## Between November 30 and December 21, 1915

Polish
social-democracy
decisively
and
solemnly
protests against the redrawing and dismemberment into parts of an entire
country...
[99]
With deep bitterness the Polish socialist workers learned
that the majority of socialists both in the countries of the Triple Entente
and in the Central monarchies succumbed to the influence of war hypnosis — some,
following the orders of imperialists, actively supported
the rehabilitation of Tsarism, others entrusted the Habsburgs and
Hohenzollerns with the task of liberating oppressed peoples.

NB ||||
At the moment when the German government is preparing to
dispose of Polish territories as a conquered colony, the corresponding
intention of it, barely concealed in the Chancellor's declaration,
encountered no resistance whatsoever from German social-
NB democracy. The German social-nationalists, who before the war
fought against Polish-Galician social-patriotic instigators to war, now
patronize the senseless and criminal military utopias of theirs, in order thereby
to justify the support that they themselves render to their own governments.

The contemporary war, which has revealed capitalism's inability to adapt
inter-state relations to the demands of the world economy, opens an era of military
conflicts and social upheavals. The revolutionary struggle
of the proletariat, which under these conditions with spontaneous force must
ignite on an international scale, will be directed against the very foundations of the
capitalist system, will unfold into a struggle for socialism.

Polish s.-d. expresses the conviction that only the participation in
this impending struggle of the revolutionary international proletariat,
participation in a struggle that will break the chains of national
NB
oppression and destroy all forms of foreign domination,
will ensure and the Polish people the possibility of comprehensive free
development as an equal member in the union of peoples.

1 "Declaration of the Polish delegation to the international socialist
conference in Zimmerwald" was published in bulletin № 2
of the International Socialist Commission ("Internationale sozialistische
Kommission zu Bern. Bulletin") of November 27, 1915. Having read the
declaration, V. I. Lenin made numerous annotations and remarks
in the text and margins of the bulletin, and at its end wrote that this document
contains "five propositions in the guise of (more precisely — Ed.) political postulates," and then enumerated them (see Lenin Collection XVII,
pp. 290–297).

Having set forth these propositions in his theses "Socialist
Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Lenin wrote: "From the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination these propositions in no way differ
in essence, suffering only from even greater vagueness and indefiniteness
of political formulations than the majority of programs and resolutions of the II International" (Complete Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 265).

The annotations of V. I. Lenin on the
declaration published in the present collection
were made by him on the Russian translation
of this document, published in the collection "The International and War" № 1 for 1915, issued
in Zurich by the Foreign Secretariat of the Organizational Committee
of the RSDLP.

The Zimmerwald, or first international socialist, conference took place September 5–8, 1915. The conference
adopted the manifesto worked out by the commission — an appeal "To the Proletarians
of Europe," into which, thanks to the insistence of V. I. Lenin and the Left
social-democrats, it proved possible to introduce a series of fundamental propositions of
revolutionary Marxism. The conference also adopted a joint declaration
of the German and French delegations (see the present collection, pp. 45–
47), a resolution of sympathy for the victims of war and those persecuted
for political activity, and elected the International Socialist
Commission.

At the conference, the Zimmerwald Left
group was created, which conducted active struggle at the conference against the centrist
majority. Only the representatives of the Bolshevik party under Lenin's leadership
maintained a thoroughly consistent position in this struggle throughout.

2 The Habsburgs — the imperial
dynasty in the "Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation" (1273–1438
with interruptions, 1438–1806), the Austrian Empire (1804–1867) and Austria-Hungary (1867–1918).

3832

ANNOTATIONS ON "THE AMENDMENT TO THE MANIFESTO,
SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE OC,
THE CENTRAL BOARD OF THE SDPuL, AND THE POLISH
SOCIALIST PARTY"1

[Between November 30 and December 21, 1915]

Only!
very little

[101] "The proletariat cannot wait in the role of passive
spectator while
all these results of the imperialist epoch
manifest themselves in full measure. Already now must it come forth
in the role of an independent political factor, all the more so
since what is now occurring in all warring countries gives
it an illustration of the fates awaiting it."

1 The amendment to the manifesto was published in the collection "The International and War" № 1 for 1915. As its authors indicated, the amendment was
proposed to the Zimmerwald conference by the mentioned delegations
after the draft manifesto "To the Proletarians of Europe" worked out
by the commission had been presented. "The authors of the amendment considered it necessary
to fill a significant gap
in the text worked out by the commission: the struggle for peace is not grounded in a definite perspective of historical
development and is not connected with it." The conference referred the amendment
to the discretion of the commission, which found it impossible to include it
in the text and proposed to transmit it as material for future discussions to the
International Socialist Commission
elected at
the conference.

3832

ANNOTATIONS ON THE ARTICLE BY L. MARTOV
"WAR AND THE RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT"*

[Between November 30 and December 21, 1915]

NB
[103] ...Russia,
as was to be expected,
proved to be locus
minoris
resistentiae — the point
of least resistance — for the spirit of revolution, called to life by the imperialist
whirlwind. For the degree of socio-political
development on which it stands did not allow

!| become ossified ||
inter-class relations to the extent that with Western Europe's entry into the period of imperialist
struggle this occurred in the advanced capitalist countries*** | The first revolutionary action of the world-imperialist war and manifested itself first in the fact that the Russian
|| Not the first ||
bourgeoisie, becoming increasingly permeated with imperialist tendencies,
set forth to struggle for power.

In itself, of course, the revolutionary significance of this
fact would have been insignificant, and the struggle of the Russian
bourgeoisie might still end in rather pitiful fiasco. But,
arising in the atmosphere of world crisis and
directly stimulated by the colossal calamities that have
descended upon the entire country, this struggle must become the starting
point of an enormous social movement, which has many
chances of taking on the character of revolution.

[104] "Great-power-ism" thus played for the June Third
Russia the same role that national-state unification played after 1848 in Germany:
it served as a banner for the process of modernization of the monarchy
and nobility, on the one hand, for the political consolidation of the
bourgeoisie into a co-governing class — on the other...

[107–108] The June Third
experiment could
historically justify itself only insofar as on its basis it was possible
to create political and economic might
sufficient to make use of all the favorable
chances created for Russia by its geographic position
and its vastness in a period of the aggravation of antagonism between the imperialist
giants of the "West" reaching the utmost degree.

Pointing to this only case which could
remove from the order of the day the problem of a new
bourgeois revolution in Russia, we laid this analysis at the foundation of our understanding
of the tasks of the Russian workers' movement in the counter-revolutionary
period. We rejected the placing of the entire policy of the proletariat
on one card of bourgeois
revolution, continuing
from the point at which it had stopped in 1906–07. Standing on the ground created
by the defeat of the 1905 revolution and the beginning
process of mutual adaptation of the old and
new Russia, we put forward "the struggle for an open party"
as the watchword summing up the organizational-tactical side
of the new tasks of the class struggle of the Russian proletariat. But at the same time we fought with such an interpretation of this
watchword and these tasks which would have meant recognition of
this path of mutual adaptation as irreversible and assured of success. That in the Russian workers' movement (and not at all among its fellow-travelers*, as
Lenin and Plekhanov sought to portray) there was a tendency to accept as finally given
and historically assured such a "painless" development of June Third
Russia toward the "Prussian type," is beyond any doubt: this tendency was fed by the natural
striving of the fighting elements
of the working class to find firm ground
for their sustained political and
organizational construction. However, this tendency did not develop further, and at the
August Conference of 1912
the line
of "Menshevism" (or "Liquidationism") was outlined
with respect to both possible outcomes
of the historical process. — In the hesitations and waverings
which manifested themselves at the beginning of the present war among part
of the "liquidators" in Russia, there was undoubtedly also a belch
of the tendencies of 1909–11 to build in advance the future of the Russian
proletariat on the historical victory of the Russian bourgeoisie
in its attempt through imperialism — aside from national
revolution — to move toward the Europeanization of Russia and the solution of its
internal problems of unleashing national productive
forces. The irony of history demanded that at the time when among this part of the "liquidators" the
revival of this tendency in most cases went no further than the watchword "non-opposition to war," the mission to carry it
to its logically pitiless conclusion and in deed to subordinate completely the
fates and tasks
of the proletarian movement to the success of the
imperialist-liberal
experiment
of the bourgeoisie was taken upon themselves by Plekhanov, Alexinsky*, Iordansky (may there be victory!), Finn-Enotaevsky**, that is, people who have garnered
no few laurels in "the struggle against liquidationism"...

[108] By the end of the first year of the world war Russia turned out to be
the only one of the warring great powers whose fighting
force was undermined at its roots, whose economic disorganization
took on a catastrophic character and from which significant territorial
amputations as a result of war can still be saved (if salvation is
at all still possible) only by its allies, — of course, at the price of its
complete enslavement by the latter. In the very first decisive imperialist struggle
* — fellow-travelers.

Not in itself

Russia of Sazonov — Guchkov — Miliukov* remained behind
the flag, again ceased to exist as a serious claimant to participation in the division of the world.

This result ||in itself|| means the collapse of the June Third
system,
the destruction
of the social equilibrium created by it. Almost automatically all the problems posed by 1905
in revolutionary scale and eliminated by counter-revolution — political, estate, national, agrarian, financial, workers' — rise up in full measure before
broad social circles, and rise up in the atmosphere
of military defeats, in the perspective of fundamental disruption
of the all-national economy. The civil peace* is broken, and amid hysterical
cries about the salutariness of "unity," amid the roar of war, amid the thunder of guns, in the camp of the propertied classes there openly rages
party and class struggle.

[109] The destruction of Russian civil peace*
in two respects means the collapse of the June Third system and consequently
the attempt to bypass the problem of the national-bourgeois revolution
by a leap into imperialist space.

Firstly, in the respect that the bourgeoisie found itself forced [to contest]
at the monarchy, bureaucracy and nobility their very same function as the organizer and leader
of "state defense," the preservation of which in the hands of these
social groups constitutes the very essence of counter-revolutionary
cohabitation.

Secondly, in that faced with the necessity
to advance its claims to participation in power, the bourgeoisie
was forced to appeal to the broad popular masses,
to raise noisy public — extra-Duma — agitation, through its party,
non-party and yellow press to introduce alarm,
excitement and embitterment into the popular masses, to
bring a lit match to colossal combustible material, which
through the growth of prices and deprivation, the dearness of living, panic at defeats and
disorganization of the state piles up without that in the proletariat, peasantry and
petty bourgeoisie.

[110] That the moment of new social upsurge — inevitable as a result of the self-exhaustion of the June Third regime — will
be characterized first of all by the initiative and
advanced — among other non-proletarian classes — role
of the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie — this we indicated already
a few years ago on the basis
of analysis of the internal contradictions of post-revolutionary development. Then our assertions far from met
sympathy among a significant part of Russian Marxists. It seemed least probable at that time
that the Russian commercial-industrial
bourgeoisie, directly patronized by the June Third
bloc and seized with counter-revolutionary
fear of the proletariat, could ever come forward at the head of
national
movement uniting different propertied and non-propertied strata, and give this movement the character of conscious
struggle
for power, consequently
turn out to be among the "moving forces of revolution," as the writer of these lines expressed it.

[111] ...the new struggle for power against Tsarism and nobility
is begun at this moment under the hegemony of the commercial-industrial
bourgeoisie...

untrue

[111–112] Being drawn by the course of events into struggle for power,
the bourgeois
classes fall into fundamental contradiction
with the starting point of their "war" policy. They concluded
a civil peace*
with the monarchy and bureaucracy in the name of the interests of state defense. But what constitutes the
actual essence of "civil peace"* in all countries?
In that in the name of defense the proletariat unconditionally leaves
state power and the command of the military organization to the bourgeoisie — where it is the ruling
class; in that the bourgeoisie renounces its claims
to state power and the command of the military organization — where these are in the hands of privileged estates. When
however the Russian
bourgeoisie in the name of better
organization of the command of the army and state begins
to struggle for
power,
renouncing
civil peace,* it
undoubtedly and inevitably undermines the cause of "state defense"...

2 о

NB

[112–113] ||Among us||
the matter concerns the genuine replacement in the role
of the ruling one estate by another.

How ridiculous therefore are these attempts to squeeze the movement
in favor of "public ministry" into the framework of "non-violation
of the interests of state defense"!, these attempts, according to a French proverb, to make an omelet
without breaking eggs! That is, more precisely, they are not ridiculous when they come from the actual politicians
of the bourgeoisie; for the latter, crying: "softly, softly, don't step on defense!"
are meanwhile chiefly concerned that the popular ferment awakened by their struggle should not encroach
on their own narrow class interests or, as A. I. Guchkov expressed it, in the struggle with the given state
order not touch the order in general; so that in the process of struggle against the given government the popular masses should not form
an independent political force,
dangerous for

the very claimants to power themselves. But all the more ridiculous are the NB
Plekhanovs, Bunakovs, Sommers*, seriously and patheticalally repeating the exhortations of industrialists, city mayors
and zemstvo politicians directed at the address of workers:
struggle, but so as not to spill a drop from the patriotic cup! press on the authorities, but so as
to avoid as much as possible activating your main means
of pressure — the strike! prefer demonstrations in time free
from the production of shells! or, if you simply must strike,
then work off this truancy on Sundays!

[113] ...We — Mensheviks — in 1904 with such energy called on workers not to see in street
manifestations the sole saving means with which in 1913 we rose up against "strike fervor."

[114] Occupation by enemy armies of ever new
areas, colossal indemnities, direct or disguised seizure of considerable territories will directly and painfully affect the interests of the popular masses, and in particular
the proletariat.

[115] In calling for struggle with the given regime, social-democracy knows
that the Octobrist, liberal and any other
bourgeois-imperialist government which by the correlation of social forces is the nearest claimant
to power, will continue the war in the name of the same imperialist
and capitalist interests in whose name it has been waged until now... "National defense" in the hands
of such a government and the social groups standing behind it
will be directed against the proletariat... this national
defense,
exploiting the natural striving of the popular
masses to save themselves from violent annexations and indemnities,
will be accomplished by the sole method accessible to the propertied classes...

[116] All this social-democracy knew even before the beginning of the war,
which is why it "swore allegiance" to the Stuttgart and Basel resolutions; whoever did not know this or hastened to forget it with the beginning of the present war,
had at his disposal no fewer than 15
months to see by vivid examples what it really means to have the participation of the proletariat and socialists in the
conduct of "national defense" directed by the propertied classes...

As tempting as it is for a revolutionary party to have behind it at once the sympathies
of broad popular masses and the army, as obligatory as it is for it
not to cause, through clumsy tactics
or, even worse, through verbal hooliganism (such as playing at "defeatism"),
a chasm between itself and the popular masses and army, it must not forget for the sake of momentary successes the future

NB

Lie!

Not
truth

flunkey
of petty-bourgeois
chauvinism*
(1)
(2)
* This
of the class that it serves... If the masses cannot come to us otherwise
than through new illusions, through their exposure by the tragic experience of history, we are obliged
to protect from the influence of these illusions those strata of the people who already stand with us, obliged to speak and repeat
to the proletariat all the truth we know — the truth that so long as war bears an imperialist character,
before the proletariat there cannot arise the task of "defense of the fatherland."

[116–117] It goes without saying
that if the present crisis led to the victory of democratic revolution, to a
republic, the character of war would fundamentally change... But the Russian democratic
republic, directly emerged from
sharp revolutionary battles led by the proletariat, expressing (of course, transitional) the triumph of
general-democratic interests of the petty bourgeoisie
and peasantry over the narrow class appetites of capitalist
bourgeoisie — such a republic would represent in the war the side in whose victory the
world proletariat is interested. If therefore we remain
within the framework of this hypothesis, one
can say that the Russian proletariat should have defended such a republic if necessary with arms in hand against external enemies, as it would defend it against internal enemies.

If one is to picture to oneself these — for now quite distant — perspectives, then it will be permissible to attempt to represent to oneself concretely what character this "defensive" war of the Russian republic emerged from revolution should have taken. It would have been in the full sense of the word a revolutionary war, or, more precisely, the proletariat should have given it the character of a revolutionary war. This means, first, that it could not have done without the most revolutionary interventions in the "sacred" rights of private property, — at least, the private property of the noble estate defeated by revolution. This means, second,
that it, setting itself the task of defending ||Russia|| from enslavement in case of victory of the Central monarchies, should have taken measures so that victory over these
monarchies would not lead to such enslavement of Russia by its present allies. It is difficult, for instance, to imagine that the victorious democracy in Russia could have left untouched those multi-billion obligations to French capital with which Tsarism has for many decades pawned to it the labor of the Russian people, [it is] difficult to imagine a victorious democratic revolution in Russia which would not have declared state bankruptcy. This means, third, that the revolutionary war of the Russian
republic should have been waged in the name of the unlimited
principle of
democratic self-determination of peoples — both those against which German imperialism might encroach and those whose
liberation runs counter to the interests of English, French or Italian imperialism.

[117–118] Suffice it to picture to oneself
the image of such a war — and only such a war would express the historical progressiveness of the Russian republic defending itself against German imperialism — to pose the question:
is such a transformation of imperialist war into democratically-revolutionary compatible with the present interrelation of states in the world conflict? Does not the entire character
of the latter vouch for us that the revolutionary
victory, if only of bourgeois democracy in one of the countries,
would immediately explode this interrelation,
uniting all the capitalist
bourgeoisie of the entire world in the striving to extinguish the fire of revolution, and thereby, consequently, eliminating for the Russian proletariat the very question of whether it should
continue the defensive war against
the Central monarchies in case of victory of democracy in Russia
and the unwillingness of Germany and Austria to conclude a honorable peace? It is entirely obvious that in such a situation the question would become
not one of continuing the old war, but of an entirely new war, and this
new war would have little in common with defensive war
in the ordinary sense of the word: like
the revolutionary war
of the First French republic, it would bear an offensive character or
should have taken on such, insofar as it became certain that the atmosphere of
international imperialist reaction would not permit democracy to establish itself in Russia (1).

Well, and what a clever
rogue!

NBX

X
= revolutionary-democratic
dictatorship of
the proletariat and
peasantry!

?

1* Can Russian bourgeois democracy, coming to power, prove capable of waging such a revolutionary war, that is, of developing the revolution against domestic feudalism into struggle against international imperialism? This can very much be doubted: the proletariat in attempts to push its revolutionary ally onto this path may suffer defeat, which would mean its break with bourgeois democracy and the entry of the latter onto the path of adaptation to the interests of capitalist bourgeoisie, which transforms the "republic of 1793" into the "republic of Gambetta and Clemenceau." — In connection with this stands the general question of whether it is historically conceivable that there be a complete victory of revolution in Russia, as a bourgeois revolution, transferring real power to petty-bourgeois and peasant democracy (with the support of the proletariat or with its participation in power — it's all the same)? Comrade N. Trotsky in № 217 of "Our Word" answers this question categorically in the negative,
not taking the trouble to buttress his thesis with any proofs other than axiomatic
assertions, whose aim is to prepare the reader for the watchword: "revolutionary workers' government, seizure of power by the revolutionary
proletariat." Like in 1905 and 1906, comrade Trotsky proceeds from a peculiar
teleological conception: the democratic revolution must triumph in Russia. Then he sets about the analysis of social forces and arrives at the conclusion: neither liberal transformation nor bourgeois-revolutionary overturn is conceivable: capitalist
bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, and "there is no bourgeois democracy" (that is, [there is] none capable of seizing power). Consequently, the overturn will be accomplished by the proletariat, and if accomplished, then "why should it" yield power to other classes? Consequently, "workers' government"...

[119] But if we have already gone so far in our hypotheses,
we cannot fail to introduce into our constructions yet one more complicating factor. Is it conceivable that the development of the Russian political crisis reach the point at which we have stopped,
on condition of the continuing dominance of militarist
and imperialist reaction throughout the world? Such a supposition appears entirely improbable. A series of revolutionary
upheavals of ever deeper and ever wider
character, which alone could have brought Russia to a
democratic republic, could not have failed to exert an immediate deep
impression on the popular masses of the allied and warring-with-Russia countries and, probably, would have served as the stimulus for the emergence
in them of popular movements. And on the other hand, if the atmosphere of war turned out to be unfavorable for the development of the latter, then by that very fact the development of the revolutionary crisis
in Russia itself would have been paralyzed if only in that the forces of imperialism of the allied and hostile countries would have come
in one form or another to the aid of the shaken "order" in Russia. Under these conditions it would scarcely have become a realistic
perspective that democracy would triumph completely in Russia even during
the war, the only
perspective under which the task of "defense" could enter as a component part into the
revolutionary tasks of the proletariat.

[120] From this it follows that the watchword "revolution for defense," if it is posed in the perspective of a revolution developing, as we expressed it, "to its logical conclusion," — and in no other perspective can social-democracy
pose
the problem of bourgeois revolution, — is deprived of concrete-historical content and is a contrived one...

Raising struggle in Russia for the decisive triumph
of democracy, the proletariat, consequently, must regard it as part of the international struggle of the proletariat against international imperialist reaction; must therefore closely connect it with the struggle against war, with the struggle for "peace concluded by the peoples," as the recently issued leaflet of the OC* expresses it, for peace imposed on the warring countries
by awakened
peoples...

[120–121] Not revolution in the name of national
defense, but revolution in the name of peace! The central battle watchword
of the moment for the Russian proletariat should become the all-national constituent assembly for the liquidation both of Tsarism and
of war.

— Well, they object to us. The proletariat together with
democracy has achieved the constituent assembly and moves toward the establishment of a republic. The new government offers Germany peace without annexations. Imperial Germany wants to know nothing of it, and the German proletariat turns out to be either still not awakened
or insufficiently strong to stop the further invasion of German armies into Russia. Then
would we not defend the fatherland together with the newly conquered
republic?

Philistine,
"led" to
"Our Cause"*

NB

NB

NB

...Marxists do not at all need to resort to faith. Those of them who remained Marxists after this upheaval and, despite it, remained such only because this upheaval and the facts that caused it
(the capitulation of the proletariat and its parties before imperialism), did not disabuse them of the correctness of the fundamental Marxist conception of the tendencies of class development of the proletariat. These tendencies, despite any delays, despite any temporary retreats, impel the proletariat toward internationalism and revolutionary
struggle. Therefore amid the chaos of the most terrible confusion the Marxist perceives the beginning of new awakening and upsurge, and,
if he wishes, will be able to apply his active energy
there and in such a way that in the struggle between contradictory
tendencies now tearing at the international proletariat, he would contribute to the strengthening of those tendencies which the future belongs to. And this, of course, [consists of] revolutionary-internationalist
tendencies, now stifled by possibilist-
national ones. He for whom skepticism prevents [him at] this critical moment from standing with both feet on the path of the most decisive support of the now stifled internationalist element of the workers' movement, thereby dooms himself
to a passive contemplative role in the historical process; in attempting to maintain himself in the role of a political actor, he will inevitably slide into the swamp of nationalist opportunism.

[122–124] ||The starting||
point of the revolutionary crisis
in Russia is the collision caused by
defeats of the united propertied classes, relying on the discontent of the popular masses, with the ruling gang. The movement growing
out of this collision and having already taken on considerable
dimensions, is united by the idea of national defense.

The proletariat must, of course, support this movement, insofar as it shakes the old power and knocks the ground from under its feet. But to support a movement led by
the bourgeoisie does not mean to go at its tail. Supporting military actions
directed against the "government of treason," the proletariat and social-democracy do not support its watchwords. They criticize some of them as half-hearted and insufficient ("public ministry"); they come out directly against others as hostile to the interests of democracy ("war to victory," "struggle with German domination!," "no strikes!" etc.).

So long as the liberal-patriotic movement under the flag
of "defense" has not exhausted itself internally, has not dealt to the existing
order all the blows it is capable of dealing it,
social-democracy, taking what assistance it can in the conflicts caused by this movement, making use of it agitatively,
calling on the workers' masses to actively protest against the manifestations of reaction in response to this movement, must concentrate the center of gravity of its work on the organization
of the forces of the proletariat,
in view of the events to come, which will require all its revolutionary energy...

It is inconceivable to work successfully on the organization of the proletariat as an independent political force if the watchword of organization is torn away from the tasks of that revolutionary
struggle which lies before the proletariat, — the struggle for peace and the struggle for democracy. As far as we can judge from our distant position abroad,
such a tendency to tear organizational
work away from agitation for the general watchwords of the movement exists among Russian comrades. We recall the article by comrade Gorsky in № 1 of the now-closed "Morning"*. He proposed, as far as we understood him, to solve the question of participation or non-participation in the military-industrial committees independently of the relationship to the cause of "national defense," proceeding from the thought that one could be a principled
supporter of "defense" and boycott Goremykin's unfortunate "committees"
and that, conversely, one could, while being a principled
opponent of defense, stand for the participation of workers in these committees. In fact, attempts to solve this question from the angle of organizational "utilization" of new positions, while leaving in the shadows or to the side the question of the principled and practical relationship of the working class to "defense," instead of facilitating the cause of organization
of the workers,
should rather lead to their disorganization. On the threshold of the revolutionary epoch in the history of Russia the working class must give itself as clear an accounting as possible of what goals and by what methods it will uphold in the course of the revolutionary process, must know for what and in the name of what it organizes its forces. Every
lack of agreement and lack of clarity manifested now will take cruel revenge on itself tomorrow (*).

All the movement of the working class must be animated and united by the idea of struggle for peace and struggle for the democratic liquidation of the June Third regime. The proletariat must organize its forces and strengthen its positions, therefore,
without trimming [its sails], without adapting to the movement of "national defense" led by
the bourgeoisie, but contrasting to this movement its own internationalist
tasks and methods of action calculated on international class
solidarity. This was done excellently
by the workers' delegation — with comrades Khaustov and Skobелев at the head —
at the Moscow congress of struggle against the dearness of living...

Not
clear
/ Well and \
<*' The article was already in proof when the results
( A CLEVER || of the campaign concerning the military-industrial committees fully
NB
| ROGUE || confirmed our fears.

Will the proletarian masses in fact now go along the path of consistently revolutionary politics, under the flag of internationalism, or under the immediate impression of the calamities caused by defeat, and under the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere of all-national "patriotic alarm" will they move into battle under the banner of "defense" and play their role in the political crisis (perhaps only at first),
remaining under the dominion of patriotic-democratic illusions?
The fighters of the Commune of 1871 also moved under the banner of defense and "war to the end." If the same were to happen with the Russian proletariat, this, of course, would not eliminate either the revolutionary character of its role in the begun crisis (a character determined by the interrelation of classes in Russia), nor the international significance of its revolutionary
struggle, but would only weaken them. In this case it would fall to the vanguard of workers-socialists, without breaking away from the struggle
of the broad masses, without counterposing themselves to their movement, to conduct their own line within it (as Varlin,
Malon* and the Paris internationalists conducted it in the insurrectionary movement of 1870–71, in general permeated with Blanquist-patriotic illusions). As R. Hilferding remarks very correctly, it may fall to the Marxists in the events of the nearest historical moment, marked by the cursed seal of world war, once again, like the "communists" of 1848, to reduce their role to that of, in each concrete movement, formulating and upholding
the general and permanent interests
of the proletariat, overshadowed at the given moment by its particular and transitory interests.

[125] The more decisively the Russian social-democracy at the very beginning of the political crisis takes a clear revolutionary-
internationalist position, the more distinctly
will it call on the proletariat to build all its policy on the revival of international class struggle, the greater will its influence become in the course of the development of this crisis, the more surely and the faster