V. I. Lenin

All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!

Written:No later than 3 July, 1919First Published:Published in theBulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)No. 4, July 9, 1919; Published according to theBulletin, verified with a typewritten copy bearing Lenin’s correctionsSource:Lenin’sCollected Works, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 Volume 29, pages 436-455Translated:George HannaTranscription/HTML Markup:David Walters & Robert CymbalaCopyleft:V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marx.org) 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of theGNU Free Documentation License

This is one of the most critical, probably even the most
      critical moment for the socialist revolution. Those who defend
      the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, in Russia and
      abroad (primarily in Britain and France) are making a desperate
      effort to restore the power of those who seize the results of
      the people’s labour, the landowners and exploiters of
      Russia, in order to bolster up their power, which is waning all
      over the world. The British and French capitalists have failed
      in their plan to conquer the Ukraine using their own troops;
      they have failed in their support of Kolchak in Siberia; the Red
      Army, heroically advancing in the Urals with the help of the
      Urals workers who are rising to a man, is nearing Siberia to
      liberate it from the incredible tyranny and brutality of the
      capitalists who rule there. Lastly, the British and French
      imperialists have failed in their plan to seize Petrograd by
      means of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy with the
      participation of Russian monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and
      Socialist-Revolutionaries (not excluding even Left
      Socialist-Revolutionaries).

The foreign capitalists are now making a desperate effort to
    restore the yoke of capital by means of an onslaught by Denikin,
    whom they have supplied with officers, shells, tanks, etc., etc.,
    as they once did Kolchak.

All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of
    the Soviet Republic, must be harnessed to repulse Denikin’s
    onslaught and to defeat him, without checking the Red Army’s
    victorious advance into the Urals and Siberia.  That is the

Main Task Of The Moment

All Communists first and foremost, all sympathisers with them,
      all honest workers and peasants, all Soviet officials mustpull themselves together like soldiersand concentrateto the maximum their work, their efforts and their
      concerndirectly on the tasks of the war, on the speedy
      repulse of Denikin’s attack, curtailing and rearranging
      all their other activities to allow for this task.

The Soviet Republic is besieged by the enemy. It must becomea single military camp, not in word but in deed.

All the work of all institutions most be adapted to the war and
    placed on a military footing!

Collegiate methods are essential for the conduct of the affairs
    of the workers’ and peasants’ state. But any expansion
    of these methods, any distortion of them resulting in red tape and
    irresponsibility, any conversion of collegiate bodies into
    talk-shops is a supreme evil, an evil which must be halted at all
    costs as quickly as possible and by whatever the means.

Collegiate methods must not exceed an absolutely indispensable
    minimum in respect both to the number of members in the committees
    and to the efficient conduct of work; “speechifying”
    must be prohibited, opinions must be exchanged as rapidly as
    possible and confined to information and precisely formulated
    practical proposals.

Whenever there is the slightest possibility, such methods must
    be reduced to the briefest discussion of only the most important
    questions in the narrowest collegiate bodies, while thepractical managementof institutions, enterprises,
    undertakings or tasks should be entrustedto one comrade,
    known for his firmness, resolution, boldness and ability to
    conduct practical affairs and who enjoys the greatest
    confidence. At any rate, and under all circumstances without
    exception, collegiate management must be accompanied by the
    priciest definition of the personal responsibility ofeveryindividual for apreciselydefined job. To
    refer to collegiate methods as an excuse for irresponsibility is a
    most dangerous evil, threatening all who have not had very
    extensive experience in efficient collective work; in the army  it
    all too often leads to inevitable disaster, chaos, panic, division
    of authority and defeat.

A no less dangerous evil is organisational fuss or
    organisational fantasies. The reorganisation of work necessitated
    by the war must under no circumstances lead to the reorganisation
    of institutions, still less to the hasty formation of new
    institutions. That is absolutely impermissible and would only lead
    to chaos. The reorganisation of work should consist in suspending
    for a time institutions which are not absolutely essential, or in
    reducing their size to a certain extent. But all war work must be
    conductedentirely and exclusively through already
    existingmilitary institutions, by improving, strengthening,
    expanding and supporting them. The creation of special
    “defence committees” or “revcoms”
    (revolutionary or revolutionary military committees) is
    permissible, first, only by way of exception, secondly, only with
    the approval of the military authority concerned or the superior
    Soviet authority, and, thirdly, only provided this last condition
    is complied with.

The Truth About Kolchak And DenikinMust Be Explained To The People

Kolchak and Denikin are the chief, and the only serious,
    enemies of the Soviet Republic. If it were not for the help they
    are getting from the Entente (Britain, France, America) they would
    have collapsed long ago. It is only the help of the Entente which
    makes them strong. Nevertheless, they are still forced to deceive
    the people, to pretend from time to time that they support
    “democracy”, a “constituent assembly”,
    “government by the people”, etc. The Mensheviks and
    Socialist-Revolutionaries are only too willing to be duped.

The truth about Kolchak (and his double, Denikin) has now been
    revealed in full. The shooting oftens of thousandsof
    workers. The shooting even of Mensheviks and
    Socialist-Revolutionaries. The flogging of peasants of entire
    districts. The public flogging of women. The absolutely unbridled
    power of the officers, the sons of landowners. Endless
    looting. Such is the truth about Kolchak and Denikin. Increasing
    numbers of people even among the Mensheviks and
    Socialist-Revolutionaries, who themselves betrayed the workers and
    sided with Kolchak and Denikin, are forced to admit this
    truth.

All our agitation and propaganda must serve to inform the
    people of the truth. It must be explained that the alternative is
    either Kolchak and Denikin or Soviet power, the power
    (dictatorship) of the workers. There is no middle course; there
    can be no middle course. Particular use must be made of the
    testimony of non-Bolshevik eyewitnesses, of Mensheviks,
    Socialist-Revolutionaries, and non-party people whohave
    beenin the areas overrun by Kolchak or Denikin. Let every
    worker and peasant know what the issue of the struggle is, what
    awaits him in the event of a victory for Kolchak or Denikin.

Work Among Men Called Up For Service

One of our chief concerns must now be work among those liable to
      mobilisation, in aid of mobilisation, and among those already
      mobilised. Wherever mobilised men are concentrated, or where
      there are garrisons, and especially training depots, etc., every
      single Communist and sympathiser must be brought into
      action. They must all without exception unite and work, some
      daily, others, say, four or eight hours per week, in aid of
      mobilisation and among mobilised men, among the soldiers of the
      local garrison; it must be done in a properly organised manner,
      of course, each person being assigned appropriate work by the
      local Party organisation and the military authorities.

Non-party people or members of parties other than the Communist
    Party are naturally not in a position to carry on ideological work
    against Denikin or Kolchak. But to release them for that reason
    from all work would be impermissible. Every means must be sought
    that would compel the whole population (and thewealthier
    sections, both in town and country, in the first place) to
    contribute their share, in one form or another, to help
    mobilisation or the mobilised.

Measures to further the quickest and most effective training of
    the mobilised should form a special category of aid. The Soviet
    government is calling up all ex-officers,  non-commissioned
    officers, etc. The Communist Party, as well as all sympathisers
    and all workers, must assist the workers’ and
    peasants’ state, first, by helping to round up all
    ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., who do not report
    for service, and, secondly, by organising, under the control of
    the Party organisation or attached to it, groups of those who have
    had theoretical or practical (e.g., in the imperialist war)
    military training and who are capable of doing their share.

Work Among Deserters

An obvious change for the better has latterly taken place in the
      fight against desertion. In a number ofgubernias
      deserters have begun to return to the army en masse; it is no
      exaggeration to say that deserters are flocking to the Red
      Army. The reasons are, first, that Party comrades are working
      more efficiently and systematically, and, secondly, the
      peasants’ growing realisation that Kolchak and Denikin
      mean the restoration of a regime which is worse than the
      tsarist, the restoration ofslaveryfor the workers and
      peasants, and of floggings, robbery and insults on the part of
      the officers and scions of the nobility.

We must therefore everywhere lay special stress on the work
    among deserters to bring them back into the army, and mustspare no effortin this work. That is one of the primary
    and urgent tasks of the day.

Incidentally, the fact that deserters can be influenced by
    persuasion and that the persuasion can beeffectiveshows
    that the workers’ state has aspecialattitude
    towards the peasants, and in this it differs from the landowner or
    capitalist state The rule of the bludgeon or the rule of
    hunger—that is what constitutes the sole source of
    discipline of the latter two forms of state. Adifferentsource of discipline is possible in the case of the workers’
    state, or the dictatorship of the proletariat—that of
    persuasion of the peasants by the workers, a comradely alliance
    between them. When you hear the accounts of eyewitnesses that in
    such-and-such agubernia(Ryazan, for instance) thousands
    upon thousands of deserters are returning voluntarily, that the
    appeal at meetings to “comrades deserters” sometimes
    has a success  which beggars all description, you begin to realise
    how much untappedstrengththere is in this comradely
    alliance between workers and peasants. The peasant has hisprejudice, which makes him inclined to support the
    capitalist, the Socialist-Revolutionary, and “freedom to
    trade”, but he also has hissound judgement, which
    is impelling him more and more towards an alliance with the
    workers.

Direct Aid To The Army

What our army needs most issupplies—clothing,
      foot wear, arms, shells. With the country impoverished as it is,
      an immense effort has to be made to satisfy the army’s
      needs, and it is only the assistance which the capitalist
      robbers of Britain, France and America are so lavishly rendering
      Kolchak and Denikin that saves them from inevitable disaster due
      to shortage of supplies.

But impoverished though Russia is, she still has endless
    resources which we have not yet utilised, and often have shownno abilityto utilise. There are still many undisclosed
    or uninspected military stores, plenty of production
    potentialities which are being overlooked, partly owing to the
    deliberate sabotage of officials, partly owing to red tape,
    bureaucracy, inefficiency and incompetence—all those
    “sins of the past” which so inevitably and so
    drastically weigh upon every revolution which makes a
    “leap” into a new social order.

Direct aid to the army in this respect is particularly
    important. The institutions in charge of it are particularly in
    need of “fresh blood”, of outside assistance, of the
    voluntary, vigorous and heroicinitiativeof the workers
    and peasantsin the localities.

We must appeal as widely as possible to the initiative of all
    class-conscious workers and peasants, and of all Soviet officials;
    we must test in different localities and in different fields of
    workdifferentforms of assistance to the army in this
    respect. “Work in a revolutionary way” is far less in
    evidence here than in other spheres, yet “work in a
    revolutionary way” is needed herefar more.

The collection of arms from the population is an integral part
    of this work. It is natural that plenty of arms should  have been
    hidden by the peasants and the bourgeoisie in a country which has
    been through four years of imperialist war followed by two
    people’s revolutions—it was inevitable that this
    should happen. But we must combat itwith all our mightnow, in face of Denikin’s menacing onslaught whoever
    conceals or helps to conceal arms is guilty of a grave crime
    against the workers and peasants and deserves to be shot, for he
    is responsible for the death of thousands upon thousands of the
    finest Red Army men, who not infrequently perish only because of a
    shortage of arms at the fronts.

The Petrograd comrades succeeded in unearthing thousands and
    thousands of rifles when they conducted mass searches in a
    strictly organised way. The rest of Russia must not lag behind
    Petrograd and must at all costs over take and outstrip it.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the largest numbers
    of rifles are hidden by the peasants, and often without the least
    evil intention, but solely from an ingrained distrust of any
    “state”, etc. If we have been able to do much, very
    much (in the bestgubernias) by means ofpersuasion, skilful agitation and a proper approach to
    get deserters to return to the Red Army voluntarily, there can be
    no doubt that just as much, if not more, can be done, and should
    be done, to secure a voluntary return of arms.

Workers and peasants, look for concealed rifles and turn them
    over to the army! By doing so you will save yourselves from being
    massacred, shot, flogged wholesale and robbed by Kolchak and
    Denikin!

Curtailment Of Work Not For The War

To carry out even a part of the work briefly outlined above we
      shall need more and more workers, drawn, moreover, from the
      ranks of the most reliable, devoted and energetic
      Communists. But where are they to come from, bearing in mind the
      universal complaints about the dearth of such workers and the
      over-fatigue they are suffering from?

There can be no doubt that these complaints are largely
    justified. If anyone were to gauge exactly how thin is that
    stratum of advanced workers and Communists who with the support
    and sympathy of the worker and peasant masses  have administered
    Russia in these last twenty months, it would seem truly
    incredible. Yet we administered with signal success, building
    socialism, overcoming unparalleled difficulties, and vanquishing
    enemies, directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie,
    that raised their heads everywhere. We have already vanquished all
    enemies except one—the Entente, the all-powerful imperialist
    bourgeoisie of Britain, France and America. And we have broken one
    of the arms of this enemy too—Kolchak. We are only
    threatened by his other arm—Denikin.

Fresh labour-power for the administration of the state and to
    carry out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are
    rapidly emerging in the shape of the worker and peasant youth who
    are most earnestly, zealously and fervidly learning, digesting the
    new impressions of the new order, throwing off the husk of old,
    capitalist and bourgeois democratic prejudices, and moulding
    themselves into even firmer Communists than the older
    generation.

But however rapidly this new stratum may be emerging, however
    rapidly it may be learning and maturing in the fire of the Civil
    War and the frantic resistance of the bourgeoisie, all the same it
    cannot, in the next few months, supply us with atrainedstaff for the administration of the state. Yet it is precisely the
    next few months, the summer and autumn of 1919, that count, for it
    is essentialto decidethe struggle against Denikin, and
    it must be doneimmediately.

In order to obtain a large number of well-trained workers to
    strengthen the war effort we mustreduce in sizea whole
    number of branches and institutions, not doing war work, or,
    rather, those not directly connected with the war, but doing
    Soviet work; we mustreorganiseon these lines (i.e., on
    the lines of reduction) all institutions and enterprises which arenot absolutely indispensable.

Take, as a case in point, the Scientific and Technological
    Department of the Supreme Economic Council. This is a highly
    valuable institution, one indispensable for the building of
    full-scale socialism and to account for and distribute all our
    scientific and technological forces properly. But is such an
    institution absolutely indispensable? Of course not. To assign to
    it people who could and should be immediately employed in urgent
    and absolutely indispensable communist workin the armyordirectlyfor the army would, at the present juncture,
    be a downright crime.

There are quite a number of such institutions and departments
    of institutions in the centre and in the localities. In our
    efforts to achieve socialism in full we had to begin to set up
    such institutions immediately. But we would be fools or criminals,
    if, in the face of Denikin’s formidable attack, we were
    unable toreform our ranksin such a way as tosuspendorreduce everythingthat is not
    absolutely indispensable.

We must not give way to panic or succumb to the organisational
    urge and must not reorganise any institutions nor close them down
    altogether nor—which is particularly harmful when being done
    in haste—must we begin to build new institutions. What we
    must do is tosuspendfor three, four or five monthsallinstitutions or departments of institutions, both in
    the centre and in the localities, which are not absolutely
    indispensable, or, if it is not possible to suspend them
    altogether,reducethem for the same (approximately)
    period, reduce them to the greatest possible extent, in other
    words, reduce the work to an absolutely indispensable
    minimum.

Inasmuch as our main purpose is to secure at once a large
    number of well-trained, experienced, devoted and tested Communists
    or socialist sympathisers for military work, we can incur the risk
    of temporarily leaving many of the heavily curtailed institutions
    (or departments of institutions)without a single
    Communist, of placing them exclusively in the hands of
    bourgeois executives. That is not a big risk, for it is only
    institutions which are not absolutely indispensable that are
    involved, and while there will certainly be a loss from the
    weakening of their (semi-suspended) activities, it will not be a
    great loss, and one which at any rate will not be fatal to
    us. Whereas insufficient energy in strengthening war work, and
    strengthening it immediately and considerably, may prove fatal to
    us. This must be clearly understood and all the necessary
    conclusions drawn from it.

If every manager of a government department or of a division of
    a government department in everygubernia, uyezd,  etc.,
    if every Communist nucleus, without losing a moment, asks, is
    such-and-such an institution, such-and-such a department
    absolutely indispensable, shall we perish if we suspend it or
    reduce its activities by nine-tenths and leave no Communists in it
    at all?—if the posing of this question is followed by speedy
    and resolute reduction of work and withdrawal of Communists
    (together with their absolutely reliable assistants among the
    sympathisers or non-party people), in a very short time we shall
    have hundreds upon hundreds of persons for work in the political
    departments of the army, as commissars, etc. And then we shall
    have a very good chance of defeating Denikin, just as we have
    defeated the much stronger Kolchak.

Work In The Front Zone

The front zone in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
      Republic has greatly increased in the past few weeks and has
      undergone an extremely rapid change. This is a harbinger or
      concomitant of the decisive moment of the war, of its
      approaching concluding phase.

On the one hand, a vast front zone west of the Urals and in the
    Ural Mountains proper has become our front zone owing to the
    victories of the Red Army, the disintegration of Kolchak, and the
    growth of revolution in Kolchakia. On the other hand,an even
    largerzone near Petrograd and in the South has become a
    front zone owing to our losses, owing to the immense advance made
    by the enemy towards Petrograd and the advance from the South into
    the Ukraine and towards the centre of Russia.

Work in the front zone is assuming cardinal importance.

In the Cis-Urals area, where the Red Army, is rapidly
    advancing, there is a natural desire among army
    workers—commissars, members of political departments,
    etc.—as well as among local workers and peasants, to settle
    down in the newly won localities for constructive Soviet work, a
    desire which is the more natural, the greater the war fatigue and
    the more distressful the picture of the destruction wrought by
    Kolchak. But nothing could be more dangerous than to yield to this
    desire. It would threaten to weaken our offensive, to retard it,
    and to increase Kolchak’s chances of  recovering his
    strength. It would be a downright crime against the revolution on
    our part.

Under no circumstances must a single extra worker be taken from
    the Eastern Army for local work![Unless there
    is urgent need none at all should be taken, but people should be
    transferred from the centralgubernias! ]Under no
    circumstances can the offensive be weakened! The only chance we
    have of complete victory is for the entire population of the Urals
    area, who have experienced the horrors of Kolchak
    “democracy”, to take part in it to a man, and to
    continue the offensive into Siberia until thecomplete
    victoryof the revolution in Siberia.

Let organisational work in the Cis-Urals and the Urals area be
    delayed, let it proceed less intensively, being done by local,
    young, inexperienced and weak forces alone. We shall not perish
    from that. But if weweakenthe offensive against the
    Urals and Siberiawe shall perish.We muststrengthenthat offensive with the forces of the
    insurgent workers in the Urals, with the forces of the Cis-Urals
    peasants, who have now learned to their cost the meaning of the
    “constituent” promises of the Menshevik Maisky and the
    Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov, and the real meaning of these
    promises,i.e.,Kolchak.

To weaken the offensive against the Urals and Siberia would be
    to betray the revolution, to betray the cause of the emancipation
    of the workers and peasants from the Kolchak yoke.

It should be remembered in connection with the work in the
    front zone which has only just been liberated that the main task
    there is to make not only the workers, but the peasants as well,
    put their faith in Soviet power, to explain to them in practice
    that Soviet power means the power of the workers and peasants, and
    at once to take the right course, the course adopted by the Party
    from the experience of twenty months of work. We must not repeat
    in the Urals the mistakes which were sometimes made in Great
    Russia and which we are rapidly learning to avoid.

In the front zone outside Petrograd and in that vast front zone
    which has been growing so rapidly and menacingly in the Ukraine
    and in the South, absolutely everything  must be put on a war
    footing, and all work, all efforts, all thoughts subordinated to
    the war and only the war. Otherwise it will be impossible to
    repulse Denikin’s attack. That is clear. And this must be
    clearly understood and fully put into practice.

Incidentally. A feature of Denikin’s army is the large
    number of officers and Cossacks in it. This is an element which,
    having no mass force behind it, is extremely likely to engage in
    swift raids, in gambles, in desperate ventures, with the object of
    sowing panic and causing destruction for destruction’s
    sake.

In fighting such a foe military discipline and military
    vigilance of the highest degree are necessary. To be caught
    napping or to lose one’s head means losing everything. Every
    responsible Party and Soviet worker must bear this in mind.

Military discipline in military and all other matters!

Military vigilance and strictness, and firmness in the adoption
    of all measures of precaution!

Attitude Towards Military Experts

The vast conspiracy hatched at Krasnaya Gorka and whose purpose
    was the surrender of Petrograd has again brought forward and with
    particular emphasis the question of the military experts and of
    combating counter-revolution in the rear. There can be no doubt
    that the aggravation of the food and war situation is inevitably
    stimulating, and will continue to stimulate in the immediate
    future, still greater efforts by the counter-revolutionaries (in
    the Petrograd plot there participated the League of Regeneration,
    Cadets, Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries; the Left
    Socialist-Revolutionaries also participated, as a separate group,
    it is true, but they did participate nevertheless). Nor can there
    be any doubt that the military experts, like the kulaks, the
    bourgeois intellectuals, the Mensheviks and the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries, will in the near future give a bigger
    proportion of traitors.

But it would be an irreparable mistake and unpardonable
    weakness of character to raise on this account the question  of
    changing the fundamental principles of our army policy. Hundreds
    and hundreds of military experts are betraying us and will betray
    us; we will catch them and shoot them, but thousands and tens of
    thousands of military experts have been working for us
    systematically and for a long time, and without them we could not
    have formed the Red Army, which has grown out of the guerrilla
    force of evil memory, and has been able to score brilliant
    victories in the East. Experienced people who head our War
    Department rightly point out that where the Party policy in regard
    to the military experts and the extirpation of the guerrilla
    spirit has been adhered to most strictly, where discipline is
    firmest, where political work among the troops and the work of the
    commissars is conducted most thoroughly, there, generally
    speaking, the number of military experts inclined to betray us is
    the lowest, there the opportunities for those who are so inclined
    to carry out their designs are the slightest, there we have no
    laxity in the army, there its organisation and morale are best,
    and there we have the most victories. The guerrilla spirit, its
    vestiges, remnants and survivals have been the cause of
    immeasurably greater misfortune, disintegration, defeats,
    disasters and losses in men and military equipment in our army and
    in the Ukrainian army than all the betrayals of the military
    experts.

Our Party Programme, both on the general subject of bourgeois
    experts, and on the particular problem of one of their varieties,
    the military experts, has defined the policy of the Communist
    Party with absolute precision. Our Party is waging and will
    continue to wage “a relentless struggle against the
    pseudo-radical but actually ignorant and conceited opinion that
    the working people are capable of overcoming capitalism and the
    bourgeois social system without learning from bourgeois
    specialists, without making use of their services and without
    undergoing thetraining of a lengthy periodof work side
    by side with them”.

At the same time, of course, the Party does not make the
    “slightest political concession to this bourgeois section of
    the population”, the Party suppresses and will continue
    “ruthlessly to suppress any counter-revolutionary attempts
    on its part”. Naturally, whenever such an
    “attempt” is made or becomes more or less probable,
    its “ruthless  suppression” requires other qualities
    than the deliberateness, the cautiousness of an apprentice, which
    are demanded for lengthy training, and which the latter
    inculcates. The contradiction between the attitude of people
    engaged in the “lengthy period of work side by side”
    with the military experts, and the attitude of people absorbed in
    the direct task of “ruthlessly suppressing a
    counter-revolutionary attempt” of military experts might
    easily lead, and does lead, to friction and conflict. The same
    applies to the necessary changes of personnel, the shifting around
    sometimes of large numbers of military experts which is
    necessitated by instances of counter-revolutionary
    “attempts”, and all the more by large-scale
    conspiracies.

We settle, and will continue to settle, such friction and
    conflicts in the Party way, demanding the same of all the Party
    organisations and insisting that not the slightest damage to
    practical work, not the slightest delay in the adoption of
    essential measures, not a shadow of hesitation in the observance
    of the established principles of our military policy be
    tolerated.

If some of our Party bodies adopt an incorrect tone towards the
    military experts (as was recently the case in Petrograd), or if in
    some cases “criticism” of military experts turns into
    direct hindrance to the systematic and persistent work of
    employing them, the Party immediately rectifies, and will rectify,
    such mistakes.

The chief and principal means of rectifying them is to
    intensify political work in the army and among the mobilised, to
    improve the work of the commissars in the army, to have more
    highly qualified commissars, to raise their level, to have them
    carry outin practicethat which the Party Programme
    demands and which only too often is carried out far too
    inadequately, i.e., “the concentration ofall-roundcontrol over the commanders (of the army) in the hands of the
    working class”. Criticism of the military experts by
    outsiders, attempts to correct matters by “lightning
    raids” are too easy, and therefore hopeless and harmful. All
    those who recognise their political responsibility, who take the
    defects of our army to heart, let them join its ranks, either as
    privates or commanders, as political workers or commissars; let
    each work—every Party member will find a place  suited to
    his abilities—inside the army organisation for its
    improvement.

The Soviet government has long been paying the greatest
    attention to making it possible for workers, and also peasants,
    Communists in particular, to master the art of war in all
    seriousness. This is being done at a number of establishments,
    institutions and courses, but still far too little is being
    done. There is still a lot of room here for personal initiative
    and personal energy. Communists, in particular, should
    persistently study the handling of machine guns, artillery,
    armoured vehicles, etc., for here our backwardness is more
    telling, here the enemy’s superiority,  with his larger
    number of officers, is greater, here it is possible for an
    unreliable military expert to do grave harm, here the role of the
    Communist is important in the extreme.

The Fight Against Counter-Revolution In The Rear

Counter-revolution is raising its head in our rear and in our
      midst just as it did in July of last year.

Counter-revolution has been defeated, but by no means
    destroyed, and is naturally taking advantage of Denikin’s
    victories and of the aggravation of the food shortage. And, as
    always, in the wake of direct and open counter-revolution, in the
    wake of the Black Hundreds and the Cadets, whose strength lies in
    their capital, their direct connections with Entente imperialism,
    and their understanding of the inevitability of dictatorship and
    their ability to exercise it (on Kolchak lines)—in their
    wake follow the wavering, spineless Mensheviks, Right
    Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who
    embellish their deeds with words.

There should be no illusions on this score! What is the
    “nutritive medium” which engenders
    counter-revolutionary activities, outbreaks, conspiracies and so
    forth we know full well. The medium is the bourgeoisie, the
    bourgeois intelligentsia, the kulaks in the countryside, and,
    everywhere, the “non-party” public, as well as the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. We must redouble, we
    must increase tenfold our watch over this medium. We  must
    multiply tenfold our vigilance, because counter-revolutionary
    attempts from this quarter are absolutely inevitable, precisely at
    the present moment and in the near future. For this reason, too,
    repeated attempts to blow up bridges, to foment strikes, to engage
    in every kind of espionage and the like, are natural. All
    precautions of the most intense, systematic, repeated, wholesale
    and unexpected kind are essential in all centres without exception
    where the “nutritive medium” of the
    counter-revolutionaries has the least chance of existing.

In regard to the Mensheviks and the Right and Left
    Socialist-Revolutionaries, we must draw a lesson from our most
    recent experience. Among their “periphery”, among the
    public which gravitates towards them, there is an undoubted
    shifting away from Kolchak and Denikin towards Soviet power. We
    have taken cognisance of this shift, and every time it has assumed
    any real shape we, on our part, have taken a step to meet it. This
    policy of ours we shall not change under any circumstances, and
    generally speaking, there will no doubt be an increase in the
    number of “migrants” from the type of Menshevism and
    Socialist-Revolutionarism which leans towards Kolchak and Denikin
    to the type of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism which
    leans towards Soviet power.

But at the present juncture the petty-bourgeois democrats,
    headed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks,
    spineless and wavering as always, are watching to  see which way
    the wind blows, and are swinging in the direction of the victor,
    Denikin. This is especially true of the “political
    leaders” of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the
    Mensheviks (of the type of Martov and Co.), of the Right
    Socialist-Revolutionaries (of the type of Chernov and Co.), and of
    their “literary groups” in general, whose members,
    apart from all else, are deeply offended at their political
    bankruptcy, and for whom hazardous ventures against Soviet power,
    therefore, have an attraction that is hardly likely to be
    eradicated.

We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the words and
    ideology of their leaders, by their personal integrity or
    hypocrisy. This is important from the standpoint of their
    individual biographies. But it is not important from  the
    standpoint of politics, i.e., of the relations between classes, of
    the relations between millions of people. Martov and Co.,
    “in the name of the Central Committee”, solemnly
    condemn their “activists” and threaten (eternally
    threaten!) to expel them from the party. But this by no means does
    away with the fact that the “activists” are the
    strongest of all among the Mensheviks, hide behind them, and carry
    on their work on behalf of Kolchak and Denikin. Volsky and
    Co. condemn Avksentyev, Chernov and Co., but this does not in the
    least prevent the latter from being stronger than Volsky, nor does
    it prevent Chernov from saying, “If it is not we who are to
    overthrow the Bolsheviks, and not now, then who is, and
    when?” The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries may “work
    independently” without any agreement with the reactionaries,
    with the Chernovs, but actually they are just as much allies of
    Denikin and pawns inhisgame as the late Left
    Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov, the ex-commander-in-chief, who
    for “ideological” reasons opened the front to the
    Czechoslovaks and to Kolchak.

Martov, Volsky and Co. fancy themselves “superior”
    to both contending sides; they fancy themselves capable of
    creating a “third side”.

This desire, even when it is sincere, still remains the
    illusion of the petty-bourgeois democrat, who to this day, seventy
    years after 1848, has still not learned the most elementary thing,
    namely, that in a capitalist environment only the dictatorship of
    the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat is
    possible, and that no third course can exist. Martov and Co. will
    evidently die with this illusion. That is their affair. And it is
    our affair to remember that in practice vacillations on the part
    of these people are inevitable, today in the direction of Denikin,
    tomorrow in the direction of the Bolsheviks. And today we must do
    the task of this day.

Our task is to put the question bluntly. What is better? To
    ferret out, to imprison, sometimes even to shoot hundreds of
    traitors from among the Cadets, non-party people, Mensheviks and
    Socialist-Revolutionaries, who “come out” (some with
    arms in hand, others with conspiracies, others still with
    agitation against mobilisation, like the Menshevik printers and
    railwaymen, etc.)againstSoviet power,in other
    words,in favour of Denikin? Or to allow matters to
    reach such a pass that Kolchak and Denikin are able to slaughter,
    shoot and flog to death tens of thousands of workers and peasants?
    The choice is not difficult to make.

That is how the question stands, and not otherwise.

Whoever has not yet understood this, whoever is capable of
    whining over the “iniquity” of such a decision, must
    be given up as hopeless and held up to public ridicule and
    shame.

The Population Must Be Mobilised 
      For War To A Man

The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world
    capital. We can concede the right to use it as a refuge from
    Kolchak, and the right to live in it generally, only to those who
    take an active part in the war and help us in every way. Hence our
    right and our duty to mobilise the whole population for the war to
    a man, some for army work in the direct meaning of the term,
    others for subsidiary activities of every kind in aid of the
    war.

To carry this out in full, an ideal organisation is
    required. And since our government organisation is very far from
    perfect (which is not in the least surprising in view of its
    youth, its novelty and the extraordinary difficulties which
    accompany its development), to attempt at once and on a wide scale
    anything complete or even very considerable in this sphere would
    be a most dangerous indulgence in fantastic organisational
    schemes.

But much can be done in a partial way to bring us nearer to
    this ideal, and the “initiative” shown by our Party
    workers and Soviet officials in this respect is very, very far
    from enough.

It will suffice here to raise this question and to draw the
    attention of comrades to it. There is no need to give any specific
    instructions or proposals.

Let us only observe that the petty-bourgeois democrats who
    stand nearest to the Soviets and who call themselves, by force of
    habit, socialists—some of the “Left” Mensheviks
    and the like, for example—are particularly disposed to wax
    indignant at the”barbaric”, in their opinion, practice
    of taking hostages.

Let them wax indignant, but unless this is done war can not be
    waged, and when the danger grows acute the use of this means must
    be extended and multiplied in every sense. Not infrequently, for
    instance, Menshevik or yellow printers, higher railway employees
    or secret profiteers, kulaks, the wealthy sections of the urban
    (and rural) population and similar elements look upon defence
    against Kolchak and Denikin with an infinitely criminal and
    infinitely brazen attitude of indifference which grows into
    sabotage. Lists of such groups must be drawn up (or they must be
    compelled themselves to form groups in which each answers for
    everybody), and they must not only be put to work digging
    trenches, as is sometimes practised, but assigned to the most
    diverse and comprehensive duties for material aid to the Red
    Army.

The fields of the Red Army men will be better cultivated, the
    supply of food, tobacco and other necessities to the Red Army men
    will be better arranged, the danger to the lives of thousands upon
    thousands of workers and peasants resulting from a single
    conspiracy, etc., will be considerably reduced if we employ this
    method more widely, more comprehensively and more skilfully.

“Work In A Revolutionary Way”

Summing up what was said above, we arrive at a simple
      conclusion. What is demanded immediately and in the course of
      the next few months of all Communists, of all class-conscious
      workers and peasants, of everyone who does not want to see
      Kolchak and Denikin win, is an extraordinary accession of
      energy; what is needed is “work in a revolutionary
      way”.

The starving, exhausted and worn-out Moscow railwaymen, both
      skilled and unskilled, have for the sake of victory over Kolchak
      inaugurated “communist subbotniks”—work
      without pay for several hours a week to continue until victory
      over Kolchak is complete—and have, moreover, developed
      unprecedented labour productivity, exceeding the  usual
      productivity many times over; this goes to show that much, very
      much can still be done.

And we must do it.

Then we shall win.

Central Committee 
      of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)