Strictly secret

Please do not make copies in any case, and each member of the Politburo (Comrade Kalinin too) should make his notes on the document1.

Lenin.

To Comrade Molotov. For members of the Politburo

With regard to the incident in Shuya2 , which has already been put to the Politburo for discussion, it seems to me necessary to take a firm decision now in connection with the general plan of struggle in this direction. Since I doubt whether I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting of March 203 in person, I shall therefore put my considerations in writing.

The incident in Shuya must be put in connection with the report which ROSTA1* recently forwarded to the newspapers not for printing, namely, the report of the resistance being prepared by the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg against the decree on the seizure of church valuables4. If we compare with this fact what the newspapers report about the attitude of the clergy to the decree on the confiscation of church valuables, and then what we know about the illegal proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, it will become quite clear that the Black Hundred clergy, headed by their leader, are quite deliberately carrying out a plan to give us a decisive battle at this very moment.

It is evident that in the secret meetings of the most influential group of the Black Hundred clergy this plan has been thought over and adopted quite firmly. The events in Shuya are only one of the manifestations and applications of this general plan.

I think that here our adversary is making a tremendous strategic mistake in trying to draw us into a decisive struggle when it is especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous for him. On the contrary, for us, it is at this very moment is not only extremely favorable, but in general the only moment when we can 99 out of 100 chances for complete success to defeat the enemy on the head and secure for us the necessary positions for us for many decades. It is now and only now, when people are being eaten in starving areas and hundreds if not thousands of corpses are lying on the roads, that we can (and therefore must) carry out the seizure of church valuables with the most frantic and ruthless energy and without stopping to crush any resistance. It is now, and only now, that the vast majority of the peasant mass will either be for us, or in any case will be unable to support in any decisive way that handful of Black Hundred clergy and reactionary urban bourgeoisie who can and will try a policy of violent resistance to the Soviet decree.

We must at all costs carry out the seizure of church valuables in the most decisive and the most rapid manner, by which we can secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles (one must remember the gigantic wealth of some monasteries and laurels). Without this fund no state work in general, no economic construction in particular, and no defense of our position in Genoa in particular, is absolutely unthinkable. We must take into our hands this fund of several hundred million gold rubles (or perhaps several billion) by all means. And to do this successfully can only be done now. All considerations point to the fact that we shall not be able to do it later, for no other moment than a desperate famine will give us such a mood of the broad peasant masses as would either ensure us the sympathy of this mass, or at least ensure us the neutralization of these masses in the sense that the victory in the struggle against the seizure of valuables will remain unconditionally and completely on our side.

An intelligent writer on state affairs has rightly said that if it is necessary to go to a series of cruelties in order to realize a certain political goal, it is necessary to carry them out in the most energetic manner and in the shortest possible time, for the masses will not bear the long application of cruelties. This consideration, in particular, is further strengthened by the fact that in the international situation of Russia it is likely that after Genoa it will or may turn out that brutal measures against the reactionary clergy will be politically irrational, perhaps even too dangerous. Now the victory over the reactionary clergy is fully secured for us. Moreover, the main part of our foreign opponents among the Russian emigrants abroad, i.e., the SS-ers and Miliukovites, will find it difficult to fight against us if we, precisely at this moment, precisely in connection with the famine, carry out the suppression of the reactionary clergy with the utmost speed and ruthlessness.

Therefore I come to the unquestionable conclusion that we must now give the most decisive and merciless battle to the Black Hundred clergy and crush their resistance with such ferocity that they will not forget it for several decades. I envision the very campaign of carrying out this plan as follows:

Only Comrade Kalinin should speak officially with any [whatever] measures, - never and in no case should Comrade Trotsky speak in the press or otherwise before the public.

The telegram already sent on behalf of the Politburo on the temporary suspension of the withdrawals should not be canceled5. It is advantageous to us, for it will give the enemy the impression that we are hesitating, that he has succeeded in intimidating us (the enemy will, of course, soon find out about this secret telegram, precisely because it is secret).

Send to Shuya one of the most energetic, intelligent and orderly members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee or other representatives of central power (one is better than several)6 and give him a verbal instruction through one of the members of the Politburo. This instruction should be that he should arrest in Shuya as many as possible, at least several dozen representatives of the local clergy, local bourgeoisie and local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct or indirect participation in the violent resistance to the decree of the VTsIK on the seizure of church valuables. Immediately upon completion of this work he should come to Moscow and personally make a report to the full Politburo meeting or to two members of the Politburo authorized to do so. On the basis of this report the Politburo gives a detailed directive to the judicial authorities, also verbal, that the trial against the Shuya rebels resisting famine relief should be carried out with the utmost speed and should end with nothing less than the execution of a very large number of the most influential and dangerous Black Hundreds in Shuya7 and, if possible, also not only in this city, but also in Moscow8 and several other spiritual centers.

The patriarch Tikhon himself, I think, it is advisable for us not to touch, although he is undoubtedly at the head of all this rebellion of the slaveholders. Concerning him it is necessary to give a secret directive to the Gosudolitupr, so that all the connections of this figure should be observed and uncovered more precisely and in detail at this very moment. Dzerzhinsky and Unschlicht should be obliged to report on this personally to the Politburo on a weekly basis.

At the Party Congress arrange a secret meeting of all or almost all delegates on this question together with the chief workers of the GPU, the NKJ2* and the Revtribunal9. At this meeting to carry out the secret decision of the Congress that the seizure of valuables, especially of the richest laurels, monasteries and churches, should be carried out with ruthless determination, without stopping at nothing and in the shortest possible time. The greater the number of representatives of the reactionary clergy and reactionary bourgeoisie we manage to execute on this occasion, the better. It is necessary now to teach this public a lesson so that for several decades they will not dare to think of any resistance.

In order to supervise the quickest and most successful implementation of these measures, a special commission should be appointed at the Congress, i.e. at its secret meeting, with the obligatory participation of Trotsky and Trotsky. Trotsky and Mr. Kalinin without any publication about this commission, so that the subordination of all operations to it would be ensured and carried out not in the name of the commission, but in the All-Soviet and All-Party order. To appoint specially responsible best workers to carry out this measure in the richest laurels, monasteries and churches.

Lenin.

19.III.22.

I ask t. Molotov to try to circulate this letter to the members of the Politburo today (without making copies) and ask them to return it to the Secretary immediately after reading it with a brief note as to whether each member of the Politburo agrees with the basis or whether the letter excites any disagreement.

Lenin.

19.III.22.

Received by telephone

M. Volodicheva.

Published - "Izvestia CPSU Central Committee", 1990, No. 4, pp. 191-193.

Fond 2, op. 1, d. 22947 - typewritten text.

1* ROSTA - Russian Telegraphic Agency.

2* GPU - State Political Department under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, NKJ - People's Commissariat of Justice.

3* CHON - special purpose units.

1The document has only a note by V.M.Molotov: "I agree. However, I propose to extend the campaign not to all provinces and cities, but to those where there are really large values, concentrating the forces and attention of the Party accordingly. 19/III. V.Molotov."

2The newspaper "Izvestiya VTsIK" No. 70 of March 28, 1922, published a governmental report of March 27, 1922, adopted by the Presidium of the VTsIK, "On the events in the town of Shuya in connection with the seizure of church valuables." The message described all the events in detail. In particular, it was reported that on March 3, 1922 by the resolution of the Shuya district executive committee a commission was established in accordance with the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 23, 1922 "On the order of seizure of church valuables in the possession of groups of believers" and the instructions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the People's Commissariat of Justice of the same date to the decree (see: Izvestia All-Russian Central Executive Committee, No. 46, February 26, 1922; No. 47, February 28, 1922). Having seized valuables in three small churches, on March 13, 1922, the commission appeared at the cathedral, but, meeting a crowd of excited believers, postponed its work until March 15. On March 14, in a calm atmosphere, the commission took into account the valuables of the synagogue. On March 15, a considerable crowd gathered on Cathedral Square. The mounted militia (6 horsemen) arrived and were met with threats, stones and logs. On the belfry began to beat the bells. Then arrived a half company of the 146th infantry regiment and two cars with machine guns. Revolver shots were heard from the crowd, the crowd tried to surround the half company, then on the order of the detached chief the Red Army soldiers fired in the air, but it did not help, the second volley was into the crowd, which then scattered. Four people were killed and 10 wounded (all the wounds were light, some from revolvers fired from the crowd). Toward evening, arrests were made of merchants, teachers, etc., seen in the square. The same evening representatives of believers handed over to the county executive committee 3 1/2 poods of silver from the valuables of the cathedral. On March 23 the county commission, representatives of believers in the presence of members of the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee began to seize the valuables of the cathedral. About 10 poods of silver were handed over to the county financial department; precious stones, pearl vestments and other valuables were handed over to the State Vault of Valuables. All the confiscated goods were taken into special account by the Central Commission for Famine Relief.

3At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on March 20, 1922, it was decided to propose to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to send a commission to Shuyu consisting of: P.G.Smidovich (chairman), N.I.Muralov and I.I.Kutuzov. On March 21 the commission arrived in the town, on March 23 it finished its work and came to the following conclusion: "1) To recognize the actions of the district commission on the seizure of church valuables as correct and coordinated with the orders of the center. 2) To recognize the actions of the local authorities as correct in general, but insufficiently energetic and systematic both in the preparation of work on the seizure of valuables and in the protection of public order. 3) To propose that the commission for the seizure of valuables immediately begin to finalize this work. 4) To propose to the provincial and district authorities to take measures to thoroughly investigate the violation of public order in connection with the seizure of valuables, to find out those responsible for the resistance to the authorities and the attack on the Red Army and the militia, and to refer the whole case to the Revolutionary Tribunal for a final examination and exemplary punishment of those responsible.

At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on March 20, consisting of L.B.Kamenev, I.V.Stalin, L.D.Trotsky and V.M.Molotov, the draft directives on the seizure of church valuables proposed by Trotsky on March 17 were also discussed, which was adopted with amendments:

"1. In the center and in the provinces to create secret governing commissions for the seizure of valuables on the model of the Moscow commission Sapronov-Unschlicht. All these commissions must necessarily include either the secretary of the provincial committee or the head of the agitprop department.

Note. In the most important provinces to set the nearest terms of seizure, in the less important ones - later, after the information about the seizure in Petrograd and other central provinces has spread throughout Russia.

2. The Central Commission should consist of the chairman, Mr. Kalinin, Mr. Yakovlev and Mr. Sapronov (after the departure of Mr. Kalinin, Mr. Yakovlev and Mr. Sapronov). Sapronov's departure, the commission should include, as his deputy, T. Beloborodov, who should get up to speed no later than Wednesday, 22/III), T. Unschlicht, Krasikov (Galkin's deputy), Vinokurov, and Bazilevich. The commission has a daily bureau (Yakovlev, Sapronov (deputy Beloborodov), Unshlicht, Galkin). Once a week the commission meets with the participation of t. Trotsky.

3. In provincial cities the commissar of a division, brigade or the chief of the political department is involved in the commissions.

4. Alongside these secret preparatory commissions there are official commissions or tables at the famine relief committees for the formal acceptance of valuables, negotiations with groups of believers and so forth. Strictly observe that the national composition of these official commissions does not give rise to chauvinistic agitation.

5. In each province, appoint an unofficial week of agitation and preliminary organization for the seizure of valuables (without, of course, announcing such a week). For this purpose select the best agitators and, in particular, the military. The agitation should have a character alien to any struggle against religion and the church, and should be entirely directed to help the hungry.

6. At the same time, to bring about a split in the clergy, showing strong initiative in this regard and taking under the protection of the state authorities those priests who are openly in favor of exemption.

7. Of course, our agitation and the agitation of the loyal priests must by no means merge, but in our agitation we refer to the fact that a considerable part of the clergy has opened a struggle against the criminal misappropriation of values by the inhuman and greedy "princes of the church".

8. For the entire duration of the campaign, especially during the week, it is necessary to ensure full awareness of everything that is going on in the different groups of clergy, believers, etc., in the church.

9. If bourgeois merchant elements, former officials, etc. are found to be organizers of the demonstration, their leaders should be arrested. If necessary, especially if the Black Hundred agitation had gone too far, organize a demonstration with the participation of the garrison at arms with the placards: "Church values to save the lives of the starving", etc.

10. If possible, do not touch prominent priests until the end of the campaign, but warn them tacitly but officially (on receipt through the provincial political departments) that in case of any excesses they will be the first to answer.

11. Along with campaigning work should go organizational work: to prepare the appropriate apparatus for the very accounting and seizure with such a calculation that this work was carried out in the shortest possible time. It is best to begin the seizure with a church with a loyal priest at its head. If there is no such church, start from the most significant church, carefully preparing all the details (Communists should be in all the neighboring streets, preventing crowding, a reliable unit, preferably the ChON3*, should be nearby, etc.).

12.Wherever possible, issue representatives of the hunger strikers in churches, at meetings, in barracks, demanding the speedy withdrawal of valuables.

13. Representatives of the loyal clergy should be allowed in the provinces and in the center to keep track of the seized church valuables at the pomgols, making it widely known that the population will have a full opportunity to see to it that not a single grain of church property gets any other purpose than to help the hungry.

14. In the event that groups of believers propose a redemption for valuables, declare that the question must be considered on a case-by-case basis by the Central Committee of Pomgol, without in any case suspending the work of seizure. Experience in the province shows that such negotiations are conducted without serious intentions of redemption and bring only uncertainty and demoralization.

15. In Moscow the work should proceed in the established order so that the seizure should begin no later than March 31.

16. I believe that the same approximate term could be set for Petrograd in agreement with Mr. Zinoviev, without in any case forcing the campaign too much and without resorting to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Zinoviev, without in any case forcing the campaign too much and without resorting to the use of force until the whole operation is politically and organizationally secured.

17. As for the provinces, the provincial committees should, on the basis of this instruction, in accordance with the deadline set in Moscow and under the control of the Central Commission, set their own deadline, on the one hand, ensuring thorough preparation and, on the other hand, not delaying the matter for a single extra day and with such a calculation that the most important provinces go first." (RCCHIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 283, l. 6-7).

The Politburo decided to send directives to all the gubernational committees.

4Rosta's report could not be found. Judging by subsequent events in Petrograd, it was about the preparation of the clergy led by Metropolitan Veniamin resistance to the commissions to seize church valuables. Anti-Soviet demonstrations on this ground took place at the Kazan Cathedral, the Church of the Sorrowful Mother of God, St. Vladimir's Cathedral on the Petrograd side, the Church of the Intercession on Borovaya, etc. Members of commissions and individual citizens who tried to calm the crowd were beaten, and there were wounded.

5This is a telegram sent on the basis of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) of March 16, 1922: "Having questioned the comrades involved in the matter of the withdrawal of valuables from churches, the Politburo concluded that the matter of organizing the withdrawal of church valuables has not yet been prepared and requires postponement in at least some places" (ibid., d. 282, fol. 2).

6Cf. note 3.

7The trial on the events in Shuya stated that the anti-Soviet performance was prepared and led by the clergymen Rozhdestvensky, Svetozarov, Lavrov, and Smelchakov, the church headman Paramonov, the merchants Pokhlebkin and Afanasyev, the former landlord Kokovnikov, the Socialist Yazykov, and others.

8In Moscow, the organizers of the speech were tried by a tribunal, which on May 8, 1922, sentenced 11 people (priests, benefactors and citizens) to capital punishment, 4 people to 5 years, 13 to 3 years, 10 to one year in prison; 14 people were released (see: Pravda, No. 101, May 9, 1922). On the same day L.B.Kamenev submitted a proposal to the Politburo to cancel the sentence of the tribunal, but the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) did not agree with it. Those convicted to capital punishment appealed to the Cassation Department of the Supreme Tribunal, which decided to petition the VTsIK to mitigate the fate of the convicts (see: Pravda, No. 119, May 31, 1922), May 8, 1922. On May 8, 1922, the complaint of the convicts was discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee; it was decided: "With regard to the convicted priests Christopher Nadezhdin, Vasily Sokolov, Makary Telegin, Sergei Tikhomirov and Alexander Zaozersky, the petition should be rejected and the sentence of the Revolutionary Tribunal should remain in force. With regard to the other six convicted to capital punishment, the sentence of the Revolutionary Tribunal should be replaced by 5 years' imprisonment".

On May 11, 1922, L.B.Kamenev again brought the issue of pardoning the convicts to the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b); L.D.Trotsky's proposal was accepted: "a) to suspend the execution of the sentence; 6) to instruct t. Trotsky to orient himself and submit a written proposal to the Politburo by the evening of 12.V.c.y." (RCCHIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 292, l. 4). On May 14, 1922, L.D.Trotsky submitted an opinion denying the existence of data for mitigation of the sentence of five convicts (the same persons as in the decision of the Presidium of the VTsIK - see above). The mitigation of punishment for the six convicts was justified "solely by considerations of the possibility to meet the petition of the progressive clergy as much as possible with the least damage to the substance of the sentence, fair to all 11" (Ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 293, l. 12). On May 18, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) agreed with this conclusion.

March 925, 1922 plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) approved the agenda of the XI Congress of the Party, the issue proposed by Lenin was not included in it. No information about the meeting was found in the documentary materials of the Congress. The XI Congress of the Party was held in Moscow from March 27 to April 2, 1922