One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution

Published:First published inRabochy PutNo. 10, September 27 (14), 1917.

      Signed:N. Lenin.

      Published according to the text inRabochy Put.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      Progress Publishers,1977,

      Moscow,Volume 25,

      pages370-377.Translated:Transcription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive.  

      2002You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work, as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

Thekey question of every revolution is undoubtedly the
      question of state power. Which class holds power decides
      everything. WhenDyelo Naroda, the paper of the chief governing
      party in Russia, recently complained (No. 147) that, owing to
      the controversies over power, both the question of the
      Constituent Assembly and that of bread are being forgotten, the
      Socialist-Revolutionaries should have been answered, “Blame
      yourselves. For it is the wavering and indecision ofyourparty
      that are mostly to blame for ‘ministerial leapfrog’, the
      interminable postponements of the Constituent Assembly, and the
      undermining by the capitalists of the planned and agreed
      measures of a grain monopoly and of providing the country with
      bread.”

Thequestion of power cannot be evaded or brushed aside,
    because it is the key question determiningeverythingin a
    revolution’s development, and in its foreign and domestic
    policies. It is an undisputed fact that our revolution has
    “wasted” six months in wavering over the system of power; it
    is a fact resulting from the wavering policy of the
    Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In the long run, these
    parties’ wavering policy was determined by the class position of
    the petty bourgeoisie, by their economic instability in the
    struggle between capital and labour.

Thewhole issue at present is whether the petty-bourgeois
    democrats have learned anything during these great, exceptionally
    eventful six months. If not, then the revolution is lost, and only
    a victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If they have
    learned something, the establishment of a stable, unwavering power
    must be begun immediately.Only if power is based, obviously and
    unconditionally,on a majorityof the population can it be stable
    during a popular revolution, i.e., a revolution which rouses the
    people, the majority of the workers and peasants, to action. Up to
      now state power in Russia hasvirtuallyremained in the hands of
    thebourgeoisie, who are compelled to make only particular
    concessions (only to begin withdrawing them the following day), to
    hand out promises (only to fail to carry them out), to search for
    all sorts of excuses to cover their domination (only to fool the
    people by a show of “honest coalition”), etc., etc. In
    words it claims to be a popular, democratic, revolutionary
    government, but in deeds it is an anti-popular, undemocratic,
    counter-revolutionary, bourgeois government. This is the
    contradiction which has existed so far and which has been a source
    of the complete instability and inconsistency of power, of that
    “ministerial leapfrog” in which the S.R.s and Mensheviks
    have been engaged with such unfortunate (for the people)
    enthusiasm.

Inearly June 1917 1 told the All-Russia Congress of
Soviets[1]that either the Soviets would be dispersed and die an inglorious
    death, or all power must be transferred to them. The events of
    July and August very convincingly bore out these words. No matter
    what lies the lackeys of the bourgeoisie—Potresov, Plekhanov
    and others, who designate as “broadening the base” of power
    its virtual transfer to a tiny minority of the people, to the
    bourgeoisie, the exploiters—may resort to, only the power of
    the Soviets can be stable, obviously based on a majority of the
    people.

OnlySoviet power could be stable and not be overthrown even in
    the stormiest moments of the stormiest revolution. Only this power
    could assure a continuous and broad development of the revolution,
    a peaceful struggle of parties within the Soviets. Until this
    power is created, there will inevitably be indecision,
    instability, vacillation, endless “crises of power”, a
    constant farce of ministerial leapfrog, outbreaks on the Right and
    on the Left.

Theslogan, “Power to the Soviets”, however, is very
    often, if not in most cases, taken quite incorrectly to meana
    “Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority”. We would
    like to go into more detail on this very false notion.

A“Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority” means a
    change of individual ministers, with the entire old government
    apparatus left intact—a thoroughly bureaucratic and thoroughly
    undemocratic apparatus incapable of carrying out serious reforms,
    such as are contained even in the S.R. and Menshevik
    programmes.

“Powerto the Soviets” means radically reshaping the
    entire old state apparatus, that bureaucratic apparatus which
    hampers everything democratic. It means removing this apparatus
    and substituting for it a new, popular one, i.e., a truly
    democratic apparatus of Soviets, i.e., the organised and armed
    majority of the people—the workers, soldiers and peasants. It
    means allowing the majority of the people initiative and
    independence not only in the election of deputies, but also in
    state administration, in effecting reforms and various other
    changes.

Tomake this difference clearer and more comprehensible, it is
    worth recalling a valuable admission made some time ago by the
    paper of the governing party of the S.R.s,Dyelo Naroda. It wrote
    thatevenin those ministries which were in the hands of socialist
    Ministers (this was written during the notorious coalition with
    the Cadets, when some Mensheviks and S.R.s were ministers), the
    entire administrative apparatus had remained unchanged, and
    hampered work.

Thisis quite understandable. The entire history of the
    bourgeois-parliamentary, and also, to a considerable extent, of
    the bourgeois-constitutional, countries shows that a change of
    ministers means very little, for the real work of administration
    is in the hands of an enormous army of officials. This army,
    however, is undemocratic through and through, it is connected by
    thousands and millions of threads with the landowners and the
    bourgeoisie and is completely dependent on them. This army is
    surrounded by an atmosphere of bourgeois relations, and breathes
    nothing but this atmosphere. It is set in its ways, petrified,
    stagnant, and is powerless to break free of this atmosphere. It
    can only think, feel, or act in the old way. This army is bound by
    servility to rank, by certain privileges of “Civil”Service;
    the upper ranks of this army are, through the medium of shares and
    banks, entirely enslaved by finance capital, being to a certain
    extent its agent and a vehicle of its interests and influence.

Itis the greatest delusion, the greatest self-deception, and a
    deception of the people, to attempt, by means ofthisstate
    apparatus, to carry out such reforms as the abolition of landed
    estates without compensation, or the grain monopoly, etc. This
    apparatuscanserve a republican bourgeoisie, creating a republic
    in the shape of a “monarchy without a monarch”, like the
    French Third Republic, but it is absolutely incapable of carrying
    out reforms which would even seriously curtail or limit the rights
    of capital, the rights of “sacred private property”, much
    less abolish those rights. That is why it always happens, under
    all sorts of “coalition” Cabinets that include
    “socialists”, that these socialists, even when individuals
    among them are perfectly honest, in reality turn out to be either
    a useless ornament of or a screen for the bourgeois government, a
    sort of lightning conductor to divert the people’s indignation
    from the government, a tool for the government to deceive the
    people. This was the case with Louis Blanc in 1848, and dozens of
    times in Britain and France, when socialists participated in
    Cabinets. This is also the case with the Chernovs and Tseretelis in
    1917. So it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois
    system exists and as long as the old bourgeois, bureaucratic state
    apparatus remains intact.

TheSoviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies are
    particularly valuable because they represent a newtypeof state
    apparatus, which is immeasurably higher, incomparably more
    democratic. The S.R.s and Mensheviks have done everything, the
    possible and the impossible, to turn the Soviets (particularly the
    Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russia Soviet, i.e., the Central
    Executive Committee) into useless talking shops which, under the
    guise of “control”, merely adopted useless resolutions and
    suggestions which the government shelved with the most polite and
    kindly smile. The “fresh breeze” of the Kornilov affair,
    however, which promised a real storm, was enough for all that was
    musty in the Soviet to blow away for a while, and for the
    initiative of the revolutionary people to beginexpressing itself
    as something majestic, powerful and invincible.

Letall sceptics learn from this example from history. Let
    those who say: “We have no apparatus to replace the old one,
    which inevitably gravitates towards the defence of the
    bourgeoisie,” be ashamed of themselves. For this apparatusexists. It is the Soviets. Don’t be afraid of the people’s
    initiative and independence. Put your faith in their revolutionary
    organisations, and you will seein allrealms of state affairs the
    same strength, majesty and invincibility of the workers and
    peasants as were displayed in their unity and their fury against
    Kornilov.

Lackof faith in the people, fear of their initiative and
    independence, trepidation before their revolutionary energy
    instead of all-round and unqualified support for it—this is
    where the S.R. and Menshevik leaders have sinned most of all. This
    is where we find one of the deepest roots of their indecision,
    their vacillation, their infinite and infinitely fruitless
    attempts to pour new wine into the old bottles of the old,
    bureaucratic state apparatus.

Takethe history of the democratisation of the army in the 1917
    Russian revolution, the history of the Chernov Ministry, of
    Palchinsky’s “reign”, and of Peshekhonov’s
    resignation—you will find what we have said above strikingly
    borne out at every step. Because there was no full confidence in
    the elected, soldiers’ organisations and no absolute observance of
    the principle of soldiers electing their commanding officers, the
    Kornilovs, Kaledins and counter-revolutionary officers came to be
    at the head of the army. This is a fact. Without deliberately
    closing one’s eyes, one cannot fail to see thatafterthe Kornilov
    affair Kerensky’s government isleaving everything as before, thatin fact it is bringing back the Kornilov affair. The appointment
    of Alexeyev, the “peace” with the Klembovskys, Gagarins,
    Bagrations and other Kornilov men, and leniency in the treatment
    of Kornilov and Kaledin all very clearly prove that Kerensky is in
    fact bringing back the Kornilov affair.

Thereis no middle course. This has been shown by
    experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets and the army is
    made fully democratic, or another Kornilov affair occurs.

Andwhat about the history of the Chernov Ministry? Didn’t it
    prove that every more or less serious step towards actually
    satisfying the peasants’ needs, every step showing confidence in
    the peasants and in their mass organisations and actions, evoked
    very great enthusiasm among them? Chernov, however, had to spend
    almost four months “haggling” with the Cadets and
    bureaucrats, who by endless delays and intrigues finally forced
    him to resign without having accomplished anything. For and during
    these four months the landowners and capitalists “won the
    game”—they saved the landed estates, delayed the convocation
    of the Constituent Assembly, and even started a number of
    repressions against the land committees.

Thereis no middle course. This has been shown by
    experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets both centrally
    and locally, and all land is given to the peasantsimmediately,
    pending the Constituent Assembly’s decision, or the landowners and
    capitalists obstruct every step, restore the landowners’ power,
    drive the peasants into a rage and carry things to an exceedingly
    violent peasant revolt.

Thesame thing happened when the capitalists (with the aid of
    Palchinsky) crushed every more or less serious attempt to
    supervise production, when the merchants thwarted the grain
    monopoly and broke up the regulated democratic distribution of
    grain and other foodstuffs justbegunby Peshekhonov.

Whatis now necessary in Russia is not to invent“new
      reforms”,not to make“plans”for“comprehensive”changes.Nothing of the kind.This is how the situation is
    depicted—deliberately depicted in a false light—by the
    capitalists, the Potresovs, the Plekhanovs, who shout against“introducing socialism”and against the“dictatorship of
    the proletariat”. The situation in Russia in fact is such that
    the unprecedented burdens and hardships of the war, the
    unparalleled and very real danger of economic dislocation and
    famine have of themselves suggested the way out, have of
    themselves not only pointed out, but advanced reforms and other
    changes as absolutely necessary. These changes must be the grain
    monopoly, control over production and distribution, restriction of
    the issue of paper money, a fair exchange of grain for
    manufactured goods, etc.

Everyonerecognises measures of this kind and in this direction
    as inevitable, and in many places they have already been launched
    from the most diverse sides.They have already been launched, but
    they have been and are being obstructed everywhere by the
    resistance of the landowners and the capitalists, which is being
    put up through the Kerensky government (an utterly bourgeois
    and Bonapartist governmentin reality), through the old
    bureaucratic state apparatus, and through the direct and indirect
    pressure of Russian and “Allied” finance capital.

Notso long ago I. Prilezhayev, lamenting the resignation of
    Peshekhonov and the collapse of the fixed prices and the grain
    monopoly, wrote inDyelo Naroda(No. 147):

“Courageand resolve are what our governments of all
	compositions have lacked. . . . The revolutionary democrats must
	not wait; they must themselves show initiative, and intervene in
	the economic chaos in a planned way. . . . If anywhere, it is here
	that a firm course and a determined government are
	necessary.”

“Courageand resolve are what our governments of all
	compositions have lacked. . . . The revolutionary democrats must
	not wait; they must themselves show initiative, and intervene in
	the economic chaos in a planned way. . . . If anywhere, it is here
	that a firm course and a determined government are
	necessary.”

Thatgoes without saying. Words of gold. The only trouble is
    that the author forgot that the question of the firm course to
    take, of courage and resolve, is not a personal matter, but a
    question of whichclassis capable of manifesting courage and
    resolve. The only class capable of this is the proletariat. A
    courageous and resolute government ..steering a firm course is
    nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor
    peasants. I. Prilezhayev unwittingly longs forthis
    dictatorship.

Whatwould such a dictatorship mean in practice? It would mean
    nothing but the fact that the resistance of the Kornilov men would
    be broken and the democratisation of the army restored and
    completed. Two days after its creation ninety-mine per cent of the
    army would be enthusiastic supporters of this dictatorship. This
    dictatorship would give land to the peasants and ‘full power to
    the local peasant committees. How can anyone in his right senses
    doubt that the peasants would support this dictatorship? What
    Peshekhonov onlypromised(“the resistance of the capitalists
    has been. broken” was what Peshekhonov actually said in his
    famous speech before the Congress of Soviets), this dictatorship
    would put into effect, would translate into reality. At the same
    time the democratic organisations offood supply, control, etc.,
    that have already begun to form would in no way be
    eliminated. They would, on the contrary, be supported and
    developed, and all obstacles in the way of their work would be
    removed.

Onlythe dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants
    is capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, of
    displaying truly supreme courage and determination in the exercise
    of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, selfless and truly
    heroic support of the masses both ‘in the army and among the
    peasants.

Powerto the Soviets—this is the only way to make further
    progress gradual, peaceful and smooth, keeping perfect pace with
    the political awareness and resolve of the majority of the people
    and with their own experience. Power to the Soviets means the
    complete transfer of the country’s administration and economic
    control into the hands of the workers and peasants, to whomnobodywould dare offer resistance and who, through practice, through
      their own experience,would soon learnhow to distribute the land,
    products and grain properly.

[1]Seepp. 17–19 of this volume.—Ed.