Left bloc. If Radek 
gives the theses on Saturday, send them immediately so I have them 
Sunday morning.

7) Shouldn't we give money to I.S.D.¹⁰ for one more delegate? Ask 
Radek, *wieviel* and then we'll discuss.

8) I'm returning Alexander's letter. What should we do with this 
letter? Should you answer it alone or should I as well? Did he ask you 
not to show it to me?

If you're going to write, it needs to be thought through very 
carefully. I advise you to go after the "old woman" with all your 
might: all the gossip comes from her. That's the end of it; the matter 
is clear.

LENIN COLLECTION

9) Five secretaries are playing a double game. Here Martov¹¹ and K 
left the group of our word people. Martov read his statement about 
his withdrawal from the editorial board of "Nashe Slovo"!!

In my opinion, tell Weis¹² (scoundrel!) at the discussion: if "your 
people" really break with "Samozashchita"¹³ and with Tsereteli, then 
we're happy to unite!!

10) An issue on "self-determination"? Wouldn't it be better to wait 
for No. 2 of "Vorbote"¹⁴, so as to answer immediately on Radek's 
theses and Co.?¹⁵ In my opinion, that's better. We'll send our theses 
to the typesetter, then wait for Radek's theses (perhaps you'll get 
them in proof?) and immediately after "Vorbote," our issue. That's 
better this way.

Will Radek refuse to show you his counter-theses?

11) Will Radek agree to give us full pages in "Vorbote" (No. 2) 
for our theses? And what's the deadline? I'll propose 2-3 more 
additions. 

Salut. Lenin

P.S. Regarding my nerves, I apologize very much for the trouble. 
My nerves are in terrible shape*.

_________

*Below, in N. K. Krupskaya's hand is written the following text: "Alexander sent nothing 'practical.' Everything that was received has been sent to you. By the way, did you receive that letter where my letter was [to] (the word is illegible) with the resolution of KZO? Alexander still hasn't sent the composition of the bureau. I didn't expect such disloyalty from him—instead of corresponding, he immediately believed all the nonsense from N. Iv. about Malinovsky, Kamenev, etc. Now we're guilty in the transport for not developing his paths! About what he did in Russia (aside from squabbling with the PK)—not a word. Who are these 'Russians' who 'want, demand, insist'—workers or Avilov and Co.? Damn annoying.

Isn't Inessa writing about when she returns? From England another 496 fr. received (altogether a thousand)."

# THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE AT KIENTHAL

[Between 24 and 30 April 1916]

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH PIERRE BRIZON

It is not a matter of theory because "pacifism" (represented by 
Vandervelde and company) serves in reality, in practice, to deflect 
the masses from revolutionary struggle*.

Revolutionary struggle—except in Parliaments and insofar as 
parliamentarism can be revolutionary—is impossible in countries 
where the proletariat is under arms. Let us not forget reality.

=====

We are against "pacifism," believing that it is only bourgeois 
deception and that it is revolutionary struggle, not sonorous phrases 
about peace, which is the true means of achieving socialism—the 
sole guarantee of peace.

Yes—but today that is a matter of theory. Let us talk about the 
means of ending this war. What you say is good for preventing 
other wars—by emphasizing socialist propaganda.

## TRANSLATION

It is not a question of theory, because "pacifism" (represented 
by Vandervelde and company) serves in reality, in practice, to 
deflect the masses from revolutionary struggle*.

Revolutionary struggle—except in parliaments and insofar as 
parliamentarism can be revolutionary—is impossible in countries 
where the proletariat is under arms. Let us not forget about reality.

We are against "pacifism," considering it to be mere bourgeois 
fraud and that revolutionary struggle itself, not resounding phrases 
about peace, is the actual means of achieving socialism—the only 
guarantee of peace.

Yes—but today that is a question of theory. Let us talk about 
the means of ending this war. What you say is good for preventing 
new wars—since it emphasizes the significance of socialist 
propaganda.

## REMARKS ON THE DRAFT THESES
"THE ATTITUDE OF THE PROLETARIAT TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE"

### LENIN

The Position of the Proletariat to the Questions of Peace. Proposal for Theses

I

[objectively]
(essence)

The present war is the result of the imperialist contradictions 
generated by bourgeois property relations; its aim is the regrouping 
of the correlation of forces between capitalist classes on the world 
market in accordance with the military successes achieved in the war.

Insofar as the aim of this war is not the abolition of capitalist 
commodity production, which produced it, it is likewise unable to 
eliminate the causes of future wars. It leaves old problems unsolved, 
entangles them further, and creates new contradictions which, on 
the basis of unimpeded imperialist development alongside an 
intensified economic and military oppression, bring forth new 
conflicts and therewith the danger of further military entanglements.

Therefore, when bourgeois governments and their agents assert 
that war has the aim of establishing a lasting peace, they either lie 
or ignore the conditions necessary for the realization of such an aim. 
Just as annexations—that is, the oppression of foreign peoples—
cannot be the means to ensure the peaceful development of 
humanity, so too can lasting peace not be brought about through 
demands which are well-intentioned, to be sure, but contradict the 
historical conditions of capitalist development, such as limitation 
of armaments, introduction of compulsory arbitration courts, 
democratization of foreign policy, etc.

On the basis of a [capitalist] class society, these demands remain 
utopia. Limitation of armaments, which is in itself only a means to 
establish an armistice between imperialist states, can neither 
eliminate nor mitigate the causes of war, not to mention the fact 
that in the epoch of imperialism there exists no universally binding 
standard by which armaments could be limited. Compulsory 
arbitration courts presuppose the existence of universally recognized 
law, which can be neither created through the brute force of an 
imperialist war nor realized in such a class society whose legal 
consciousness at each given moment flows from the material 
interests of its ruling class. Democratization of foreign policy 
presupposes the existence alongside political democracy also of social 
democracy in the internal life of states, the creation of which, in 
turn, is impossible so long as capitalist property relations exist and 
with them the exploitation of man by man.

The same presuppositions are necessary for the so-called right of 
nations to self-determination. So long as peoples in their internal 
economic, political, and social relations are dominated by the rule 
of propertied classes who dispose of all economic and state means of 
power with which they oppress and exploit their own fellow citizens, 
the people cannot determine themselves.

Proceeding from these considerations, the proletariat must as 
decisively as it rejects imperialist war also reject the utopian 
demands of bourgeois pacifists and embourgeoisified socialists who 
are preparing to awaken new illusions instead of old ones and force 
the proletariat to serve these illusions, which ultimately only 
promote confusion, the arousal and fanning of chauvinism, militarist 
fervor, and the policy of fighting to the bitter end.

II

If on the basis of capitalist society it is impossible to establish 
lasting peace, then its preconditions are created in the struggle for 
socialism. Socialism, by abolishing capitalist private property, 
simultaneously eliminates—together with the exploitation of the 
popular masses by propertied classes and therewith national 
oppression—also the causes of war. Therefore the struggle for lasting 
peace can consist only in the struggle for the realization of socialism. 
Every proletarian action which represents a renunciation of class 
struggle and subordinates the aims of the proletariat to the aims of 
bourgeois classes and their governments, insofar as it shows solidarity 
with the national class of exploiters, hinders the creation of 
conditions for lasting peace. Such actions only entrust capitalist 
classes and bourgeois governments with a task which they cannot 
fulfill; they moreover uselessly hurl the best forces of the working 
class into the slaughter and thereby doom to destruction and 
annihilation the most energetic and capable segment of the working 
class, which in the first instance is called upon to wage the struggle 
for socialism both during the war and in the subsequent period of 
peace.

The sole solution possible from the standpoint of proletarian 
interests in response to bourgeois peace aims is therefore the call for 
immediate cessation of hostilities and urgent initiation of peace 
negotiations, regardless of the military and strategic situation at 
the given moment.

III

Only to the extent that this call finds a response in the ranks of 
the international proletariat and leads to vigorous actions in the 
spirit of class struggle with the ultimate aim of overthrowing 
capitalist class rule will the working class succeed in exerting 
influence on the character of the coming peace. Every other position 
excludes the influence of the proletariat on the character of peace 
and leaves the establishment of its conditions to the arbitrary will 
of governments, diplomacy, and ruling classes.

While waging revolutionary mass struggle for the realization of 
the ultimate aims of socialism, and thereby for the liberation of 
humanity from the scourge of militarism and war, the proletariat 
must simultaneously turn against all annexationist appetites of the 
warring states. The proletariat must wage struggle against annexations 
not because it regards the (political) map of the world as it existed 
before the war as some unshakeable magnitude, not because it 
considers unnecessary and impossible the future formation of new 
state boundaries. Socialism itself strives for the abolition of all 
national oppression through the economic and political unification 
of peoples on a democratic basis, which cannot be realized within 
the framework of capitalist state boundaries. But it is precisely 
annexations, in whatever form they appear, which hamper the 
achievement of this aim, because the forcible dismemberment of 
nations, their arbitrary division and incorporation into foreign states 
worsen the conditions of proletarian class struggle.

Just as annexations are incompatible with the interests of the 
proletariat, so too is the demand for war indemnities. Just as ruling 
classes in each country seek to shift the costs of conducting war 
onto the shoulders of the working class, so too would the burden of 
paying war indemnities ultimately have to be borne by the proletariat 
of the respective country. Such a shifting of burden would harm also 
the working class of the victorious country, insofar as the 
deterioration of the economic and social situation of the proletariat 
of one country has a reciprocal effect on the proletariat of another 
country and thereby complicates the conditions of international class 
struggle.

Neither annexations nor indemnities, but rather general liberation 
from the burden of war through the revolutionary struggle of the 
proletariat against the ruling classes in each country—such is the 
slogan of socialist workers in their struggle for the immediate 
establishment of peace.

It is precisely because the present war is very deeply rooted in 
the totality of relations of the imperialist epoch (competition for 
world domination, financial capital, monopolies, division of the 
world, etc.) that well-intentioned phrases about lasting peace, about 
democratic peace, etc., about peace which is supposedly possible under 
the present governments, with power remaining in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie as the ruling class, such phrases deceive the masses, 
hiding from them the real, actual foundations of imperialist policy, 
instilling false confidence in the bourgeoisie, and transforming 
themselves into reformism*.

## SKETCHES FOR A SPEECH AT THE SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON 
THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

[In a word I will reply to Martov⁴. He accuses me of stabbing the 
Zimmerwald majority in the back when I say it wanted to reconcile 
itself with Vandervelde. But the Zimmerwald majority was not supposed 
to say and had not...]**

In a word I will reply to Martov. In reproaching me for my 
criticism of the Zimmerwald majority, he does not answer what I have 
already pointed out once: that in the bulletin—not No. 2 as Grimm 
said, but in No. 1—it was stated that our I.S.K. would withdraw 
(sich auflosen) if the old Bureau fulfilled its duty. This was not voted 
on at Zimmerwald.

I want to reply especially to Modigliani. He wants to be practical. 
He is not practical at all. He...***

*Here and below underlined by P. Brizon.

**Text crossed out by V. I. Lenin.

***The manuscript breaks off here.