Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party

Written:Written December 9 (22), 1904Published:Published in pamphlet form in January 1905, in Geneva.

      Published according to the leaflet text.Source:Lenin
	  Collected Works,

      publisher??,pubdate??,

      Moscow,Volume 7,

      pages529-539.Translated:Fineberg AbrahamTranscription\Markup:R. CymbalaPublic Domain:Lenin Internet Archive

      (2002).You may freely copy, distribute,
	display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and
	commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet
	Archive” as your source.•README

InNo. 77 ofIskra, three members of the Central Committee,
      claiming to act on behalf of that body as a whole, summon

 Comrade N[1]to a court
      of arbitration on the charge of
      “making a false statement designed to disrupt the
      Party”. The allegedly false statement in question was made
      “through a member of the Central Committee who took no part in
      drawing up the declaration”, that is, through me. In view of my
      close connection with the affair, and acting on the authority of
      Comrade N, I consider it my right and duty to participate in the
      arbitration proceedings, and I bring the following charges against
      Central Committee members Glebov, Valentin, and Nikitich.

Icharge them with unlawful, improper, formally and morally
      impermissible behaviour towards their fellow-members of the Central
      Committee and towards the Party as a whole.

Inasmuchas this improper behaviour is greatly protracting and
      aggravating the Party crisis, and as it moreover directly affects the
      mass of the Party workers, I consider publicity of the proceedings
      absolutely essential in regard to everything that does not affect the
      secrecy of the organisation, and I shall therefore set forth my
      charges in detail.

I.I charge the three Central Committee members, Glebov, Valentin,
	and Nikitich, with systematically deceiving the Party.

1)I charge them with having used the powers conferred on them by the
      Second Party Congress to suppress the public opinion of the Party
      as expressed in the agitation for a Third Congress. They had no
      right to suppress this agitation, which is an inalienable right of
      every Party member. In particular, they had no right to dissolve
      the SouthernBureau for agitating on behalf of a congress. They had neither the
      formal nor the moral right to censure me, a member of the Party
      Council, for having voted in the Council in favour of a congress.

2)I charge them with having concealed from the Party the committee
      resolutions in favour of a congress, and with taking advantage of
      the confidence they enjoy as members of one of the Party’s highest
      institutions to mislead the committees by a deliberately false
      account of the state of affairs in the Party. They have obstructed
      the elucidation of the truth by refusing to meet the Riga
      Committee’s request to have the resolution of the twenty-two
      printed and distributed and to have majority literature delivered
      to Russia, on the pretext that it is not Party literature.

3)I charge them with not having hesitated, in their agitation against
      a congress, even to disrupt the work on the spot by appealing
      against the pro-congress commit tees to their peripheral
      organisations, doing everything to discredit these committees in
      the eyes of the local workers, and thus tending to destroy that
      confidence between the committees and their periphery without which
      all work is impossible.

4)I charge them with having, through the Central Committee delegate
      on the Council, shared in devising the Council rulings as to the
      conditions for summoning the Third Congress—rulings which
      made a congress impossible and thus deprived the Party of the
      opportunity of settling the conflict within it in a normal way.

5)I charge them with having told the committees that they agreed in
      principle with the position of the majority and that any agreement
      with the minority was only possible if the latter gave up its
      secret separate organisation and its demand for co-optation to the
      Central Committee, yet having at the same time,in secret from
	the Party and in deliberate defiance of its will, made a deal
      with the minority on the following terms: 1) preservation of the
      autonomy of the minority’s technical enterprises, and 2)
      co-optation to the Central Committee of three of the most
      inveterate minority adherents.

6)I charge them with having taken advantage of their authority as
      members of one of the Party’s highest institutionsto cast aspersions on their political opponents. They have
      behaved dishonourably towards

 Comrade P.[2]in
      resolvinglast Julyon an investigation into his
      alleged false statement to the Northern Committee andto
      this day(December 22) not even presenting him with the
      charges made against him, although Glebov has met P. several
      times, and although this same Glebov, in his capacity of member
      of the Party Council, allowed himself to apply the term
      “deceit” inIskrato the action of this
      comrade, who had no opportunity to defend himself. They told a
      deliberate untruth when they declared that

 Lidin[3]was not
      a representative(Vertrauensmann) of the
      Central Committee. They deceived the Party members, with the
      object of discrediting in their eyes Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich
      and his associates in the Distribution Centre, by publishing a
      statement inIskra(No. 77) in which only the
      liabilities of the Distribution Centre were shown (and that
      inaccurately)—and this after they had, through their
      representatives, issued Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich a written
      certificate to the effect that he had conducted the business
      properly and that the accounts were in good order.

7)I charge them with having taken advantage of the absence of Comrade
      Vasilyev and Comrade Zverev, the former foreign representatives of
      the Central Committee, to discredit Party institutions (the
      library and archives of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva). They published a
      statement inIskra, signed by a Central Committee
      “representative” unknown to me, in which the history
      and true character of these institutions was absolutely distorted.

II.In addition, I charge the three members of the Central
	Committee, Glebov, Valentin, and Nikitich, with a number of morally
	and formally impermissible actions towards fellow-members of that
	body.

1)They violated every principle of Party organisation and discipline
      by presenting me (through Comrade Glebov) with an ultimatum to
      resign from the Central Committee or cease agitating for a
      congress.

2)They broke the agreement concluded in their name by Central
      Committee member Glebov, when, as a result of the altered
      composition of the Central Committee, it was no longer to their
      advantage to observe this agreement.

3)They had no right, at their meeting in July, to declare
      Comrade N as having resigned from the Central Committee without
      hearing either his statement or mine, particularly as these
      three members of the Central Committee were aware of our demand
      (the demand of four Central Committee

 members[4]) to have this
      disputed matter examined at a general meeting of the Central
      Committee. To declare Comrade N no longer a member of the
      Central Committee was also impermissible in itself, for in doing
      so the three Central Committee members took improper advantage
      of a statement which Comrade N had made conditionally (and of
      which not all the comrades had been informed).

4)The three Central Committee members had no right to conceal
      from me the change in their views and intentions. Comrade Glebov
      assured me at the end of May that their views were expressed in
      the declaration they had drawn up in

 March.[5]Thus
      the July declaration, which conflicts

      basically with the March declaration, was adopted in secret from
      me, and Glebov’s statements were a piece of deception.

5)Glebov broke the agreement he had made with me that in the
      report to the Amsterdam

 Congress,[6]which was to be
      written by Dan (as delegate from the Central Organ) and himself,
      Glebov (as delegate from the Central Committee), there would be
      no reference to the differences in the Party. The report, which
      was written by Dan alone, proved to be full of veiled
      controversy and permeated through and through with the views of
      the “minority”. Glebov did not protest against Dan’s
      report, and thus indirectly shared in this attempt to deceive
      the international Social-Democratic movement.

6)The three Central Committee members had no right to deny me
      the opportunity to announce and publish my dissenting opinion
      on an important issue of Party life. The July declaration was
      sent to the Central Organfor publicationbefore I had
      been given a chance to express an opinion about it. On August
      24, I sent the Central Organ a protest against this
      declaration. The Central Organ declared that it would print it
      only if so desired by the three Central Committee members who
      had written the declaration. They did not so desire, and thus
      they concealed my protest from the Party.

7)They had no right to withhold from me the minutes )f the Council
      and to deprive me, without formally expeling me from the Central
      Committee, of all information about what was happening in the
      Central Committee, about the appointment of new agents in Russia
      and abroad, the negotiations with the “minority”, the
      state of the Party funds, etc., etc.

8)They had no right to co-opt three new comrades (con iliators) to
      the Central Committee without taking the matter to the Council, as
      required by the Party Rules in he absence of unanimity; and there
      was no unanimity, since I had lodged a protest against the
      co-optation.

Inview of the importance attaching to the position of the Central
      Committee in the conflict within the Party, I deem it necessary to
      publish the following documents.

I.Letters from Comrade Glebov to members of the

	“collegium”.[7]

a)September.

“Relationswith the Central Organ and the League have not been
      settled yet. I must say that since our declaration they have become
      impudent and their appetites have been growing. Our position here is
      very difficult: control of things abroad is in the hands of the
      League, private sources are in the hands of the Central Organ, and so
      we are up to our ears in debt. In these straits (with a debt of 9,000
      round our necks), I have to think about finding some solution. I have
      therefore asked the minority to let me have an outline of their
      desired reforms.”

“Relationswith the Central Organ and the League have not been
      settled yet. I must say that since our declaration they have become
      impudent and their appetites have been growing. Our position here is
      very difficult: control of things abroad is in the hands of the
      League, private sources are in the hands of the Central Organ, and so
      we are up to our ears in debt. In these straits (with a debt of 9,000
      round our necks), I have to think about finding some solution. I have
      therefore asked the minority to let me have an outline of their
      desired reforms.”

b)September 7.

“Lastnight I had a business meeting, in the presence of S., with
      three spokesmen of the minority: Popov, Blumenfeld, and Martov.”

“Lastnight I had a business meeting, in the presence of S., with
      three spokesmen of the minority: Popov, Blumenfeld, and Martov.”

Ofthe questions discussed at this meeting, which, in Glebov’s words,
      turned into “a preliminary meeting for the arrangement of
      peace”, let me mention the following:

1)Organisational relations abroad.

“Responsibilityfor the movement in Russia to be assumed by the
      Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the League. With a view to
      removing mutual friction and creating a greater interest in the work
      and complete confidence, the general direction of affairs to be
      entrusted to a commission of representatives of the Central Committee,
      the
      Central Organ, and the League. The Central Committee to have two votes
      and the right of veto....”

“Responsibilityfor the movement in Russia to be assumed by the
      Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the League. With a view to
      removing mutual friction and creating a greater interest in the work
      and complete confidence, the general direction of affairs to be
      entrusted to a commission of representatives of the Central Committee,
      the
      Central Organ, and the League. The Central Committee to have two votes
      and the right of veto....”

2)Transport.

“TheCentral Organ to come under the Central Committee’s control,
      with a certain amount of autonomy, as follows: There must only be one
      distribution centre abroad, the Central Committee’s. But the Central
      Organ is to keep charge of its own part of the border. Literature
      distribution in Russia to be in the Central Committee’s hands. To
      give it greater autonomy, however, the Central Organ is to have charge
      of the South. Let me explain. The Central Organ has its own transport
      arrangements. It fears that in the event of a change of administration
      it might be deprived of its routes. It therefore requests to be
      guaranteed them by organisational means.”

“TheCentral Organ to come under the Central Committee’s control,
      with a certain amount of autonomy, as follows: There must only be one
      distribution centre abroad, the Central Committee’s. But the Central
      Organ is to keep charge of its own part of the border. Literature
      distribution in Russia to be in the Central Committee’s hands. To
      give it greater autonomy, however, the Central Organ is to have charge
      of the South. Let me explain. The Central Organ has its own transport
      arrangements. It fears that in the event of a change of administration
      it might be deprived of its routes. It therefore requests to be
      guaranteed them by organisational means.”

c)September 7.

“Danand possibly others here too are furious over yesterday’s
      agreement as to the management of affairs. What a greedy lot! What
      they would like is to set up abroad a committee of representatives of
      the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the League, which would
      decide everything abroad; each only to have one vote, of course. Not
      bad, eh?”

“Danand possibly others here too are furious over yesterday’s
      agreement as to the management of affairs. What a greedy lot! What
      they would like is to set up abroad a committee of representatives of
      the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the League, which would
      decide everything abroad; each only to have one vote, of course. Not
      bad, eh?”

d)September.

“Iwant to draw your attention to the desire the Council has
      expressed for replenishment [this refers to replenishment of the
      Central Committee representation on the Council]. Somebody will have
      to he elected in place of Lenin, who will, of course, proclaim it
      unlawful. I would suggest Dan or Deutsch—with the express
      proviso that they are being appointed only for the purpose of
      representation on the Council. There is nobody else we can elect, it
      seems to me.”

“Iwant to draw your attention to the desire the Council has
      expressed for replenishment [this refers to replenishment of the
      Central Committee representation on the Council]. Somebody will have
      to he elected in place of Lenin, who will, of course, proclaim it
      unlawful. I would suggest Dan or Deutsch—with the express
      proviso that they are being appointed only for the purpose of
      representation on the Council. There is nobody else we can elect, it
      seems to me.”

II.Letter from a Central Committee agent (now officially co-opted
	to the Central Committee) to Comrade Glebov:

September4.

“Overthe declaration there’s such a to-do that it’s hard
      to sort things out. The one thing that’s clear is that all the
      committees except the Kharkov, Crimea, Mining Area, and Don are
      majority commit tees. The Don Committee is neutral, I think, but
      I don’t know for certain. Of the ’majority’ committees, the
      Riga, Moscow, St. Peters burg, and Northern have, as I informed
      you before, expressed lack of confidence in the Central
      Committee on account of the declaration. Full confidence in it
      has been expressed by only a very few committees. The rest have
      expressed confidence in it as regards attempts at
      reconciliation—with the proviso that if these should fail
      a special congress is to be called immediately. Of these
      last-named committees, some make it a condition of
      reconciliation that the minority should cease to regard
      themselves as a ’contracting party’ and abandon their demandfor co-optation as a ’contracting party’ (?). That is the
      picture. If the reconciliation doesn’t come off, the Central
      Committee forfeits the confidence of the majority of the
      committees and will, consequently, itself be obliged to agitate
      for a congress in order to surrender its mandate.And the committees’ frame of mind makes it quite clear that a
      congress would pass decisions along the lines proposed by the
      twenty-two, viz., to dismiss the editors and hand over the
      editorship to the majority, to reform the party Council,
      etc.But, as I have already told you,
      if the reconciliation is to satisfy the committees, the minority
      must accept the declaration and cease to regard themselves as a
      ’contracting party’. If they do that, I think Lenin will lose
      all support in Russia and it will be possible to restore
      peace. Your remark that matters with Martov are straightening
      out ’little by little’ surprised me. The editors’ obstinacy is
      becoming positively exasperating, and in spite of my sympathies
      for them ideologically and otherwise, I am beginning to lose
      confidence in them as political ’leaders’. They now have the
      organisational question cleared up, and if they persist in their
      obstinacy in the absence of support from Russia (the minority
      are powerless here), it will show that they are only fighting
      for posts.”

“Overthe declaration there’s such a to-do that it’s hard
      to sort things out. The one thing that’s clear is that all the
      committees except the Kharkov, Crimea, Mining Area, and Don are
      majority commit tees. The Don Committee is neutral, I think, but
      I don’t know for certain. Of the ’majority’ committees, the
      Riga, Moscow, St. Peters burg, and Northern have, as I informed
      you before, expressed lack of confidence in the Central
      Committee on account of the declaration. Full confidence in it
      has been expressed by only a very few committees. The rest have
      expressed confidence in it as regards attempts at
      reconciliation—with the proviso that if these should fail
      a special congress is to be called immediately. Of these
      last-named committees, some make it a condition of
      reconciliation that the minority should cease to regard
      themselves as a ’contracting party’ and abandon their demandfor co-optation as a ’contracting party’ (?). That is the
      picture. If the reconciliation doesn’t come off, the Central
      Committee forfeits the confidence of the majority of the
      committees and will, consequently, itself be obliged to agitate
      for a congress in order to surrender its mandate.And the committees’ frame of mind makes it quite clear that a
      congress would pass decisions along the lines proposed by the
      twenty-two, viz., to dismiss the editors and hand over the
      editorship to the majority, to reform the party Council,
      etc.But, as I have already told you,
      if the reconciliation is to satisfy the committees, the minority
      must accept the declaration and cease to regard themselves as a
      ’contracting party’. If they do that, I think Lenin will lose
      all support in Russia and it will be possible to restore
      peace. Your remark that matters with Martov are straightening
      out ’little by little’ surprised me. The editors’ obstinacy is
      becoming positively exasperating, and in spite of my sympathies
      for them ideologically and otherwise, I am beginning to lose
      confidence in them as political ’leaders’. They now have the
      organisational question cleared up, and if they persist in their
      obstinacy in the absence of support from Russia (the minority
      are powerless here), it will show that they are only fighting
      for posts.”

Thatwas the beginning of the bargain; and here is the finale.

TheCentral Committee circulated a letter to the commit tees informing
      them that

“Thenegotiations will be completed very shortly (in a
      couple of weeks at the outside), and meanwhile we can inform you
      that (1) the Central Committee has not co-opted any minority
      members (somebody is circulating a slander to that effect);
      ... (3) the negotiations with the minority are being conducted
      precisely along the lines that Valentin reported to you, namely,
      that if there are to be any concessions, they can only be on the
      part of the minority and must consist in the Central Organ
      abandoning factional controversy and in the minority dissolving
      their secret organisation, renouncing their demand for
      co-optation to the Central Committee, and turning over all their
      enterprises (technical equipment, transport arrangements,
      contacts) to the Central Committee. Only on these conditions can
      peace be restored in the Party. And there is reason to hope that
      that is how it will be. At all events, if the minority should
      now evince a desire to continue their old policy, the Central
      Committee will immediately break off the negotiations and
      proceed to summon a special congress.”

“Thenegotiations will be completed very shortly (in a
      couple of weeks at the outside), and meanwhile we can inform you
      that (1) the Central Committee has not co-opted any minority
      members (somebody is circulating a slander to that effect);
      ... (3) the negotiations with the minority are being conducted
      precisely along the lines that Valentin reported to you, namely,
      that if there are to be any concessions, they can only be on the
      part of the minority and must consist in the Central Organ
      abandoning factional controversy and in the minority dissolving
      their secret organisation, renouncing their demand for
      co-optation to the Central Committee, and turning over all their
      enterprises (technical equipment, transport arrangements,
      contacts) to the Central Committee. Only on these conditions can
      peace be restored in the Party. And there is reason to hope that
      that is how it will be. At all events, if the minority should
      now evince a desire to continue their old policy, the Central
      Committee will immediately break off the negotiations and
      proceed to summon a special congress.”

Thatis how the Central Committee tried to soothe the committees,
      which expressed lack of confidence in it; and here are someletters of “prominent” members of the minority.The letters were received in the middle of December 1904, Old Style.

“Atlast we have had a meeting with the riffraff. Their
      reply was as follows: they agree to autonomy for our technical
      enterprises; but as regards the agitation commission, they
      object, considering that to be a direct function of the Central
      Committee (direction of agitation), and prefer reform of the
      Central Committee to this plan;however, they cannot
      co-opt officially just now, and propose instead the de facto
      (unofficial) co-optation of three members of the minority
      (Popov, Fomin, and Fischer). Naturally, X. and I at once
      agreed, and hence forth the Menshevik opposition is officially
      dissolved.It is a veritable load off our minds. The
      entire Central Committee is to have a meeting with us in a day
      or two, after which we shall arrange a conference of the
      committees closest to us....“Weare, of course, quite certain that we shall gain
	control of the Central Committee and direct it along the lines we
	want.That will be
      all the easier since many of them already admit the correctness of the
      minority’s criticism on points of principle.... In
      all the consistent firm-liner committees
      (Baku, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, and St. Petersburg) the workers are
      demanding the system of office by election. That is a clear symptom
      that the firm-liners are in their death-agony.”

“Atlast we have had a meeting with the riffraff. Their
      reply was as follows: they agree to autonomy for our technical
      enterprises; but as regards the agitation commission, they
      object, considering that to be a direct function of the Central
      Committee (direction of agitation), and prefer reform of the
      Central Committee to this plan;however, they cannot
      co-opt officially just now, and propose instead the de facto
      (unofficial) co-optation of three members of the minority
      (Popov, Fomin, and Fischer). Naturally, X. and I at once
      agreed, and hence forth the Menshevik opposition is officially
      dissolved.It is a veritable load off our minds. The
      entire Central Committee is to have a meeting with us in a day
      or two, after which we shall arrange a conference of the
      committees closest to us....

“Weare, of course, quite certain that we shall gain
	control of the Central Committee and direct it along the lines we
	want.That will be
      all the easier since many of them already admit the correctness of the
      minority’s criticism on points of principle.... In
      all the consistent firm-liner committees
      (Baku, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, and St. Petersburg) the workers are
      demanding the system of office by election. That is a clear symptom
      that the firm-liners are in their death-agony.”

Simultaneouslywith this another letter was received:

“Anagreement has been reached between ’minority’ representatives
      and the Central Committee. The representatives signed an under
      taking. But as there had been no canvass of the ’minority’ first, the
      undertaking, not unnaturally, turned out not altogether satisfactory:
      it expresses ’confidence’ in the Central Committee, instead of in its
      unity policy; it speaks both of absorption in the Party and of
      terminating our separate existence, whereas the latter alone
      would be sufficient. Lastly, the undertaking does not contain the ’credo’ of
      the ’minority’. In view of this, it has been decided to have all the
      ’minority’ organisations pass a resolution containing the ’credo’ and
      the amendments indicated, while of course recognising our
      representatives’ agreement with the Central Committee as valid.”

“Anagreement has been reached between ’minority’ representatives
      and the Central Committee. The representatives signed an under
      taking. But as there had been no canvass of the ’minority’ first, the
      undertaking, not unnaturally, turned out not altogether satisfactory:
      it expresses ’confidence’ in the Central Committee, instead of in its
      unity policy; it speaks both of absorption in the Party and of
      terminating our separate existence, whereas the latter alone
      would be sufficient. Lastly, the undertaking does not contain the ’credo’ of
      the ’minority’. In view of this, it has been decided to have all the
      ’minority’ organisations pass a resolution containing the ’credo’ and
      the amendments indicated, while of course recognising our
      representatives’ agreement with the Central Committee as valid.”

Itis very likely that the individuals caught red-handed and exi osed
      by these documents will, with their usual “moral
      sensitivity”, do their best to divert the Party’s attention from
      the contents of the documents to the moral issue of the right to
      publish them. I am certain that the Party will not allow itself to be
      fooled by this sleight-of-hand. I declare that I take upon myself full
      moral responsibility for this exposure, and will give all necessary
      explanations to the court of arbitration that investigates the matter
      as a whole.

[1]ByNis meant Central Committee member Rosalia Zemlyachka.

[2]ByP.is meant P. A. Krasikov.

[3]Lidin—pseudonym of M. N. Lyadov.

[4]These four Central Committee members were Lenin, Lengnik,
      Essen, and Zemlyachka.

[6]The reference is to the Amsterdam Congress of
      the Second Inter national, held on August 14-20, 1904. The report presented
      to it in the name of the R.S.D.L.P. delegation was a Menshevik docu ment; to
      counterbalance it the Bolsheviks presented a report of their own, in the
      form of a pamphlet entitledMaterial for an Understanding of the Party
      Crisis in the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia, which Lenin
      helped to compile and edit.

[7]For the“collegium”see Note 142.