Encyclopedia § 213 (p. 385* [I, 321**]):
... "The Idea is truth; for truth consists in the correspondence of objectivity with the Concept... But all that is actual, insofar as it is something true, is also the Idea... Individual Being represents only one side of the Idea; therefore the Idea still needs other actualities, which likewise present themselves as isolated and apparently self-subsistent existences; only in their aggregate and in their relation to one another is the Concept realized. The individual, taken by itself, does not correspond to its Concept; this limitation of its determinate being constitutes its finitude and leads to its destruction"...

Individual being (object, phenomenon, etc.) is (only) one side of the Idea (truth). For truth, still other sides of actuality are needed, which likewise appear to be self-subsistent and separate only in seeming (besonders für sich bestehende***). Only in their aggregate (zusammen) and in their relation (Beziehung) is truth realized.

The aggregate of all sides of the phenomenon, actuality and their (mutual) relations — this is what comprises truth. Relations (= transitions = contradictions) of concepts = the main content of logic, and these concepts (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world.

The dialectic of things creates the dialectic of ideas, and not the reverse.

Hegel genially divined the dialectic of things (phenomena, world, nature) in the dialectic of concepts.

* Hegel. Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840. Ed.
** Hegel. Works, vol. I, M.-L., 1929. Ed.
*** - existing separately for themselves. Ed.