Comrades, allow me to begin with remarks that are comparatively minor, starting from the end. Comrade Bukharin, at the end of his speech, went so far as to compare us with Petliura. If he believes that to be the case, how then can he remain in one party with us? Is that not a phrase? Of course, if that were truly the case, we would not be sitting in one party. The fact that we are together proves that we agree with Bukharin on nine-tenths of the issues. True, he added a few revolutionary phrases about how we wanted to betray Ukraine. I am convinced that it is not worth speaking of such manifest nonsense. I shall return to comrade Ryazanov, and here I wish to note that just as an exception, occurring once in ten years, merely confirms the rule, so it happened that he accidentally said something serious. (Applause.) He said that Lenin yields space in order to gain time. This is almost a philosophical argument. This time it turned out that Comrade Ryazanov said something entirely serious—a phrase, moreover, in which lies the whole essence: I wish to yield space to the actual victor in order to gain time. That is the whole essence, and only in that. Everything else is merely talk: the necessity of revolutionary war, the uprising of the peasantry, and so forth. When Comrade Bukharin presents the matter as if there can be no two opinions about the possibility of war, and says: "ask any military man" (I noted his words), since he poses the question that way, asking any military man, I shall answer him: such a military man turned out to be a French officer with whom I happened to have a conversation{13}. This French officer, looking at me, of course, with angry eyes—after all, I sold Russia to the Germans—said: "I am a royalist, a supporter of monarchy, and in France—a supporter of Germany's defeat. Do not think that I am a supporter of Soviet power—how could I think that if he is a monarchist—but I was in favor of you signing the treaty at Brest, because it was necessary." There you have it—"ask any military man." Any military man should have said what I said: the treaty at Brest had to be signed. If it now follows from Bukharin's speech that our disagreements have greatly diminished, it is because the supporters of his position have hidden the main point of disagreement.

When Bukharin now criticizes us for demoralizing the masses, he is absolutely right—only he is criticizing himself, not us. Who pushed this porridge through the Central Committee?—You, Comrade Bukharin. (Laughter.) No matter how you cry "no," truth will prevail: we are in our comradely family, we are at our own congress, there is nothing to hide, and we shall have to speak the truth. And the truth is that there were three currents in the Central Committee. On February 17, Lomov and Bukharin did not vote. I requested that the voting be reproduced, duplicated, every party member can go to the secretariat, if they wish, and look at the voting—the historic voting of January 21, which shows that they wavered, while we did not waver at all. We said: "let us take peace at Brest—you will not get better—in order to prepare for revolutionary war." Now we have already gained five days to evacuate Petrograd. Now a proclamation has been issued by Krylenko and Podvoysky{14}, who were not among the Left and whom Bukharin treated with disdain, saying that they are being "dragged out," as if we invented what Krylenko reported. We absolutely agree with this; you see how matters stand, you see these military men proved what I said, while you object that the German will not advance. Can this situation be compared with October, when the matter was not one of technique? No, if you want to reckon with facts, then reckon with the fact that the disagreements concerned the impossibility of beginning war when it is manifestly disadvantageous. When Comrade Bukharin began his closing remarks with a thunderous question: "is war possible in the near future?", he greatly surprised me. I answer without hesitation: yes, it is possible—but now we must accept peace. There is no contradiction whatsoever here. After these brief remarks, I shall move on to detailed replies to the previous speakers. With respect to Radek, I must make an exception. But there was another statement—from Comrade Uritsky. What was there besides Canossa{15}, "betrayal," "retreat," "capitulation"? Well, what is all this? Is this not criticism from a Left Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper? Comrade Bubnov read us a statement submitted to the Central Committee by Central Committee activists who consider themselves very left, who gave a perfect example of a demonstration before the whole world: "the behavior of the Central Committee strikes a blow at the international proletariat." Is that not a phrase? "To demonstrate before the whole world our helplessness!" How are we demonstrating? By offering peace? By the fact that the army fled? Did we not prove that to start war with Germany now, without accepting the Brest peace, means showing the world that our army is sick, does not wish to go into battle? It is entirely empty when Bubnov asserts that this wavering was entirely created by us—it was because our army is sick. At any time, a respite had to be given. If the correct strategy had been followed, we would have had a month's respite, but since you followed an incorrect strategy, we have only five days' respite—and that is good. The history of war shows that in order to stop an army fleeing in panic, sometimes even days suffice. Whoever does not take, does not sign now this devilish peace, is a man of phrases, not of strategy. Therein lies the trouble. When Central Committee activists write to me: "demonstration of helplessness," "betrayal"—this is the most harmful, most empty childish phrase. We demonstrated helplessness by attempting to wage war when it was impossible to demonstrate, when an advance against us was inevitable. As for the Pskov peasants, we shall bring them to the Congress of Soviets so that they may tell how the Germans behave, so that they may create that psychology when a soldier stricken by panic flight begins to recover and says: "Yes, now I understand that this is not the war the Bolsheviks promised to end—this is a new war that the Germans are waging against Soviet power." Then recovery will come. But you pose a question that cannot be solved. No one knows the length of the respite.

Next, I must touch upon the position of Comrade Trotsky. In his activity, two aspects must be distinguished: when he began negotiations at Brest, brilliantly using them for agitation, we all agreed with Comrade Trotsky. He cited part of a conversation with me, but I shall add that it was agreed between us that we would hold out until the German ultimatum, and after the ultimatum we would capitulate. The German deceived us: out of seven days, he stole five{16}. Trotsky's tactic, insofar as it aimed at prolonging negotiations, was correct: it became incorrect when the state of war was declared ended and peace was not signed. I proposed quite definitely to sign peace. We could not have obtained a better peace than Brest. It is clear to everyone that the respite would have been a month, that we would not have lost. Since history has swept this aside, it is not worth recalling, but it is absurd that Bukharin says: "life will show that we were right." I was right because I wrote about it back in 1915: "One must prepare to wage war, it is inevitable, it is happening, it will come"[2]. But we should have taken peace, not boasted needlessly. And all the more should we have taken peace because war will come, and now we are, at the very least, facilitating the evacuation of Petrograd, we have facilitated it. That is a fact. When Comrade Trotsky puts forward new demands: "promise that you will not sign peace with Vinnichenko," I say that I shall under no circumstances take such an obligation upon myself{17}. If the congress took such an obligation, neither I nor any of my like-minded comrades would take responsibility for it. This would mean that instead of a clear line of maneuvering—retreating when one can, sometimes advancing—instead of this, we would bind ourselves again with a formal decision. One can never bind oneself with formal considerations in war. It is ridiculous not to know military history, not to know that a treaty is a means of gathering forces: I have already referred to Prussian history. Some people definitely think, like children: you sign a treaty, which means you have sold yourself to the devil, gone to hell. This is simply absurd, when military history speaks as clearly as can be that the signing of a treaty upon defeat is a means of gathering forces. There have been cases in history when wars followed one after another, all of which we have forgotten. We see the old war transforming into…[3]. If you like, bind yourselves with formal considerations forever, and then give responsible posts to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries{18}. We shall not take responsibility for this. There is not a shadow of desire for a split. I am convinced that life will teach you. March 12 is not far off—you will receive great material{19}.

Comrade Trotsky says that this will be betrayal in the full sense of the word. I assert that this is a completely incorrect point of view[4]. To show concretely, I shall take an example: two men are walking, ten men attack them, one fights, the other flees—that is betrayal; but if two armies of one hundred thousand each, and against them five armies; one army is surrounded by two hundred thousand, the other should come to its aid, but it knows that three hundred thousand are positioned such that there is a trap: can one come to aid? No, one cannot. This is not betrayal, not cowardice: a simple increase in numbers changed all concepts. Every military man knows this—here it is not a personal concept: by acting thus, I preserve my army. Let them take that one prisoner, I shall renew mine, I have allies, I shall wait, my allies will come. Only in this way can one reason; but when other considerations are mixed with military considerations, there is nothing but phrases. Politics cannot be conducted this way.

Everything that can be done, we have done. By signing this treaty, we have saved Petrograd, even if only for several days. (Let the secretaries and stenographers not attempt to write this down.) In the treaty, we are ordered to withdraw our troops from Finland, troops that are manifestly unfit, but we are not forbidden to import arms into Finland. If Petrograd had fallen several days ago, panic would have seized Petrograd, and we would have evacuated nothing, but in these five days we have helped our Finnish comrades—I shall not say how much, they know themselves.

Words that we betrayed Finland are the most childish phrase. We helped precisely by retreating in time before the Germans. Russia will never perish if Petrograd falls; on this point Comrade Bukharin is a thousand times right, but if one maneuvers à la Bukharin, then one can ruin a good revolution. (Laughter.)

We have betrayed neither Finland nor Ukraine. Not one conscious worker will reproach us for this. We are helping as we can. We have not withdrawn and will not withdraw a single good man from our troops. If you say that Hoffmann will catch us, surround us—of course, he can; I have no doubt of that—but in how many days will he do it, he does not know and no one knows. Besides, your reasoning, that he will catch and surround us, is a matter of the political balance of forces, about which I shall speak further.

Having explained why I absolutely cannot accept Trotsky's proposal—politics cannot be conducted this way—I must say that Radek showed the extent to which comrades at our congress have moved away from the phrase that actually remained with Uritsky. I cannot in any way accuse him of resorting to phrases in this statement. He said: "There is not a shadow of betrayal, not a scrap of shame, because it is clear that you retreated before an overwhelming military force." This is an evaluation that completely refutes Trotsky's position. When Radek said: "Clenching your teeth, you must prepare forces," that is true—on this I wholly agree: not boasting, but clenching your teeth, prepare yourselves.

Clenching your teeth, not boasting, but prepare forces. Revolutionary war will come, we have no disagreements on that; disagreements concern the Tilsit peace—should we sign it? Worst of all is a sick army, yes, and therefore there must be one firm line in the Central Committee, not disagreements or a middle line, which Comrade Bukharin also supported. I do not paint rosy pictures about the respite; no one knows how long it will last, and I do not know. It is ridiculous when people try to squeeze out of me how long the respite will last. Thanks to preserved communications, we are helping both Ukraine and Finland. We are using the respite by maneuvering, retreating.

To the German worker one can no longer say that the Russians are being capricious, for now it is clear that Germano-Japanese imperialism is advancing, and this will be clear to everyone and each; besides the desire to strangle the Bolsheviks, the German has a desire to strangle on the West as well, everything is mixed up, and in this new war one will have to and must be able to maneuver.

Touching on Comrade Bukharin's speech, I note that when he lacks arguments, he brings up something from Uritsky and says: "The treaty disgraces us." Here arguments are unnecessary: if we are disgraced, we should have gathered our papers and fled, but although we are "disgraced," I do not think our positions have been shaken. Comrade Bukharin attempted to analyze the class basis of our positions, but instead told an anecdote about a deceased economist from Moscow. When we found in our tactics a connection with speculation, then—upon my word, it is funny—we forgot that the relation of the class as a whole—the class, not speculators—shows us that Russian bourgeoisie and all its hangers-on—the Constitutional Democrats and the New Life supporters{20}—are drawing us into this war with all their might. You do not emphasize this class fact. To declare war on Germany now means to succumb to the provocation of Russian bourgeoisie. This is not new, because it is the surest—I do not say: absolutely sure, nothing is absolutely sure—it is the surest way to bring us down now. When Comrade Bukharin said: life will tell, everything will end with us acknowledging revolutionary war—he was celebrating an easy victory, because we predicted the inevitability of revolutionary war back in 1915. Our disagreements were about whether the German would advance or not; that we needed to declare the state of war ended; that in the interests of revolutionary war we must retreat physically, surrendering the country to gain time. Strategy and policy prescribe the most vile peace treaty. All our disagreements will disappear once we acknowledge this tactic.

A brief account was printed on March 19 (March 6 old style), 1918, in the newspaper "Raboche-Krestyansky Nizhegorodsky Listok" (Workers' and Peasants' Nizhny Novgorod Gazette), No. 54