Old and New (December 10, 1911)

Published:Zvezda, No. 33, December10, 1911.

      Signed:V. Ilyin.

      Published according to theZvezdatext.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      Progress Publishers,[1974],

      Moscow,Volume 17,

      pages388-392.Translated:Dora CoxTranscription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2004).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

Nik.Nikolin’s article inZvezda, No. 29,
characteristically entitled “The New in the Old”, raises a number of
extremely interesting and important questions. A discussion on these
questions is undoubtedly desirable in order to lay down an exact, clear,
and definite line of conduct for adherents to the Russian working-class
democratic movement.

Thechief shortcoming of Nik. Nikolin’s article is that many of his
propositions are extremely vague. The author says, without explaining why,
that “on many points” he would “perhaps disagree” with me. I, for my
part, must say that none of Nikolin’s propositions call for disagreement,
since he never makes outspoken statements.

Thus,for instance, Nikolin comes out dead against people who believe
that “our present situation ... is approximately what it was at the
beginning of the twentieth century”. According to his interpretation,
people holding such an opinion deny that there is somethingnewin
the old. Of course, they are wrong if they deny that. And, of course,
Nikolin is a thousand times right when he says that there is something new
in the old which it is necessary to take into consideration and make use
of. But Nikolin says no thing as to what the new consists of, as to how
exactly it is to be taken into consideration, etc. On the other hand, it is
not clear from the passages he quotes what exactly his opponents mean by
the word “approximately”. If the new in the old is to be taken into
consideration in the same way as the Russian Marxists did exactly three
years ago in their appraisal of the political situation created after the
three years of storm and stress (i.e., after 1905–07), then, in my
opinion, it would not be wrong to say: “our present situation isapproximatelywhat it was at the beginningof the twentieth century”. If, however, people put forward a proposition
of this kind without, at first, giving a precise, clear, and definite
appraisal of the situation and the problems involved, then, of course, it
is wrong.

Theold problems, the old methods of solving them, and new ways of
preparing for the solution—that, it seems to me, is how, approximately,
the answer given three years ago could be formulated. From the standpoint
of this answer, participation in the Third Duma, which Nik. Nikolin
advocates so warmly and so correctly, appears to beabsolutelyindispensable. The “trend” which repudiates this participation or which
hesitates to come out, openly, clearly, and without beating about the bush,
in favour of participating in the Third Duma, is taking the name of
working-class democracy in vain. Actually this is a trend outside
working-class democracy, for it represents a “legitimate shade” of
anarchist ideas but by no means of Marxist ideas.

Takethe question of the “superstructure”. “Formerly,” writes
Nik. Nikolin, “it may have seemed that the bureaucracy was the sole and
chief enemy of ‘all Russia’; today nobody thinks so any longer.... We are
sufficiently well aware that the Markovs, Krestovnikovs, Volkonskys,
Purishkeviches, Guchkovs, Khomyakovs, Avdakovs, and their like, are all
representatives of that particular social milieu from which the bureaucracy
draws its strength and obtains the motives for its activity.”

Nik.Nikolin’s emphasis on the connection of the “bureaucracy” with
the upper ranks of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie is quite
correct and extremely valuable. Only people who have never given a thought
to the new brought by the first decade of the twentieth century, who
understand nothing about the interdependence between the economic and the
political relations in Russia and about the significance of the Third Duma
can deny that this connection exists, deny that the present agrarian policy
is bourgeois in character, deny in general that “a step” has been taken
“towards the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy”.

Butit is not enough to concede that the connection exists, itisnecessary to point out what exactly is the actual nature of
this connection. The step taken toward the transformation into something
new by no means eliminates theold, say, “bureaucratic” regime with its vast self-sufficiency and
independence, with its “peculiar nature” which the methods of Tolmachov
and Reinbot (etc., et al.) lend it, and with its uncontrolled
finances. While “drawing strength” from the support of the upper ranks of
the bourgeoisie the bureaucracy isnotrecruited from the
bourgeoisie, but from the old, very old, not only pre-revolutionary (before
‘905), but even pre-Reform (before 1861), landed and office-holding
nobility. While it “obtains the motives for its activity” largely from
the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie the bureaucracy lends its bourgeois
activity atendency and a formthat is purely and solely
feudal. For, if there is a difference between the bourgeois character of
the Prussian Junker and the American farmer (although both of them are
unquestionably bourgeois), there is a no less evident and equally great
difference between the bourgeois character of the Prussian Junker and the
“bourgeois character” of Markov and Purishkevich. Compared with the
latter, the Prussian Junker is quite a “European”!

Theprincipal, cardinal, and fatal mistake which, for instance,
M. Alexandrov commits in his well-known pamphlet is that he forgets about
the vast self-sufficiency and independence of the “bureaucracy”; and
N. R-kov, in No. 9–10 of the liquidationistNasha Zarya, indulges
in this mistake to a point where it is reduced to an absurdity. Only the
above-mentioned answer given three years ago contains an exact definition
of the extent to which the old persists in the so-called “bureaucratic”
regime, and of the changes, or, rather, modifications, that have been
introduced by the “new”.

Iam by no means opposed to the “exploration of other ways and
means”, and I attach vast importance to constant and repeated discussion
of the direct answers to the vexed questions, but I cannot refrain,
however, from voicing my protest against the contraband that the
liquidators, for example, are smuggling in under the flag of
“exploration”. It is obvious that the differences of opinion between the
“exploring” R-kov and the “exploring” Potresovs, Yezhovs, and Chatskys
concern onlydetailsof their liberal labour policy. The stand
taken by all these “explorers” is that of a liberal, not a Marxist,
labour policy! It is one thing to“explore ways” and discuss them from a Marxist standpoint in books,
magazines, etc.; and it is a different thing to come out with definite
answers in publications giving practical guidance.

Takethe question of “romanticism”.NikNikolin condemns romanticism as a hopelessly obsolete feature of the
“old” and cites the following example: “The liberal thought that he was
performing the part of champion of all the oppressed, while the socialist
believed that he was backed by all ‘thinking’ and ‘labouring’ Russia”. The
example refers to the failure to understand the class struggle, and Nikolin
would have been perfectly right, of course, had he said that such a
“socialist”—obviously a Narodnik—was really no socialist at all but ademocratwho cloaked his democracy with pseudo-socialist
phrases. But in speaking of romanticism, one must not overlook theVekhi, i.e., counter-revolutionary, interpretation of that term
which is current in the most widely circulated, namely, the liberal
press. We can not help protesting against such an interpretation. We can
not help noting the “new” feature, namely, that liberalism in Russia has
given rise to the liberal trend of theVekhitype, the policy
which the Milyukovs actually pursue although in words they renounce it for
purely diplomatic reasons.

Hencethe following practical conclusion of major importance: on the
basis of the “new” experience of the first ten years of the twentieth
century, the line of demarcation between liberalism and democracy must be
drawn more sharply. It is, of course, absurd to “lump the liberal
opposition with reaction”, but this conclusion alone (which Nikolin
draws), without the one I have just indicated, is decidedly insufficient.

Ingeneral, it must be said that it is in his conclusion that
Nik. Nikolin commits his chief sin—that of being vague and leaving things
unsaid. Take the first part of his conclusion: “Both the unreasonable
infatuation with the old methods of action and the emphatically negative
attitude to those methods are equally harmful”. In my opinion this is not
a dialectical, but an eclectic, conclusion. The unreasonable is
unreasonable, and therefore it is always and absolutely harmful—that goes
without saying. In order tolend this part of the conclusion a vital, dialectical significance, it
would have to be couched in approximately the fob lowing terms: an attempt
to justify the refusal to take part in the Third or in, the Fourth Duma by
references to the old methods of action would be an extremely grave
mistake, a hollow phrase, a meaningless cry, in spite of the fact,
or—more correctly—because of the fact, that we must have an
emphatically positive attitude to those methods.

Itis just in passing, since it is impossible for me to dwell on this
question in greater detail, that I have thus indicated how, in my opinion,
the second part of the quoted conclusion ought to be corrected.