To demonstrate concretely the philosophical struggle that has flared up in contemporary literature over various conclusions drawn from new physics, we shall give the floor to direct participants in the "battle," beginning with the English. Physicist Arthur W. Ricker defends one direction—from the standpoint of the natural scientist; philosopher James Ward another—from the standpoint of epistemology.

At the congress of English natural scientists in Glasgow in 1901, President of the Physics Section A. W. Ricker chose as the theme of his speech the question of the value of physical theory, concerning those doubts to which the existence of atoms and particularly the ether had been subjected. The speaker cited the physicists Poincaré and Poynting (an English fellow-thinker of the symbolists, or Machists) who had raised this question, the philosopher Ward, the well-known book of E. Haeckel, and attempted to set forth his views[172].

"The disputed question consists in this," said Ricker, "whether those hypotheses which underlie the most widely distributed scientific theories should be regarded as precise descriptions of the structure of the world surrounding us, or only as convenient fictions." (In the terms of our dispute with Bogdanov, Yushkevich and Co.: a copy of objective reality, of moving matter, or only a "methodology," a "pure symbol," "forms of organization of experience"?) Ricker agrees that practically there may be no difference between both theories: the direction of a river can, perhaps, be determined both by one who merely examines the blue stripe on a map or diagram and by one who knows that this stripe depicts an actual river. The theory, from the standpoint of convenient fiction, will be an "aid to memory," an "introduction of order" into our observations, a bringing of them into accord with some artificial system, a "regulation of our knowledge," a summary of it in equations, etc. One can, for example, limit oneself to saying that heat is a form of motion or energy, "thereby replacing the living picture of moving atoms with a pale (colourless) statement about thermal energy, the real nature of which we do not attempt to determine." While fully acknowledging the possibility of major scientific successes on this path, Ricker "dares to assert that such a system of tactics cannot be regarded as the final word of science in the struggle for truth." The question remains in full force: "can we conclude from the phenomena displayed by matter to the structure of matter itself"? "Do we have grounds to suppose that the sketch of theory which science has already given is to some degree a copy, and not merely a diagram of truth"?

Examining the question of the structure of matter, Ricker takes air as an example, speaks of the fact that air consists of gases and that science decomposes "every elementary gas into a mixture of atoms and ether." Here, he continues, we are cried at: "Stop!" Molecules and atoms cannot be seen; they may be suitable as "mere conceptions," "but they cannot be regarded as realities." Ricker eliminates this objection by reference to one of countless cases in the development of science: the rings of Saturn appear in the telescope as a solid mass. Mathematicians proved by calculation that this is impossible, and spectral analysis confirmed the conclusions drawn on the basis of calculation. Another objection: atoms and the ether are ascribed such properties as our senses do not show us in ordinary matter. Ricker eliminates this too, by reference to such examples as the diffusion of gases and liquids, etc. A series of facts, observations, and experiments proves that matter consists of separate particles or grains. The question of whether these particles, atoms, differ from the "original medium," the "basic medium," surrounding them (the ether), or whether they are parts of this medium in a particular state, remains for now open, without affecting the very theory of the existence of atoms. There is no basis for a priori denying, against the indications of experience, the existence of "quasi-material substances" distinct from ordinary matter (atoms and ether). Errors in particulars are here inevitable, but the entire aggregate of scientific data leaves no room for doubt about the existence of atoms and molecules.

Ricker then points to new data concerning the structure of atoms from corpuscles (particles, electrons) charged with negative electricity, and notes the similarity of results of various experiments and calculations concerning the magnitude of molecules: "the first approximation" gives a diameter of about 100 millimicrons (millionths of a millimeter). Passing over Ricker's particular remarks and his critique of neo-vitalism{84}, we present his conclusions:

"Those who belittle the significance of the ideas that have hitherto guided the progress of scientific theory too often assume that there is no choice except between two opposite assertions: either that the atom and ether are mere fictions of scientific imagination, or that the mechanical theory of atoms and ether—it is not now complete, but if it could be completed—gives us a complete and ideally precise representation of realities. In my opinion, there is a middle path." A man in a dark room may distinguish objects extremely unclearly, but if he does not bump into furniture and does not mistake a mirror for a door, then he sees something correctly. We need not therefore either renounce our pretensions to penetrate deeper than the surface of nature, or claim that we have already torn away all the veils of mystery from the world surrounding us. "One can agree that we have not yet formed a perfectly complete picture either of the nature of atoms or of the nature of the ether in which they exist; but I have attempted to show that, despite the tentative character of some of our theories, despite many particular difficulties, the theory of atoms… in its basic principles is correct; that atoms are not merely auxiliary conceptions (helps) for bewildered mathematicians, but physical realities."

Thus Ricker concluded his speech. The reader sees that the speaker did not concern himself with epistemology, but in essence he defended, on behalf of, undoubtedly, a mass of natural scientists, a spontaneously-materialistic standpoint. The gist of his position: the theory of physics is a photograph (ever more accurate) of objective reality. The world is moving matter, which we know ever more deeply. The inaccuracies in Ricker's philosophy flow from the unnecessary defense of the "mechanical" (why not electromagnetic?) theory of the motions of the ether, and from a misunderstanding of the relationship of relative and absolute truth. This physicist lacks only knowledge of dialectical materialism (if we do not count, of course, those very important worldly considerations that cause English professors to call themselves "agnostics").

Let us now see how the spiritualist James Ward criticized this philosophy. "…Naturalism is not science," he wrote, "and the mechanical theory of nature, which serves as its foundation, is also not science… But although naturalism and natural science, mechanical theory of the world and mechanics as a science, are logically different things, at first glance they resemble each other very much and are historically closely connected. There is no danger that one will confuse natural science and philosophy of an idealistic or spiritualistic direction, for such philosophy necessarily includes a critique of the epistemological presuppositions which science makes unconsciously…"[173] True! Natural science unconsciously assumes that its teaching reflects objective reality, and only such a philosophy is compatible with natural science! "…The situation is different with naturalism, which is as innocent concerning the theory of knowledge as science itself. Indeed, naturalism, like materialism, is simply physics treated as metaphysics… Naturalism is certainly less dogmatic than materialism, inasmuch as it makes agnostic reservations concerning the nature of ultimate reality; but it insists decisively on the primacy of the material side of this 'Unknowable'…"

The materialist treats physics as metaphysics. A familiar argument! Metaphysics is called the recognition of objective reality outside man: spiritualists agree with Kantians and Humists in such reproaches toward materialism. And it is understandable: one cannot clear the way for "real concepts" in the spirit of Remke without eliminating objective reality of things, bodies, objects known to all and sundry!..

"…When there arises a question that is essentially philosophical, such as how best to systematize experience as a whole" (plagiarism from Bogdanov, Mr. Ward!), "the naturalist asserts that we must begin with the physical side. Only these facts are precise, definite, and strictly connected; any thought that stirred the human heart… can, we are told, be reduced to a perfectly precise redistribution of matter and motion… That assertions of such philosophical significance and such breadth are legitimate conclusions from physical science (i.e., natural science)—this contemporary physicists do not venture to assert directly. But many of them consider subversive to the authority of science those who strive to uncover the hidden metaphysics, to expose the physical realism on which the mechanical theory of the world rests…" So-and-so looked at my philosophy, and Ricker too. "…In fact, however, my critique" (of this "metaphysics," hateful also to all Machists) "is based entirely on the conclusions of the school of physicists, if one can so call it, a school growing ever in number and expanding its influence, which rejects this almost medieval realism… This realism has gone so long without encountering objections that rebellion against it is equated with the proclamation of scientific anarchy. Yet it would truly be extravagant to suspect men like Kirchhoff and Poincaré—I name only two major names among many—of wanting to 'undermine the authority of science'… To distinguish them from the old school, which we may rightly call physical realists, we can call the new school physical symbolists. The term is not entirely apt, but it, at least, emphasizes one essential difference between both schools, that interests us specially at the present time. The disputed question is very simple. Both schools, of course, proceed from the same sensual (perceptual) experience; both employ abstract systems of concepts, differing in particulars, but identical in essence; both resort to the same methods of testing theories. But one supposes that it is approaching ever more the ultimate reality and is leaving behind ever more appearances. The other supposes that it is substituting generalized descriptive schemes, suitable for intellectual operations, for complex concrete facts… Neither on the one side nor the other is the value of physics as systematic knowledge about (italics Ward's) things touched upon; the possibility of further development of physics and its practical applications is the same in both cases. But the philosophical (speculative) difference between both schools is enormous, and in this respect the question of which of them is right acquires importance…"

The formulation of the question by an open and consistent spiritualist is remarkably correct and clear. Indeed, the difference between both schools in contemporary physics is only philosophical, only epistemological. Indeed, the basic difference consists only in that one recognizes the "ultimate" (it should have been said: objective) reality, reflected by our theory, while the other denies this, regarding the theory only as a systematization of experience, a system of empirio-symbols, etc., etc. New physics, having found new types of matter and new forms of its motion, has posed, by occasion of the breaking of old physical concepts, old philosophical questions. And if people of "middle" philosophical directions ("positivists," Humists, Machists) do not know how to pose the disputed question distinctly, then the open idealist Ward has thrown off all veils.

"…Ricker devoted his presidential address to the defense of physical realism against the symbolic interpretation, defended recently by professors Poincaré, Poynting, and myself" (p. 305–306; in other places in his book Ward adds to this list Duhem, Pearson, and Mach, see II vol., p. 161, 63, 57, 75, 83, etc.).

"…Ricker constantly speaks of 'mental images' and at the same time constantly asserts that the atom and ether are something more than mental images. Such a procedure of reasoning in fact amounts to the following: in such-and-such a case I cannot form any other image, and therefore reality must resemble it… Professor Ricker acknowledges the abstract possibility of a different mental image… He even admits the 'tentative' character of some of our theories and many 'particular difficulties.' In the end he defends only a working hypothesis, and one that has in considerable measure lost its prestige over the last half century. But if the atomic and other theories of the structure of matter are only working hypotheses and, at that, hypotheses strictly limited to physical phenomena, then there is no way to justify the theory asserting that mechanism is the basis of everything and that it reduces the facts of life and spirit to epiphenomena, i.e., makes them, so to speak, one degree more phenomenal, one degree less real than matter and motion. Such is the mechanical theory of the world, and if Professor Ricker directly will not support it, then we have nothing to dispute about" (p. 314–315).

This is, of course, sheer nonsense, that materialism asserted the "lesser" reality of consciousness or necessarily a "mechanical," rather than electromagnetic, or some immeasurably more complex picture of the world as moving matter. But truly prestidigitatorially, far better than our Machists (i.e., confused idealists)—the direct and open idealist Ward catches the weak points of "spontaneous" historical-natural materialism, for example, the inability to explain the relationship of relative and absolute truth. Ward performs somersaults and declares that since truth is relative, approximate, only "gropes at" the essence of the matter—it cannot therefore reflect reality! Extraordinarily correctly, however, the spiritualist has posed the question about atoms, etc., as a "working hypothesis." Fiducianism, which is modern and cultured (Ward directly derives it from his spiritualism), thinks it can do nothing more than proclaim the concepts of natural science "working hypotheses," and requires nothing more. We shall give you science, gentlemen natural scientists, give us epistemology, philosophy,—such is the condition of cohabitation of theologians and professors in "advanced" capitalist countries.

As for other points of Ward's epistemology, connected by him with "new" physics, we must add to this his decisive struggle against matter. What is matter? What is energy? Ward demands, mocking the abundance and contradictoriness of hypotheses. The ether or ethers? some sort of new "perfect fluid," which one arbitrarily endows with new and incredible qualities! And Ward's conclusion: "We find nothing definite except motion. Heat is a kind of motion, elasticity is a kind of motion, light and magnetism are kinds of motion. Mass itself turns out in the end, it is supposed, to be a kind of motion—motion of something that is neither a solid body nor a liquid nor a gas,—itself not a body and not an aggregate of bodies,—not phenomenal and not to be numenal,—the real apeiron[174] (a term from Greek philosophy = the infinite, the boundless), to which we can apply our own characteristics" (I, 140).

The spiritualist is true to himself, severing motion from matter. The motion of bodies is transformed in nature into the motion of that which is not a body with constant mass, into the motion of some unknown charge of unknown electricity in an unknown ether,—this dialectic of material transformations, carried out in the laboratory and in the factory, serves in the eyes of the idealist (as well as in the eyes of the broad public, as well as in the eyes of the Machists) as confirmation not of materialist dialectics, but as an argument against materialism: "…Mechanical theory, as the professed explanation of the world, receives a mortal blow from the progress of mechanics itself" (143)… The world is moving matter, we answer, and the laws of the motion of this matter are reflected by mechanics with respect to slow motions, by electromagnetic theory with respect to fast motions… "The extended, solid, indestructible atom has always been the prop of the materialist view of the world. But, unfortunately for these views, the extended atom did not satisfy the demands which growing knowledge made upon it" (144)… The destructibility of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the changeability of all forms of matter and its motion have always been the prop of dialectical materialism. All distinctions in nature are conditional, relative, mobile, express the approximation of our mind to the knowledge of matter,—but this in no way proves that nature, matter itself, were a symbol, a conventional sign, i.e., a product of our mind. The electron stands to the atom as a point in this book to the volume of a building 30 sazhens in length, 15 in width, and 71/2 in height (Lodge); it moves at speeds up to 270,000 kilometers per second; its mass changes with its speed; it makes 500 trillion revolutions per second,—all this is much more intricate than old mechanics, but all this is motion of matter in space and in time. The human mind has discovered much that is wondrous in nature and will discover still more, thereby increasing its power over it, but this does not mean that nature is a creation of our mind or of abstract mind, i.e., Ward's god, Bogdanov's "substitution," etc. "…Rigorously carried out as a theory of the real world, this ideal (the ideal of "mechanism") leads us to nihilism: all changes are motions, because motions are the only changes we can know, and that which moves, in order to be known by us, must again be motion" (166)… "As I have attempted to show, the progress of physics proves to be precisely the mightiest means of struggle against the ignorant faith in matter and motion, against recognizing them as the ultimate (inmost) substance, rather than the most abstract symbol for the sum of existence… We shall never reach god through bare mechanism" (180)…

Well, now this has become just like in the "Essays 'on' the Philosophy of Marxism"! You would do well to try addressing yourself there, Mr. Ward, to Lunacharsky and Yushkevich, Bazarov and Bogdanov: while they are more "bashful" than you, they preach precisely the same thing.