...the relationship between different systems and methods of policy in a revolution of the kind that is taking place among us. The example I am speaking of is this — the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese general Nogi. The fundamental thing that interests me in this example consists in the fact that the capture of Port Arthur passed through two completely distinct stages. The first consisted of fierce assaults, which all ended in failure and cost the famous Japanese commander an extraordinary number of casualties. The second stage — this is when it became necessary to transition to an extraordinarily difficult, extraordinarily laborious and slow siege of the fortress according to all the rules of military art, and after the passage of a certain time, precisely by such a method was the task of capturing the fortress accomplished. If we look at these facts, then, naturally, the question arises: in what sense can one evaluate the first method of action of the Japanese general against the fortress of Port Arthur as an error? Were the assault attacks on the fortress erroneous? And if they were an error, then under what conditions was it necessary for the Japanese army, for the correct fulfillment of its task, to speak of this erroneousness and to what extent was it necessary to become conscious of this erroneousness?

Of course, at first glance the answer to this question appears to be the simplest. If a whole series of assault attacks on Port Arthur proved fruitless — and this is a fact — if the casualties that the attacking forces sustained were incredibly great — and this again is an indisputable fact — then from this it is already evident that the erroneousness of the tactic of direct and immediate assault on the fortress of Port Arthur requires no proof whatsoever. But, on the other hand, it is not difficult to see that in solving such a task, in which there were very many unknowns — it was difficult without corresponding practical experience to determine with absolute or even with a sufficiently high degree of approximation and precision what method could be employed against a hostile fortress. To determine this was impossible without testing in practice what force the fortress represented — what was the strength of its fortifications, what was the condition of its garrison, and so forth. Without this it was impossible to resolve the question of applying the correct method of capturing the fortress even for one of the best commanders, to whose number General Nogi undoubtedly belonged. On the other hand, the objective and conditions of the successful conclusion of the entire war demanded the quickest possible resolution of this task; at the same time there was enormous probability that even very great casualties, should they prove necessary for the capture of the fortress by storm, would nevertheless be repaid with interest. They would have freed the Japanese army for operations on other theaters of war, would have completed one of the most essential tasks before the moment when the enemy — that is, the Russian army — had succeeded in transferring large forces to the distant theater of war, preparing them better, and perhaps arriving at a position where it would prove to be many times stronger than the Japanese army.

If we look at the development of the military operation as a whole and at those conditions in which the Japanese army operated, then we must arrive at the conclusion that these assaults on Port Arthur signified not only the greatest heroism of an army that proved capable of going to enormous sacrifices, but also signified that unique possibility in the conditions of that time — that is, at the beginning of operations — which was necessary and useful, because without a testing of forces in the practical task of capturing the fortress by storm, without trial of the strength of resistance, there was no basis for undertaking a struggle more prolonged and more severe, a struggle which by virtue of its very prolongedness harbored within itself a whole series of dangers of another kind. From the point of view of the operation as a whole we cannot but regard also the first part of it, consisting of assaults and attacks, as a necessary part, as a useful part, because, I repeat, without such experience the Japanese army could not have had sufficient knowledge of the concrete conditions of the struggle. What was the position of this army when it was concluding the period of struggle against the hostile fortress by way of assaults? Well, thousands upon thousands have been laid down and thousands more will yet be laid down, and yet...

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