Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Conspectus of Hegel’sScience of Logic—Book II (Essence)

Book Two:Essence

“The truth of Being is Essence.”(3)[1]Such is the first sentence, sounding thor-oughly idealistic and mystical. Butimmediately afterwards, a fresh wind,

so to speak, begins to blow: “Being is theimmediate. Knowledge seeks to understandthat truth[2]which Being,in and foritself, is, and therefore it does not halt”(does not haltNB) “at the imme-

diate and its determinations, butpene-trates(NB) through (NB) it, assum-ing thatbehind(Hegel’s italics) this Beingthere is something other than Being itself,and that this background constitutes thetruth of Being. This cognition is mediatedknowledge, for it is not lodged immedi-ately. with and in Essence, but begins atan Other, at Being, and has to make a pre-

liminary passage, the passage of transitionbeyond Being, or rather of entrance intoit....”

This Bewegung,[3]the path of knowl-edge, seems to be the “activity of cognition”(Tätligkeit des Erkennens) “external to Be-ing.”

“However, this movement is the move-ment of Being itself.”

“Essence ... is what it is ... by virtueof its owninfinite movementof Being.”(4)

“Absolute Essencehas no DeterminateBeing. Into this, however, it must pass.”(5)

Essence stands midway between Beingand the Notion, as the transition to the No-tion (=Absolute).

Subdivisions ofEssence: Semblance orShow (Schein), Appearance (Erscheinung),Actuality (Wirlichkeit).

Das Wesentliche und das Unwesentli-che.[4](8) Der Schein. (9)

In the unessential, in Semblance, thereis a moment of not-Being. (10)

i.e., the unessential, seeming, super-ficial, vanishes more often, does not holdso “tightly,” does not “sit so firmly” asas “Essence.” Etwa[5]: the movementof a river—the foam above and the deepcurrents below.But even thefoamis an expression of essence!

Semblance and scepticism, Kantianism,respectively:“Semblance then is the phenomenon ofscepticism; or again the appearance of ideal-ism, such an immediacy, which is neitherSomething nor Thing, and, generally, isnot an indifferent Being which could beoutside its determinateness and relationto the subject. Scepticism did not dare to

affirm ‘it is’;modern idealism did notdare to regard cognition as a knowledgeof the Thing-in-itself;with the former,

Semblance was supposed to have no basisat all in any Being; with the latter, theThing-in-itself was supposed incapable ofentering into cognition. But at the same

time scepticism admitted manifold deter-

minations of its Semblance, or rather itsSemblance had for content all the manifoldriches of the world. In the same mannerthe appearance of idealism comprehendsthe whole range of these manifold determi-natenesses.“

You include in Schein[6]all the wealthof the world and you deny the objectivityof Schein!!

Semblance and appearance are immediate-ly determined so diversely. The contentmay then have no basis in any Being nor inany thing nor Thing-in-itself; for itself itremains as it is: it has only been translatedfrom being into Semblance; thus Semblancecontains these manifold determinatenesses,

which are immediate, existent and recip-rocally other. Semblance itself is, then,immediately determinate. It may have thisor that content; but whatever content ithas is not posited by itself but belongs to itimmediately. The idealism of Leibnitz,

Kant or Fichte, like any other form of ideal-ism, did not reach beyond Being as deter-minateness, beyond this immediacy anymore than scepticism. Scepticism allows

the content“that which is immediatelygiven”!! of its Semblance to begivento it; for it, it isimmediate, whatever con-tent it is to have. The monad of Leibnitzdevelops its presentations out of itself;but it is no creative and connecting force,—the presentations arise in it like bubbles;they are indifferent and immediate rela-tive to one another, and therefore to the

monad itself. Similarly Kant’s phenomenonis agivencontent of perception; it presup-poses affections, determinations of the sub-

ject which are immediate to one anotherand to the subject. The infinite limitationor check of Fichte's idealism refuses per-haps, to be based on any Thing-in_itself,so that it becomes purely a determinate-ness in the Ego. But this determinatenessisimmediateand alimitto the Ego, which,transcending its externality, incorporatesit; and though the Ego can pass beyondthe limit, the latter has in it an aspectof indifference by virtue of which itcontains an immediate not-Being ofthe Ego, though itself contained in theEgo.” (10-11)

...“Determinations which distinguish it”(den Schein) “from Essence are deter-minations of Essence....” (12)

...“It is the immediacy of not-Beingwhich constitutes Semblance; in Essence,Being is not-Being. Its nullity in itself isthenegative nature of Essenceitself....”(12)

...“These two moments thus constituteSemblance: Nullity, which however persists,and Being, which however is Moment; oragain negativity which is in itself, andreflected immediacy. Consequently thesemoments are the moments of Essence it-self....”

“Semblance is Essence itself in the deter-minateness of Being....” (12-13)

Semblance is (1) nothing, non-exis-tent (Nichtigkeit) whichexists—(2) Being as moment

“Thus Semblance is Essence itself, butEssence in a determinateness, and this insuch a manner that determinateness is onlyits moment: Essence is the showing of it-self in itself.”(14)

That which shows itself is essence inoneof its determinations, in one of itsaspects, in one of its moments.Essenceseems to be just that. Semblance is theshowing (Scheinen) of essence itself initself.

...“Essence ... contains Semblance withinitself, as infinite internal movement....”(14)

...“In this its self-movement Essence isReflection. Semblance is the same as Re-flection.” (14)

Semblance (that which shows itself)is theReflectionof Essence in (it)itself.

...“Becoming in Essence—its reflectivemovement—is hence the movement fromNothing to Nothing and through Nothingback to itself....”(15)

This is shrewd and profound. Move-ments “to nothing” occur in nature andin life. Only there are certainly none“from nothing.” Always from something.

“Commonly Reflection is taken in thesubjective meaning of the movement ofjudgment which passes beyond a given im-mediate presentation, seeking universal de-terminations for it or comparing them with,it.”(21)(Quotation from Kant—Critiqueof the Power of Judgment[7]).... “Here,however, neither the reflection of conscious-ness nor the more determinate reflection ofunderstanding, which has the particular andthe universal for its determinations, is inquestion, but only Reflection in general....”

Thus here too, Hegel charges Kantwithsubjectivism. ThisNB. Hegel isfor the “objective validity” (sit veniaverbo[8]) of Semblance,

		  “of that whichis immediately given” [the expression“that which is given” is gener-ally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21i.f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophersdispute whether essenceorthat whichis immediately given should be takenas basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists).Instead ofo r, Hegel putsand, explain-ing the concrete content of this “and.”

“Die Reflexion is the showing of Essenceinto itself”(27)(translation? Reflectivity?Reflective determination? Рефлексия isnot suitable).[9]

“It” (das Wesen) “is a movement throughdifferent moments, absolute self-media-tion....”(27)Identity — Difference — Contradiction(+Gegensatz[10])   (Ground)...(  in particular )(  antithesis   )

Therefore Hegel elucidates the one-sided-ness, the incorrectness of the “law of iden-tity” (A = A), of the category (all determi-nations of that which is are categories—pp.27-28).

“If everything is self-identical it is notdistinguished: it contains no oppositionand has no ground.” (29)

“Essence is ... simple self-identity.”(30)

Ordinary thinking places resemblance anddifference next to (“daneben”) each other,not understanding “this movement oftransition of one of these determinationsinto the other” (31)

And again, against the law of identity(A = A): its adherents

“since they cling to thisrigidIdentitywhich as its opposite in Variety, they donot see that they are thereby making itinto aone-sideddeterminateness, whichas such as no truth.”(33)

(“Empty tautology”: 32)

“It contains onlyformaltruth,which isabstractand incomplete.” (33)

Kinds of reflection:external, etc.; ex-pounded very obscurely.

The principles of difference: “All thingsare different....” “A is also not A....” (44)

“There are no two things which are en-tirely alike....”

There is a difference in one or anotheraspect (Seite), Rücksicht, etc. “insofern,”[11]etc.

“The customary tenderness for things,whose only care is that they shall notcontradict one another, forgets here as else-where that this is no solution of the contra-diction, which is merely planted elsewhere,namely, intosubjective or external re-flection;and that the latter does in factcontain the two moments—which this re-moval and transplantation proclaim to bea mere positedness—in one unity as tran-scended and related to each other.”(47)

(This irony is exquisite! “Tenderness”for nature and history (among the philis-tines)—the endeavour to cleanse them fromcontradictions and struggle....)

The result of the addition of plus and mi-nus is nought. “The result of contradictionis not only nought.” (59)

The solution of the contradiction, the re-duction of positive and negative to “onlydeterminations” (61) convertsEssence(dasWesen) intoGround(Grund) (ibidem).

...“Resolved Contradiction is, then,Grund, that is, Essence as unity of Positiveand Negative....”(62)

“Even a slight experience in reflectivethought will perceive that, if anything hasjust been determined as Positive, it straight-way turns into Negative if any progressis made from that base, and converselythat a Negative determination turns intoPositive; that reflective thought becomesconfused in these determinations and con-tradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintancewith the nature of these determinationsleads to the conclusion that this confusionis a fault which should not occur, andattributes it to asubjectiveerror. Andin fact this transition does remain mere

confusion insofar as thenecessityfor thismetamorphosisis not present toconsciousness.“(63)

...“The opposition of Positive and Nega-tive is especially taken in the meaningthat the former (although etymologicallyit expresses being posited or positedness)is to be an objective entity, and the lattersubjective, belonging only to externalreflection and in no way concerned withthe objective, which is in and for itselfand quite ignores it.”(64)“And indeed ifthe Negative expresses nothing but theabstraction af subjective caprice....” (thenit, this Negative, does not exist “für dasobjective Positive”[12])....

Truth, too, is the Positive, as knowl-edge, corresponding with itsobjectbutit is this self-equality only insofar asknowledge has already taken up a negativeattitude to the Other, haspenetrated theobject, and transcended that negation whichthe object is. Error is a Positive, as anopinion affirming that which is not in

and for itself, an opinion which knows

itself and asserts itself. But ignorance iseither indifference to truth and error, andthus determined neither as positive nor asnegative,—and if it is determined as a de-

ficiency, this determinatian belongs to ex-ternal reflection; or else, objectively andas proper determinatian af a nature, itis the impulse which is directed againstitself, a negative which contains a positivedirection.—It is of the greatest impor-tance to recognise this nature af the Deter-minations af Reflection which have beenconsidered here, that their truth consistsonly in their relation to each other, andtherefore in the fact that each contains theother in its own concept. This must beunderstood and remembered, far withoutthis understanding not a step can reallybe taken in philosophy.”(65-66)Thisfrom the Note 1.————

Note 2. “The Law of the Excluded Middle”

Hegel quotes this proposition af the ex-cluded middle. “Something is either A ornot A; there is no third”(66)and “anal-yses” it. If it implies that “alles einEntgegengesetztes ist,”[13]that everythinghas its positive and its negative determi-nation, then it is all right. But if it isunderstood as it is generally understood,that, of all predicates, either a givenone, or its not-Being, applies, then thisis a “triviality”!! Spirit ... sweet, not sweet?green, not green? The determination shouldlead to determinateness, but in this triv-iality it leads to nothing.

And then—Hegel says wittily—it issaid that there is no third. There is a thirdin this thesis itself.Aitself is the third, forAcan be both +Aand -A. “The Some-thing thus is itself the third term whichwas supposed to be excluded.” (67)

This is shrewd and correct. Every con-crete thing, every concrete something,stands in multifarious and often con-tradictory relations to everything else,ergo it is itself and some other.

Note 3 (at the end of Chapter2, Sec-tion1of Book II of theLogic). “theLaw of Contradiction.”

“If now the primary Determinations ofReflection—Identity, Variety and Oppo-sition—are established in a proposition,then the determination into which theypass over as into their truth (namely Con-tradiction) should much more so be com-prehended and expressed in a proposition:all things are contradicto-ry in themselves, in this meaning,

thatthis propositionas opposed to theothers expresses much better thetruthand essence of things.—Contradiction,

which emerges in Opposition, is no morethan developed Nothing; and this is alreadycontained in Identity, and occurred in theexpression that the law of identity statesnothing. This negation further determinesitself into Variety and into Opposition,which now is posited Contradiction.

“But it has been a fundamental prejudiceof hitherto existing logic and of ordinaryimagination that Contradiction is a deter-mination having less essence and immanencethan Identity; but indeed, if there were

any question of rank, and the two deter-minations had to be fixed as separate, Cont-radiction would have to be taken as themore profound and more fully essential.

For as opposed to it Identity is only thedetermination of simple immediacy, or

of dead Being, while Contradiction is therood of all movement andvitality,and it is only insofar as it contains a Con-tradiction that anythingmoves andhas impulse and activity.

“Ordinarily Contradiction is removed,

first of all from things, from the existentand the true in general; and it is assertedthat there is nothing contradictory. Nextit is shifted into subjective reflection,which alone is said to posit it by relat-

ing and comparing it. But really it doesnot exist even in this reflection, for it isimpossible to imagine or to think anythingcontradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, bothin actuality and in thinking reflection, isconsidered an accident, a kind of abnormal-ity or paroxysm of sickness which will soonpass away.

“With regard to the assertion that Con-tradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement.In every experience thete must be an ab-solute determination of Essence—in everyactuality as well as in every concept.The same remark has already been madeabove, under Infinity, which is Contradic-tion as it appears in the sphere of Being.But ordinary experience itself declares thatat least there are a number of contradic-tory things, arrangements and so forth, thecontradiction being present in them andnot merely in an external reflection. Butit must further not be taken only as anabnormality which occurs just here and

there; it is the Negative in its essentialdetermination, theprinciple all self-

movement,which consists of nothing elsebut an exhibition of Contradiction. Exter-

nal, sensible motion is itself its immediateexistence. Something moves, not becauseit is here at one point of time and thereat another, but because at one and thesame point of time it is here and not here,and in this here both is and is not. Wemust grant the old dialecticians the contra-dictions which they prove in motion; butwhat follows is not that there is no mo-tion, but rather that motion isexistentContradiction itself.

“And similarly internal self-movementproper, or impulse in general (the appe-titive force or nisus of the monad, the en-telechy of absolutely simple Essence), isnothing else than the fact that something isin itself and is also the deficiency or the neg-ative of itself, inbne and the same respect.Abstractself-identityhas no vi-talitybut the fact that Positive in itselfis negativity causes it to pass outside itself

andto change. Something therefore isliving only insofar as it contains Contra-diction, and is that force which can both

comprehend and endure Contradiction. But

if an existent something cannot in its pos-itive determination also encroach on itsnegative, cannot hold fast the one in theother and contain Contradiction within it-self, then it is not living unity, or Ground,but perishes in Contradiction. Speculative

thought consists only in this, that thoughtholds fast Contradiction and itself in Con-tradiction and not in that it allows itselfto be dominated by it—as happens to imag-ination—or suffers its determinations to beresolved into others, or into Nothing.”(67-70)

Movement and “self-movement” (thisNB! arbitrary (independent), spon-taneous,internally-necessarymovement),“change,” “movement and vitality,” “theprinciple of all self-movement,” “impulse”(Trieb) to “movement” and to “activity”—the opposite to “dead Being”—whowould believe that this is the core of “He-gelianism,” of abstract and abstrusen (pon-derous, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This corehad to be discovered, understood, hin-überretten,[14]laid bare, refined, which isprecisely what Marx and Engels did.

The idea of universal movement andchange (1813Logic) was conjectured beforeits application to life and society. In regardto society it was proclaimed earlier (1847)than it was demonstrated in applicationto man (1859).[15]

“In movement, impulse, and the like,

thesimplicityof these determinations con-ceals the contradiction from imagination;but this contradiction immediately standsrevealed in the determinations of relation.

The most trivial examples—above and be-low, right and left, father and son, and soon without end—all contain Contradictionin one term. That is above which is notbelow; ‘above’ is determined only as notbeing ‘below,’ and is only insofar as thereis a ‘below,’ and conversely: one deter-mination implies its opposite. Father isthe Other of son, and son of father, andeach exists only as this Other of the other;and also the one determination exists onlyin relation to the other: their Being is onesubsistence..........(70)

”Thus although Imagination everywherehas Contradiction for content, it neverbecomes aware of it; it remains an externalreflection, which passes from Likeness toUnlikeness, or from negative relation tointro-reflectedness of the different terms.

It keeps these two determinations externalto each other, and has in mind only theseand not their transition, which is the es-sential matter and contains the Contradic-

tion.—On the other hand, intelligent reflec-tion, if we may mention this here, consistsin the understanding and enunciating ofContradiction. It does not express the con-cept of things and their relations, and hasonly determinations of imagination for ma-terial and content; but still it relates them,and the relation contains their contradic-tion, allowing their concept to show throughthe contradiction.—Thinking Reason, onthe other hand, sharpens (so to speak)the blunt difference of Variety, the meremanifold of imagination, into essentialdifference, that is, Opposition. The mani-fold entities acquire activity and vitalityin relation to one another only when drivenon to the sharp point of Contradiction;thence they draw negativity, which is theinherent pulsation of self-movement andvitality....” (70-71)

NB(1) Ordinary imagination grasps dif-ference and contradiction, but not thetransitionfrom one to the other,this however is the mostimportant.(2) Intelligence and understanding.Intelligence grasps contradiction,enunciatesit, brings things into rela-tion with one another, allows the“concept to show through the contra-diction,” but does notexpresstheconcept of things and their relations.(3) Thinking reason (understanding)sharpens the blunt difference of vari-ety, the mere manifold of imagination,intoessentialdifference, intoopposi-tion. Only when raised to the peak ofcontradiction, do the manifold enti-ties become active (regasm) and livelyin relation to one another,—they re-ceive[16]acquire that negativity whichis theinherent pulsationof self-movement andvitality.

Subdivisions:Der Grund—(ground)(1) Absolute Ground—die Grundlage (thefoundation). “Form and Matter.” “Con-tent.”(2) Determinate Ground (as the ground[for] a determinate content)

Its transition toConditioning Media-tiondie bedingende Vermittelung

(3) The Thing-in-Itself (transition toExis-tence). Note."The Law of Ground"

Customary proposition: “Everything hasits sufficient Ground.”

“In general this just means that what ismust be considered not as an existent im-mediate, but as a posited entity. We mustnot remain at immediate Determinate Be-ing or at determinateness in general, butmust pass back to its Ground....”(76)It is superfluous to add:sufficientGround.What is insufficient, is not Ground.

Leibnitz, who made the law of sufficientground the basis of his philosophy, un-derstood more profoundly. “Leib-nitzespecially opposed the sufficiency ofGround tocausalityin its strictmeaning ofmechanicalefficacy.”(76)He looked for “Beziehung” der Ursach-en[17](77),——“the whole as essential unity.”

He looked forends, but teleologydoes not belong here, according toHegel, but to the doctrine of the No-tion.

...“The question cannot therefore beasked, how Form is added to Essence; forForm is only the showing of Essence initself—it is its own immanent (sic!) Re-flection....”(81)

Form is essential. Essence isformed. In one way or another also independence on Essence....

Essenceas formless identity (of itselfwith itself) becomesmatter.(82)

“...It” (die Materie[18]) “is the real foun-dation or substratum of Form....”(82)

“If abstraction is made from every de-termination and Form of a Something,indeterminate Matter remains. Matter isa pureabstract. (—Matter cannot be seenor felt, etc.—what is seen or felt is ade-terminate Matter, that is, a unity of Matterand Form).” (82)

Matter is not theGroundof Form, butthe unity of Ground and Grounded. (83)Matter is thepassive, Form is theactive(tätiges). “Matter must be formed,and Form must materialise itself....”(84)

Now this, which appears as the activityof Form, is equally the proper movementof Matter itself....” (85-86)

...“Both—the activity of Form and themovement of Matter—are the same.... Mat-ter is determined as such or necessarily hasa Form; and Form is simply material,persistent Form.” (86)

Note:“Formal Method of Explanationfrom Tautological Grounds”

Very often, Hegel says, especially in thephysical sciences, “Grounds” are explainedtautologically: the movement of the earthis explained by the“attractive force”ofthe sun. And what	then is attractive force?It is also movement!! (92) Empty tautol-ogy: why does this man go to town? Be-cause of the attractive force of the town!(93) It also happens in science that at firstmolecules, the ether, “electrical matter”(95-96), etc., are put forward as “ground,”and then it turns out “that they”	(these con-cepts) “are determinations deduced fromthat for which they are meant to be thegrounds—hypotheses and figments derivedby an uncritical reflection....” (96) Or it issaid that “we do not know the inner natureitself of these forces and classes of matter...”(96) then there remains indeed Nothing to“explain,” but one must simply limit one-self to the facts....

Der reale Grund[19]... is not tautology,but already “some other determination ofContent.” (97)

On the question of “Ground” (Grund),Hegel remarks inter alia:“If it is said of Nature that it is theground of the world, then what is calledNature isidenticalwith the world, andthe world is nothing but Nature itself.”(100)On the other hand, “if Nature is tobe the world, a manifold of determinationsis added externally....”

Since everything has “mehere”—“Inhalts-bestimmungen, Verhältnisse und Rücksich-ten,”[20]so any number of argumentsforandagainstcan be put forward. (103)That is what Socrates and Plato calledsophistry. Such arguments do not contain“the whole extent of the thing,” they do not“exhaust” it (in the sense “of constituting itsconnections” and “containing all” its sides).

The transition of Ground (Grund) intocondition (Bedingung).

If I am not mistaken, there is muchmysticism and leeres[21]pedantry inthese conclusions of Hegel, but the basicidea is one of genius: that of the univer-sal, all-sidedvitalconnection of every-thing with everything and the reflec-tion of this connection—materialistiischauf den Kopf gestellter Hegel[22]human concepts, which must likewisebe hewn, treated,	flexible, mobile, rel-ative, mutually connected, united inopposites, in order to embrace the world.Continuation of the work of Hegel andMarx must consist in thedialec-ticalelaboration of the history of hu-man thought, science and technique.

A river and thedropsin this river.The position ofeverydrop, its relationto the others; its connection with theothers; the direction of its movement;its speed; the line of the movement—straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards,downwards. The sum of the movement.Concepts, asregistrationof individualaspects of the movement, of individ-ual drops (=“things”), of individual“streams,” etc. There you have à peuprès[24]the picture of the world accordingto Hegel’sLogic,—of course minus Godand the Absolute.

“When all the conditions of a thing arepresent, it enters into existence....”(116)

Very Good! What has the AbsoluteIdea and idealism to do with it?

Amusing, this “derivation” of . . .exis-tence....

The first phrase: “Essence must appear....”(119) The appearance of Essence is (1)Existenz (Thing); (2) Appearance (Erschei-nung). (“Appearance is what the Thingis in itself, or its truth” “The intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposedto the world of Appearance....“ (120) (3)Verhältnis (relation) andActuality.

Incidentally: “Demonstration in generalis mediated cognition....”(121)

...“The various kinds of Being demandor contain their own kind of mediation;consequently the nature of demonstrationtoo is different for each.......”(121)

And again ... on the existence ofGod!! This wretched God, as soon asthe word existence is mentioned, hetakes offence.

Existence differs from Being by its medi-ation (Vermittlung: 124) [?By concrete-ness and Connection?]

...“The Thing-in-itself and its medi-ated Being are both contained in Existence,and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-it-self exists and is the essential Existenceof the Thing, while mediated Being is itsunessential Existence....”(125)

The Thing-in-itself is related toBeing as the essential to the non-essential?

...“The latter” (Ding-an-sich) “is not sup-posed to contain in itself any determinatemultiplicity, and consequently obtains thisonly when brought under external reflec-tion, but remains indifferent to it. (—TheThing-in-itself has colour only in relationto the eye, smell in relation to the nose,and so forth.)...”(126)

...“A Thing has the Property of effectingthis or that in an Other, and of disclosingitself in a peculiar manner in its relationto it....” (129) “The Thing-in-itself thusexists essentially....”(131)

The Note deals with “The Thing-in-itselfof Transcendental Idealism....”

...“The Thing-in-itself as such is no morethan the empty abstraction from all deter-minateness, of which it is admitted thatnothing can be known just because it ismeant to be the abstraction from all deter-mination....”(131)

Transcendental idealism ... places “alldeterminateness of things (both with regardto form and to content) in consciousness...”(131)“accordingly, from this point of view,it falls within me, the subject, that I seethe leaves of a tree not as black but asgreen, the sun as round and not as square,and taste sugar as sweet and not as bit-ter; that I determine the first and secondstrokes of a clock as successive and not assimultaneous, and determine the first to beneither the cause nor the effect of thesecond, and so forth” (131)....	Hegel furthermakes the reservation that he has hereinvestigated only the question of theThing-in-itself and “äußerliche Refle-xion.”[25]

“The essential inadequacy of the stand-point at which this philosophy halts con-sists in this, that it clings to the abstractThing-in-itself as to an ultimate determi-nation; it opposes Reflection, or the deter-minateness and multiplicity of the Prop-erties, to the Thing-in-itself; while infact the Thing-in-itself essentially has thisExternal Reflection in itself, and deter-mines itself as an entity endowed with itsproper determinations, or Properties; whenceit is seen that the abstraction of the Thing,which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is anuntrue determination.”(132)

...“Many different Things are in essen-tial Reciprocal Action by virtue of theirProperties; Property is this very recipro-cal relation, and apart from it the Thingis nothing....”(133)

Die Dingheit[26]passes over into Eigen-schaft.[27](134) Eigenschaft into “matter”or “Stoff”[28](“things consist of sub-stance”), etc.

“Appearance at this point is Essencein its Existence....”(144)“Appearance ...is the unity of semblance and Existence....”(145)

Unity in appearances: “This unity is theLaw of Appearance. Law therefore is thepositive element in the mediation of theApparent.”(148)

|Here in general utter obscurity.But there is a vital thought,	evident-ly: the concept oflawisoneof thestages of cognition by man ofunityandconnection, of the recip-rocal dependence and totality	of theworld process. The “treatment” and“twisting” of words and concepts towhich Hegel devotes himself here isa struggle against making the con-cept oflawabsolute, against simplify-ing it, against making a fetish of it.NBfor modern physics!!!|

“This enduring persistence which belongsto Appearance in Law....”(149)

...“Law is the Reflection of Appearanceinto identity with itself.”(149)(Law isthe identical in appearances: “the Reflectionof Appearance into identity with itself.”)

...“This identity, the foundation of Ap-pearance, which constitutes Law, is thepeculiar moment of Appearance....”(150)

Hence Law is not beyond Appearance,but isimmediately presentin it; the realmof Laws is thequiescent(Hegel’s italics)reflection of the existing or appearingworld....”(150)

This is remarkably materialisticand remarkably appropriate (withthe word “ruhige”[29]) determination.Law takes the quiescent—and there-fore law, every law, is narrow, in-complete, approximate.

“Existence passes back into Law as intoits Ground; Appearance contains themboth—simple Ground and the dissolvingmovement of the appearing universe, ofwhich Ground is the essentiality.”“Hence law isessentialappearance.”(150)

Ergo,lawandessenceare conceptsof the same kind (of the same order),or rather, of the same degree, expressingthe deepening of man’s knowledge ofphenomena, the world, etc.

The movement of the universe in ap-pearances, (Bewegung des erscheinendenUniversums), in the essentiality of thismovement, is law.

“The realm of Laws is thequies-centcontent of Appearance; Appearanceis this same content, but presents itselfin unquiet change and as Reflection intoother.... Appearance, therefore, as against

Law is thetotalisy, for it contains Law,but also more, namely the momentof self-moving Form.”(151)

But further on, although unclearly,it is admitted, it seems, p. 154,that law can make up for this Man-gel[30]and embrace both the negativeside and the Totalität der Erschei-nung[31](especially 154 i. f.). Re-turn to this!

The World in and for itself is identicalwith the World of Appearances, but at thesame time it is opposite to it.(158)Whatis positive in the one is negative in theother. What is evil in the World of Appear-ances is good in the world which is in andfor itself. Cf.—Hegel says here—The Phe-nomenology of Mind, p. 121 et seq.

“The Appearing and the Essential Worldare each ... the independent whole of Exis-tence. One was to have been only reflectedExistence, and the other only immediateExistence; but each continues itself inthe other, and consequently in itself is theidentity of these two moments....	Bothin the first instance are independent, butthey are independent only as totalities,and they are this insofar as each essentiallyhas in itself the moment of the other....”(159-160)

The essence here is that both theworld of appearances and the world initself aremomentsof man’s knowledgeof nature, stages,alterationsor deepen-ings (of knowledge). The shifting ofthe world in itself further and furtherfromthe world of appearances—that iswhat is so far still not to be seen in Hegel.N B. Have not Hegel’s “moments” ofthe concept the significance of “mo-ments” of transition?

...“Thus Law is EssentialRelation.”(160)(Hegel’s italics)

(Law isrelation. ThisN Bfor theMachists and other agnostics, and for theKantians, etc. Relation ofessencesor be-tween essences.)

“The termworldexpresses the formlesstotality of multifariousness....”(160)

And the third chapter (“Essential Rela-tion”) begins with the proposition: “Thetruth of Appearance is Essential Relation....”(161)

Subdivisions:The relation ofWholetoParts;this relation passes into the following one(sic!! (p. 168)):—ofForceto itsMan-ifestation;—ofInnertoOuter.—The transition toSubstance,Actu-ality.

...“The truth of the relation consists,then, inmediation....”(167)

“Transition” to Force: “Force is the neg-ative unity into which the contradictionof Whole and Parts has resolved itself; itis the truth of that first Relation.”(170)

((This is one of1,000similar passagesin Hegel, which arouse the fury ofnaïvephilosophers like Pearson, the author ofTheGrammar of Science.[32]—He quotes asimilar passage and exclaims in fury: Whata galimatias is being taught in our schools!!And in acertain limitedsense he is right.To teachthatis stupid. One must first of allextractthe materialistic dialectics fromit. Nine-tenths of it, however, is chaff,rubbish.))

Force makes its appearance as “belong-ing” (als angehörig)(171)”to the existingThing or Matter....” “When therefore it isasked how the Thing or Matter comes tohavea Force, then the Force appears asconnected with it externally, andimpressedon the Thing by an alien power.” (171)

...“This is apparentin all natural,scientific, and, in general,intellectual development;

and it is essential to understand that the First,when as yet Something isinternal, or initsconcept, is, for this reason, only itsimmediate and passive existence....”(181)

#The beginning of everything canbe regarded as inner—passive—andat the same time as outer.But what is interesting here isnot that, but something else: Hegel’scriterionof dialectics that has acci-dentally slipped in: “in all nat-ural, scientific and in-tellectual development”:here we have agrainof profoundtruth in the mystical integument ofHegelianism!

Example: the germ of a man, says Hegel,is only internal man, dem Anderssein Preis-gegebenes,[33]the passive.  Gott[34]at firstis not yet Spirit. “Immediately,therefore, God isonlyNature.”(182)(This is also characteristic!!)

...“Actuality is the unity of Essence andExistence....”(184)

Subdivisions: 1) “The Absolute”—2) Actuality proper. “Actuality, Possibil-ityandNecessityconstitute the formalmoments of the Absolute.” 3) “AbsoluteRelation”:Substance.[37]

“In it itself” (dem Absoluten) “there isno Becoming” (187)—and other nonsense abouttheAbsolute....

The Absolute is the absolute Absolute...

The Attribute is a relative Absolute...

In a “note” Hegel speaks (all too gener-ally and obscurely) of the defects of thephilosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

Inter alia note:“The one-sidedness of one philosophicprinciple is generally faced by its oppositeone-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totalityat least is found as adispersed complete-ness” (197)

Actualityis higher thanBeing, andhigher thanExistence.

...“Actuality also stands higher than Exis-tence” (200)....

...“Real Necessity is a relation whichisfull of content”.... “But this Necessity isat the same time relative....”(211)

“Absolute Necessity then is the truthinto which Actuality and Possibility ingeneral pass back, as well as Formal andReal Necessity.”(215)

(Continued)[38]...

(End of Volume II of theLogic, the Doc-trine of Essence)...

It is to be noted that in the smallLogic(theEncyclopaedia)[39]the same thing isexpounded very often  more clearly, withconcrete examples. Cf. idem Engels andKuno Fischer.[40]

On the question of“possibility,”Hegelnotes the emptiness of this category andsays in theEncyclopaedia:“Whether a thing is possible or impossibledepends on the content, i.e., on the sum-total of the moments of Actuality which inits unfolding discloses itself to be Ne-cessity.” (Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 287,[41]§ 143, Addendum.)

“The sum-total, the en-tirety of the moments ofActuality, which, in itsunfold-ingdiscloses itself to be Necessity.”The unfolding of the sum-total ofthe moments of actualityN B= theessence of dialectical cognition.

Cf. In the sameEncyclopaedia, Vol. VI,p. 289, the eloquent words on the vanity ofmere delight at the wealth and flux of thephenomena of nature and on the neces-sity

...“of advancing to a closer insight intotheinnerharmony anduniformityof nature....”(289)(Closenessto materialism.)

IbidemEncyclopaedia,p. 292:“Devel-oped Actuality, as the coincident alternationof Inner and Outer, the alternation of theiropposite motions combined in a singlemotion, is Necessity.”

Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 294:...“Necessity is blind only insofar as itis not understood....”

Ibidem,p. 295“it happens to him” (demMenschen[42])...

	  “that from his activity therearises something quite different from whathe had meant and willed....”

Ibidem,p. 301“Substance is an essen-tialstage in the Process ofdevelopmentof the Idea....”

Read: an important stage in the proc-ess of development ofhuman knowl-edgeof nature andmatter.

Logik,[43]Vol. IV

...“It” (die Substanz) “is the Being inallBeing....” (220)[44]

The Relation of Substantiality passesover into the Relation of Causality.(223)

...“Substance attains ... Actuality onlywhen it has become Cause....”(225).

On the one hand, knowledge of mat-ter must be deepened to knowledge (tothe concept) of Substance in order tofind the causes of phenomena. On theother hand, the actual cognition of thecause is the deepening of knowledgefrom the externality of phenomena tothe Substance. Two types of examplesshould explain this: 1) from the his-tory of natural science, and 2) from thehistory of philosophy. More exactly:it is not “examples” that should behere—comparison n’est pas raison,[45]—but thequintessenceof the history ofboth the one and the other + the his-tory of technique.

...“Effect contains nothing whatever whichCause does not contain...”(226)undum-gekehrt[46]....

Cause and effect, ergo, are merely mo-ments of universal reciprocal dependence,of (universal) connection, of the	recip-rocal concatenation of events, merelylinks in the chain of the developmentof matter.

NB:“It is the same fact which displays itselffirst as Cause and then as Effect,—here aspeculiar persistence and there as posited-ness or determination in an Other.”(227)

NBThe all-sidedness and all-embrac-ing character of the interconnectionof the world, which is only one-sidedly, fragmentarily amd incom-pletely expressed by causality.

“But we may here and now observe that,insofar as the relation of cause and effectis admitted (although in an improper sense),effect cannot be greater than cause; foreffect is nothing further than the manifes-tation of cause.”(230)

And further about history. Hegel saysthat it is customary in history to quoteanecdotesas the minor “causes” of majorevents—in fact they are onlyoccasions,only äußere Erregung,[47]which “the inner

spirit of the event would not have required.”(230)“Consequently, these arabesques ofhistory, where a huge shape is depicted asgrowing from a slender stalk, are a spright-ly but a most superficial treatment.” (Ibi-dem)

This “inner spirit”—c.f. Plekhanov[48]—is an idealistic,mystical, but a veryprofound indication of the historicalcauses of events. Hegel subsumes his-torycompletelyunder causality and un-derstands causality a	thousand timesmore profoundly and richly than themultitude	of “savants” nowadays.

“Thus a stone in motion is cause; itsmovement is a determination which it has,while besides this it contains many otherdeterminations of colour, shape, and soon, which do not enter into its causal na-ture.”(232)

Causality, as usually understood byus, is only a small particle of universalinterconnection, but (a materialist ex-tension) a particle not of the subjective,but of the objectively real intercon-nection.

“But themovementof the Determi-nateRelationofCausalityhas nowresulted in this, that the cause is notmerely extinguished in the effect, andwith it the effect too (as happens in FormalCausality),—but the cause in its extinction,in the effect, becomes again; that effectvanishes into cause, but equally becomesagain in it. Each of these determinationscancels itself in its positing and posits it-self in its cancellation; what takes placeis not an external transition of causalityfrom one substratum to another, but thisits becoming other is at the same timeits own positing. Causality, then, presup-poses or conditions itself.”(235)

“The movement of the relation of cau-sality” = in fact: the movement of mat-ter, respective the movement of history,grasped, mastered in its innerconnec-tionup to one or other degree of breadthor depth....

“At this point Reciprocity presents itselfas a reciprocal causality of presupposedsubstances conditioning each other; eachis, in relation to the other, at once activeand passive substance.”(240)

“In Reciprocity, original Causality pre-sents itself as an arising out of its negation(or passivity) and as a passing away intoit—as a Becoming....

“Necessity and Causality have, then,vanished in it; they contain both the imme-diate identity (asconnectionandrelation)

and the absolutesubstantiality of dis-

tincts, and therefore their absolute con-tingency,—the original unity of substan-tial variety, hence absolute contradiction.Necessity is Being,becauseit is;—the self-

unity of Being, which has itself forground;but, conversely, because it has a ground,

it is not Being, it is nothing whatever butSemblance, relationormediation. Cau-sality is this posited transition of originalBeing, or cause, into Semblance or mere

positedness, and conversely of positednessinto originality; but the identity itselfof Being and Semblance is, still, inner Ne-cessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self)transcends the movement of Causality; andconcurrently, the substantiality of the sides

which are in relation is lost—Necessityreveals itself. Necessity does not becomeFreedom because it vanishes, but onlybecause its identity (as yet an inner iden-tity) is manifested.”(241-242)

When one reads Hegel on causality,it appears strange at first glance thathe dwells so relatively lightly on thistheme, beloved of the Kantians. Why?Because, indeed, for him causality isonlyoneof the determinations of univer-sal connection, which he had alreadycovered earlier, in hisentireexposition,much more deeply and all-sidedly;al-waysand from the very outset empha-sising this connection, the reciprocaltransitions, etc., etc. It would be veryinstructive to compare the “birth-pangs” of neo-empiricism (respective“physical idealism”) with the solutionsof rather with the dialectical methodof Hegel.

It is to be noted also that in theEncy-clopaediaHegel stresses the inadequacyand emptiness of thebareconcept of “re-ciprocal action.”

Vol. VI,p. 308[49]:“Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proxi-mate truth of the relation of cause andeffect, and stands, so to say, on the thresh-old of the Notion, nevertheless, preciselyon this account one should not rest con-tent with applying this relation, insofaras it is a matter of, conceptual cognition.

If one gets no further than consideringa given content merely from the point ofview of reciprocity, then such an atti-tude is in fact quite without concept; it is

then merely a matter of a dry fact, and

the requirement of mediation, which isthe point of immediate concern in apply-ing the relation of causality, still remains

unsatisfied. On closer examination, thedeficiency in the application of the rela-tion of reciprocal action is seen to be thatthis relation, instead of being the equiva-lent of the Notion, has itself to be graspedfirst of all. And this occurs through its

two sides not being left as an immediatedatum but, as was shown in the two pre-ceding paragraphs, being recognised as mo-ments of a third, higher determination,which is precisely the Notion. If, forexample, we regard the customs of theSpartans as the effect of their constitu-tion, and the latter, conversely, as theeffect of their customs, such a view may

perhaps be correct,but it is a conceptionthat. gives no final satisfaction, because inpoint of fact it enables neither the con-stitution nor the customs of this people

to be understood. Such understanding canonly come about when these two aspects,and likewise all the other special aspectsof the life and the history of the Spartansare recognised to be grounded in thisNotion.” (308-309)

— — — — —At the end of the second volume of theLogic, Vol. VI,p. 243, in the transitionto the “Notion,” the determination is given:“the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity, orof Freedom....”

NBFreedom = Subjectivity(“or”)End, Consciousness, EndeavourNB

[1]Hegel,Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 

	1834.—Ed.

[2]Incidentally. Hegel more than once pokes fun at[cf.the passages cited above on gradualness]the word (and the concept)

	erklären (explanation), obviously opposing to the metaphysical solution once

	for all (“it has been explained”!!) the eternal process of cognition

	penetrating deeper and deeper. Cf. Volume III, p. 463: “can becognisedor,	as they say,explained.”—Ed.

[3]movement—Ed.

[4]TheEssentialand the Unessential.—Ed.

[5]approximately.—Ed.

[6]Semblance or Show—Ed.

[7]The refernece is toDie Kritik der UrteilskraftbyKant.

[8]If it may be called that—Ed.

[9]Variants of the translation of the German word “die 

	Reflexion” into Russian are given within the parentheses.—Ed.

[10]The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the MS.—Ed.

[11]consideration, etc., “insofar as,” etc.—Ed.

[12]“for the objective positive”—Ed.

[13]“everything is the term of an opposition”—Ed.

[14]rescued—Ed.

[15]Lenin is referring to the appearance of the following three

	works: Hegel’sScience of Logic(the first two books were published

	in 1812 and 1813, respectively);Marx and Engels’Manifesto of the

	Communist Party(written at the end of 1847 and published in February 1848); andDarwin’sOrigin of Species(published in 1859).

[16]The word “receive” is crossed out in the MS.—Ed.

[17]“relation” of causes—Ed.

[18]matter—Ed.

[19]realGround—Ed.

[20]“multiple”—“content determinations,

	relations and considerations”—Ed.

[21]empty—Ed.

[22]Hegel materialistically turned upside down—Ed.

[23]It coincides.—Ed.

[24]approximately—Ed.

[25]“external reflection”—Ed.

[26]thinghood—Ed.

[27]property—Ed.

[28]“substance”—Ed.

[29]“quiescent”—Ed.

[30]deficiency—Ed.

[31]Totality of Appearance—Ed.

[32]The reference is to K. Pearson’s workThe

	Grammar of Science, London, 1892.

[33]something given up to otherness—Ed.

[34]God—Ed.

[35]“links up” to this—Ed.

[36]nature—Ed.

[37]Here Lenin’s manuscript gives the list of chapters of Section III:

	1) “The Absolute”; 2) “Actuality”; 3) “The Absolute 

	Relation.”—Ed.

[38]At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new 

	notebook.—Ed.

[39]The reference is toEnzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften

	im Grundrisse. Hegel,Werke, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840 (Encyclopaedia of

	the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, Hegel,Works, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1840). “Logic”

	constitutes Part I of theEncyclopaediaand is referred to by Lenin as “small” to

	distinguish it from the “large”Science	of Logic, which consists of three volumes.

[40]Lenin is referring to remarks by Engels on Hegel’sEncyclopaedia.

	See Engels’ letter to Marx dated September 21, 1874. Also see Engels’letter to Conrad Schmidtdated November 1, 1891 (Marx and Engels,Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 519-520).Kuno Fischer—a German bourgeois historian of philosophy and

	the author ofThe History of Modern Philosophy, one of whose volumes (Vol. 8) is devoted to Hegel.

[41]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[42]to man.—Ed.

[43]Logic—Ed.

[44]Hegel,Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

[45]comparison is not proof—Ed.

[46]andvice versa—Ed.

[47]external stimulus—Ed.

[48]SeeG. Plekhanov, “For the Sixtieth Anniversary

	of Hegel’s Death,” (Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Moscow, 1960).

[49]Hegel,Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.

[50]“notion”—Ed.