90
LENIN COLLECTION

3733

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF I. V. STALIN 
AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY ON THE CAUSES OF THE FALL 
OF PERM

January 21, 1919

To the Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic:

Return this to me, please, having written your opinion. 

In my opinion, it is the height of outrage that Vatsetis handed over 3 regiments near Narva. Cancel this!!

Lenin

REPORT OF I. V. STALIN AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY*

To Comrade Lenin

We have received your enciphered telegram. Regarding the causes of the catastrophe, according to the data from our investigation, we have already informed you: an army with exhausted units in the absence of reserves and firm command, occupying moreover a flank position with the danger of being outflanked from the north—such an army could not but collapse under serious pressure from the enemy's superior fresh forces. In our opinion, the matter lies not only in the weakness of the organs of the III Army and the immediate rear, but also: 1) in the General Staff and district military commissions, which form and send to the front units that are manifestly unreliable, 2) in the All-Russian Bureau of Commissars, which supplies the units being formed in the rear with boys rather than commissars, 3) in the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic, which disrupts the management of the front and armies through its so-called directives and orders. Without appropriate changes in the military center, there are no guarantees for success on the fronts.

Our Response to the Questions of the Military

1. **Regarding Two Regiments.** Two regiments surrendered into captivity: the 1st Soviet and the Sailors' Regiment from Petersburg. They did not open hostile actions against us. Hostile actions against us were opened by

* Printed from the original signed by I. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky. The last paragraph of point eight and the postscript were written in the hand of I. V. Stalin.

1919

the 10th Cavalry Regiment of the 10th Division, stationed in the village of Ilyinskoye, formed by the Uraldistrict Military Commission. In addition, a mutiny of the 10th Engineering Regiment, stationed at the Ochersky works, formed also by the District Military Commission, was prevented. The reason for the transition to the enemy and for hostile actions—the counter-revolutionary character of the regiments, explained by the old methods of mobilization and formation without preliminary screening of those conscripted for military service, in the absence of any minimal political work in the regiments.

2. **Motovilikh(a).** The machinery sections of the factory and units from the electrical shop, with an inventory of all parts, were removed in timely fashion and loaded into cars, but they were not evacuated, were not destroyed. Responsibility falls on the Central Collegium, the head of military communications, and the Revolutionary War Council of the army, which displayed unprecedented lack of efficiency. Five-sixths of the Motovilikh workers remained in Perm, all the technical personnel of the factory remained, raw materials. According to all available data, the factory can be put back into operation within about a month and a half. Rumors of an uprising of Motovilikh workers on the eve of Perm's fall are not confirmed; there was only considerable ferment on the basis of food supply disorder.

3. **Regarding the Explosion of the Bridge and Valuable Structures.** The bridge and so forth were not blown up due to lack of efficiency of the Revolutionary War Council of the army and the absence of communication between the retreating units and army headquarters. There is a version that the comrade obliged to blow up the bridge could not carry out his task because he was killed by White Guards a few minutes before the explosion. It has not been possible to verify this version so far owing to the flight of the bridge guard and the departure of a whole series of "Soviet" workers to an unknown destination.

4. **Regarding Reserves near Perm.** The reserve consisted of a single unstrengthened and unreliable "Soviet regiment," which immediately upon going to the front went over to the enemy. There were no other reserves.

5. **Losses of Materiel and Personnel.** It has not yet been possible to restore a complete picture of losses owing to the disappearance of a number of documents and the transition of a whole series of "Soviet" specialists involved in the matter to the enemy.

Based on the meager data we have, we lost: 297 steam locomotives (of which 86 were disabled), approximately 3,000 cars (probably more), 900,000 poods of oil and kerosene, several hundred thousand poods of caustic soda, 2 million poods of salt, 5 million rubles worth of medicines, the material warehouses of the Motovilikh Factory and Perm railway workshops with enormous riches, machinery and parts of the Motovilikh Factory, machinery of steamships of the Kama flotilla, 65 cars of leather, 150 cars of foodstuffs from the army supply section, an enormous warehouse of Rupvoda with cotton wool, textiles, alinaphtha and so forth, 10 cars of wounded soldiers, the axle park of communication routes with large supplies of American axles, 29 cannon, 10,000 shells, 2,000 rifles, 8 million cartridges, more than eight thousand killed and wounded and missing for the period from December 22 to 29, all railway specialists remained in Perm and almost all supply specialists. The count of losses is continuing.

6. **Present Numerical Combat Composition of the Army.** The III Army at present consists of two divisions (29th and 30th) with 14,000 bayonets, 3,000 sabers, 323 machine guns, 78 cannon. Reserves—a brigade of the 7th Division sent from Russia, which has not yet been committed owing to its unreliability and the necessity for serious screening. The three regiments promised by Vatsetis have not yet arrived (and will not arrive, since yesterday, as it turned out, they received new orders for Narva). The active units are worn out, exhausted, holding on at the front with difficulty.

7. **Order of Management of the III Army.** Outwardly the order of management is normal, "in accordance with regulations," in reality—complete absence of any order, absolute lack of proper management, detachment from its combat sector, factual autonomy of the divisions.

8. **Have Sufficient Measures Been Taken to Stop the Retreat.** Of the measures taken, the following can be recognized as serious: 1) the advance of the II Army toward Kungur, which is undoubtedly a great support to the III Army, and 2) the dispatch to the front, owing to the efforts of Stalin—Dzerzhinsky, of 900 fully reliable fresh bayonets, intended to reverse the declining mood of the III Army. In two days we are sending to the front two cavalry squadrons and the 61st Regiment of the 3rd Brigade (already filtered). In 10 days one more regiment will go. The III Army front knows this, sees the concern of the rear and its mood is strengthening. There is no doubt that the situation is now better than two weeks ago. In some places the army is even going on the offensive and not without success. If the enemy gives another two weeks of respite, that is, if it does not throw new fresh forces on the front, one can hope that a stable position will be created on the III Army sector. At present we are occupied with liquidating the northern outflanking movement of some enemy detachments toward Vyatka along the cart road through Kaigorod. We came to Vyatka, among other things, in order to send a detachment of skiers to Kaigorod, which we shall do. As regards other measures (strengthening the rear), we are mobilizing workers, rank-and-file and non-rank-and-file, sending them to army units in the rear, purging the Glazov and Vyatka Soviet Departments. But the results of this work will, of course, not be evident soon.

These exhaust the measures taken. They cannot be considered sufficient under any circumstances, since the exhausted units of the III Army will not be able to hold on for long without at least partial rotation. Therefore it is necessary to send here at least two regiments. Only in this case can the stability of the front be considered guaranteed. In addition it is necessary: 1) to replace the army commander, 2) to send a group of capable political workers, 3) urgently to dissolve the Regional Committee, Regional Soviet, etc., with the aim of accelerating the mobilization of evacuated workers.

Stalin. Dzerzhinsky

January 19, 1919. Vyatka

P.S. We shall leave in a few days for Glazov to complete the investigation.

3744

RESOLUTION 
ON THE TELEGRAM OF I. V. STALIN 
AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY

January 23, 1919

To the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic—for review (urgent).

TELEGRAM OF I. V. STALIN AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY

Serpukhov to Commander-in-Chief, Moscow to Lenin

The Commission of the Council of Defense considers it absolutely necessary to place at the disposal of the Third Army the Vyatka ski battalion to strengthen its left wing at the junction point with the Sixth Army and to ensure stability in the army sector. The 16 companies from Kazan and three regiments from Vologda and Yaroslavl promised to the Third Army by the Commander-in-Chief will not arrive, since in the meantime they have received new assignments, and if there is a refusal on the battalion as well, on which the Sixth Army insists,