V. I. Lenin

Notes of a Publicist

7. Pro-Party Menshevism and its Evaluation

Thelast question which we must consider in order to
understand the “unity crisis” in our Party is the question of so-called
pro-Party Menshevism and the appraisal of its significance.

Theviews held by the non-factionalists, i.e., by those who wish to be
regarded as outside the factious—Yonov and Trotsky (PravdaNo. 12, and the Vienna resolution)—are very characteristic in this
respect. Trotsky determinedly and persistently ignores pro-Party Menshevism
(this was already pointed out in No. 13 of the Central Organ), while Yonov
reveals the “cherished” idea of his fellow-thinker by declaring that the
significance of “Comrade Plekhanov’ s” utterances (Yonov refuses to
notice any other pro-Party Mensheviks) consists in their “reinforcing”
the factional struggle of the Bolsheviks and in advocating that “martial
law be declared in the Party”.

Thatthis position of Yonov and Trotsky is wrong should have been
obvious to them for the simple reason that it is refuted by facts. From
No. 13 of the Central

				Organ{1}we see that in no fewer than seven of the groups abroad assisting the Party
(in Paris, Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Liége, Nice, San Remo), the
Plekhanovites, or more correctly, the pro-party Mensheviks, rose againstGolosand demanded the fulfilment of the decisions of the plenum,
demanded thatGoloscease publication and pointed out the
liquidationist nature of the ideological position taken up byGolosin No. 19–20. The same process is taking place among the
Party workers in Russia, though perhaps less conspicuously. It is
ridiculous to keep silent about these facts. To attempt, despite them, to
represent Plekhanov’s struggle against the Golosists as a, journalistic
“factional” struggle means—objectively—taking the side of
the group of independent legalists against the Party.

Theobviously false and untenable position taken up by the
above-mentioned “conciliators” should have opened their eyes to the fact
that they are wrong in their point of departure, namely, that the political
significance of the unity reached at the plenum lies in the agreement with
“given persons, groups and institutions”. We must not allow ourselves to
be deceived by the outward forms of Party events and their individual
peculiarities; it is necessary to appraise the ideological and political
significance of what is taking place. Judging by outward appearances the
agreement was made with specified Golosists But the basis, the condition
for agreement was the adoption by the Golosists of Plekhanov’s position;
that is evident from the analysis given above of the resolution on the
state of affairs in the

				Party.[2]Outwardly it was the Golosists who appeared as the representatives of
Menshevism in the Party—judging, for example, by the composition of the
Central Organ. In reality, after the plenum the Central Organ began to
transform itself into an organ of “collaboration” between the pro-Party
Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites, with the Golosists in full
opposition. The result was a zigzag in the development of Party unity; at
first there was something in the nature of an indiscriminate, conciliatory
mass without a clear definition of the ideological basis for unity, but
later on the logic of political tendencies gained the upper hand, the
sifting of the independents from the Party was accelerated by the maximal
concessions that were made to the Golosists at the plenum.

WhenI heard at the plenum and saw inGolos(No. 19–20,
p. 18) fierce attacks on the slogan “an agreement between the strong
factions for the fight against the liquidators of the Right and of the
Left” (this slogan is put in quotation marks byGolos, but for
some reason it is not stated openly that I defended this slogan both before
and at the plenum)—Ithought to myself: “abwarten!” “wait and see”. Just wait,
gentlemen ofGolos, you are reckoning “without your host”. The
point is not that the plenum offered the opportunity of taking part in the
agreement to everyone, and not only to the “strong” factions, strong
because of their ideological and political position. The point is, will
your “host”, i.e., the groups of independent-legalists, allow this
opportunity to become a reality?

Somemonths have elapsed, and only the blind can fail to see now that,
in reality, it is precisely the “agreement between the strong factions”
that constitutes Party unity and drives it forward “despite all
obstacles”. That is how it should be, that is the only way it can be in
view of the real relationship of forces in the Party. No doubt, in the near
future, either all the leading organs of the Party will be formally
reconstructed in such a way as to express this agreement, or the life of
the Party and the progress of its unity will, proceed for a time
irrespective of its leading organs.

Nodoubt, at first sight, it may seem strange to call the pro-Party
Mensheviks a “strong faction”, for at the present moment—at any rate
abroad—the Golosists are apparently stronger. However, we
Social-Democrats judge strength not by the statements of the emigrant
groups, not by the way the Menshevik writers group themselves, but from the
stand point as to, which position is objectively correct, and which is
condemned by the logic of the political situation to subordination to the
“independents”. From 1898 to 1900, theRabocheye Dyelo-ists were
stronger than the Iskrists both abroad and in Russia, yet they did not
constitute a “strong faction”.

Nowthat the Golosists have mobilised all their forces against
Plekhanov and brought out all their slop-pails to pour on him—including
Mr. Potresov and the recollections of show Martov was “offended” in1901–03(sic!)—the impotence of the Golosists becomes
particularly obvious. Axelrod and Co. were hopelessly behind the times
politically when they published abroad, in April, a, symposium of personal
abuse against Plekhanov, while in RussiaNasha Zaryain its
February issue andVozrozhdeniyein its March issue had already
shifted the question to a completely differentplane, and Plekhanov in No. 13 of the Central Organ had already passed from
the history of his clashes with the Golosists to a fight against their
present-day policy. The Golosists, in recalling old “insults” (right up
to 1901!), are floundering as helplessly as the Vperyodists, who are still
appealing to the kind-hearted to protect them from the Bolshevik Centre.

Andsee how our “offended” ones, who in 1910 are raving at the very
thought of a “Lenin-Plekhanov” agreement (their terminology!) in just the
same way as Maximov did a year ago over the same thing, are more and more
betraying themselves. Like Maximov, the Golosists try to make it appear
that it is a question of almost a personal agreement “between Lenin and
Plekhanov”, moreover the actions of the latter are explained as a “wild
caprice” (p. 16 of the “Necessary Supplement”), as the “transformation
of Saul into Paul”, as “fluttering”, etc., etc. By recalling Plekhanov’s
“five years of activity” (ibid.) as a Menshevik, Martov is doing
his utmost to compromise him (retrospectively) for this fluttering, without
noticing that by doing so he is disparaging himself most of all.

Inthe very same “Necessary Supplement”, the collective editorial
board ofGolosassures us (p. 32) that Plekhanov was “great”
precisely during the above-mentioned five-year period (1904–08). Just see
what follows from this. The Mensheviks proclaim Plekhanov to be “great”
not because of his activity during the twenty years (1883–1903) when he
remained true to himself, when he was neither a Menshevik nor a Bolshevik,
but the founder of Social-Democracy, but because of his activity during the
five years when, as the Mensheviks themselves admit, he was “fluttering,”
i.e., was not following a consistent Menshevik line. It follows that his
“greatness” consisted in that he did not sink entirely into the morass of
Menshevism.

Butit is precisely the five-year history of Menshevism, which Axelrod
and Martov recalled to their own disadvantage, that furnishes a number of
facts which help toexplainthe split among the Mensheviks by
causes other than those petty, personal causes stressed by Martov.

Plekhanovco-opted Axelrod and Martov in 1903, declaring inIskraNo. 52, in an article entitled “What ShouldNot Be Done”, that he wanted tomanoeuvre with the opportunistsand, by these manoeuvres,reformthem. And in so doing he resorted
to the most extreme attacks on the Bolsheviks. At the end of 1904 he tried
to save Axelrod, who had obviously slipped into liberalism (“The Plan of
the Zemstvo Campaign”), but did it in such a manner as to avoid saying a
single word about such gems as proclaiming demonstrations before the
Zemstvo members to be “the highest type of demonstration” (in the
pamphletLetter to the Central Committee, published for Party
membersonly). In the spring of 1905 Plekhanov became convinced of
the hopelessness of these “manoeuvres”, left the Mensheviks and startedDnevnik, advocating reunion with the Bolsheviks. Number 3 ofDnevnik(November 1905) is not Menshevik at all.

Havingwasted about a year and a half on manoeuvres with the
opportunists within the Party (from the end of 1903 to the spring of 1905),
Plekhanov, from the beginning of 1906 and during 1907, engaged inmanoeuvringwith the Cadets. In this he went to far greater
opportunist extremes than the other Mensheviks. But when Plekhanov, who
proclaimed the tactics of “manoeuvring” at the time of the First Duma and
after its dispersal (seeDnevnikNo. 6), proposed an agreement
between the revolutionary parties for a struggle for a constituent
assembly,Proletary(No. 2 of August 29, 1906, in the article,
“Vacillating Tactics”) immediately pointed out that this position was not
Menshevik at

				 all.{3}

Atthe London Congress in the spring of 1907, Plekhanov (according to
Cherevanin’s account, already cited by me in the preface to the symposiumTwelve Years) fought theorganisational anarchismof the

			     Mensheviks.{4}He wanted a “labour congress” as a manoeuvreforthe development
of the Party and notagainstthe Party. During the second half of
1907, as we learn from Martov in the “Necessary Supplement”, Plekhanov
“had to expend a good deal of eloquence” to uphold the need for an
illegal (i.e., Party) Menshevik organ in opposition to Axelrod (who
apparentlypreferred legal organs, which in fact were non-Party). In 1908, the
conflict over Potresov’s article served as an occasion for his break with
the liquidators.

Whatdo these facts prove? They prove that the present split among the
Mensheviks is not accidental but inevitable. “Manoeuvring” does not
exonerate the one who made mistakes for the sake of carrying out
manoeuvres, and I withdraw nothing of what I wrote against those mistakes
of Plekhanov. However, “manoeuvring”explainswhy it iseasyfor some Mensheviks to go over to the independents, while for
others it isdifficultand even impossible. A Social-Democrat who
by his manoeuvres leads the working class to follow the Cadets does it no
less harm than he who acts in this way because of his immanent gravitation
towards opportunism. But whereas the former will be able and will manage to
call a halt in time, the latter will end up in the ditch. A Russian proverb
says: make a certain person pray and he will do it with such zeal that he
will bang his forehead against the ground! Plekhanov might have said: make
the Potresovs and the Dans go to the Right for the sake of a manoeuvre and
they will go to the Right on principle.

Thestand taken by certain Mensheviks fully justifies their
appellation, “pro-Party Mensheviks”. They took their stand upon the
struggle for the Party—against the independent-legalists. Mr. Potresov
and the editors ofGolos Sotsial Demokratain the “Necessary
Supplement” vainly try to evade this simple and obvious question.

Engelstoo fought the S.D.F. (the British Social-Democrats)—says
Potresov, wriggling (p. 24). This is sophistry, my dear sir. Engels
corrected the

Party,{5}but you do not say how the Party is to be corrected; you do
not even say straightforwardly whether an illegal Social-Democratic Party
is necessary now, whether the R.S.D.L.P. is necessary or not. In front of
Stolypin you say:No(Nasha Zarya), but in front of Party
members, in the illegal press, youdarenot say this, you wriggle
and twist.

“Lenin-Plekhanovrecommend a war against the new forms of the labour
movement” (p. 31), “westart outfrom... the position,
conditions and requirements of the real labour movement” (p. 32)—the
editors assure us. Sophistry, mydear sirs. You yourselves have acknowledged that the plenum dideverythingto recognise these new forms, and the Bolsheviks, too,
by the struggle they wagedbeforethe plenum,provedit. What we differ on is not the question whether “new forms are
necessary”, whether it is necessary to conduct legal work, or to found
legal societies; we do not differ on this at all. What we differ on is
whether it is permissible for legalists conducting such work, like the
group of Mikhail and Co., like the group of Potresov and Co., to consider
themselves Social-Democratswhile being independent of the Party of the
Social-Democrats, or whether Social-Democratic Party members areobligedto recognise the Party, to advocate the need for it, to
work in it, to work on its organisation, to set up illegal Party units
everywhere and in all unions for regular communications with the Party,
etc. And you understand perfectly well that we differnow—after
the plenum—on this account andonlyon this account.

TheGolosists try to represent our efforts to draw closer to the
pro-Party Mensheviks, to enter into an agreement with them in order to
fight for the Party against the independents, as a personal bloc between
“Lenin and Plekhanov”. They violently abuse the author of the article
against Potresov, in No. 47–48 ofProletary, for his tone of a
“flattering courtier” who, they allege, is “speculating on an
agreement” with Plekhanov.

Iturn to this article and read on p. 7:

“Ofcourse, all the mistakes committed by Plekhanov during the
   revolution occurred precisely because he didnotconsistently
   carry out the policy which he himself had advocated in the oldIskra."

“Ofcourse, all the mistakes committed by Plekhanov during the
   revolution occurred precisely because he didnotconsistently
   carry out the policy which he himself had advocated in the oldIskra."

Letthe reader judge what looks more like “flattery” and
“speculation”: this blunt indication of what the Bolsheviks regard as
Plekhanov’s mistake, or the declaration that Plekhanov was “great”
precisely in the period when he was a Menshevik and, according to the
Mensheviks, was “fluttering”.

“Plekhanovwill be with us,” the editors ofGolos Sotsial
Demokratawrite, when “the time comes again forresponsible[Golos’s italics] political actions” (p. 32 of the “Necessary
Supplement”).

Thisbetrays political illiteracy, but is clear enough as regards
“speculation”. It is illiterate becausenowis just the time
which calls for political actions ahundred timesmoreresponsiblefor the old leaders than during an open struggle when
the masses themselves will much more easily find the way. It is clear in
the sense of “speculation”, because it expresses readiness to recognise
Plekhanov as a Menshevik once more as soon as he starts “manoeuvring”
again.

Weare surprised that the Golosists do not realise the significance of
outbursts of this kind on their part along side, for example, Axelrod’s
phrase: “We did not want to stoop” (before Plekhanov) “to the role of
toadying flunkeys” (p. 19). You are behaving exactly like thetype of
peoplementioned in your concluding words. Your attitude towards
Plekhanov corresponds precisely to the “formula” ofsuchpeople:
“either coats off, or let’s have your hand.”

Forfive years you have been asking for his “hand”, now on thirty-two
double-sized pages you are “smacking his face”, and on the thirty-second
page you “express readiness”, you are prepared to recognise him as a
Menshevik once more and kiss his hand.

Asregards ourselves, we are entitled to say that at the time of his
“fluttering”, Plekhanov was never a Bolshevik. We do not and never will
consider him a Bolshevik. But we do consider him apro-PartyMenshevik, as we do any Menshevik capable of rebelling against the group of
independent-legalists and carrying on the struggle against them to the
end. We regard it as the absolute duty of all Bolsheviks in these difficult
times, when the task of the day is the struggle for Marxism in theory and
for the Party in the practical work of the labour movement, to exert every
effort to arrive at a rapprochement with such Social-Democrats.

{1}See pp. 189–90 of this volume.—Ed.

[2]Of the four Menshevik members of the Central Committee who were present
at the plenum, two directed all their efforts to winning over the
Golosists, in effect to Plekhanov’s position—by making the maximum
concessions to them. This does not mean that these two were firm pro-Party
men, that they were proof against a return to theGoloscamp. It
merely means that Menshevism was caught at the moment when it could not as
yetrenouncethe Party principle.  —Lenin

{3}See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 179-83.—Ed.

{4}See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 94-113.—Ed.

{5}This refers to F. Engels’s article “Der 4. Mai in London”
(Arbeiter-Zeitung, Wien, Nr. 21, vom 23.5.1890); see also the
letters of Engels to Sorge of November 29, 1886, and May 11, 1889 (Marx and
Engels,Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 469–73).